elf: fix NT_FILE integer overflow
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 elf: fix NT_FILE integer overflow
If vm.max_map_count bumped above 2^26 (67+ mil) and system has enough RAM to allocate all the VMAs (~12.8 GB on Fedora 27 with 200-byte VMAs), then it should be possible to overflow 32-bit "size", pass paranoia check, allocate very little vmalloc space and oops while writing into vmalloc guard page...
But I didn't test this, only coredump of regular process.
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fs/binfmt_elf.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/binfmt_elf.c +2 -0
@@ -1599,6 +1599,8 @@ static int fill_files_note(struct memelfnote *note)/* *Estimated* file count and total data size needed */ count = current->mm->map_count; +if (count >UINT_MAX /64 ) +return -EINVAL ; size = count *64 ; names_ofs = (2 +3 * count) *sizeof (data[0 ]);
Quoted 13 lines · On Fri, 12 Jan 2018 23:34:27 +0300 Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]> wrote:
If vm.max_map_count bumped above 2^26 (67+ mil) and system has enough RAM to allocate all the VMAs (~12.8 GB on Fedora 27 with 200-byte VMAs), then it should be possible to overflow 32-bit "size", pass paranoia check, allocate very little vmalloc space and oops while writing into vmalloc guard page...
But I didn't test this, only coredump of regular process.
...
fs/binfmt_elf.c static int fill_files_note(struct memelfnote *note) · line 1606
Quoted 8 lines
fs/binfmt_elf.c +2
-0@@ -1599,6 +1599,8 @@ static int fill_files_note(struct memelfnote *note)/* *Estimated* file count and total data size needed */ count = current->mm->map_count; +if (count >UINT_MAX /64 ) +return -EINVAL ; size = count *64 ; names_ofs = (2 +3 * count) *sizeof (data[0 ]);
Why not make `size' a ulong (or size_t)? That seems to be the appropriate type and the code will then immediately barf over the MAX_FILE_NOTE_SIZE comparison anyway.
Quoted 22 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 20 lines · On Fri, 12 Jan 2018 23:34:27 +0300 Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]> wrote:
If vm.max_map_count bumped above 2^26 (67+ mil) and system has enough RAM to allocate all the VMAs (~12.8 GB on Fedora 27 with 200-byte VMAs), then it should be possible to overflow 32-bit "size", pass paranoia check, allocate very little vmalloc space and oops while writing into vmalloc guard page...
But I didn't test this, only coredump of regular process.
...
fs/binfmt_elf.c +2
-0@@ -1599,6 +1599,8 @@ static int fill_files_note(struct memelfnote *note)/* *Estimated* file count and total data size needed */ count = current->mm->map_count; +if (count >UINT_MAX /64 ) +return -EINVAL ; size = count *64 ;
Quoted 5 lines
fs/binfmt_elf.c static int fill_files_note(struct memelfnote *note) · line 1606
Quoted 1 line
fs/binfmt_elf.c +0
-0names_ofs = (2 +3 * count) *sizeof (data[0 ]);Why not make `size' a ulong (or
size_t)? That seems to be the appropriate type and the code will then immediately barf over theMAX_FILE_NOTE_SIZEcomparison anyway.
You can do it, but MAX_FILE_NOTE_SIZE is only 4 MB, and 32-bit code is smaller than 64-bit code.