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netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks

PATCH Applied Florian Westphal 2 participants 2 messages Feb 7, 2018 – Feb 14, 2018

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Florian Westphal

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks

The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets generated by ip(6)tables.

In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e. because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we cannot exceed stack size.

However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction, and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a valid rule start point.

IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined chains but does contain a jump.

If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs because no jumpstack was allocated.

Fixes 7814b6ec6d0d6 ("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by [email protected]
---
 net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 4 ++++
 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c  | 7 ++++++-
 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 4 ++++
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +4 -0
index 4ffe302f9b82..e3e420f3ba7b 100644
@@ -252,6 +252,10 @@ unsigned int arpt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			}
 			if (table_base + v
 			    != arpt_next_entry(e)) {
+				if (unlikely(stackidx >= private->stacksize)) {
+					verdict = NF_DROP;
+					break;
+				}
 				jumpstack[stackidx++] = e;
 			}
 
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +6 -1
index 9a71f3149507..e38395a8dcf2 100644
@@ -330,8 +330,13 @@ ipt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				continue;
 			}
 			if (table_base + v != ipt_next_entry(e) &&
-			    !(e->ip.flags & IPT_F_GOTO))
+			    !(e->ip.flags & IPT_F_GOTO)) {
+				if (unlikely(stackidx >= private->stacksize)) {
+					verdict = NF_DROP;
+					break;
+				}
 				jumpstack[stackidx++] = e;
+			}
 
 			e = get_entry(table_base, v);
 			continue;
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +4 -0
index af4c917e0836..62358b93bbac 100644
@@ -352,6 +352,10 @@ ip6t_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			}
 			if (table_base + v != ip6t_next_entry(e) &&
 			    !(e->ipv6.flags & IP6T_F_GOTO)) {
+				if (unlikely(stackidx >= private->stacksize)) {
+					verdict = NF_DROP;
+					break;
+				}
 				jumpstack[stackidx++] = e;
 			}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.13.6
maintainer Applied
#1 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · Florian Westphal

The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets generated by ip(6)tables.

In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e. because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we cannot exceed stack size.

However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction, and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a valid rule start point.

Quoted 5 lines

IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined chains but does contain a jump.

If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs because no jumpstack was allocated.

Applied, thanks.