asterisk: security bump to version 14.6.2

PATCH New Peter Korsgaard 3 participants 4 messages Jan 7, 2018 – Jan 8, 2018

lore

Share & tools

lore

Peter Korsgaard

author

2018-01-07 21:46 UTC #0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 asterisk: security bump to version 14.6.2

Fixes the following security issues:

14.6.1:

* AST-2017-005 (applied to all released versions): The "strictrtp" option in rtp.conf enables a feature of the RTP stack that learns the source address of media for a session and drops any packets that do not originate from the expected address. This option is enabled by default in Asterisk 11 and above. The "nat" and "rtp_symmetric" options for chan_sip and chan_pjsip respectively enable symmetric RTP support in the RTP stack. This uses the source address of incoming media as the target address of any sent media. This option is not enabled by default but is commonly enabled to handle devices behind NAT.

A change was made to the strict RTP support in the RTP stack to better tolerate late media when a reinvite occurs. When combined with the symmetric RTP support this introduced an avenue where media could be hijacked. Instead of only learning a new address when expected the new code allowed a new source address to be learned at all times.

If a flood of RTP traffic was received the strict RTPsupport would allow the new address to provide media and with symmetric RTP enabled outgoing traffic would be sent to this new address, allowing the media to be hijacked. Provided the attacker continued to send traffic they would continue to receive traffic as well.

* AST-2017-006 (applied to all released versions): The app_minivm module has an ?externnotify? program configuration option that is executed by the MinivmNotify dialplan application. The application uses the caller-id name and number as part of a built string passed to the OS shell for interpretation and execution. Since the caller-id name and number can come from an untrusted source, a crafted caller-id name or number allows an arbitrary shell command injection.

* AST-2017-007 (applied only to 13.17.1 and 14.6.1): A carefully crafted URI in a From, To or Contact header could cause Asterisk to crash

For more details, see the announcement:
https://www.asterisk.org/downloads/asterisk-news/asterisk-11252-13171-1461-116-cert17-1313-cert5-now-available-security

14.6.2:

* AST-2017-008: Insufficient RTCP packet validation could allow reading stale buffer contents and when combined with the ?nat? and ?symmetric_rtp? options allow redirecting where Asterisk sends the next RTCP report.

The RTP stream qualification to learn the source address of media always accepted the first RTP packet as the new source and allowed what AST-2017-005 was mitigating. The intent was to qualify a series of packets before accepting the new source address.

For more details, see the announcement:
https://www.asterisk.org/downloads/asterisk-news/asterisk-11253-13172-1462-116-cert18-1313-cert6-now-available-security

Drop 0004-configure-in-cross-complation-assimne-eventfd-are-av.patch as this is now handled differently upstream (by disabling eventfd for cross compilation, see commit 2e927990b3d2 (eventfd: Disable during cross compilation)). If eventfd support is needed then this should be submitted upstream.

Signed-off-by Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]>

---
 ...sure-target-directory-for-modules-exists.patch} |  0
 ...n-cross-complation-assimne-eventfd-are-av.patch | 37 ----------------------
 ...0005-install-samples-need-the-data-files.patch} |  0
 package/asterisk/asterisk.hash                     |  2 +-
 package/asterisk/asterisk.mk                       |  2 +-
 5 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
 rename package/asterisk/{0005-build-ensure-target-directory-for-modules-exists.patch => 0004-build-ensure-target-directory-for-modules-exists.patch} (100%)
 delete mode 100644 package/asterisk/0004-configure-in-cross-complation-assimne-eventfd-are-av.patch
 rename package/asterisk/{0006-install-samples-need-the-data-files.patch => 0005-install-samples-need-the-data-files.patch} (100%)

package/asterisk/0004-build-ensure-target-directory-for-modules-exists.patch renamed from package/asterisk/0005-build-ensure-target-directory-for-modules-exists.patch +0 -0

similarity index 100%
rename from package/asterisk/0005-build-ensure-target-directory-for-modules-exists.patch
rename to package/asterisk/0004-build-ensure-target-directory-for-modules-exists.patch

package/asterisk/0004-configure-in-cross-complation-assimne-eventfd-are-av.patch deleted +0 ~~-37~~

deleted file mode 100644
index dae36d173d..0000000000
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From e7de812c979d219765fbf1292f0e150bfa087716 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Yann E. MORIN" <[email protected]>
-Date: Sun, 18 Jun 2017 21:54:16 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] configure: in cross-complation, assume eventfd are available
-
-eventfd have been in the kernel since 2.6.22, and in glibc since 2.8,
-repectively released in July 2007 and April 2008, almost a decade ago
-now.
-
-Assume that no one building from now on for cross-compilation will be
-unlucky enough to get versions older than that...
-
-As such, in cross-compilation, assume eventfd are available.
-
-Signed-off-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <[email protected]>
----
- configure.ac | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 1c20517864..474d17ae55 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -1107,7 +1107,9 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
-       [return eventfd(0, EFD_NONBLOCK | EFD_SEMAPHORE) == -1;])],
-   AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
-   AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVENTFD], 1, [Define to 1 if your system supports eventfd and the EFD_NONBLOCK and EFD_SEMAPHORE flags.]),
--  AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
-+  AC_MSG_RESULT(no),
-+  AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compile; assume yes])
-+  AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVENTFD], 1, [Define to 1 if your system supports eventfd and the EFD_NONBLOCK and EFD_SEMAPHORE flags.])
- )
- 
- AST_GCC_ATTRIBUTE(pure)
--- 
-2.11.0
-

package/asterisk/0005-install-samples-need-the-data-files.patch renamed from package/asterisk/0006-install-samples-need-the-data-files.patch +0 -0

similarity index 100%
rename from package/asterisk/0006-install-samples-need-the-data-files.patch
rename to package/asterisk/0005-install-samples-need-the-data-files.patch

package/asterisk/asterisk.hash +1 -1

index 7ae35bc4b1..d1667acaae 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # Locally computed
-sha256  c122fbe88e089737fa2c80356762ceed38498aa26da1dfdd4da5506f9b135696  asterisk-14.5.0.tar.gz
+sha256  f85f6df802de485d9b8cb1bfa5493e22f6401dce8246646af9506489a264d7b1  asterisk-14.6.2.tar.gz
 
 # sha1 from: http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/sounds/releases
 # sha256 locally computed

package/asterisk/asterisk.mk +1 -1

index 50512c0b3a..da78b25405 100644
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 #
 ################################################################################
 
-ASTERISK_VERSION = 14.5.0
+ASTERISK_VERSION = 14.6.2
 # Use the github mirror: it's an official mirror maintained by Digium, and
 # provides tarballs, which the main Asterisk git tree (behind Gerrit) does not.
 ASTERISK_SITE = $(call github,asterisk,asterisk,$(ASTERISK_VERSION))

Signature · 1 line

2.11.0

Yann E. MORIN

2018-01-07 22:09 UTC #1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 asterisk: security bump to version 14.6.2

Peter, All,

On 2018-01-07 22:46 +0100, Peter Korsgaard spake thusly:

Quoted 54 lines

Fixes the following security issues:
14.6.1:
* AST-2017-005 (applied to all released versions): The "strictrtp" option in rtp.conf enables a feature of the RTP stack that learns the source address of media for a session and drops any packets that do not originate from the expected address. This option is enabled by default in Asterisk 11 and above. The "nat" and "rtp_symmetric" options for chan_sip and chan_pjsip respectively enable symmetric RTP support in the RTP stack. This uses the source address of incoming media as the target address of any sent media. This option is not enabled by default but is commonly enabled to handle devices behind NAT.
A change was made to the strict RTP support in the RTP stack to better tolerate late media when a reinvite occurs. When combined with the symmetric RTP support this introduced an avenue where media could be hijacked. Instead of only learning a new address when expected the new code allowed a new source address to be learned at all times.
If a flood of RTP traffic was received the strict RTPsupport would allow the new address to provide media and with symmetric RTP enabled outgoing traffic would be sent to this new address, allowing the media to be hijacked. Provided the attacker continued to send traffic they would continue to receive traffic as well.
* AST-2017-006 (applied to all released versions): The app_minivm module has an ?externnotify? program configuration option that is executed by the MinivmNotify dialplan application. The application uses the caller-id name and number as part of a built string passed to the OS shell for interpretation and execution. Since the caller-id name and number can come from an untrusted source, a crafted caller-id name or number allows an arbitrary shell command injection.
* AST-2017-007 (applied only to 13.17.1 and 14.6.1): A carefully crafted URI in a From, To or Contact header could cause Asterisk to crash
For more details, see the announcement:
https://www.asterisk.org/downloads/asterisk-news/asterisk-11252-13171-1461-116-cert17-1313-cert5-now-available-security
14.6.2:
* AST-2017-008: Insufficient RTCP packet validation could allow reading stale buffer contents and when combined with the ?nat? and ?symmetric_rtp? options allow redirecting where Asterisk sends the next RTCP report.
The RTP stream qualification to learn the source address of media always accepted the first RTP packet as the new source and allowed what AST-2017-005 was mitigating. The intent was to qualify a series of packets before accepting the new source address.
For more details, see the announcement:
https://www.asterisk.org/downloads/asterisk-news/asterisk-11253-13172-1462-116-cert18-1313-cert6-now-available-security

Quoted 7 lines

Drop 0004-configure-in-cross-complation-assimne-eventfd-are-av.patch as this is now handled differently upstream (by disabling eventfd for cross compilation, see commit 2e927990b3d2 (eventfd: Disable during cross compilation)). If eventfd support is needed then this should be submitted upstream.
Signed-off-by Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]>

Reviewed-by "Yann E. MORIN" <[email protected]>

Regards,
Yann E. MORIN.

Quoted 89 lines

---
 ...sure-target-directory-for-modules-exists.patch} |  0
 ...n-cross-complation-assimne-eventfd-are-av.patch | 37 ----------------------
 ...0005-install-samples-need-the-data-files.patch} |  0
 package/asterisk/asterisk.hash                     |  2 +-
 package/asterisk/asterisk.mk                       |  2 +-
 5 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
 rename package/asterisk/{0005-build-ensure-target-directory-for-modules-exists.patch => 0004-build-ensure-target-directory-for-modules-exists.patch} (100%)
 delete mode 100644 package/asterisk/0004-configure-in-cross-complation-assimne-eventfd-are-av.patch
 rename package/asterisk/{0006-install-samples-need-the-data-files.patch => 0005-install-samples-need-the-data-files.patch} (100%)

package/asterisk/0004-build-ensure-target-directory-for-modules-exists.patch renamed from package/asterisk/0005-build-ensure-target-directory-for-modules-exists.patch +0 -0

similarity index 100%
rename from package/asterisk/0005-build-ensure-target-directory-for-modules-exists.patch
rename to package/asterisk/0004-build-ensure-target-directory-for-modules-exists.patch

package/asterisk/0004-configure-in-cross-complation-assimne-eventfd-are-av.patch deleted +0 ~~-37~~

deleted file mode 100644
index dae36d173d..0000000000
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From e7de812c979d219765fbf1292f0e150bfa087716 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "Yann E. MORIN" <[email protected]>
-Date: Sun, 18 Jun 2017 21:54:16 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] configure: in cross-complation, assume eventfd are available
-
-eventfd have been in the kernel since 2.6.22, and in glibc since 2.8,
-repectively released in July 2007 and April 2008, almost a decade ago
-now.
-
-Assume that no one building from now on for cross-compilation will be
-unlucky enough to get versions older than that...
-
-As such, in cross-compilation, assume eventfd are available.
-
-Signed-off-by: "Yann E. MORIN" <[email protected]>
----
- configure.ac | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 1c20517864..474d17ae55 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -1107,7 +1107,9 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
-       [return eventfd(0, EFD_NONBLOCK | EFD_SEMAPHORE) == -1;])],
-   AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
-   AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVENTFD], 1, [Define to 1 if your system supports eventfd and the EFD_NONBLOCK and EFD_SEMAPHORE flags.]),
--  AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
-+  AC_MSG_RESULT(no),
-+  AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compile; assume yes])
-+  AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVENTFD], 1, [Define to 1 if your system supports eventfd and the EFD_NONBLOCK and EFD_SEMAPHORE flags.])
- )
- 
- AST_GCC_ATTRIBUTE(pure)
--- 
-2.11.0
-

package/asterisk/0005-install-samples-need-the-data-files.patch renamed from package/asterisk/0006-install-samples-need-the-data-files.patch +0 -0

similarity index 100%
rename from package/asterisk/0006-install-samples-need-the-data-files.patch
rename to package/asterisk/0005-install-samples-need-the-data-files.patch

package/asterisk/asterisk.hash +1 -1

index 7ae35bc4b1..d1667acaae 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 # Locally computed
-sha256  c122fbe88e089737fa2c80356762ceed38498aa26da1dfdd4da5506f9b135696  asterisk-14.5.0.tar.gz
+sha256  f85f6df802de485d9b8cb1bfa5493e22f6401dce8246646af9506489a264d7b1  asterisk-14.6.2.tar.gz
 
 # sha1 from: http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/sounds/releases
 # sha256 locally computed

package/asterisk/asterisk.mk +1 -1

index 50512c0b3a..da78b25405 100644
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 #
 ################################################################################
 
-ASTERISK_VERSION = 14.5.0
+ASTERISK_VERSION = 14.6.2
 # Use the github mirror: it's an official mirror maintained by Digium, and
 # provides tarballs, which the main Asterisk git tree (behind Gerrit) does not.
 ASTERISK_SITE = $(call github,asterisk,asterisk,$(ASTERISK_VERSION))

Signature · 1 line

2.11.0

Signature · 6 lines

.-----------------.--------------------.------------------.--------------------.
|  Yann E. MORIN  | Real-Time Embedded | /"\ ASCII RIBBON | Erics' conspiracy: |
| +33 662 376 056 | Software  Designer | \ / CAMPAIGN     |  ___               |
| +33 223 225 172 `------------.-------:  X  AGAINST      |  \e/  There is no  |
| http://ymorin.is-a-geek.org/ | _/*\_ | / \ HTML MAIL    |   v   conspiracy.  |
'------------------------------^-------^------------------^--------------------'

Thomas Petazzoni

Applied

2018-01-07 22:47 UTC #2 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 asterisk: security bump to version 14.6.2

In reply to Peter Korsgaard

Hello,

Quoted 61 lines · Peter Korsgaard

Fixes the following security issues:
14.6.1:
* AST-2017-005 (applied to all released versions): The "strictrtp" option in rtp.conf enables a feature of the RTP stack that learns the source address of media for a session and drops any packets that do not originate from the expected address. This option is enabled by default in Asterisk 11 and above. The "nat" and "rtp_symmetric" options for chan_sip and chan_pjsip respectively enable symmetric RTP support in the RTP stack. This uses the source address of incoming media as the target address of any sent media. This option is not enabled by default but is commonly enabled to handle devices behind NAT.
A change was made to the strict RTP support in the RTP stack to better tolerate late media when a reinvite occurs. When combined with the symmetric RTP support this introduced an avenue where media could be hijacked. Instead of only learning a new address when expected the new code allowed a new source address to be learned at all times.
If a flood of RTP traffic was received the strict RTPsupport would allow the new address to provide media and with symmetric RTP enabled outgoing traffic would be sent to this new address, allowing the media to be hijacked. Provided the attacker continued to send traffic they would continue to receive traffic as well.
* AST-2017-006 (applied to all released versions): The app_minivm module has an ?externnotify? program configuration option that is executed by the MinivmNotify dialplan application. The application uses the caller-id name and number as part of a built string passed to the OS shell for interpretation and execution. Since the caller-id name and number can come from an untrusted source, a crafted caller-id name or number allows an arbitrary shell command injection.
* AST-2017-007 (applied only to 13.17.1 and 14.6.1): A carefully crafted URI in a From, To or Contact header could cause Asterisk to crash
For more details, see the announcement:
https://www.asterisk.org/downloads/asterisk-news/asterisk-11252-13171-1461-116-cert17-1313-cert5-now-available-security
14.6.2:
* AST-2017-008: Insufficient RTCP packet validation could allow reading stale buffer contents and when combined with the ?nat? and ?symmetric_rtp? options allow redirecting where Asterisk sends the next RTCP report.
The RTP stream qualification to learn the source address of media always accepted the first RTP packet as the new source and allowed what AST-2017-005 was mitigating. The intent was to qualify a series of packets before accepting the new source address.
For more details, see the announcement:
https://www.asterisk.org/downloads/asterisk-news/asterisk-11253-13172-1462-116-cert18-1313-cert6-now-available-security
Drop 0004-configure-in-cross-complation-assimne-eventfd-are-av.patch as this is now handled differently upstream (by disabling eventfd for cross compilation, see commit 2e927990b3d2 (eventfd: Disable during cross compilation)). If eventfd support is needed then this should be submitted upstream.
Signed-off-by Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]>

Quoted 10 lines

---
 ...sure-target-directory-for-modules-exists.patch} |  0
 ...n-cross-complation-assimne-eventfd-are-av.patch | 37 ----------------------
 ...0005-install-samples-need-the-data-files.patch} |  0
 package/asterisk/asterisk.hash                     |  2 +-
 package/asterisk/asterisk.mk                       |  2 +-
 5 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
 rename package/asterisk/{0005-build-ensure-target-directory-for-modules-exists.patch => 0004-build-ensure-target-directory-for-modules-exists.patch} (100%)
 delete mode 100644 package/asterisk/0004-configure-in-cross-complation-assimne-eventfd-are-av.patch
 rename package/asterisk/{0006-install-samples-need-the-data-files.patch => 0005-install-samples-need-the-data-files.patch} (100%)

Applied to master, thanks.

Thomas

Signature · 3 lines

Thomas Petazzoni, CTO, Free Electrons
Embedded Linux, Kernel and Android engineering
http://free-electrons.com

Peter Korsgaard

author

2018-01-08 21:54 UTC #3 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 asterisk: security bump to version 14.6.2

In reply to Peter Korsgaard

Quoted 55 lines

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
"Peter" == Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]> writes:
Fixes the following security issues:
14.6.1:
* AST-2017-005 (applied to all released versions): The "strictrtp" option in rtp.conf enables a feature of the RTP stack that learns the source address of media for a session and drops any packets that do not originate from the expected address. This option is enabled by default in Asterisk 11 and above. The "nat" and "rtp_symmetric" options for chan_sip and chan_pjsip respectively enable symmetric RTP support in the RTP stack. This uses the source address of incoming media as the target address of any sent media. This option is not enabled by default but is commonly enabled to handle devices behind NAT.
A change was made to the strict RTP support in the RTP stack to better tolerate late media when a reinvite occurs. When combined with the symmetric RTP support this introduced an avenue where media could be hijacked. Instead of only learning a new address when expected the new code allowed a new source address to be learned at all times.
If a flood of RTP traffic was received the strict RTPsupport would allow the new address to provide media and with symmetric RTP enabled outgoing traffic would be sent to this new address, allowing the media to be hijacked. Provided the attacker continued to send traffic they would continue to receive traffic as well.
* AST-2017-006 (applied to all released versions): The app_minivm module has an ?externnotify? program configuration option that is executed by the MinivmNotify dialplan application. The application uses the caller-id name and number as part of a built string passed to the OS shell for interpretation and execution. Since the caller-id name and number can come from an untrusted source, a crafted caller-id name or number allows an arbitrary shell command injection.
* AST-2017-007 (applied only to 13.17.1 and 14.6.1): A carefully crafted URI in a From, To or Contact header could cause Asterisk to crash
For more details, see the announcement:
https://www.asterisk.org/downloads/asterisk-news/asterisk-11252-13171-1461-116-cert17-1313-cert5-now-available-security
14.6.2:
* AST-2017-008: Insufficient RTCP packet validation could allow reading stale buffer contents and when combined with the ?nat? and ?symmetric_rtp? options allow redirecting where Asterisk sends the next RTCP report.
The RTP stream qualification to learn the source address of media always accepted the first RTP packet as the new source and allowed what AST-2017-005 was mitigating. The intent was to qualify a series of packets before accepting the new source address.
For more details, see the announcement:
https://www.asterisk.org/downloads/asterisk-news/asterisk-11253-13172-1462-116-cert18-1313-cert6-now-available-security

Quoted 7 lines

Drop 0004-configure-in-cross-complation-assimne-eventfd-are-av.patch as this is now handled differently upstream (by disabling eventfd for cross compilation, see commit 2e927990b3d2 (eventfd: Disable during cross compilation)). If eventfd support is needed then this should be submitted upstream.
Signed-off-by Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]>

Committed to 2017.11.x, thanks.

Signature · 1 line

Bye, Peter Korsgaard