proc: use set_puts() at /proc/*/wchan
PATCH 2/2 proc: use set_puts() at /proc/*/wchan
---
fs/proc/base.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/proc/base.c +1 -1
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, wchan =get_wchan (task);if (wchan && !lookup_symbol_name (wchan, symname)) { -seq_printf (m,"%s" , symname); +seq_puts (m, symname);return 0 ; }
fs/proc/base.c static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, · line 399
Quoted 5 lines · Alexey Dobriyan
Signed-off-by Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>fs/proc/base.c +1
-1-seq_printf (m,"%s" , symname); +seq_puts (m, symname);
While this might have no security concerns, the pattern might be brainlessly used by some janitors and there would have security implications.
Signature · 2 lines
With Best Regards, Andy Shevchenko
Quoted 7 lines · Andy Shevchenko
fs/proc/base.c static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, · line 399
Quoted 2 lines · Alexey Dobriyan
fs/proc/base.c +1
-1-seq_printf (m,"%s" , symname); +seq_puts (m, symname);While this might have no security concerns, the pattern might be brainlessly used by some janitors and there would have security implications.
Unless there is some kind of preprocessor which seamlessly converts one to another I'd continue converting.
Quoted 10 lines · On Sat, 17 Feb 2018 16:06:42 +0200 Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>…
fs/proc/base.c static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, · line 399
Quoted 5 lines · Alexey Dobriyan
Signed-off-by Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>fs/proc/base.c +1
-1-seq_printf (m,"%s" , symname); +seq_puts (m, symname);While this might have no security concerns, the pattern might be brainlessly used by some janitors and there would have security implications.
And I'd like to see a changelog, please. One which explains why `symname' cannot have a %s (etc) in it, and never will.
Quoted 9 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 7 lines · On Sat, 17 Feb 2018 16:06:42 +0200 Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>…
Quoted 5 lines · Alexey Dobriyan
Signed-off-by Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>fs/proc/base.c +1
-1-seq_printf (m,"%s" , symname); +seq_puts (m, symname);
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
While this might have no security concerns, the pattern might be brainlessly used by some janitors and there would have security implications.
And I'd like to see a changelog, please. One which explains why `symname' cannot have a %s (etc) in it, and never will.
OK, since #youtoo: It doesn't _matter_ if symname is "%pHAHAHA %fooled you <unicode for evil grin emoji>", seq_puts does not interpret it at all. There are _never_ security implications with the above replacement. Sure, seq_printf(m, symname) would be bad, but that's not what is being done.
AFAICT, this should always lead to slightly smaller code (one less parameter passed) and in all likelyhood also slightly faster (no format interpretation, no slow char-by-char handling by the string() function etc.). So the only case where I'd think this should not necessarily be done would be in a long sequence of seq_printf, where only one or two could be replaced by seq_puts/seq_putc.
Rasmus
Quoted 14 lines · On Wed, 21 Feb 2018 09:57:49 +0100 Rasmus Villemoes…
Quoted 13 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 10 lines · On Sat, 17 Feb 2018 16:06:42 +0200 Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>…
fs/proc/base.c static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, · line 399
Quoted 5 lines · Alexey Dobriyan
Signed-off-by Alexey Dobriyan <[email protected]>fs/proc/base.c +1
-1-seq_printf (m,"%s" , symname); +seq_puts (m, symname);While this might have no security concerns, the pattern might be brainlessly used by some janitors and there would have security implications.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
And I'd like to see a changelog, please. One which explains why `symname' cannot have a %s (etc) in it, and never will.
OK, since #youtoo: It doesn't _matter_ if symname is "%pHAHAHA %fooled you <unicode for evil grin emoji>",
seq_putsdoes not interpret it at all. There are _never_ security implications with the above replacement. Sure,seq_printf(m, symname)would be bad, but that's not what is being done.
doh, OK, sorry. RTFP, Andrew.