KVM: SVM: Fix sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different base types)
PATCH 1/1 KVM: SVM: Fix sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different base types)
Fix sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different base types). Typecast the userspace address argument.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +3 -1
@@ -6262,7 +6262,9 @@ static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) goto e_free; } -if (!access_ok (VERIFY_WRITE , params.uaddr, params.len)) { +if (!access_ok (VERIFY_WRITE , + (void __user *)(uintptr_t )params.uaddr, + params.len)) { ret = -EFAULT ; goto e_free; }
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
Quoted 2 lines · Brijesh Singh
Fix sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different base types). Typecast the userspace address argument.
Better question: why the hell do we want that access_ok(), anyway? The only thing we do to params.uaddr is
if (blob) {
if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr, blob, params.len))
ret = -EFAULT;
}downstream. What does that access_ok() buy us? It does not guarantee that copy_to_user() won't fail. It does not clamp params.len (we'd just done that explicitly). So why not somethings like this:
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +7 -9
@@ -6239,13 +6239,15 @@ static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;struct sev_data_launch_measure *data;struct kvm_sev_launch_measure params; +void __user *measure = (void __user *)(uintptr_t )argp->data; +void __user *p =NULL ;void *blob =NULL ;int ret;if (!sev_guest (kvm))return -ENOTTY ; -if (copy_from_user (¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t )argp->data,sizeof (params))) +if (copy_from_user (¶ms, measure,sizeof (params)))return -EFAULT ; data =kzalloc (sizeof (*data),GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -6256,17 +6258,13 @@ static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)if (!params.len) goto cmd; -if (params.uaddr) { + p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t )params.uaddr; +if (p) {if (params.len >SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE ) { ret = -EINVAL ; goto e_free; } -if (!access_ok (VERIFY_WRITE , params.uaddr, params.len)) { - ret = -EFAULT ; - goto e_free; - } - ret = -ENOMEM ; blob =kmalloc (params.len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!blob)
@@ -6290,13 +6288,13 @@ static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) goto e_free_blob;if (blob) { -if (copy_to_user ((void __user *)(uintptr_t )params.uaddr, blob, params.len)) +if (copy_to_user (p, blob, params.len)) ret = -EFAULT ; } done: params.len = data->len; -if (copy_to_user ((void __user *)(uintptr_t )argp->data, ¶ms,sizeof (params))) +if (copy_to_user (measure, ¶ms,sizeof (params))) ret = -EFAULT ; e_free_blob:kfree (blob);
Quoted 5 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 2 lines · Brijesh Singh
Fix sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different base types). Typecast the userspace address argument.
Better question: why the hell do we want that
access_ok(), anyway? The only thing we do to params.uaddr is
Quoted 7 lines
if (blob) { if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr, blob, params.len)) ret = -EFAULT; }downstream. What does that
access_ok()buy us? It does not guarantee thatcopy_to_user()won't fail.
Sure, checking access_ok() does not guarantee that later copy_from_user() will not fail. But it does eliminate one possible reason for the failure. We are trying to validate most of the user inputs before we invoke SEV command. The SEV command handler does heavy lifting (which includes setting up PSP mailbox, issuing FW command, and handling the response etc). I would like to avoid invoking SEV command when we know for sure that copy_to_user() will fail later.
Quoted 60 lines
It does not clamp params.len (we'd just done that explicitly). So why not somethings like this:
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +7
-9@@ -6239,13 +6239,15 @@ static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;struct sev_data_launch_measure *data;struct kvm_sev_launch_measure params; +void __user *measure = (void __user *)(uintptr_t )argp->data; +void __user *p =NULL ;void *blob =NULL ;int ret;if (!sev_guest (kvm))return -ENOTTY ; -if (copy_from_user (¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t )argp->data,sizeof (params))) +if (copy_from_user (¶ms, measure,sizeof (params)))return -EFAULT ; data =kzalloc (sizeof (*data),GFP_KERNEL );@@ -6256,17 +6258,13 @@ static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)if (!params.len) goto cmd; -if (params.uaddr) { + p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t )params.uaddr; +if (p) {if (params.len >SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE ) { ret = -EINVAL ; goto e_free; } -if (!access_ok (VERIFY_WRITE , params.uaddr, params.len)) { - ret = -EFAULT ; - goto e_free; - } - ret = -ENOMEM ; blob =kmalloc (params.len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!blob)@@ -6290,13 +6288,13 @@ static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) goto e_free_blob;if (blob) { -if (copy_to_user ((void __user *)(uintptr_t )params.uaddr, blob, params.len)) +if (copy_to_user (p, blob, params.len)) ret = -EFAULT ; } done: params.len = data->len; -if (copy_to_user ((void __user *)(uintptr_t )argp->data, ¶ms,sizeof (params))) +if (copy_to_user (measure, ¶ms,sizeof (params))) ret = -EFAULT ; e_free_blob:kfree (blob);
Quoted 4 lines · Brijesh Singh
Sure, checking
access_ok()does not guarantee that latercopy_from_user()will not fail. But it does eliminate one possible reason for the failure. We are trying to validate most of the user inputs before we invoke SEV command.
That makes no sense whatsoever. If user is deliberately fuzzing your code or trying to DoS it, that "validation" doesn't buy you anything - they can just as well feed you NULL, after all.
What is the rationale for that? "Userland is accidentally feeding us garbage pointers" is the case where slowness is the least of your concerns...
Quoted 11 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 4 lines · Brijesh Singh
Sure, checking
access_ok()does not guarantee that latercopy_from_user()will not fail. But it does eliminate one possible reason for the failure. We are trying to validate most of the user inputs before we invoke SEV command.That makes no sense whatsoever. If user is deliberately fuzzing your code or trying to DoS it, that "validation" doesn't buy you anything - they can just as well feed you NULL, after all.
Currently, we let user query the blob length with params.len == 0 || param.uaddr == NULL. We could limit it to just params.len == 0.
Quoted 4 lines
What is the rationale for that? "Userland is accidentally feeding us garbage pointers" is the case where slowness is the least of your concerns...
My intent was to do some obvious failure checks on user inputs before invoking the HW. I do see your point that if userspace is feeding us garbage then slowness is least of our concern. If you think that we should not be using access_ok() in this particular case then I am okay with it.
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerQuoted 25 lines · Brijesh Singh
Quoted 11 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 4 lines · Brijesh Singh
Sure, checking
access_ok()does not guarantee that latercopy_from_user()will not fail. But it does eliminate one possible reason for the failure. We are trying to validate most of the user inputs before we invoke SEV command.That makes no sense whatsoever. If user is deliberately fuzzing your code or trying to DoS it, that "validation" doesn't buy you anything - they can just as well feed you NULL, after all.
Currently, we let user query the blob length with params.len == 0 || param.uaddr == NULL. We could limit it to just params.len == 0.
Quoted 4 lines
What is the rationale for that? "Userland is accidentally feeding us garbage pointers" is the case where slowness is the least of your concerns...
Quoted 5 lines
My intent was to do some obvious failure checks on user inputs before invoking the HW. I do see your point that if userspace is feeding us garbage then slowness is least of our concern. If you think that we should not be using
access_ok()in this particular case then I am okay with it.
Can you please send a patch? Thanks!
Paolo
Quoted 26 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 25 lines · Brijesh Singh
Quoted 11 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 4 lines · Brijesh Singh
Sure, checking
access_ok()does not guarantee that latercopy_from_user()will not fail. But it does eliminate one possible reason for the failure. We are trying to validate most of the user inputs before we invoke SEV command.That makes no sense whatsoever. If user is deliberately fuzzing your code or trying to DoS it, that "validation" doesn't buy you anything - they can just as well feed you NULL, after all.
Currently, we let user query the blob length with params.len == 0 || param.uaddr == NULL. We could limit it to just params.len == 0.
Quoted 4 lines
What is the rationale for that? "Userland is accidentally feeding us garbage pointers" is the case where slowness is the least of your concerns...
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
My intent was to do some obvious failure checks on user inputs before invoking the HW. I do see your point that if userspace is feeding us garbage then slowness is least of our concern. If you think that we should not be using
access_ok()in this particular case then I am okay with it.Can you please send a patch? Thanks!
Sure, I will send patch soon.
-Brijesh