x86/pti: unpoison pgd for trusted boot
Subsystems (2)
Dave Hansen
maintainerPATCH 1/1 x86/pti: unpoison pgd for trusted boot
I believe this should replace 262b6b30087 in -tip.
The patch in -tip potentially misses the pgd clearing if pud_alloc() sets a PGD. It would also be nice to have that comment back.
Note that the -tip commit probably works in *practice* because for two adjacent calls to map_tboot_page() that share a PGD entry, the first will clear NX, *then* allocate and set the PGD (without NX clear). The second call will *not* allocate but will clear the NX bit.
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From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
This is another case similar to what EFI does: create a new set of page tables, map some code at a low address, and jump to it. PTI mistakes this low address for userspace and mistakenly marks it non-executable in an effort to make it unusable for userspace. Undo the poison to allow execution.
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b/arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c renamed from arch/x86/kernel/tboot.c~pti-tboot-fix +11 -0
@@ -138,6 +138,17 @@ static int map_tboot_page(unsigned longreturn -1 ;set_pte_at (&tboot_mm, vaddr, pte,pfn_pte (pfn, prot));pte_unmap (pte); + +/* +* PTI poisons low addresses in the kernel page tables in the +* name of making them unusable for userspace. To execute +* code at such a low address, the poison must be cleared. +* +* Note: 'pgd' actually gets set in p4d_alloc() _or_ +* pud_alloc() depending on 4/5-level paging. +*/ + pgd->pgd &= ~_PAGE_NX; +return 0 ; }
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