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KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc()

PATCH In review Jin Qian 2 participants 2 messages Feb 5, 2018 – Feb 6, 2018

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Jin Qian

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 KEYS: encrypted: fix buffer overread in valid_master_desc()

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

commit 794b4bc292f5d31739d89c0202c54e7dc9bc3add upstream

With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected, e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'. When validating such a master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end of the buffer. Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp(). [Also clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.]

---
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 31 +++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +15 -16
index a871159bf03c..ead2fd60244d 100644
@@ -141,23 +141,22 @@ static int valid_ecryptfs_desc(const char *ecryptfs_desc)
  */
 static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
 {
-	if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)) {
-		if (strlen(new_desc) = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN)
-			goto out;
-		if (orig_desc)
-			if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
-				goto out;
-	} else if (!memcmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) {
-		if (strlen(new_desc) = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN)
-			goto out;
-		if (orig_desc)
-			if (memcmp(new_desc, orig_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
-				goto out;
-	} else
-		goto out;
+	int prefix_len;
+
+	if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX, KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
+		prefix_len = KEY_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN;
+	else if (!strncmp(new_desc, KEY_USER_PREFIX, KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN))
+		prefix_len = KEY_USER_PREFIX_LEN;
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!new_desc[prefix_len])
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (orig_desc && strncmp(new_desc, orig_desc, prefix_len))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	return 0;
-out:
-	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.16.0.rc1.238.g530d649a79-goog
#1 lore raw
Quoted 17 lines · Jin Qian

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

commit 794b4bc292f5d31739d89c0202c54e7dc9bc3add upstream

With the 'encrypted' key type it was possible for userspace to provide a data blob ending with a master key description shorter than expected, e.g. 'keyctl add encrypted desc "new x" @s'. When validating such a master key description, validate_master_desc() could read beyond the end of the buffer. Fix this by using strncmp() instead of memcmp(). [Also clean up the code to deduplicate some logic.]

Quoted 4 lines
---
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 31 +++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

Hi Jin, see Documentation/stable_kernel_rules.txt -- patches for stable should be sent To: [email protected] (and generally with a lighter Cc: list, unless it's a complicated backport), and you need to say which kernel version(s) it should be applied to. Also for upstream commits that cherry-pick cleanly, such as this one, you don't need to send an actual patch but rather just request that it be applied. The reason it should be applied is helpful too; in this case the commit fixes a bug that caused a KASAN warning.

Thanks!

- Eric