netfilter: x_tables: only allow jumps to user-defined chains
Subsystems (2)
Florian Westphal
maintainerRFC PATCH 1/1 netfilter: x_tables: only allow jumps to user-defined chains
This rejects rulesets where a jump occurs to a non-user defined chain. This isn't limited in any way in the binary format (you can jump to any rule you want within the blob structure), but iptables tools do not offset such a feature.
Sending as RFC as this limits features that might be used by programs that don't call xtables(-restore) tools.
This change also prevents the syzkaller reported crash as ruleset gets rejected.
--- net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------ net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +14 -6
@@ -368,10 +368,14 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,if (strcmp (t->target.u.user.name,XT_STANDARD_TARGET ) ==0 && newpos >=0 ) { -/* This a jump; chase it. */ -if (!xt_find_jump_offset (offsets, newpos, - newinfo->number)) +if (newpos >= newinfo->size)return 0 ; +if (entry0 + newpos !=ipt_next_entry (e)) { +/* This a jump; chase it. */ +if (!xt_find_jump_offset (offsets, newpos, + newinfo->stacksize)) +return 0 ; + } }else {/* ... this is a fallthru */ newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
@@ -523,6 +527,7 @@ static int translate_table(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0,struct arpt_entry *iter;unsigned int *offsets;unsigned int i; +bool userchain;int ret =0 ; newinfo->size = repl->size;
@@ -548,12 +553,15 @@ static int translate_table(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0, repl->valid_hooks);if (ret !=0 ) goto out_free; -if (i < repl->num_entries) - offsets[i] = (void *)iter - entry0; ++i; +if (userchain) { + offsets[newinfo->stacksize] = (void *)iter - entry0; + ++newinfo->stacksize; + userchain = false; + }if (strcmp (arpt_get_target (iter)->u.user.name,XT_ERROR_TARGET ) ==0 ) - ++newinfo->stacksize; + userchain = true; } ret = -EINVAL ;
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c +15 -6
@@ -435,10 +435,14 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,if (strcmp (t->target.u.user.name,XT_STANDARD_TARGET ) ==0 && newpos >=0 ) { -/* This a jump; chase it. */ -if (!xt_find_jump_offset (offsets, newpos, - newinfo->number)) +if (newpos >= newinfo->size)return 0 ; +if (entry0 + newpos !=ipt_next_entry (e)) { +/* This a jump; chase it. */ +if (!xt_find_jump_offset (offsets, newpos, + newinfo->stacksize)) +return 0 ; + } }else {/* ... this is a fallthru */ newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
@@ -671,6 +675,7 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0,struct ipt_entry *iter;unsigned int *offsets;unsigned int i; +bool userchain;int ret =0 ; newinfo->size = repl->size;
@@ -686,6 +691,7 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0,if (!offsets)return -ENOMEM ; i =0 ; + userchain = false;/* Walk through entries, checking offsets. */ xt_entry_foreach(iter, entry0, newinfo->size) { ret = check_entry_size_and_hooks(iter, newinfo, entry0,
@@ -695,12 +701,15 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0, repl->valid_hooks);if (ret !=0 ) goto out_free; -if (i < repl->num_entries) - offsets[i] = (void *)iter - entry0; ++i; +if (userchain) { + offsets[newinfo->stacksize] = (void *)iter - entry0; + ++newinfo->stacksize; + userchain = false; + }if (strcmp (ipt_get_target (iter)->u.user.name,XT_ERROR_TARGET ) ==0 ) - ++newinfo->stacksize; + userchain = true; } ret = -EINVAL ;
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +16 -6
@@ -453,10 +453,15 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,if (strcmp (t->target.u.user.name,XT_STANDARD_TARGET ) ==0 && newpos >=0 ) { -/* This a jump; chase it. */ -if (!xt_find_jump_offset (offsets, newpos, - newinfo->number)) +if (newpos >= newinfo->size)return 0 ; + +if (entry0 + newpos !=ip6t_next_entry (e)) { +/* This a jump; chase it. */ +if (!xt_find_jump_offset (offsets, newpos, + newinfo->stacksize)) +return 0 ; + } }else {/* ... this is a fallthru */ newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
@@ -689,6 +694,7 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0,struct ip6t_entry *iter;unsigned int *offsets;unsigned int i; +bool userchain;int ret =0 ; newinfo->size = repl->size;
@@ -704,6 +710,7 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0,if (!offsets)return -ENOMEM ; i =0 ; + userchain = false;/* Walk through entries, checking offsets. */ xt_entry_foreach(iter, entry0, newinfo->size) { ret = check_entry_size_and_hooks(iter, newinfo, entry0,
@@ -713,12 +720,15 @@ translate_table(struct net *net, struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0, repl->valid_hooks);if (ret !=0 ) goto out_free; -if (i < repl->num_entries) - offsets[i] = (void *)iter - entry0; ++i; +if (userchain) { + offsets[newinfo->stacksize] = (void *)iter - entry0; + ++newinfo->stacksize; + userchain = false; + }if (strcmp (ip6t_get_target (iter)->u.user.name,XT_ERROR_TARGET ) ==0 ) - ++newinfo->stacksize; + userchain = true; } ret = -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.13.6
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerQuoted 10 lines · Florian Westphal
This rejects rulesets where a jump occurs to a non-user defined chain. This isn't limited in any way in the binary format (you can jump to any rule you want within the blob structure), but iptables tools do not offset such a feature.
Sending as RFC as this limits features that might be used by programs that don't call xtables(-restore) tools.
This change also prevents the syzkaller reported crash as ruleset gets rejected.
My original intention was to go for this, given our official interface since the beginning has been iptables-restore. But given this description makes it clear that we have chance to break third applications relying on this binary layout, better go conservative and keep allowing this.
My only concern so far is if this sort of flexibility, allowing us arbitrary jumps, can cause us more problems later on.
Let me know,
Thanks!