KVM retpoline fixes
cover KVM retpoline fixes
Here the two KVM retpoline fixes that should get into tip/x86/pti asap.
PATCH 1/2 x86,kvm: Fix indirect calls in emulator
Replace the indirect calls with CALL_NOSPEC.
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
--- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +5 -4
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@#include <asm/kvm_emulate.h> #include <linux/stringify.h> #include <asm/debugreg.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include "x86.h" #include "tss.h"
@@ -1021,8 +1022,8 @@ static __always_inline u8 test_cc(unsignvoid (*fop)(void ) = (void *)em_setcc +4 * (condition &0xf ); flags = (flags &EFLAGS_MASK ) |X86_EFLAGS_IF ; - asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]" - :"=a" (rc) : [fastop]"r" (fop), [flags]"r" (flags)); + asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC + :"=a" (rc) : [thunk_target]"r" (fop), [flags]"r" (flags));return rc; }
@@ -5335,9 +5336,9 @@ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxif (!(ctxt->d & ByteOp)) fop +=__ffs (ctxt->dst.bytes) *FASTOP_SIZE ; - asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]; pushf; pop %[flags]\n" + asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC " ; pushf; pop %[flags]\n" :"+a" (ctxt->dst.val),"+d" (ctxt->src.val), [flags]"+D" (flags), - [fastop]"+S"(fop), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT + [thunk_target]"+S"(fop), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT :"c" (ctxt->src2.val)); ctxt->eflags = (ctxt->eflags & ~EFLAGS_MASK ) | (flags &EFLAGS_MASK );
tip-bot for Peter Zijlstra
merge bot[tip:x86/pti] KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe
KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe
Commit-ID: 1a29b5b7f347a1a9230c1e0af5b37e3e571588ab Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/1a29b5b7f347a1a9230c1e0af5b37e3e571588ab Author: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 10:58:13 +0100 Committer: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> CommitDate: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 11:30:07 +0100
KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe
Replace the indirect calls with CALL_NOSPEC.
Signed-off-by Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc Ashok Raj <[email protected]>
Cc Greg KH <[email protected]>
Cc Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc Asit Mallick <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc Jason Baron <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc Arjan Van De Ven <[email protected]>
Cc Tim Chen <[email protected]>
--- arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c +5 -4
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@#include <asm/kvm_emulate.h> #include <linux/stringify.h> #include <asm/debugreg.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include "x86.h" #include "tss.h"
@@ -1021,8 +1022,8 @@ static __always_inline u8 test_cc(unsigned int condition, unsigned long flags)void (*fop)(void ) = (void *)em_setcc +4 * (condition &0xf ); flags = (flags &EFLAGS_MASK ) |X86_EFLAGS_IF ; - asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]" - :"=a" (rc) : [fastop]"r" (fop), [flags]"r" (flags)); + asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC + :"=a" (rc) : [thunk_target]"r" (fop), [flags]"r" (flags));return rc; }
@@ -5305,9 +5306,9 @@ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void (*fop)(struct fastop *))if (!(ctxt->d & ByteOp)) fop +=__ffs (ctxt->dst.bytes) *FASTOP_SIZE ; - asm("push %[flags]; popf; call *%[fastop]; pushf; pop %[flags]\n" + asm("push %[flags]; popf; " CALL_NOSPEC " ; pushf; pop %[flags]\n" :"+a" (ctxt->dst.val),"+d" (ctxt->src.val), [flags]"+D" (flags), - [fastop]"+S"(fop), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT + [thunk_target]"+S"(fop), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT :"c" (ctxt->src2.val)); ctxt->eflags = (ctxt->eflags & ~EFLAGS_MASK ) | (flags &EFLAGS_MASK );
PATCH 2/2 x86,vmx: Fix indirect call
In reply to Peter ZijlstraReplace indirect call with CALL_NOSPEC.
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +2 -2
@@ -9129,14 +9129,14 @@ static void vmx_handle_external_intr(str#endif "pushf\n\t" __ASM_SIZE(push) " $%c[cs]\n\t" - "call *%[entry]\n\t" + CALL_NOSPEC : #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 [sp]"=&r"(tmp), #endif ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT : - [entry]"r"(entry), + THUNK_TARGET(entry), [ss]"i"(__KERNEL_DS), [cs]"i"(__KERNEL_CS) );
tip-bot for Peter Zijlstra
merge bot[tip:x86/pti] KVM: VMX: Make indirect call specualation safe
KVM: VMX: Make indirect call specualation safe
Commit-ID: 34cc5034b57b81f789ad4714533ca921a9b1c9d7 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/34cc5034b57b81f789ad4714533ca921a9b1c9d7 Author: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 10:58:14 +0100 Committer: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> CommitDate: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 11:30:07 +0100
KVM: VMX: Make indirect call specualation safe
Replace indirect call with CALL_NOSPEC.
Signed-off-by Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc Ashok Raj <[email protected]>
Cc Greg KH <[email protected]>
Cc Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc Asit Mallick <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc Jason Baron <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc Arjan Van De Ven <[email protected]>
Cc Tim Chen <[email protected]>
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +2 -2
@@ -9064,14 +9064,14 @@ static void vmx_handle_external_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)#endif "pushf\n\t" __ASM_SIZE(push) " $%c[cs]\n\t" - "call *%[entry]\n\t" + CALL_NOSPEC : #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 [sp]"=&r"(tmp), #endif ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT : - [entry]"r"(entry), + THUNK_TARGET(entry), [ss]"i"(__KERNEL_DS), [cs]"i"(__KERNEL_CS) );
tip-bot for Peter Zijlstra
merge bot[tip:x86/pti] KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe
In reply to Peter ZijlstraKVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe
Commit-ID: c940a3fb1e2e9b7d03228ab28f375fb5a47ff699 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/c940a3fb1e2e9b7d03228ab28f375fb5a47ff699 Author: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 10:58:14 +0100 Committer: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> CommitDate: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 14:14:42 +0100
KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe
Replace indirect call with CALL_NOSPEC.
Signed-off-by Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc Ashok Raj <[email protected]>
Cc Greg KH <[email protected]>
Cc Jun Nakajima <[email protected]>
Cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc Asit Mallick <[email protected]>
Cc Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
Cc Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc Jason Baron <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc Arjan Van De Ven <[email protected]>
Cc Tim Chen <[email protected]>
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +2 -2
@@ -9064,14 +9064,14 @@ static void vmx_handle_external_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)#endif "pushf\n\t" __ASM_SIZE(push) " $%c[cs]\n\t" - "call *%[entry]\n\t" + CALL_NOSPEC : #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 [sp]"=&r"(tmp), #endif ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT : - [entry]"r"(entry), + THUNK_TARGET(entry), [ss]"i"(__KERNEL_DS), [cs]"i"(__KERNEL_CS) );