net: Whitelist the skbuff_head_cache "cb" field
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 net: Whitelist the skbuff_head_cache "cb" field
Most callers of put_cmsg() use a "sizeof(foo)" for the length argument. Within put_cmsg(), a copy_to_user() call is made with a dynamic size, as a result of the cmsg header calculations. This means that hardened usercopy will examine the copy, even though it was technically a fixed size and should be implicitly whitelisted. All the put_cmsg() calls being built from values in skbuff_head_cache are coming out of the protocol-defined "cb" field, so whitelist this field entirely instead of creating per-use bounce buffers, for which there are concerns about performance.
Original report was:
Bad or missing usercopy whitelist? Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLAB object 'skbuff_head_cache' (offset 64, size 16)!
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 3663 at mm/usercopy.c:81 usercopy_warn+0xdb/0x100 mm/usercopy.c:76 ... __check_heap_object+0x89/0xc0 mm/slab.c:4426 check_heap_object mm/usercopy.c:236 [inline] __check_object_size+0x272/0x530 mm/usercopy.c:259 check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:112 [inline] check_copy_size include/linux/thread_info.h:143 [inline] copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:154 [inline] put_cmsg+0x233/0x3f0 net/core/scm.c:242 sock_recv_errqueue+0x200/0x3e0 net/core/sock.c:2913 packet_recvmsg+0xb2e/0x17a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3296 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:803 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0xc9/0x110 net/socket.c:810 ___sys_recvmsg+0x2a4/0x640 net/socket.c:2179 __sys_recvmmsg+0x2a9/0xaf0 net/socket.c:2287 SYSC_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2368 [inline] SyS_recvmmsg+0xc4/0x160 net/socket.c:2352 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x29/0xa0
---
I tried the inlining, it was awful. Splitting put_cmsg() was awful. So, instead, whitelist the "cb" field as the least bad option if bounce buffers are unacceptable. Dave, do you want to take this through net, or should I take it through the usercopy tree?
--- net/core/skbuff.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/core/skbuff.c +3 -1
@@ -3889,10 +3889,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(skb_gro_receive);void __init skb_init (void ) { - skbuff_head_cache =kmem_cache_create ("skbuff_head_cache" , + skbuff_head_cache =kmem_cache_create_usercopy ("skbuff_head_cache" ,sizeof (struct sk_buff ),0 ,SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN |SLAB_PANIC , + offsetof(struct sk_buff , cb), + sizeof_field(struct sk_buff, cb),NULL ); skbuff_fclone_cache = kmem_cache_create("skbuff_fclone_cache", sizeof(struct sk_buff_fclones),
Signature · 6 lines
2.7.4 -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
David Miller
maintainerFrom: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2018 17:44:38 -0800
Quoted 10 lines
Most callers of
put_cmsg()use a "sizeof(foo)" for the length argument. Withinput_cmsg(), acopy_to_user()call is made with a dynamic size, as a result of the cmsg header calculations. This means that hardened usercopy will examine the copy, even though it was technically a fixed size and should be implicitly whitelisted. All theput_cmsg()calls being built from values inskbuff_head_cacheare coming out of the protocol-defined "cb" field, so whitelist this field entirely instead of creating per-use bounce buffers, for which there are concerns about performance.Original report was:
...
Quoted 8 lines
Reported-by [email protected]Fixes 6d07d1cd300f ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>---
I tried the inlining, it was awful. Splittingput_cmsg()was awful. So, instead, whitelist the "cb" field as the least bad option if bounce buffers are unacceptable. Dave, do you want to take this through net, or should I take it through the usercopy tree?
Thanks Kees, I'll take this through my 'net' tree.
Quoted 23 lines · David Miller
From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2018 17:44:38 -0800Quoted 10 lines
Most callers of
put_cmsg()use a "sizeof(foo)" for the length argument. Withinput_cmsg(), acopy_to_user()call is made with a dynamic size, as a result of the cmsg header calculations. This means that hardened usercopy will examine the copy, even though it was technically a fixed size and should be implicitly whitelisted. All theput_cmsg()calls being built from values inskbuff_head_cacheare coming out of the protocol-defined "cb" field, so whitelist this field entirely instead of creating per-use bounce buffers, for which there are concerns about performance.Original report was:
...
Quoted 8 lines
Reported-by [email protected]Fixes 6d07d1cd300f ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>---
I tried the inlining, it was awful. Splittingput_cmsg()was awful. So, instead, whitelist the "cb" field as the least bad option if bounce buffers are unacceptable. Dave, do you want to take this through net, or should I take it through the usercopy tree?
Quoted 1 line
Thanks Kees, I'll take this through my 'net' tree.
Cool, thanks. And just to be clear, if it's not already obvious, this patch needs kmem_cache_create_usercopy() which just landed in Linus's tree last week, in case you've not merged yet.
-Kees
Signature · 8 lines
Kees Cook Pixel Security -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to [email protected]. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: <a href=mailto:"[email protected]"> [email protected] </a>
From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2018 08:01:12 +1100
Quoted 3 lines
Cool, thanks. And just to be clear, if it's not already obvious, this patch needs
kmem_cache_create_usercopy()which just landed in Linus's tree last week, in case you've not merged yet.
Understood, and 'net' has it.
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