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x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD)

PATCH Superseded Brijesh Singh 5 participants 38 messages Feb 28, 2018 – Mar 7, 2018 KVM

v10 of 12 Superseded Latest is v12 →

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#0 lore raw

v10 cover x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD)

This patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature.

SEV is an extension to the AMD-V architecture which supports running multiple VMs under the control of a hypervisor. The SEV feature allows the memory contents of a virtual machine (VM) to be transparently encrypted with a key unique to the guest VM. The memory controller contains a high performance encryption engine which can be programmed with multiple keys for use by a different VMs in the system. The programming and management of these keys is handled by the AMD Secure Processor firmware which exposes a commands for these tasks.

The KVM SEV patch series introduced a new ioctl (KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPTION_OP) which is used by qemu to issue the SEV commands to assist performing common hypervisor activities such as a launching, running, snapshooting, migration and debugging guests.

The following links provide additional details:

AMD Memory Encryption whitepaper:

http://amd-dev.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf

AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual:
http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf
SME is section 7.10
SEV is section 15.34

Secure Encrypted Virutualization Key Management:
http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM API_Specification.pdf

KVM Forum slides:
http://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf

Video of the KVM Forum Talk:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RcvQ1xN55Ew

---

The complete patch series is available :
https://github.com/codomania/qemu/tree/v10

Using these patches we have succesfully booted and tested a guest both with and without SEV enabled.

TODO:

* Add SEV guest migration support
* Add SEV guest snapshot and restore support

Changes since v9:
- move sev specific header definition in target/i386/sev_i386.h
- add new QMP query-sev-capabilities - the command will be used by libvirt to query the SEV capabilities information.
- move sev specific QMP command implementation in target/i386/monitor.c. The sev commands are disabled for non x86 architecture
- update 'info sev' command to display human readiable format for policy
- use g_new0 to allocate to structure memory
- update qemu-options.hx to include cbitspos and reduced-phys-bit field

Changes since v8:
- update 'query-sev' command to use enum type for SEV state.
- populate memory encryption cpuid when only SEV is enabled.

Changes since v7:
- move sev.c from accel/kvm to target/i386
- update query-sev-launch-measure to return error when measurement is not available
- update flatview_read to use slow path when attrs.debug=1 is set
- fix the buffer overflow
- use '-' when adding new member in SevInfo QMP structure

Changes since v6:
- add support to specify cbitpos in sev-guest object
- add 'info sev' HMP command
- add 'query-sev' and 'query-launch-measure' QMP commands
- rework the logic to query the memory encryption mask when walking guest pagetable for debug

Changes since v5:
- drop MEMTXTATTRS_DEBUG macro, caller now specify attrs.debug=1 when needed.
- drop DPRINTF and use trace points to output the debug messages

Changes since v4:
- extend sev-guest object to add new properties 'dh-cert-file', 'session-file' etc.
- emit SEV_MEASUREMENT event when measurement is available
- add migration blocker
- add memory encryption cpuid support
- rebase the series with recent qemu tree

Changes since v3:
- update to newer SEV spec (0.12 -> 0.14)
- update to newer KVM RFC and use KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPTION_OP ioctl instead of KVM_ISSUE_SEV.
- add support to encrypt plfash

Changes since v2:
- rename ram_ops to ram_debug_ops
- use '-' rather than '_' when adding new member in KvmInfo struct
- update sev object to use link properties when referencing other objects
- use ldq_phys_debug in tlb_info_64 and mem_info_64.
- remove sev-guest-policy object, we will revisit it after basic SEV guest support is merged.
- remove kernel API from doc and add SEV guest LAUNCH model. The doc will be updated as we integerate the remaining SEV APIs.

Changes since v1:
- Added Documentation
- Added security-policy object.
- Drop sev config parsing support and create new objects to get/set SEV specific parameters
- Added sev-guest-info object.
- Added sev-launch-info object.
- Added kvm_memory_encrytion_* APIs. The idea behind this was to allow adding a non SEV memory encrytion object without modifying interfaces.
- Drop patch to load OS image at fixed location.
- updated LAUNCH_FINISH command structure. Now the structure contains just 'measurement' field. Other fields are not used and will also be removed from newer SEV firmware API spec.

Brijesh Singh (28):
memattrs: add debug attribute
exec: add ram_debug_ops support
exec: add debug version of physical memory read and write API monitor/i386: use debug APIs when accessing guest memory
machine: add -memory-encryption property
kvm: update kvm.h to include memory encryption ioctls
docs: add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) target/i386: add Secure Encrypted Virtulization (SEV) object
qmp: add query-sev command
include: add psp-sev.h header file
sev/i386: add command to initialize the memory encryption context sev/i386: register the guest memory range which may contain encrypted
data
kvm: introduce memory encryption APIs
hmp: add 'info sev' command
sev/i386: add command to create launch memory encryption context sev/i386: add command to encrypt guest memory region target/i386: encrypt bios rom
sev/i386: add support to LAUNCH_MEASURE command
sev/i386: finalize the SEV guest launch flow
hw/i386: set ram_debug_ops when memory encryption is enabled sev/i386: add debug encrypt and decrypt commands target/i386: clear C-bit when walking SEV guest page table
qmp: add query-sev-launch-measure command
sev/i386: add migration blocker
cpu/i386: populate CPUID 0x8000_001F when SEV is active
qmp: add query-sev-capabilities command
sev/i386: add sev_get_capabilities()
tests/qmp-test: blacklist sev specific qmp commands

 accel/kvm/kvm-all.c            |  48 +++
 accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c         |  14 +
 cpus.c                         |   2 +-
 disas.c                        |   2 +-
 docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 109 ++++++
 exec.c                         |  83 +++-
 hmp-commands-info.hx           |  16 +
 hmp.h                          |   1 +
 hw/core/machine.c              |  22 ++
 hw/i386/pc.c                   |   9 +
 hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c             |  19 +
 include/exec/cpu-common.h      |  15 +
 include/exec/memattrs.h        |   2 +
 include/exec/memory.h          |  30 +-
 include/hw/boards.h            |   1 +
 include/sysemu/kvm.h           |  25 ++
 include/sysemu/sev.h           |  22 ++
 linux-headers/linux/kvm.h      |  90 +++++
 linux-headers/linux/psp-sev.h  | 142 +++++++
 monitor.c                      |  27 +-
 qapi-schema.json               | 132 +++++++
 qemu-options.hx                |  49 ++-
 stubs/Makefile.objs            |   1 +
 stubs/sev.c                    |  30 ++
 target/i386/Makefile.objs      |   4 +-
 target/i386/cpu.c              |  13 +
 target/i386/helper.c           |  31 +-
 target/i386/monitor.c          | 193 ++++++---
 target/i386/sev-stub.c         |  51 +++
 target/i386/sev.c              | 860 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/sev_i386.h         |  93 +++++
 target/i386/trace-events       |  11 +
 tests/qmp-test.c               |   5 +
 33 files changed, 2067 insertions(+), 85 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt
 create mode 100644 include/sysemu/sev.h
 create mode 100644 linux-headers/linux/psp-sev.h
 create mode 100644 stubs/sev.c
 create mode 100644 target/i386/sev-stub.c
 create mode 100644 target/i386/sev.c
 create mode 100644 target/i386/sev_i386.h
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#1 lore raw

PATCH v10 1/28 memattrs: add debug attribute

Extend the MemTxAttrs to include 'debug' flag. The flag can be used as general indicator that operation was triggered by the debugger.

Later in the patch series we set the debug=1 when issuing a memory access from the gdbstub or HMP commands. This patch is prerequisite to support debugging the encrypted guest. If we see request with debug=1 then we will need to use encryption APIs to access the guest memory.

Cc Alistair Francis <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Maydell <[email protected]>
Cc "Edgar E. Iglesias" <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
 include/exec/memattrs.h | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
include/exec/memattrs.h +2 -0
index d4a16420984b..08099e4f7e72 100644
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ typedef struct MemTxAttrs {
     unsigned int user:1;
     /* Requester ID (for MSI for example) */
     unsigned int requester_id:16;
+    /* Memory access request from the debugger */
+    unsigned int debug:1;
 } MemTxAttrs;
 
 /* Bus masters which don't specify any attributes will get this,
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#2 lore raw

PATCH v10 2/28 exec: add ram_debug_ops support

In reply to Brijesh Singh

Currently, the guest memory access for the debug purpose is performed using the memcpy(). Lets extend the 'struct MemoryRegion' to include ram_debug_ops callbacks. The ram_debug_ops can be used to override memcpy() with something else.

The feature can be used by encrypted guest -- which can register callbacks to override memcpy() with memory encryption/decryption APIs.

a typical usage:

mem_read(uint8_t *dst, uint8_t *src, uint32_t len, MemTxAttrs *attrs); mem_write(uint8_t *dst, uint8_t *src, uint32_t len, MemTxAttrs *attrs);

MemoryRegionRAMReadWriteOps ops;
ops.read = mem_read;
ops.write = mem_write;

memory_region_init_ram(mem, NULL, "memory", size, NULL); memory_region_set_ram_debug_ops(mem, ops);

Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Crosthwaite <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
---
 exec.c                | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 include/exec/memory.h | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
exec.c +32 -11
index 4d8addb263a0..4408cd26c989 100644
@@ -3054,7 +3054,11 @@ static MemTxResult flatview_write_continue(FlatView *fv, hwaddr addr,
         } else {
             /* RAM case */
             ptr = qemu_ram_ptr_length(mr->ram_block, addr1, &l, false);
-            memcpy(ptr, buf, l);
+            if (attrs.debug && mr->ram_debug_ops) {
+                mr->ram_debug_ops->write(ptr, buf, l, attrs);
+            } else {
+                memcpy(ptr, buf, l);
+            }
             invalidate_and_set_dirty(mr, addr1, l);
         }
 
@@ -3152,7 +3156,11 @@ MemTxResult flatview_read_continue(FlatView *fv, hwaddr addr,
         } else {
             /* RAM case */
             ptr = qemu_ram_ptr_length(mr->ram_block, addr1, &l, false);
-            memcpy(buf, ptr, l);
+            if (attrs.debug && mr->ram_debug_ops) {
+                mr->ram_debug_ops->read(buf, ptr, l, attrs);
+            } else {
+                memcpy(buf, ptr, l);
+            }
         }
 
         if (release_lock) {
@@ -3226,7 +3234,8 @@ enum write_rom_type {
 };
 
 static inline void cpu_physical_memory_write_rom_internal(AddressSpace *as,
-    hwaddr addr, const uint8_t *buf, int len, enum write_rom_type type)
+    hwaddr addr, const uint8_t *buf, int len, MemTxAttrs attrs,
+    enum write_rom_type type)
 {
     hwaddr l;
     uint8_t *ptr;
@@ -3246,7 +3255,11 @@ static inline void cpu_physical_memory_write_rom_internal(AddressSpace *as,
             ptr = qemu_map_ram_ptr(mr->ram_block, addr1);
             switch (type) {
             case WRITE_DATA:
-                memcpy(ptr, buf, l);
+                if (mr->ram_debug_ops) {
+                    mr->ram_debug_ops->write(ptr, buf, l, attrs);
+                } else {
+                    memcpy(ptr, buf, l);
+                }
                 invalidate_and_set_dirty(mr, addr1, l);
                 break;
             case FLUSH_CACHE:
@@ -3265,7 +3278,9 @@ static inline void cpu_physical_memory_write_rom_internal(AddressSpace *as,
 void cpu_physical_memory_write_rom(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr,
                                    const uint8_t *buf, int len)
 {
-    cpu_physical_memory_write_rom_internal(as, addr, buf, len, WRITE_DATA);
+    cpu_physical_memory_write_rom_internal(as, addr, buf, len,
+                                           MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED,
+                                           WRITE_DATA);
 }
 
 void cpu_flush_icache_range(hwaddr start, int len)
@@ -3280,8 +3295,9 @@ void cpu_flush_icache_range(hwaddr start, int len)
         return;
     }
 
-    cpu_physical_memory_write_rom_internal(&address_space_memory,
-                                           start, NULL, len, FLUSH_CACHE);
+    cpu_physical_memory_write_rom_internal(&address_space_memory, start, NULL,
+                                           len, MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED,
+                                           FLUSH_CACHE);
 }
 
 typedef struct {
@@ -3596,6 +3612,10 @@ int cpu_memory_rw_debug(CPUState *cpu, target_ulong addr,
         page = addr & TARGET_PAGE_MASK;
         phys_addr = cpu_get_phys_page_attrs_debug(cpu, page, &attrs);
         asidx = cpu_asidx_from_attrs(cpu, attrs);
+
+        /* set debug attrs to indicate memory access is from the debugger */
+        attrs.debug = 1;
+
         /* if no physical page mapped, return an error */
         if (phys_addr == -1)
             return -1;
@@ -3604,13 +3624,14 @@ int cpu_memory_rw_debug(CPUState *cpu, target_ulong addr,
             l = len;
         phys_addr += (addr & ~TARGET_PAGE_MASK);
         if (is_write) {
-            cpu_physical_memory_write_rom(cpu->cpu_ases[asidx].as,
-                                          phys_addr, buf, l);
+            cpu_physical_memory_write_rom_internal(cpu->cpu_ases[asidx].as,
+                                                   phys_addr, buf, l, attrs,
+                                                   WRITE_DATA);
         } else {
             address_space_rw(cpu->cpu_ases[asidx].as, phys_addr,
-                             MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED,
-                             buf, l, 0);
+                             attrs, buf, l, 0);
         }
+
         len -= l;
         buf += l;
         addr += l;
include/exec/memory.h +29 -1
index 15e81113bac9..4a18bb3b38ec 100644
@@ -223,6 +223,18 @@ typedef struct IOMMUMemoryRegionClass {
 typedef struct CoalescedMemoryRange CoalescedMemoryRange;
 typedef struct MemoryRegionIoeventfd MemoryRegionIoeventfd;
 
+/* Memory Region RAM debug callback */
+typedef struct MemoryRegionRAMReadWriteOps MemoryRegionRAMReadWriteOps;
+
+struct MemoryRegionRAMReadWriteOps {
+    /* Write data into guest memory */
+    int (*write) (uint8_t *dest, const uint8_t *src,
+                  uint32_t len, MemTxAttrs attrs);
+    /* Read data from guest memory */
+    int (*read) (uint8_t *dest, const uint8_t *src,
+                 uint32_t len, MemTxAttrs attrs);
+};
+
 struct MemoryRegion {
     Object parent_obj;
 
@@ -262,6 +274,7 @@ struct MemoryRegion {
     const char *name;
     unsigned ioeventfd_nb;
     MemoryRegionIoeventfd *ioeventfds;
+    const MemoryRegionRAMReadWriteOps *ram_debug_ops;
 };
 
 struct IOMMUMemoryRegion {
@@ -655,6 +668,21 @@ void memory_region_init_rom_device_nomigrate(MemoryRegion *mr,
                                              uint64_t size,
                                              Error **errp);
 
+/**
+ * memory_region_set_ram_debug_ops: Set debug access ops for a given memory
+ * region.
+ *
+ * @mr: the #MemoryRegion to be initialized
+ * @ops: a function that will be used for when accessing @target region during
+ *       debug
+ */
+static inline void
+memory_region_set_ram_debug_ops(MemoryRegion *mr,
+                                const MemoryRegionRAMReadWriteOps *ops)
+{
+    mr->ram_debug_ops = ops;
+}
+
 /**
  * memory_region_init_reservation: Initialize a memory region that reserves
  *                                 I/O space.
@@ -1938,7 +1966,7 @@ MemTxResult flatview_read(FlatView *fv, hwaddr addr, MemTxAttrs attrs,
     void *ptr;
     MemoryRegion *mr;
 
-    if (__builtin_constant_p(len)) {
+    if (__builtin_constant_p(len) && !attrs.debug) {
         if (len) {
             rcu_read_lock();
             l = len;
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#3 lore raw

PATCH v10 3/28 exec: add debug version of physical memory read and write API

In reply to Brijesh Singh

Adds the following new APIs
- cpu_physical_memory_read_debug
- cpu_physical_memory_write_debug
- cpu_physical_memory_rw_debug
- ldl_phys_debug
- ldq_phys_debug

Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Crosthwaite <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
---
 exec.c                    | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/exec/cpu-common.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+)
exec.c +40 -0
index 4408cd26c989..633be92d2b3a 100644
@@ -3596,6 +3596,46 @@ void address_space_cache_destroy(MemoryRegionCache *cache)
 #define RCU_READ_UNLOCK()        rcu_read_unlock()
 #include "memory_ldst.inc.c"
 
+uint32_t ldl_phys_debug(CPUState *cpu, hwaddr addr)
+{
+    MemTxAttrs attrs;
+    int asidx = cpu_asidx_from_attrs(cpu, attrs);
+    uint32_t val;
+
+    /* set debug attrs to indicate memory access is from the debugger */
+    attrs.debug = 1;
+
+    address_space_rw(cpu->cpu_ases[asidx].as, addr, attrs,
+                     (void *) &val, 4, 0);
+
+    return tswap32(val);
+}
+
+uint64_t ldq_phys_debug(CPUState *cpu, hwaddr addr)
+{
+    MemTxAttrs attrs;
+    int asidx = cpu_asidx_from_attrs(cpu, attrs);
+    uint64_t val;
+
+    /* set debug attrs to indicate memory access is from the debugger */
+    attrs.debug = 1;
+
+    address_space_rw(cpu->cpu_ases[asidx].as, addr, attrs,
+                     (void *) &val, 8, 0);
+    return val;
+}
+
+void cpu_physical_memory_rw_debug(hwaddr addr, uint8_t *buf,
+                                  int len, int is_write)
+{
+    MemTxAttrs attrs;
+
+    /* set debug attrs to indicate memory access is from the debugger */
+    attrs.debug = 1;
+
+    address_space_rw(&address_space_memory, addr, attrs, buf, len, is_write);
+}
+
 /* virtual memory access for debug (includes writing to ROM) */
 int cpu_memory_rw_debug(CPUState *cpu, target_ulong addr,
                         uint8_t *buf, int len, int is_write)
include/exec/cpu-common.h +15 -0
index 74341b19d26a..fa01385d4f1b 100644
@@ -77,11 +77,26 @@ size_t qemu_ram_pagesize_largest(void);
 
 void cpu_physical_memory_rw(hwaddr addr, uint8_t *buf,
                             int len, int is_write);
+void cpu_physical_memory_rw_debug(hwaddr addr, uint8_t *buf,
+                                  int len, int is_write);
 static inline void cpu_physical_memory_read(hwaddr addr,
                                             void *buf, int len)
 {
     cpu_physical_memory_rw(addr, buf, len, 0);
 }
+static inline void cpu_physical_memory_read_debug(hwaddr addr,
+                                                  void *buf, int len)
+{
+    cpu_physical_memory_rw_debug(addr, buf, len, 0);
+}
+static inline void cpu_physical_memory_write_debug(hwaddr addr,
+                                                   const void *buf, int len)
+{
+    cpu_physical_memory_rw_debug(addr, (void *)buf, len, 1);
+}
+uint32_t ldl_phys_debug(CPUState *cpu, hwaddr addr);
+uint64_t ldq_phys_debug(CPUState *cpu, hwaddr addr);
+
 static inline void cpu_physical_memory_write(hwaddr addr,
                                              const void *buf, int len)
 {
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#4 lore raw

PATCH v10 4/28 monitor/i386: use debug APIs when accessing guest memory

In reply to Brijesh Singh

Updates HMP commands to use the debug version of APIs when accessing the guest memory.

Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Crosthwaite <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <[email protected]>
Cc Markus Armbruster <[email protected]>
Cc Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]>
---
 cpus.c                |  2 +-
 disas.c               |  2 +-
 monitor.c             |  6 +++---
 target/i386/helper.c  | 14 ++++++------
 target/i386/monitor.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
 5 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
cpus.c +1 -1
index f298b659f467..fdd40d9e8ead 100644
@@ -2214,7 +2214,7 @@ void qmp_pmemsave(int64_t addr, int64_t size, const char *filename,
         l = sizeof(buf);
         if (l > size)
             l = size;
-        cpu_physical_memory_read(addr, buf, l);
+        cpu_physical_memory_read_debug(addr, buf, l);
         if (fwrite(buf, 1, l, f) != l) {
             error_setg(errp, QERR_IO_ERROR);
             goto exit;
disas.c +1 -1
index d4ad1089efb3..fcedbf263302 100644
@@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ static int
 physical_read_memory(bfd_vma memaddr, bfd_byte *myaddr, int length,
                      struct disassemble_info *info)
 {
-    cpu_physical_memory_read(memaddr, myaddr, length);
+    cpu_physical_memory_read_debug(memaddr, myaddr, length);
     return 0;
 }
 
monitor.c +3 -3
index 373bb8d1c371..d77edc4bb692 100644
@@ -1361,7 +1361,7 @@ static void memory_dump(Monitor *mon, int count, int format, int wsize,
         if (l > line_size)
             l = line_size;
         if (is_physical) {
-            cpu_physical_memory_read(addr, buf, l);
+            cpu_physical_memory_read_debug(addr, buf, l);
         } else {
             if (cpu_memory_rw_debug(cs, addr, buf, l, 0) < 0) {
                 monitor_printf(mon, " Cannot access memory\n");
@@ -1567,8 +1567,8 @@ static void hmp_sum(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
 
     sum = 0;
     for(addr = start; addr < (start + size); addr++) {
-        uint8_t val = address_space_ldub(&address_space_memory, addr,
-                                         MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED, NULL);
+        uint8_t val;
+        cpu_physical_memory_read_debug(addr, &val, 1);
         /* BSD sum algorithm ('sum' Unix command) */
         sum = (sum >> 1) | (sum << 15);
         sum += val;
target/i386/helper.c +7 -7
index 9fba146b7fb0..58fb6eec562a 100644
@@ -757,7 +757,7 @@ hwaddr x86_cpu_get_phys_page_debug(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr)
             if (la57) {
                 pml5e_addr = ((env->cr[3] & ~0xfff) +
                         (((addr >> 48) & 0x1ff) << 3)) & a20_mask;
-                pml5e = x86_ldq_phys(cs, pml5e_addr);
+                pml5e = ldq_phys_debug(cs, pml5e_addr);
                 if (!(pml5e & PG_PRESENT_MASK)) {
                     return -1;
                 }
@@ -767,7 +767,7 @@ hwaddr x86_cpu_get_phys_page_debug(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr)
 
             pml4e_addr = ((pml5e & PG_ADDRESS_MASK) +
                     (((addr >> 39) & 0x1ff) << 3)) & a20_mask;
-            pml4e = x86_ldq_phys(cs, pml4e_addr);
+            pml4e = ldq_phys_debug(cs, pml4e_addr);
             if (!(pml4e & PG_PRESENT_MASK)) {
                 return -1;
             }
@@ -788,14 +788,14 @@ hwaddr x86_cpu_get_phys_page_debug(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr)
         {
             pdpe_addr = ((env->cr[3] & ~0x1f) + ((addr >> 27) & 0x18)) &
                 a20_mask;
-            pdpe = x86_ldq_phys(cs, pdpe_addr);
+            pdpe = ldq_phys_debug(cs, pdpe_addr);
             if (!(pdpe & PG_PRESENT_MASK))
                 return -1;
         }
 
         pde_addr = ((pdpe & PG_ADDRESS_MASK) +
                     (((addr >> 21) & 0x1ff) << 3)) & a20_mask;
-        pde = x86_ldq_phys(cs, pde_addr);
+        pde = ldq_phys_debug(cs, pde_addr);
         if (!(pde & PG_PRESENT_MASK)) {
             return -1;
         }
@@ -808,7 +808,7 @@ hwaddr x86_cpu_get_phys_page_debug(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr)
             pte_addr = ((pde & PG_ADDRESS_MASK) +
                         (((addr >> 12) & 0x1ff) << 3)) & a20_mask;
             page_size = 4096;
-            pte = x86_ldq_phys(cs, pte_addr);
+            pte = ldq_phys_debug(cs, pte_addr);
         }
         if (!(pte & PG_PRESENT_MASK)) {
             return -1;
@@ -818,7 +818,7 @@ hwaddr x86_cpu_get_phys_page_debug(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr)
 
         /* page directory entry */
         pde_addr = ((env->cr[3] & ~0xfff) + ((addr >> 20) & 0xffc)) & a20_mask;
-        pde = x86_ldl_phys(cs, pde_addr);
+        pde = ldl_phys_debug(cs, pde_addr);
         if (!(pde & PG_PRESENT_MASK))
             return -1;
         if ((pde & PG_PSE_MASK) && (env->cr[4] & CR4_PSE_MASK)) {
@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ hwaddr x86_cpu_get_phys_page_debug(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr)
         } else {
             /* page directory entry */
             pte_addr = ((pde & ~0xfff) + ((addr >> 10) & 0xffc)) & a20_mask;
-            pte = x86_ldl_phys(cs, pte_addr);
+            pte = ldl_phys_debug(cs, pte_addr);
             if (!(pte & PG_PRESENT_MASK)) {
                 return -1;
             }
target/i386/monitor.c +32 -28

200 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#5 lore raw

PATCH v10 5/28 machine: add -memory-encryption property

In reply to Brijesh Singh

When CPU supports memory encryption feature, the property can be used to specify the encryption object to use when launching an encrypted guest.

Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]>
Cc Marcel Apfelbaum <[email protected]>
Cc Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
---
 hw/core/machine.c   | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/hw/boards.h |  1 +
 qemu-options.hx     |  5 ++++-
 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
hw/core/machine.c +22 -0
index 5d445839e89e..414e6e71092d 100644
@@ -334,6 +334,22 @@ static bool machine_get_enforce_config_section(Object *obj, Error **errp)
     return ms->enforce_config_section;
 }
 
+static char *machine_get_memory_encryption(Object *obj, Error **errp)
+{
+    MachineState *ms = MACHINE(obj);
+
+    return g_strdup(ms->memory_encryption);
+}
+
+static void machine_set_memory_encryption(Object *obj, const char *value,
+                                        Error **errp)
+{
+    MachineState *ms = MACHINE(obj);
+
+    g_free(ms->memory_encryption);
+    ms->memory_encryption = g_strdup(value);
+}
+
 void machine_class_allow_dynamic_sysbus_dev(MachineClass *mc, const char *type)
 {
     strList *item = g_new0(strList, 1);
@@ -612,6 +628,12 @@ static void machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
         &error_abort);
     object_class_property_set_description(oc, "enforce-config-section",
         "Set on to enforce configuration section migration", &error_abort);
+
+    object_class_property_add_str(oc, "memory-encryption",
+        machine_get_memory_encryption, machine_set_memory_encryption,
+        &error_abort);
+    object_class_property_set_description(oc, "memory-encryption",
+        "Set memory encyption object to use", &error_abort);
 }
 
 static void machine_class_base_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data)
include/hw/boards.h +1 -0
index efb0a9edfdf1..8ce9a7a21d3d 100644
@@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ struct MachineState {
     bool suppress_vmdesc;
     bool enforce_config_section;
     bool enable_graphics;
+    char *memory_encryption;
 
     ram_addr_t ram_size;
     ram_addr_t maxram_size;
qemu-options.hx +4 -1
index 8ccd5dcaa61d..a6648ca073f2 100644
@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ DEF("machine", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_machine, \
     "                suppress-vmdesc=on|off disables self-describing migration (default=off)\n"
     "                nvdimm=on|off controls NVDIMM support (default=off)\n"
     "                enforce-config-section=on|off enforce configuration section migration (default=off)\n"
-    "                s390-squash-mcss=on|off (deprecated) controls support for squashing into default css (default=off)\n",
+    "                s390-squash-mcss=on|off (deprecated) controls support for squashing into default css (default=off)\n"
+    "                memory-encryption=@var{} memory encryption object to use (default=none)\n",
     QEMU_ARCH_ALL)
 STEXI
 @item -machine [type=]@var{name}[,prop=@var{value}[,...]]
@@ -110,6 +111,8 @@ code to send configuration section even if the machine-type sets the
 @option{migration.send-configuration} property to @var{off}.
 NOTE: this parameter is deprecated. Please use @option{-global}
 @option{migration.send-configuration}=@var{on|off} instead.
+@item memory-encryption=@var{}
+Memory encryption object to use. The default is none.
 @end table
 ETEXI
 
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#6 lore raw

PATCH v10 6/28 kvm: update kvm.h to include memory encryption ioctls

In reply to Brijesh Singh

Updates kmv.h to include memory encryption ioctls and SEV commands.

Cc Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Cc Cornelia Huck <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
---
 linux-headers/linux/kvm.h | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 90 insertions(+)
linux-headers/linux/kvm.h +90 -0
index d92c9b2f0ed2..aed22309950d 100644
@@ -1362,6 +1362,96 @@ struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping {
 /* Available with KVM_CAP_S390_CMMA_MIGRATION */
 #define KVM_S390_GET_CMMA_BITS      _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xb8, struct kvm_s390_cmma_log)
 #define KVM_S390_SET_CMMA_BITS      _IOW(KVMIO, 0xb9, struct kvm_s390_cmma_log)
+/* Memory Encryption Commands */
+#define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP      _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xba, unsigned long)
+
+struct kvm_enc_region {
+	__u64 addr;
+	__u64 size;
+};
+
+#define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION    _IOR(KVMIO, 0xbb, struct kvm_enc_region)
+#define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_UNREG_REGION  _IOR(KVMIO, 0xbc, struct kvm_enc_region)
+
+/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization command */
+enum sev_cmd_id {
+	/* Guest initialization commands */
+	KVM_SEV_INIT = 0,
+	KVM_SEV_ES_INIT,
+	/* Guest launch commands */
+	KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START,
+	KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA,
+	KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA,
+	KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET,
+	KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE,
+	KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH,
+	/* Guest migration commands (outgoing) */
+	KVM_SEV_SEND_START,
+	KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA,
+	KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA,
+	KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH,
+	/* Guest migration commands (incoming) */
+	KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START,
+	KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA,
+	KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA,
+	KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH,
+	/* Guest status and debug commands */
+	KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS,
+	KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT,
+	KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT,
+	/* Guest certificates commands */
+	KVM_SEV_CERT_EXPORT,
+
+	KVM_SEV_NR_MAX,
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_cmd {
+	__u32 id;
+	__u64 data;
+	__u32 error;
+	__u32 sev_fd;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_launch_start {
+	__u32 handle;
+	__u32 policy;
+	__u64 dh_uaddr;
+	__u32 dh_len;
+	__u64 session_uaddr;
+	__u32 session_len;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data {
+	__u64 uaddr;
+	__u32 len;
+};
+
+
+struct kvm_sev_launch_secret {
+	__u64 hdr_uaddr;
+	__u32 hdr_len;
+	__u64 guest_uaddr;
+	__u32 guest_len;
+	__u64 trans_uaddr;
+	__u32 trans_len;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_launch_measure {
+	__u64 uaddr;
+	__u32 len;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_guest_status {
+	__u32 handle;
+	__u32 policy;
+	__u32 state;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_dbg {
+	__u64 src_uaddr;
+	__u64 dst_uaddr;
+	__u32 len;
+};
 
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU	(1 << 0)
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3		(1 << 1)
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#7 lore raw

PATCH v10 7/28 docs: add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)

In reply to Brijesh Singh

Create a documentation entry to describe the AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature.

---
 docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 92 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 92 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt
docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt new file +92 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..72a92b6c6353
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is a feature found on AMD processors.
+
+SEV is an extension to the AMD-V architecture which supports running encrypted
+virtual machine (VMs) under the control of KVM. Encrypted VMs have their pages
+(code and data) secured such that only the guest itself has access to the
+unencrypted version. Each encrypted VM is associated with a unique encryption
+key; if its data is accessed to a different entity using a different key the
+encrypted guests data will be incorrectly decrypted, leading to unintelligible
+data.
+
+The key management of this feature is handled by separate processor known as
+AMD secure processor (AMD-SP) which is present in AMD SOCs. Firmware running
+inside the AMD-SP provide commands to support common VM lifecycle. This
+includes commands for launching, snapshotting, migrating and debugging the
+encrypted guest. Those SEV command can be issued via KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
+ioctls.
+
+Launching
+---------
+Boot images (such as bios) must be encrypted before guest can be booted.
+MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl provides commands to encrypt the images :LAUNCH_START,
+LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, LAUNCH_MEASURE and LAUNCH_FINISH. These four commands
+together generate a fresh memory encryption key for the VM, encrypt the boot
+images and provide a measurement than can be used as an attestation of the
+successful launch.
+
+LAUNCH_START is called first to create a cryptographic launch context within
+the firmware. To create this context, guest owner must provides guest policy,
+its public Diffie-Hellman key (PDH) and session parameters. These inputs
+should be treated as binary blob and must be passed as-is to the SEV firmware.
+
+The guest policy is passed as plaintext and hypervisor may able to read it
+but should not modify it (any modification of the policy bits will result
+in bad measurement). The guest policy is a 4-byte data structure containing
+several flags that restricts what can be done on running SEV guest.
+See KM Spec section 3 and 6.2 for more details.
+
+Guest owners provided DH certificate and session parameters will be used to
+establish a cryptographic session with the guest owner to negotiate keys used
+for the attestation.
+
+LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA encrypts the memory region using the cryptographic context
+created via LAUNCH_START command. If required, this command can be called
+multiple times to encrypt different memory regions. The command also calculates
+the measurement of the memory contents as it encrypts.
+
+LAUNCH_MEASURE command can be used to retrieve the measurement of encrypted
+memory. This measurement is a signature of the memory contents that can be
+sent to the guest owner as an attestation that the memory was encrypted
+correctly by the firmware. The guest owner may wait to provide the guest
+confidential information until it can verify the attestation measurement.
+Since the guest owner knows the initial contents of the guest at boot, the
+attestation measurement can be verified by comparing it to what the guest owner
+expects.
+
+LAUNCH_FINISH command finalizes the guest launch and destroy's the cryptographic
+context.
+
+See SEV KM API Spec [1] 'Launching a guest' usage flow (Appendix A) for the
+complete flow chart.
+
+Debugging
+-----------
+Since memory contents of SEV guest is encrypted hence hypervisor access to the
+guest memory will get a cipher text. If guest policy allows debugging, then
+hypervisor can use DEBUG_DECRYPT and DEBUG_ENCRYPT commands access the guest
+memory region for debug purposes.
+
+Snapshot/Restore
+-----------------
+TODO
+
+Live Migration
+----------------
+TODO
+
+References
+-----------------
+
+AMD Memory Encryption whitepaper:
+http://amd-dev.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf
+
+Secure Encrypted Virutualization Key Management:
+[1] http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM API_Specification.pdf
+
+KVM Forum slides:
+http://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf
+
+AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual:
+   http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf
+   SME is section 7.10
+   SEV is section 15.34
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#8 lore raw

PATCH v10 8/28 target/i386: add Secure Encrypted Virtulization (SEV) object

In reply to Brijesh Singh

Add a new memory encryption object 'sev-guest'. The object will be used to create enrypted VMs on AMD EPYC CPU. The object provides the properties to pass guest owner's public Diffie-hellman key, guest policy and session information required to create the memory encryption context within the SEV firmware.

e.g to launch SEV guest

 # $QEMU \
    -object sev-guest,id=sev0 \
    -machine ....,memory-encryption=sev0
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]>
---
 docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt |  17 +++
 qemu-options.hx                |  44 ++++++++
 target/i386/Makefile.objs      |   2 +-
 target/i386/sev.c              | 228 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/sev_i386.h         |  61 +++++++++++
 5 files changed, 351 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 target/i386/sev.c
 create mode 100644 target/i386/sev_i386.h
docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt +17 -0
index 72a92b6c6353..8711da9ed598 100644
@@ -35,10 +35,21 @@ in bad measurement). The guest policy is a 4-byte data structure containing
 several flags that restricts what can be done on running SEV guest.
 See KM Spec section 3 and 6.2 for more details.
 
+The guest policy can be provided via the 'policy' property (see below)
+
+# ${QEMU} \
+   sev-guest,id=sev0,policy=0x1...\
+
 Guest owners provided DH certificate and session parameters will be used to
 establish a cryptographic session with the guest owner to negotiate keys used
 for the attestation.
 
+The DH certificate and session blob can be provided via 'dh-cert-file' and
+'session-file' property (see below
+
+# ${QEMU} \
+     sev-guest,id=sev0,dh-cert-file=<file1>,session-file=<file2>
+
 LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA encrypts the memory region using the cryptographic context
 created via LAUNCH_START command. If required, this command can be called
 multiple times to encrypt different memory regions. The command also calculates
@@ -59,6 +70,12 @@ context.
 See SEV KM API Spec [1] 'Launching a guest' usage flow (Appendix A) for the
 complete flow chart.
 
+To launch a SEV guest
+
+# ${QEMU} \
+    -machine ...,memory-encryption=sev0 \
+    -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=47,reduced-phys-bits=5
+
 Debugging
 -----------
 Since memory contents of SEV guest is encrypted hence hypervisor access to the
qemu-options.hx +44 -0

50 lines not on this page · raw message

target/i386/Makefile.objs +1 -1
index f5c6ef20a7bb..76aeaeae2750 100644
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TCG) += bpt_helper.o cc_helper.o excp_helper.o fpu_helper.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG) += int_helper.o mem_helper.o misc_helper.o mpx_helper.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG) += seg_helper.o smm_helper.o svm_helper.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SOFTMMU) += machine.o arch_memory_mapping.o arch_dump.o monitor.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm.o hyperv.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm.o hyperv.o sev.o
 obj-$(call lnot,$(CONFIG_KVM)) += kvm-stub.o
 # HAX support
 ifdef CONFIG_WIN32
target/i386/sev.c new file +228 -0

228 lines not on this page · raw message

target/i386/sev_i386.h new file +61 -0

61 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#9 lore raw

PATCH v10 9/28 qmp: add query-sev command

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The QMP query command can used to retrieve the SEV information when memory encryption is enabled on AMD platform.

Cc Eric Blake <[email protected]>
Cc "Daniel P. Berrangé" <[email protected]>
Cc "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <[email protected]>
Cc Markus Armbruster <[email protected]>
---
 monitor.c             |  7 ++++++
 qapi-schema.json      | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/monitor.c |  8 +++++++
 3 files changed, 76 insertions(+)
monitor.c +7 -0
index d77edc4bb692..356d550aaf2d 100644
@@ -983,6 +983,7 @@ static void qmp_unregister_commands_hack(void)
 #endif
 #ifndef TARGET_I386
     qmp_unregister_command(&qmp_commands, "rtc-reset-reinjection");
+    qmp_unregister_command(&qmp_commands, "query-sev");
 #endif
 #ifndef TARGET_S390X
     qmp_unregister_command(&qmp_commands, "dump-skeys");
@@ -4157,6 +4158,12 @@ void qmp_rtc_reset_reinjection(Error **errp)
 {
     error_setg(errp, QERR_FEATURE_DISABLED, "rtc-reset-reinjection");
 }
+
+SevInfo *qmp_query_sev(Error **errp)
+{
+    error_setg(errp, QERR_FEATURE_DISABLED, "query-sev");
+    return NULL;
+}
 #endif
 
 #ifndef TARGET_S390X
qapi-schema.json +61 -0

64 lines not on this page · raw message

target/i386/monitor.c +8 -0
index 55ea10deb8ef..f429b1fc5383 100644
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@
 #include "hw/i386/pc.h"
 #include "sysemu/kvm.h"
 #include "hmp.h"
+#include "sev_i386.h"
+#include "qmp-commands.h"
 
 
 static void print_pte(Monitor *mon, CPUArchState *env, hwaddr addr,
@@ -665,3 +667,9 @@ void hmp_info_io_apic(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
         ioapic_dump_state(mon, qdict);
     }
 }
+
+SevInfo *qmp_query_sev(Error **errp)
+{
+    error_setg(errp, "SEV feature is not available");
+    return NULL;
+}
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
Reviewed-by on v10 9/28
#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v10 09/28] qmp: add query-sev command

Quoted 11 lines · Brijesh Singh

The QMP query command can used to retrieve the SEV information when memory encryption is enabled on AMD platform.

Cc Eric Blake <[email protected]>
Cc "Daniel P. Berrangé" <[email protected]>
Cc "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <[email protected]>
Cc Markus Armbruster <[email protected]>
---
  monitor.c             |  7 ++++++
  qapi-schema.json      | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Based on the pull request I just sent:
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2018-03/msg00394.html
you will have to rebase this to stick things in qapi/misc.json instead.

Quoted 9 lines
  target/i386/monitor.c |  8 +++++++
  3 files changed, 76 insertions(+)

+++ b/qapi-schema.json

qapi-schema.json +0 -0
@@ -3189,3 +3189,64 @@
  # Since: 2.11
  ##
  { 'command': 'watchdog-set-action', 'data' : {'action': 'WatchdogAction'} }

qapi-schema.json line 3201

Quoted 10 lines
qapi-schema.json +10 -0
+
+##
+# @SevState:
+#
+# An enumeration of SEV state information used during @query-sev.
+#
+# Since: 2.12
+##
+{ 'enum': 'SevState',
+  'data': ['uninit', 'lupdate', 'lsecret', 'running', 'supdate', 'rupdate' ] }

Could perhaps give more details about the meaning of each state. But I'm not seeing anything blatantly wrong with the UI changes.

Signature · 3 lines
Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer
Red Hat, Inc.           +1-919-301-3266
Virtualization:  qemu.org | libvirt.org
#11 lore raw

PATCH v10 10/28 include: add psp-sev.h header file

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The header file provide the ioctl command and structure to communicate with /dev/sev device.

Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]>
---
 linux-headers/linux/psp-sev.h | 142 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 142 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 linux-headers/linux/psp-sev.h
linux-headers/linux/psp-sev.h new file +142 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..33e247471ae0
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/*
+ * Userspace interface for AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)
+ * platform management commands.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * SEV spec 0.14 is available at:
+ * http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specification.pdf
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __PSP_SEV_USER_H__
+#define __PSP_SEV_USER_H__
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/**
+ * SEV platform commands
+ */
+enum {
+	SEV_FACTORY_RESET = 0,
+	SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS,
+	SEV_PEK_GEN,
+	SEV_PEK_CSR,
+	SEV_PDH_GEN,
+	SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT,
+	SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT,
+
+	SEV_MAX,
+};
+
+/**
+ * SEV Firmware status code
+ */
+typedef enum {
+	SEV_RET_SUCCESS = 0,
+	SEV_RET_INVALID_PLATFORM_STATE,
+	SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST_STATE,
+	SEV_RET_INAVLID_CONFIG,
+	SEV_RET_INVALID_LEN,
+	SEV_RET_ALREADY_OWNED,
+	SEV_RET_INVALID_CERTIFICATE,
+	SEV_RET_POLICY_FAILURE,
+	SEV_RET_INACTIVE,
+	SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS,
+	SEV_RET_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+	SEV_RET_BAD_MEASUREMENT,
+	SEV_RET_ASID_OWNED,
+	SEV_RET_INVALID_ASID,
+	SEV_RET_WBINVD_REQUIRED,
+	SEV_RET_DFFLUSH_REQUIRED,
+	SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST,
+	SEV_RET_INVALID_COMMAND,
+	SEV_RET_ACTIVE,
+	SEV_RET_HWSEV_RET_PLATFORM,
+	SEV_RET_HWSEV_RET_UNSAFE,
+	SEV_RET_UNSUPPORTED,
+	SEV_RET_MAX,
+} sev_ret_code;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_user_data_status - PLATFORM_STATUS command parameters
+ *
+ * @major: major API version
+ * @minor: minor API version
+ * @state: platform state
+ * @flags: platform config flags
+ * @build: firmware build id for API version
+ * @guest_count: number of active guests
+ */
+struct sev_user_data_status {
+	__u8 api_major;				/* Out */
+	__u8 api_minor;				/* Out */
+	__u8 state;				/* Out */
+	__u32 flags;				/* Out */
+	__u8 build;				/* Out */
+	__u32 guest_count;			/* Out */
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_user_data_pek_csr - PEK_CSR command parameters
+ *
+ * @address: PEK certificate chain
+ * @length: length of certificate
+ */
+struct sev_user_data_pek_csr {
+	__u64 address;				/* In */
+	__u32 length;				/* In/Out */
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_user_data_cert_import - PEK_CERT_IMPORT command parameters
+ *
+ * @pek_address: PEK certificate chain
+ * @pek_len: length of PEK certificate
+ * @oca_address: OCA certificate chain
+ * @oca_len: length of OCA certificate
+ */
+struct sev_user_data_pek_cert_import {
+	__u64 pek_cert_address;			/* In */
+	__u32 pek_cert_len;			/* In */
+	__u64 oca_cert_address;			/* In */
+	__u32 oca_cert_len;			/* In */
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_user_data_pdh_cert_export - PDH_CERT_EXPORT command parameters
+ *
+ * @pdh_address: PDH certificate address
+ * @pdh_len: length of PDH certificate
+ * @cert_chain_address: PDH certificate chain
+ * @cert_chain_len: length of PDH certificate chain
+ */
+struct sev_user_data_pdh_cert_export {
+	__u64 pdh_cert_address;			/* In */
+	__u32 pdh_cert_len;			/* In/Out */
+	__u64 cert_chain_address;		/* In */
+	__u32 cert_chain_len;			/* In/Out */
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_issue_cmd - SEV ioctl parameters
+ *
+ * @cmd: SEV commands to execute
+ * @opaque: pointer to the command structure
+ * @error: SEV FW return code on failure
+ */
+struct sev_issue_cmd {
+	__u32 cmd;				/* In */
+	__u64 data;				/* In */
+	__u32 error;				/* Out */
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
+#define SEV_IOC_TYPE		'S'
+#define SEV_ISSUE_CMD	_IOWR(SEV_IOC_TYPE, 0x0, struct sev_issue_cmd)
+
+#endif /* __PSP_USER_SEV_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#12 lore raw

PATCH v10 11/28 sev/i386: add command to initialize the memory encryption context

In reply to Brijesh Singh

When memory encryption is enabled, KVM_SEV_INIT command is used to initialize the platform. The command loads the SEV related persistent data from non-volatile storage and initializes the platform context. This command should be first issued before invoking any other guest commands provided by the SEV firmware.

Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]>
---
 accel/kvm/kvm-all.c       |  15 ++++
 include/sysemu/sev.h      |  22 +++++
 stubs/Makefile.objs       |   1 +
 stubs/sev.c               |  21 +++++
 target/i386/Makefile.objs |   2 +-
 target/i386/monitor.c     |  11 ++-
 target/i386/sev-stub.c    |  41 +++++++++
 target/i386/sev.c         | 222 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/sev_i386.h    |  29 ++++++
 target/i386/trace-events  |   3 +
 10 files changed, 364 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/sysemu/sev.h
 create mode 100644 stubs/sev.c
 create mode 100644 target/i386/sev-stub.c
accel/kvm/kvm-all.c +15 -0
index b91fcb7160d3..300fc3cd44ce 100644
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 #include "qemu/event_notifier.h"
 #include "trace.h"
 #include "hw/irq.h"
+#include "sysemu/sev.h"
 
 #include "hw/boards.h"
 
@@ -103,6 +104,9 @@ struct KVMState
 #endif
     KVMMemoryListener memory_listener;
     QLIST_HEAD(, KVMParkedVcpu) kvm_parked_vcpus;
+
+    /* memory encryption */
+    void *memcrypt_handle;
 };
 
 KVMState *kvm_state;
@@ -1636,6 +1640,17 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms)
 
     kvm_state = s;
 
+    /*
+     * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the memory
+     * encryption context.
+     */
+    if (ms->memory_encryption) {
+        kvm_state->memcrypt_handle = sev_guest_init(ms->memory_encryption);
+        if (!kvm_state->memcrypt_handle) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
     ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s);
     if (ret < 0) {
         goto err;
include/sysemu/sev.h new file +22 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3f6a26e92789
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/*
+ * QEMU Secure Encrypted Virutualization (SEV) support
+ *
+ * Copyright: Advanced Micro Devices, 2016-2018
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *  Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or later.
+ * See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef QEMU_SEV_H
+#define QEMU_SEV_H
+
+#include "sysemu/kvm.h"
+
+void *sev_guest_init(const char *id);
+int sev_encrypt_data(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len);
+void sev_set_debug_ops(void *handle, MemoryRegion *mr);
+#endif
stubs/Makefile.objs +1 -0
index 2d59d8409162..31b36fdfdb88 100644
@@ -43,3 +43,4 @@ stub-obj-y += xen-common.o
 stub-obj-y += xen-hvm.o
 stub-obj-y += pci-host-piix.o
 stub-obj-y += ram-block.o
+stub-obj-y += sev.o
stubs/sev.c new file +21 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4a5cc5569e5f
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/*
+ * QEMU SEV stub
+ *
+ * Copyright Advanced Micro Devices 2018
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ *      Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2 or later.
+ * See the COPYING file in the top-level directory.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "qemu/osdep.h"
+#include "qemu-common.h"
+#include "sysemu/sev.h"
+
+void *sev_guest_init(const char *id)
+{
+    return NULL;
+}
target/i386/Makefile.objs +1 -1
index 76aeaeae2750..741cb080eb17 100644
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TCG) += int_helper.o mem_helper.o misc_helper.o mpx_helper.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_TCG) += seg_helper.o smm_helper.o svm_helper.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SOFTMMU) += machine.o arch_memory_mapping.o arch_dump.o monitor.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm.o hyperv.o sev.o
-obj-$(call lnot,$(CONFIG_KVM)) += kvm-stub.o
+obj-$(call lnot,$(CONFIG_KVM)) += kvm-stub.o sev-stub.o
 # HAX support
 ifdef CONFIG_WIN32
 obj-$(CONFIG_HAX) += hax-all.o hax-mem.o hax-windows.o
target/i386/monitor.c +9 -2
index f429b1fc5383..e2f02c4be95c 100644
@@ -670,6 +670,13 @@ void hmp_info_io_apic(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
 
 SevInfo *qmp_query_sev(Error **errp)
 {
-    error_setg(errp, "SEV feature is not available");
-    return NULL;
+    SevInfo *info;
+
+    info = sev_get_info();
+    if (!info) {
+        error_setg(errp, "SEV feature is not available");
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return info;
 }
target/i386/sev-stub.c new file +41 -0

41 lines not on this page · raw message

target/i386/sev.c +222 -0

238 lines not on this page · raw message

target/i386/sev_i386.h +29 -0
index caf879c3b874..68019d6f39a5 100644
@@ -14,10 +14,17 @@
 #ifndef QEMU_SEV_I386_H
 #define QEMU_SEV_I386_H
 
+#include <linux/kvm.h>
+#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
+
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+
 #include "qom/object.h"
 #include "qapi/error.h"
 #include "sysemu/kvm.h"
+#include "sysemu/sev.h"
 #include "qemu/error-report.h"
+#include "qapi-types.h"
 
 #define SEV_POLICY_NODBG        0x1
 #define SEV_POLICY_NOKS         0x2
@@ -30,6 +37,12 @@
 #define QSEV_GUEST_INFO(obj)                  \
     OBJECT_CHECK(QSevGuestInfo, (obj), TYPE_QSEV_GUEST_INFO)
 
+extern bool sev_enabled(void);
+extern uint64_t sev_get_me_mask(void);
+extern SevInfo *sev_get_info(void);
+extern uint32_t sev_get_cbit_position(void);
+extern uint32_t sev_get_reduced_phys_bits(void);
+
 typedef struct QSevGuestInfo QSevGuestInfo;
 typedef struct QSevGuestInfoClass QSevGuestInfoClass;
 
@@ -58,4 +71,20 @@ struct QSevGuestInfoClass {
     ObjectClass parent_class;
 };
 
+struct SEVState {
+    QSevGuestInfo *sev_info;
+    uint8_t api_major;
+    uint8_t api_minor;
+    uint8_t build_id;
+    uint32_t policy;
+    uint64_t me_mask;
+    uint32_t cbitpos;
+    uint32_t reduced_phys_bits;
+    uint32_t handle;
+    int sev_fd;
+    SevState state;
+};
+
+typedef struct SEVState SEVState;
+
 #endif
target/i386/trace-events +3 -0
index 3153fd445488..797b716751b7 100644
@@ -5,3 +5,6 @@ kvm_x86_fixup_msi_error(uint32_t gsi) "VT-d failed to remap interrupt for GSI %"
 kvm_x86_add_msi_route(int virq) "Adding route entry for virq %d"
 kvm_x86_remove_msi_route(int virq) "Removing route entry for virq %d"
 kvm_x86_update_msi_routes(int num) "Updated %d MSI routes"
+
+# target/i386/sev.c
+kvm_sev_init(void) ""
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#13 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v10 11/28] sev/i386: add command to initialize the memory encryption context

Hi Brijesh,

I triggered an assertion failure here:

Quoted 25 lines · Brijesh Singh

When memory encryption is enabled, KVM_SEV_INIT command is used to initialize the platform. The command loads the SEV related persistent data from non-volatile storage and initializes the platform context. This command should be first issued before invoking any other guest commands provided by the SEV firmware.

Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]>
---
 accel/kvm/kvm-all.c       |  15 ++++
 include/sysemu/sev.h      |  22 +++++
 stubs/Makefile.objs       |   1 +
 stubs/sev.c               |  21 +++++
 target/i386/Makefile.objs |   2 +-
 target/i386/monitor.c     |  11 ++-
 target/i386/sev-stub.c    |  41 +++++++++
 target/i386/sev.c         | 222 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/sev_i386.h    |  29 ++++++
 target/i386/trace-events  |   3 +
 10 files changed, 364 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/sysemu/sev.h
 create mode 100644 stubs/sev.c
 create mode 100644 target/i386/sev-stub.c

[...]

Quoted 5 lines
accel/kvm/kvm-all.c +1 -0
@@ -1636,6 +1640,17 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms)
 
     kvm_state = s;
 
+    /*

accel/kvm/kvm-all.c static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms) · line 1653

Quoted 10 lines
accel/kvm/kvm-all.c +10 -0
+     * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the memory
+     * encryption context.
+     */
+    if (ms->memory_encryption) {
+        kvm_state->memcrypt_handle = sev_guest_init(ms->memory_encryption);
+        if (!kvm_state->memcrypt_handle) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+

You should set the "err" variable to a negative error code; otherwise the assertion at the "err" label will trigger:

err:

    assert(ret < 0);

Thanks
Laszlo

#14 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v10 11/28] sev/i386: add command to initialize the memory encryption context

Hi Laszlo,

Quoted 50 lines · Laszlo Ersek

Hi Brijesh,

I triggered an assertion failure here:

Quoted 25 lines · Brijesh Singh

When memory encryption is enabled, KVM_SEV_INIT command is used to initialize the platform. The command loads the SEV related persistent data from non-volatile storage and initializes the platform context. This command should be first issued before invoking any other guest commands provided by the SEV firmware.

Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]>
---
 accel/kvm/kvm-all.c       |  15 ++++
 include/sysemu/sev.h      |  22 +++++
 stubs/Makefile.objs       |   1 +
 stubs/sev.c               |  21 +++++
 target/i386/Makefile.objs |   2 +-
 target/i386/monitor.c     |  11 ++-
 target/i386/sev-stub.c    |  41 +++++++++
 target/i386/sev.c         | 222 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/sev_i386.h    |  29 ++++++
 target/i386/trace-events  |   3 +
 10 files changed, 364 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/sysemu/sev.h
 create mode 100644 stubs/sev.c
 create mode 100644 target/i386/sev-stub.c

[...]

Quoted 5 lines
accel/kvm/kvm-all.c +1 -0
@@ -1636,6 +1640,17 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms)
 
     kvm_state = s;
 
+    /*

accel/kvm/kvm-all.c static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms) · line 1653

Quoted 10 lines
accel/kvm/kvm-all.c +10 -0
+     * if memory encryption object is specified then initialize the memory
+     * encryption context.
+     */
+    if (ms->memory_encryption) {
+        kvm_state->memcrypt_handle = sev_guest_init(ms->memory_encryption);
+        if (!kvm_state->memcrypt_handle) {
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+

You should set the "err" variable to a negative error code; otherwise the assertion at the "err" label will trigger:

Quoted 2 lines

err:

    assert(ret < 0);

Noted, will fix in v11. thanks for reporting this.

#15 lore raw

PATCH v10 12/28 sev/i386: register the guest memory range which may contain encrypted data

In reply to Brijesh Singh

When SEV is enabled, the hardware encryption engine uses a tweak such that the two identical plaintext at different location will have a different ciphertexts. So swapping or moving a ciphertexts of two guest pages will not result in plaintexts being swapped. Hence relocating a physical backing pages of the SEV guest will require some additional steps in KVM driver. The KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_{UN,}REG_REGION ioctl can be used to register/unregister the guest memory region which may contain the encrypted data. KVM driver will internally handle the relocating physical backing pages of registered memory regions.

Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]>
---
 target/i386/sev.c        | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/trace-events |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
target/i386/sev.c +41 -0
index 80569f4bcf49..8ee6159b2bfc 100644
@@ -100,6 +100,45 @@ fw_error_to_str(int code)
     return sev_fw_errlist[code];
 }
 
+static void
+sev_ram_block_added(RAMBlockNotifier *n, void *host, size_t size)
+{
+    int r;
+    struct kvm_enc_region range;
+
+    range.addr = (__u64)host;
+    range.size = size;
+
+    trace_kvm_memcrypt_register_region(host, size);
+    r = kvm_vm_ioctl(kvm_state, KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION, &range);
+    if (r) {
+        error_report("%s: failed to register region (%p+%#lx)",
+                     __func__, host, size);
+    }
+}
+
+static void
+sev_ram_block_removed(RAMBlockNotifier *n, void *host, size_t size)
+{
+    int r;
+    struct kvm_enc_region range;
+
+    range.addr = (__u64)host;
+    range.size = size;
+
+    trace_kvm_memcrypt_unregister_region(host, size);
+    r = kvm_vm_ioctl(kvm_state, KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_UNREG_REGION, &range);
+    if (r) {
+        error_report("%s: failed to unregister region (%p+%#lx)",
+                     __func__, host, size);
+    }
+}
+
+static struct RAMBlockNotifier sev_ram_notifier = {
+    .ram_block_added = sev_ram_block_added,
+    .ram_block_removed = sev_ram_block_removed,
+};
+
 static void
 qsev_guest_finalize(Object *obj)
 {
@@ -434,6 +473,8 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id)
         goto err;
     }
 
+    ram_block_notifier_add(&sev_ram_notifier);
+
     return s;
 err:
     g_free(sev_state);
target/i386/trace-events +2 -0
index 797b716751b7..ffa3d2250425 100644
@@ -8,3 +8,5 @@ kvm_x86_update_msi_routes(int num) "Updated %d MSI routes"
 
 # target/i386/sev.c
 kvm_sev_init(void) ""
+kvm_memcrypt_register_region(void *addr, size_t len) "addr %p len 0x%lu"
+kvm_memcrypt_unregister_region(void *addr, size_t len) "addr %p len 0x%lu"
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#16 lore raw

PATCH v10 13/28 kvm: introduce memory encryption APIs

In reply to Brijesh Singh

Inorder to integerate the Secure Encryption Virtualization (SEV) support add few high-level memory encryption APIs which can be used for encrypting the guest memory region.

---
 accel/kvm/kvm-all.c    | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
 include/sysemu/kvm.h   | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 69 insertions(+)
accel/kvm/kvm-all.c +30 -0
index 300fc3cd44ce..4468c8fe002c 100644
@@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ struct KVMState
 
     /* memory encryption */
     void *memcrypt_handle;
+    int (*memcrypt_encrypt_data)(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len);
+    void (*memcrypt_debug_ops)(void *handle, MemoryRegion *mr);
 };
 
 KVMState *kvm_state;
@@ -142,6 +144,34 @@ int kvm_get_max_memslots(void)
     return s->nr_slots;
 }
 
+bool kvm_memcrypt_enabled(void)
+{
+    if (kvm_state && kvm_state->memcrypt_handle) {
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    return false;
+}
+
+int kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len)
+{
+    if (kvm_state->memcrypt_handle &&
+        kvm_state->memcrypt_encrypt_data) {
+        return kvm_state->memcrypt_encrypt_data(kvm_state->memcrypt_handle,
+                                              ptr, len);
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+void kvm_memcrypt_set_debug_ops(MemoryRegion *mr)
+{
+    if (kvm_state->memcrypt_handle &&
+        kvm_state->memcrypt_debug_ops) {
+        kvm_state->memcrypt_debug_ops(kvm_state->memcrypt_handle, mr);
+    }
+}
+
 static KVMSlot *kvm_get_free_slot(KVMMemoryListener *kml)
 {
     KVMState *s = kvm_state;
accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c +14 -0
index c964af3e1c97..5739712a67e3 100644
@@ -105,6 +105,20 @@ int kvm_on_sigbus(int code, void *addr)
     return 1;
 }
 
+bool kvm_memcrypt_enabled(void)
+{
+    return false;
+}
+
+int kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len)
+{
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void kvm_memcrypt_set_debug_ops(MemoryRegion *mr)
+{
+}
+
 #ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
 int kvm_irqchip_add_msi_route(KVMState *s, int vector, PCIDevice *dev)
 {
include/sysemu/kvm.h +25 -0
index 85002ac49a54..d69bd1ff2b07 100644
@@ -231,6 +231,31 @@ int kvm_destroy_vcpu(CPUState *cpu);
  */
 bool kvm_arm_supports_user_irq(void);
 
+/**
+ * kvm_memcrypt_enabled - return boolean indicating whether memory encryption
+ *                        is enabled
+ * Returns: 1 memory encryption is enabled
+ *          0 memory encryption is disabled
+ */
+bool kvm_memcrypt_enabled(void);
+
+/**
+ * kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data: encrypt the memory range
+ *
+ * Return: 1 failed to encrypt the range
+ *         0 succesfully encrypted memory region
+ */
+int kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len);
+
+/**
+ * kvm_memcrypt_set_debug_ram_ops: set debug_ram_ops callback
+ *
+ * When debug_ram_ops is set, debug access to this memory region will use
+ * memory encryption APIs.
+ */
+void kvm_memcrypt_set_debug_ops(MemoryRegion *mr);
+
+
 #ifdef NEED_CPU_H
 #include "cpu.h"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#17 lore raw

PATCH v10 14/28 hmp: add 'info sev' command

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The command can be used to show the SEV information when memory encryption is enabled on AMD platform.

Cc Eric Blake <[email protected]>
Cc "Daniel P. Berrangé" <[email protected]>
Cc "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <[email protected]>
Cc Markus Armbruster <[email protected]>

---

Hi Dave,

I updated the patch to address your comment on making this x86 specific, but still kept your R-b, if you don't agree with changes then let me know.

thanks

 hmp-commands-info.hx  | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 hmp.h                 |  1 +
 target/i386/monitor.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
hmp-commands-info.hx +16 -0
index ad590a4ffb2b..ddfcd5adcca6 100644
@@ -867,6 +867,22 @@ Display the amount of initially allocated and present hotpluggable (if
 enabled) memory in bytes.
 ETEXI
 
+#if defined(TARGET_I386)
+    {
+        .name       = "sev",
+        .args_type  = "",
+        .params     = "",
+        .help       = "show SEV information",
+        .cmd        = hmp_info_sev,
+    },
+#endif
+
+STEXI
+@item info sev
+@findex info sev
+Show SEV information.
+ETEXI
+
 STEXI
 @end table
 ETEXI
hmp.h +1 -0
index 1143db44a760..4ca1a77b2c1f 100644
@@ -146,5 +146,6 @@ void hmp_info_ramblock(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict);
 void hmp_hotpluggable_cpus(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict);
 void hmp_info_vm_generation_id(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict);
 void hmp_info_memory_size_summary(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict);
+void hmp_info_sev(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict);
 
 #endif
target/i386/monitor.c +20 -0
index e2f02c4be95c..e664030dbd72 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include "qapi/qmp/qdict.h"
 #include "hw/i386/pc.h"
 #include "sysemu/kvm.h"
+#include "sysemu/sev.h"
 #include "hmp.h"
 #include "sev_i386.h"
 #include "qmp-commands.h"
@@ -680,3 +681,22 @@ SevInfo *qmp_query_sev(Error **errp)
 
     return info;
 }
+
+void hmp_info_sev(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
+{
+    SevInfo *info = sev_get_info();
+
+    if (info && info->enabled) {
+        monitor_printf(mon, "handle: %d\n", info->handle);
+        monitor_printf(mon, "state: %s\n", SevState_str(info->state));
+        monitor_printf(mon, "build: %d\n", info->build_id);
+        monitor_printf(mon, "api version: %d.%d\n",
+                       info->api_major, info->api_minor);
+        monitor_printf(mon, "debug: %s\n",
+                       info->policy & SEV_POLICY_NODBG ? "off" : "on");
+        monitor_printf(mon, "key-sharing: %s\n",
+                       info->policy & SEV_POLICY_NOKS ? "off" : "on");
+    } else {
+        monitor_printf(mon, "SEV is not enabled\n");
+    }
+}
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
Reviewed-by on v10 14/28
#18 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v10 14/28] hmp: add 'info sev' command

Quoted 9 lines · * Brijesh Singh ([email protected]) wrote:

The command can be used to show the SEV information when memory encryption is enabled on AMD platform.

Cc Eric Blake <[email protected]>
Cc "Daniel P. Berrangé" <[email protected]>
Cc "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <[email protected]>
Cc Markus Armbruster <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines

---

Hi Dave,

I updated the patch to address your comment on making this x86 specific, but still kept your R-b, if you don't agree with changes then let me know.

Yes, that's fine, thanks.

Dave

Quoted 83 lines

thanks

 hmp-commands-info.hx  | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 hmp.h                 |  1 +
 target/i386/monitor.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
hmp-commands-info.hx +16 -0
index ad590a4ffb2b..ddfcd5adcca6 100644
@@ -867,6 +867,22 @@ Display the amount of initially allocated and present hotpluggable (if
 enabled) memory in bytes.
 ETEXI
 
+#if defined(TARGET_I386)
+    {
+        .name       = "sev",
+        .args_type  = "",
+        .params     = "",
+        .help       = "show SEV information",
+        .cmd        = hmp_info_sev,
+    },
+#endif
+
+STEXI
+@item info sev
+@findex info sev
+Show SEV information.
+ETEXI
+
 STEXI
 @end table
 ETEXI
hmp.h +1 -0
index 1143db44a760..4ca1a77b2c1f 100644
@@ -146,5 +146,6 @@ void hmp_info_ramblock(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict);
 void hmp_hotpluggable_cpus(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict);
 void hmp_info_vm_generation_id(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict);
 void hmp_info_memory_size_summary(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict);
+void hmp_info_sev(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict);
 
 #endif
target/i386/monitor.c +20 -0
index e2f02c4be95c..e664030dbd72 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include "qapi/qmp/qdict.h"
 #include "hw/i386/pc.h"
 #include "sysemu/kvm.h"
+#include "sysemu/sev.h"
 #include "hmp.h"
 #include "sev_i386.h"
 #include "qmp-commands.h"
@@ -680,3 +681,22 @@ SevInfo *qmp_query_sev(Error **errp)
 
     return info;
 }
+
+void hmp_info_sev(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
+{
+    SevInfo *info = sev_get_info();
+
+    if (info && info->enabled) {
+        monitor_printf(mon, "handle: %d\n", info->handle);
+        monitor_printf(mon, "state: %s\n", SevState_str(info->state));
+        monitor_printf(mon, "build: %d\n", info->build_id);
+        monitor_printf(mon, "api version: %d.%d\n",
+                       info->api_major, info->api_minor);
+        monitor_printf(mon, "debug: %s\n",
+                       info->policy & SEV_POLICY_NODBG ? "off" : "on");
+        monitor_printf(mon, "key-sharing: %s\n",
+                       info->policy & SEV_POLICY_NOKS ? "off" : "on");
+    } else {
+        monitor_printf(mon, "SEV is not enabled\n");
+    }
+}
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3

--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK

#19 lore raw

PATCH v10 15/28 sev/i386: add command to create launch memory encryption context

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command creates a new VM encryption key (VEK). The encryption key created with the command will be used for encrypting the bootstrap images (such as guest bios).

Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]>
---
 target/i386/sev.c        | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/trace-events |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 88 insertions(+)
target/i386/sev.c +86 -0
index 8ee6159b2bfc..b867ffbc0eae 100644
@@ -100,6 +100,17 @@ fw_error_to_str(int code)
     return sev_fw_errlist[code];
 }
 
+static void
+sev_set_guest_state(SevState new_state)
+{
+    assert(new_state < SEV_STATE__MAX);
+    assert(sev_state);
+
+    trace_kvm_sev_change_state(SevState_str(sev_state->state),
+                               SevState_str(new_state));
+    sev_state->state = new_state;
+}
+
 static void
 sev_ram_block_added(RAMBlockNotifier *n, void *host, size_t size)
 {
@@ -400,6 +411,75 @@ sev_get_info(void)
     return info;
 }
 
+static int
+sev_read_file_base64(const char *filename, guchar **data, gsize *len)
+{
+    gsize sz;
+    gchar *base64;
+    GError *error = NULL;
+
+    if (!g_file_get_contents(filename, &base64, &sz, &error)) {
+        error_report("failed to read '%s' (%s)", filename, error->message);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    *data = g_base64_decode(base64, len);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+sev_launch_start(SEVState *s)
+{
+    gsize sz;
+    int ret = 1;
+    int fw_error;
+    QSevGuestInfo *sev = s->sev_info;
+    struct kvm_sev_launch_start *start;
+    guchar *session = NULL, *dh_cert = NULL;
+
+    start = g_new0(struct kvm_sev_launch_start, 1);
+
+    start->handle = object_property_get_int(OBJECT(sev), "handle",
+                                            &error_abort);
+    start->policy = object_property_get_int(OBJECT(sev), "policy",
+                                            &error_abort);
+    if (sev->session_file) {
+        if (sev_read_file_base64(sev->session_file, &session, &sz) < 0) {
+            return 1;
+        }
+        start->session_uaddr = (unsigned long)session;
+        start->session_len = sz;
+    }
+
+    if (sev->dh_cert_file) {
+        if (sev_read_file_base64(sev->dh_cert_file, &dh_cert, &sz) < 0) {
+            return 1;
+        }
+        start->dh_uaddr = (unsigned long)dh_cert;
+        start->dh_len = sz;
+    }
+
+    trace_kvm_sev_launch_start(start->policy, session, dh_cert);
+    ret = sev_ioctl(s->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START, start, &fw_error);
+    if (ret < 0) {
+        error_report("%s: LAUNCH_START ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
+                __func__, ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    object_property_set_int(OBJECT(sev), start->handle, "handle",
+                            &error_abort);
+    sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_LUPDATE);
+    s->handle = start->handle;
+    s->policy = start->policy;
+
+    g_free(start);
+    g_free(session);
+    g_free(dh_cert);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
 void *
 sev_guest_init(const char *id)
 {
@@ -473,6 +553,12 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id)
         goto err;
     }
 
+    ret = sev_launch_start(s);
+    if (ret) {
+        error_report("%s: failed to create encryption context", __func__);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
     ram_block_notifier_add(&sev_ram_notifier);
 
     return s;
target/i386/trace-events +2 -0
index ffa3d2250425..9402251e9991 100644
@@ -10,3 +10,5 @@ kvm_x86_update_msi_routes(int num) "Updated %d MSI routes"
 kvm_sev_init(void) ""
 kvm_memcrypt_register_region(void *addr, size_t len) "addr %p len 0x%lu"
 kvm_memcrypt_unregister_region(void *addr, size_t len) "addr %p len 0x%lu"
+kvm_sev_change_state(const char *old, const char *new) "%s -> %s"
+kvm_sev_launch_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session %p pdh %p"
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#20 lore raw

PATCH v10 16/28 sev/i386: add command to encrypt guest memory region

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command is used to encrypt a guest memory region using the VM Encryption Key created using LAUNCH_START.

Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]>
---
 accel/kvm/kvm-all.c      |  2 ++
 stubs/sev.c              |  5 +++++
 target/i386/sev.c        | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/trace-events |  1 +
 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+)
accel/kvm/kvm-all.c +2 -0
index 4468c8fe002c..4974c00c46fb 100644
@@ -1679,6 +1679,8 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms)
         if (!kvm_state->memcrypt_handle) {
             goto err;
         }
+
+        kvm_state->memcrypt_encrypt_data = sev_encrypt_data;
     }
 
     ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s);
stubs/sev.c +5 -0
index 4a5cc5569e5f..2e20f3b73a5b 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,11 @@
 #include "qemu-common.h"
 #include "sysemu/sev.h"
 
+int sev_encrypt_data(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
+
 void *sev_guest_init(const char *id)
 {
     return NULL;
target/i386/sev.c +43 -0

61 lines not on this page · raw message

target/i386/trace-events +1 -0
index 9402251e9991..c0cd8e93217f 100644
@@ -12,3 +12,4 @@ kvm_memcrypt_register_region(void *addr, size_t len) "addr %p len 0x%lu"
 kvm_memcrypt_unregister_region(void *addr, size_t len) "addr %p len 0x%lu"
 kvm_sev_change_state(const char *old, const char *new) "%s -> %s"
 kvm_sev_launch_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session %p pdh %p"
+kvm_sev_launch_update_data(void *addr, uint64_t len) "addr %p len 0x%" PRIu64
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#21 lore raw

PATCH v10 17/28 target/i386: encrypt bios rom

In reply to Brijesh Singh

SEV requires that guest bios must be encrypted before booting the guest.

Cc "Michael S. Tsirkin" <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]>
---
 hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c +13 -0
index 4325575e7d82..73ac783f2055 100644
@@ -113,6 +113,8 @@ static void pc_system_flash_init(MemoryRegion *rom_memory)
     pflash_t *system_flash;
     MemoryRegion *flash_mem;
     char name[64];
+    void *flash_ptr;
+    int ret, flash_size;
 
     sector_bits = 12;
     sector_size = 1 << sector_bits;
@@ -169,6 +171,17 @@ static void pc_system_flash_init(MemoryRegion *rom_memory)
         if (unit == 0) {
             flash_mem = pflash_cfi01_get_memory(system_flash);
             pc_isa_bios_init(rom_memory, flash_mem, size);
+
+            /* Encrypt the pflash boot ROM */
+            if (kvm_memcrypt_enabled()) {
+                flash_ptr = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(flash_mem);
+                flash_size = memory_region_size(flash_mem);
+                ret = kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(flash_ptr, flash_size);
+                if (ret) {
+                    error_report("failed to encrypt pflash rom");
+                    exit(1);
+                }
+            }
         }
     }
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#22 lore raw

PATCH v10 18/28 sev/i386: add support to LAUNCH_MEASURE command

In reply to Brijesh Singh

During machine creation we encrypted the guest bios image, the LAUNCH_MEASURE command can be used to retrieve the measurement of the encrypted memory region. This measurement is a signature of the memory contents that can be sent to the guest owner as an attestation that the memory was encrypted correctly by the firmware. VM management tools like libvirt can query the measurement using query-sev-launch-measure QMP command.

Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]>
---
 target/i386/sev-stub.c   |  5 ++++
 target/i386/sev.c        | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/sev_i386.h   |  2 ++
 target/i386/trace-events |  1 +
 4 files changed, 71 insertions(+)
target/i386/sev-stub.c +5 -0
index c86d8c139237..2f61c32ec975 100644
@@ -39,3 +39,8 @@ uint32_t sev_get_reduced_phys_bits(void)
 {
     return 0;
 }
+
+char *sev_get_launch_measurement(void)
+{
+    return NULL;
+}
target/i386/sev.c +63 -0

75 lines not on this page · raw message

target/i386/sev_i386.h +2 -0
index 68019d6f39a5..2ecca66f6e64 100644
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ extern uint64_t sev_get_me_mask(void);
 extern SevInfo *sev_get_info(void);
 extern uint32_t sev_get_cbit_position(void);
 extern uint32_t sev_get_reduced_phys_bits(void);
+extern char *sev_get_launch_measurement(void);
 
 typedef struct QSevGuestInfo QSevGuestInfo;
 typedef struct QSevGuestInfoClass QSevGuestInfoClass;
@@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ struct SEVState {
     uint32_t handle;
     int sev_fd;
     SevState state;
+    gchar *measurement;
 };
 
 typedef struct SEVState SEVState;
target/i386/trace-events +1 -0
index c0cd8e93217f..f7a1a1e6b85c 100644
@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ kvm_memcrypt_unregister_region(void *addr, size_t len) "addr %p len 0x%lu"
 kvm_sev_change_state(const char *old, const char *new) "%s -> %s"
 kvm_sev_launch_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session %p pdh %p"
 kvm_sev_launch_update_data(void *addr, uint64_t len) "addr %p len 0x%" PRIu64
+kvm_sev_launch_measurement(const char *value) "data %s"
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#23 lore raw

PATCH v10 19/28 sev/i386: finalize the SEV guest launch flow

In reply to Brijesh Singh

SEV launch flow requires us to issue LAUNCH_FINISH command before guest is ready to run.

Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]>
---
 target/i386/sev.c        | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/trace-events |  1 +
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
target/i386/sev.c +29 -0
index a61c100ef47b..c341257fcc14 100644
@@ -572,6 +572,34 @@ static Notifier sev_machine_done_notify = {
     .notify = sev_launch_get_measure,
 };
 
+static void
+sev_launch_finish(SEVState *s)
+{
+    int ret, error;
+
+    trace_kvm_sev_launch_finish();
+    ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH, 0, &error);
+    if (ret) {
+        error_report("%s: LAUNCH_FINISH ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
+                     __func__, ret, error, fw_error_to_str(error));
+        exit(1);
+    }
+
+    sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING);
+}
+
+static void
+sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, int running, RunState state)
+{
+    SEVState *s = opaque;
+
+    if (running) {
+        if (!sev_check_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING)) {
+            sev_launch_finish(s);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 void *
 sev_guest_init(const char *id)
 {
@@ -653,6 +681,7 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id)
 
     ram_block_notifier_add(&sev_ram_notifier);
     qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier(&sev_machine_done_notify);
+    qemu_add_vm_change_state_handler(sev_vm_state_change, s);
 
     return s;
 err:
target/i386/trace-events +1 -0
index f7a1a1e6b85c..b1fbde6e40fe 100644
@@ -14,3 +14,4 @@ kvm_sev_change_state(const char *old, const char *new) "%s -> %s"
 kvm_sev_launch_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session %p pdh %p"
 kvm_sev_launch_update_data(void *addr, uint64_t len) "addr %p len 0x%" PRIu64
 kvm_sev_launch_measurement(const char *value) "data %s"
+kvm_sev_launch_finish(void) ""
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#24 lore raw

PATCH v10 20/28 hw/i386: set ram_debug_ops when memory encryption is enabled

In reply to Brijesh Singh

When memory encryption is enabled, the guest RAM and boot flash ROM will contain the encrypted data. By setting the debug ops allow us to invoke encryption APIs when accessing the memory for the debug purposes.

Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]>
Cc "Michael S. Tsirkin" <[email protected]>
---
 hw/i386/pc.c       | 9 +++++++++
 hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
hw/i386/pc.c +9 -0
index 55e69d66fe6f..53ddecef369c 100644
@@ -1360,6 +1360,15 @@ void pc_memory_init(PCMachineState *pcms,
         e820_add_entry(0x100000000ULL, pcms->above_4g_mem_size, E820_RAM);
     }
 
+    /*
+     * When memory encryption is enabled, the guest RAM will be encrypted with
+     * a guest unique key. Set the debug ops so that any debug access to the
+     * guest RAM will go through the memory encryption APIs.
+     */
+    if (kvm_memcrypt_enabled()) {
+        kvm_memcrypt_set_debug_ops(ram);
+    }
+
     if (!pcmc->has_reserved_memory &&
         (machine->ram_slots ||
          (machine->maxram_size > machine->ram_size))) {
hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c +6 -0
index 73ac783f2055..845240f97293 100644
@@ -181,6 +181,12 @@ static void pc_system_flash_init(MemoryRegion *rom_memory)
                     error_report("failed to encrypt pflash rom");
                     exit(1);
                 }
+
+                /*
+                 * The pflash ROM is encrypted, set the debug ops so that any
+                 * debug accesses will use memory encryption APIs.
+                 */
+                kvm_memcrypt_set_debug_ops(flash_mem);
             }
         }
     }
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#25 lore raw

PATCH v10 21/28 sev/i386: add debug encrypt and decrypt commands

In reply to Brijesh Singh

KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT and KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT commands are used for decrypting and encrypting guest memory region. The command works only if the guest policy allows the debugging.

Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]>
---
 accel/kvm/kvm-all.c      |  1 +
 stubs/sev.c              |  4 ++++
 target/i386/sev.c        | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/trace-events |  1 +
 4 files changed, 63 insertions(+)
accel/kvm/kvm-all.c +1 -0
index 4974c00c46fb..f53d4ca503b0 100644
@@ -1681,6 +1681,7 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms)
         }
 
         kvm_state->memcrypt_encrypt_data = sev_encrypt_data;
+        kvm_state->memcrypt_debug_ops = sev_set_debug_ops;
     }
 
     ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s);
stubs/sev.c +4 -0
index 2e20f3b73a5b..73f5c7f93a67 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@
 #include "qemu-common.h"
 #include "sysemu/sev.h"
 
+void sev_set_debug_ops(void *handle, MemoryRegion *mr)
+{
+}
+
 int sev_encrypt_data(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len)
 {
     return 1;
target/i386/sev.c +57 -0

75 lines not on this page · raw message

target/i386/trace-events +1 -0
index b1fbde6e40fe..00aa6e98d810 100644
@@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ kvm_sev_launch_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session
 kvm_sev_launch_update_data(void *addr, uint64_t len) "addr %p len 0x%" PRIu64
 kvm_sev_launch_measurement(const char *value) "data %s"
 kvm_sev_launch_finish(void) ""
+kvm_sev_debug(const char *op, const uint8_t *src, uint8_t *dst, int len) "(%s) src %p dst %p len %d"
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#26 lore raw

PATCH v10 22/28 target/i386: clear C-bit when walking SEV guest page table

In reply to Brijesh Singh

In SEV-enabled guest the pte entry will have C-bit set, we need to clear the C-bit when walking the page table.

Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]>
---
 target/i386/helper.c  | 31 +++++++++++++----------
 target/i386/monitor.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 2 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
target/i386/helper.c +18 -13
index 58fb6eec562a..dc5c7005cf13 100644
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include "cpu.h"
 #include "exec/exec-all.h"
 #include "sysemu/kvm.h"
+#include "sev_i386.h"
 #include "kvm_i386.h"
 #ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
 #include "sysemu/sysemu.h"
@@ -732,6 +733,9 @@ hwaddr x86_cpu_get_phys_page_debug(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr)
     int32_t a20_mask;
     uint32_t page_offset;
     int page_size;
+    uint64_t me_mask;
+
+    me_mask = sev_get_me_mask();
 
     a20_mask = x86_get_a20_mask(env);
     if (!(env->cr[0] & CR0_PG_MASK)) {
@@ -755,25 +759,25 @@ hwaddr x86_cpu_get_phys_page_debug(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr)
             }
 
             if (la57) {
-                pml5e_addr = ((env->cr[3] & ~0xfff) +
+                pml5e_addr = ((env->cr[3] & ~0xfff & me_mask) +
                         (((addr >> 48) & 0x1ff) << 3)) & a20_mask;
-                pml5e = ldq_phys_debug(cs, pml5e_addr);
+                pml5e = ldq_phys_debug(cs, pml5e_addr) & me_mask;
                 if (!(pml5e & PG_PRESENT_MASK)) {
                     return -1;
                 }
             } else {
-                pml5e = env->cr[3];
+                pml5e = env->cr[3] & me_mask;
             }
 
             pml4e_addr = ((pml5e & PG_ADDRESS_MASK) +
                     (((addr >> 39) & 0x1ff) << 3)) & a20_mask;
-            pml4e = ldq_phys_debug(cs, pml4e_addr);
+            pml4e = ldq_phys_debug(cs, pml4e_addr) & me_mask;
             if (!(pml4e & PG_PRESENT_MASK)) {
                 return -1;
             }
             pdpe_addr = ((pml4e & PG_ADDRESS_MASK) +
                          (((addr >> 30) & 0x1ff) << 3)) & a20_mask;
-            pdpe = x86_ldq_phys(cs, pdpe_addr);
+            pdpe = ldq_phys_debug(cs, pdpe_addr) & me_mask;
             if (!(pdpe & PG_PRESENT_MASK)) {
                 return -1;
             }
@@ -786,16 +790,16 @@ hwaddr x86_cpu_get_phys_page_debug(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr)
         } else
 #endif
         {
-            pdpe_addr = ((env->cr[3] & ~0x1f) + ((addr >> 27) & 0x18)) &
-                a20_mask;
-            pdpe = ldq_phys_debug(cs, pdpe_addr);
+            pdpe_addr = ((env->cr[3] & ~0x1f & me_mask) + ((addr >> 27) & 0x18))
+                          & a20_mask;
+            pdpe = ldq_phys_debug(cs, pdpe_addr) & me_mask;
             if (!(pdpe & PG_PRESENT_MASK))
                 return -1;
         }
 
         pde_addr = ((pdpe & PG_ADDRESS_MASK) +
                     (((addr >> 21) & 0x1ff) << 3)) & a20_mask;
-        pde = ldq_phys_debug(cs, pde_addr);
+        pde = ldq_phys_debug(cs, pde_addr) & me_mask;
         if (!(pde & PG_PRESENT_MASK)) {
             return -1;
         }
@@ -808,7 +812,7 @@ hwaddr x86_cpu_get_phys_page_debug(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr)
             pte_addr = ((pde & PG_ADDRESS_MASK) +
                         (((addr >> 12) & 0x1ff) << 3)) & a20_mask;
             page_size = 4096;
-            pte = ldq_phys_debug(cs, pte_addr);
+            pte = ldq_phys_debug(cs, pte_addr) & me_mask;
         }
         if (!(pte & PG_PRESENT_MASK)) {
             return -1;
@@ -817,8 +821,9 @@ hwaddr x86_cpu_get_phys_page_debug(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr)
         uint32_t pde;
 
         /* page directory entry */
-        pde_addr = ((env->cr[3] & ~0xfff) + ((addr >> 20) & 0xffc)) & a20_mask;
-        pde = ldl_phys_debug(cs, pde_addr);
+        pde_addr = ((env->cr[3] & ~0xfff & me_mask) + ((addr >> 20) & 0xffc))
+                     & a20_mask;
+        pde = ldl_phys_debug(cs, pde_addr) & me_mask;
         if (!(pde & PG_PRESENT_MASK))
             return -1;
         if ((pde & PG_PSE_MASK) && (env->cr[4] & CR4_PSE_MASK)) {
@@ -827,7 +832,7 @@ hwaddr x86_cpu_get_phys_page_debug(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr)
         } else {
             /* page directory entry */
             pte_addr = ((pde & ~0xfff) + ((addr >> 10) & 0xffc)) & a20_mask;
-            pte = ldl_phys_debug(cs, pte_addr);
+            pte = ldl_phys_debug(cs, pte_addr) & me_mask;
             if (!(pte & PG_PRESENT_MASK)) {
                 return -1;
             }
target/i386/monitor.c +44 -24

209 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#27 lore raw

PATCH v10 23/28 qmp: add query-sev-launch-measure command

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The command can be used by libvirt to retrieve the measurement of SEV guest. This measurement is a signature of the memory contents that was encrypted through the LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA.

Cc "Daniel P. Berrangé" <[email protected]>
Cc "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <[email protected]>
Cc Markus Armbruster <[email protected]>
---
 monitor.c             |  7 +++++++
 qapi-schema.json      | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/monitor.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
monitor.c +7 -0
index 356d550aaf2d..d0ebd5906d9d 100644
@@ -984,6 +984,7 @@ static void qmp_unregister_commands_hack(void)
 #ifndef TARGET_I386
     qmp_unregister_command(&qmp_commands, "rtc-reset-reinjection");
     qmp_unregister_command(&qmp_commands, "query-sev");
+    qmp_unregister_command(&qmp_commands, "query-sev-launch-measure");
 #endif
 #ifndef TARGET_S390X
     qmp_unregister_command(&qmp_commands, "dump-skeys");
@@ -4164,6 +4165,12 @@ SevInfo *qmp_query_sev(Error **errp)
     error_setg(errp, QERR_FEATURE_DISABLED, "query-sev");
     return NULL;
 }
+
+SevLaunchMeasureInfo *qmp_query_sev_launch_measure(Error **errp)
+{
+    error_setg(errp, QERR_FEATURE_DISABLED, "query-sev-launch-measure");
+    return NULL;
+}
 #endif
 
 #ifndef TARGET_S390X
qapi-schema.json +29 -0
index 467a06460ead..facf2138df6b 100644
@@ -3250,3 +3250,32 @@
 #
 ##
 { 'command': 'query-sev', 'returns': 'SevInfo' }
+
+##
+# @SevLaunchMeasureInfo:
+#
+# SEV Guest Launch measurement information
+#
+# @data: the measurement value encoded in base64
+#
+# Since: 2.12
+#
+##
+{ 'struct': 'SevLaunchMeasureInfo', 'data': {'data': 'str'} }
+
+##
+# @query-sev-launch-measure:
+#
+# Query the SEV guest launch information.
+#
+# Returns: The @SevLaunchMeasureInfo for the guest
+#
+# Since: 2.12
+#
+# Example:
+#
+# -> { "execute": "query-sev-launch-measure" }
+# <- { "return": { "data": "4l8LXeNlSPUDlXPJG5966/8%YZ" } }
+#
+##
+{ 'command': 'query-sev-launch-measure', 'returns': 'SevLaunchMeasureInfo' }
target/i386/monitor.c +17 -0
index 64d459f80f0c..577d50eebaaa 100644
@@ -720,3 +720,20 @@ void hmp_info_sev(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
         monitor_printf(mon, "SEV is not enabled\n");
     }
 }
+
+SevLaunchMeasureInfo *qmp_query_sev_launch_measure(Error **errp)
+{
+    char *data;
+    SevLaunchMeasureInfo *info;
+
+    data = sev_get_launch_measurement();
+    if (!data) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Measurement is not available");
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    info = g_malloc0(sizeof(*info));
+    info->data = data;
+
+    return info;
+}
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
Reviewed-by on v10 23/28
#28 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v10 23/28] qmp: add query-sev-launch-measure command

Quoted 11 lines · Brijesh Singh

The command can be used by libvirt to retrieve the measurement of SEV guest. This measurement is a signature of the memory contents that was encrypted through the LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA.

Cc "Daniel P. Berrangé" <[email protected]>
Cc "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <[email protected]>
Cc Markus Armbruster <[email protected]>
---
  monitor.c             |  7 +++++++
  qapi-schema.json      | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

Again, will need a rebase once the pending QAPI pull lands.

Quoted 3 lines
  target/i386/monitor.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
  3 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
Signature · 3 lines
Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer
Red Hat, Inc.           +1-919-301-3266
Virtualization:  qemu.org | libvirt.org
#29 lore raw

PATCH v10 24/28 sev/i386: add migration blocker

In reply to Brijesh Singh

SEV guest migration is not implemented yet.

---
 target/i386/sev.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
target/i386/sev.c +13 -0
index 23c2b6183f33..ad94eeace1b0 100644
@@ -19,12 +19,14 @@
 #include "sev_i386.h"
 #include "sysemu/sysemu.h"
 #include "trace.h"
+#include "migration/blocker.h"
 
 #define DEFAULT_GUEST_POLICY    0x1 /* disable debug */
 #define DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE      "/dev/sev"
 
 static SEVState *sev_state;
 static MemoryRegionRAMReadWriteOps  sev_ops;
+static Error *sev_mig_blocker;
 
 static const char *const sev_fw_errlist[] = {
     "",
@@ -577,6 +579,7 @@ static void
 sev_launch_finish(SEVState *s)
 {
     int ret, error;
+    Error *local_err = NULL;
 
     trace_kvm_sev_launch_finish();
     ret = sev_ioctl(sev_state->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH, 0, &error);
@@ -587,6 +590,16 @@ sev_launch_finish(SEVState *s)
     }
 
     sev_set_guest_state(SEV_STATE_RUNNING);
+
+    /* add migration blocker */
+    error_setg(&sev_mig_blocker,
+               "SEV: Migration is not implemented");
+    ret = migrate_add_blocker(sev_mig_blocker, &local_err);
+    if (local_err) {
+        error_report_err(local_err);
+        error_free(sev_mig_blocker);
+        exit(1);
+    }
 }
 
 static void
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#30 lore raw

PATCH v10 25/28 cpu/i386: populate CPUID 0x8000_001F when SEV is active

In reply to Brijesh Singh

When SEV is enabled, CPUID 0x8000_001F should provide additional information regarding the feature (such as which page table bit is used to mark the pages as encrypted etc).

The details for memory encryption CPUID is available in AMD APM
(https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24594.pdf) Section E.4.17

Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]>
---
 target/i386/cpu.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
target/i386/cpu.c +13 -0
index b5e431e769da..7a3cec59402b 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #include "sysemu/hvf.h"
 #include "sysemu/cpus.h"
 #include "kvm_i386.h"
+#include "sev_i386.h"
 
 #include "qemu/error-report.h"
 #include "qemu/option.h"
@@ -3612,6 +3613,13 @@ void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count,
         *ecx = 0;
         *edx = 0;
         break;
+    case 0x8000001F:
+        *eax = sev_enabled() ? 0x2 : 0;
+        *ebx = sev_get_cbit_position();
+        *ebx |= sev_get_reduced_phys_bits() << 6;
+        *ecx = 0;
+        *edx = 0;
+        break;
     default:
         /* reserved values: zero */
         *eax = 0;
@@ -4041,6 +4049,11 @@ static void x86_cpu_expand_features(X86CPU *cpu, Error **errp)
         if (env->features[FEAT_8000_0001_ECX] & CPUID_EXT3_SVM) {
             x86_cpu_adjust_level(cpu, &env->cpuid_min_xlevel, 0x8000000A);
         }
+
+        /* SEV requires CPUID[0x8000001F] */
+        if (sev_enabled()) {
+            x86_cpu_adjust_level(cpu, &env->cpuid_min_xlevel, 0x8000001F);
+        }
     }
 
     /* Set cpuid_*level* based on cpuid_min_*level, if not explicitly set */
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
Reviewed-by on v10 25/28
#31 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v10 25/28] cpu/i386: populate CPUID 0x8000_001F when SEV is active

Quoted 28 lines · Brijesh Singh

When SEV is enabled, CPUID 0x8000_001F should provide additional information regarding the feature (such as which page table bit is used to mark the pages as encrypted etc).

The details for memory encryption CPUID is available in AMD APM
(https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24594.pdf) Section E.4.17

Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]>
---
 target/i386/cpu.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
target/i386/cpu.c +1 -0
index b5e431e769da..7a3cec59402b 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #include "sysemu/hvf.h"
 #include "sysemu/cpus.h"
 #include "kvm_i386.h"
+#include "sev_i386.h"
 
 #include "qemu/error-report.h"
 #include "qemu/option.h"

target/i386/cpu.c void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count, · line 3616

Quoted 4 lines
target/i386/cpu.c +1 -0
@@ -3612,6 +3613,13 @@ void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count,
         *ecx = 0;
         *edx = 0;
         break;
+    case 0x8000001F:

What I'm worried about here is ABI stability and migration safety guarantees. Let's see:

target/i386/cpu.c void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count, · line 3617

Quoted 1 line
target/i386/cpu.c +1 -0
+        *eax = sev_enabled() ? 0x2 : 0;

sev_enabled() just checks if sev_state is set.
sev_state is only set by sev_guest_init().
sev_guest_init() is only called if MachineState::memory_encryption is set.

The value is a function of command-line options only. Good.

target/i386/cpu.c void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count, · line 3618

Quoted 1 line
target/i386/cpu.c +1 -0
+        *ebx = sev_get_cbit_position();

This is 0 if sev_state is NULL (see above). Good.

If sev_state is set, it returns sev_state->cbitpos.

s->cbitpos is set based on the "cbitpos" property of QSevGuestInfo only (it's only validated against host CPUID). The property has no host-dependent default and needs to be set explicitly.

This means sev_get_cbit_position() is a function of command-line options only, too. Good.

target/i386/cpu.c void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count, · line 3619

Quoted 1 line
target/i386/cpu.c +1 -0
+        *ebx |= sev_get_reduced_phys_bits() << 6;

Logic is very similar to sev_get_cbit_position(), and depends on the "reduced-phys-bits" property of QSevGuestInfo only. Good.

Quoted 7 lines
target/i386/cpu.c +3 -0
+        *ecx = 0;
+        *edx = 0;
+        break;
     default:
         /* reserved values: zero */
         *eax = 0;

target/i386/cpu.c static void x86_cpu_expand_features(X86CPU *cpu, Error **errp) · line 4056

Quoted 8 lines
target/i386/cpu.c +5 -0
@@ -4041,6 +4049,11 @@ static void x86_cpu_expand_features(X86CPU *cpu, Error **errp)
         if (env->features[FEAT_8000_0001_ECX] & CPUID_EXT3_SVM) {
             x86_cpu_adjust_level(cpu, &env->cpuid_min_xlevel, 0x8000000A);
         }
+
+        /* SEV requires CPUID[0x8000001F] */
+        if (sev_enabled()) {
+            x86_cpu_adjust_level(cpu, &env->cpuid_min_xlevel, 0x8000001F);
+        }
Quoted 7 lines
target/i386/cpu.c +0 -0
     }
 
     /* Set cpuid_*level* based on cpuid_min_*level, if not explicitly set */
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
Signature · 1 line
Eduardo
#32 lore raw

PATCH v10 26/28 qmp: add query-sev-capabilities command

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The command can be used by libvirt to query the SEV capabilities.

Cc "Daniel P. Berrangé" <[email protected]>
Cc "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <[email protected]>
Cc Markus Armbruster <[email protected]>
---
 monitor.c             |  7 +++++++
 qapi-schema.json      | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/monitor.c |  5 +++++
 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
monitor.c +7 -0
index d0ebd5906d9d..26d86685a9f9 100644
@@ -985,6 +985,7 @@ static void qmp_unregister_commands_hack(void)
     qmp_unregister_command(&qmp_commands, "rtc-reset-reinjection");
     qmp_unregister_command(&qmp_commands, "query-sev");
     qmp_unregister_command(&qmp_commands, "query-sev-launch-measure");
+    qmp_unregister_command(&qmp_commands, "query-sev-capabilities");
 #endif
 #ifndef TARGET_S390X
     qmp_unregister_command(&qmp_commands, "dump-skeys");
@@ -4171,6 +4172,12 @@ SevLaunchMeasureInfo *qmp_query_sev_launch_measure(Error **errp)
     error_setg(errp, QERR_FEATURE_DISABLED, "query-sev-launch-measure");
     return NULL;
 }
+
+SevCapability *qmp_query_sev_capabilities(Error **errp)
+{
+    error_setg(errp, QERR_FEATURE_DISABLED, "query-sev-capabilities");
+    return NULL;
+}
 #endif
 
 #ifndef TARGET_S390X
qapi-schema.json +42 -0

45 lines not on this page · raw message

target/i386/monitor.c +5 -0
index 577d50eebaaa..1b55dd0fff88 100644
@@ -737,3 +737,8 @@ SevLaunchMeasureInfo *qmp_query_sev_launch_measure(Error **errp)
 
     return info;
 }
+
+SevCapability *qmp_query_sev_capabilities(Error **errp)
+{
+    return NULL;
+}
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#33 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v10 26/28] qmp: add query-sev-capabilities command

Quoted 11 lines · Brijesh Singh

The command can be used by libvirt to query the SEV capabilities.

Cc "Daniel P. Berrangé" <[email protected]>
Cc "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <[email protected]>
Cc Markus Armbruster <[email protected]>
---
  monitor.c             |  7 +++++++
  qapi-schema.json      | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  target/i386/monitor.c |  5 +++++
  3 files changed, 54 insertions(+)

And another rebase victim.

qapi-schema.json line 3309

Quoted 4 lines
qapi-schema.json +4 -0
+##
+# @query-sev-capabilities:
+#
+# This command is used to get the SEV capabilities and supported on AMD

grammar suggestion: s/capabilities and/capabilities, and is/

Quoted 1 line

+# X86 platform only.

s/platform/platforms/

Review

Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2 -0
+#
+# Returns: a list of SevCapability objects.

This says it returns a list of objects...

qapi-schema.json line 3318

Quoted 6 lines
qapi-schema.json +6 -0
+#
+# Since: 2.12
+#
+# Example:
+#
+# -> { "execute": "query-sev-capabilities" }

...but this says it returns a single object.

Quoted 10 lines
qapi-schema.json +5 -0
+# <- { "return": { "pdh": "8CCDD8DDD", "cert-chain": "888CCCDDDEE",
+#                  "cbitpos": 47, "reduced-phys-bits": 5}}
+#
+##
+{ 'command': 'query-sev-capabilities', 'returns': 'SevCapability' }
target/i386/monitor.c +0 -0
index 577d50eebaaa..1b55dd0fff88 100644

target/i386/monitor.c SevLaunchMeasureInfo *qmp_query_sev_launch_measure(Error **errp) · line 743

Quoted 7 lines
target/i386/monitor.c +4 -0
@@ -737,3 +737,8 @@ SevLaunchMeasureInfo *qmp_query_sev_launch_measure(Error **errp)
 
      return info;
  }
+
+SevCapability *qmp_query_sev_capabilities(Error **errp)
+{
+    return NULL;

Should call error_setg() before returning NULL.

Quoted 2 lines
target/i386/monitor.c +1 -0
+}
Signature · 3 lines
Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer
Red Hat, Inc.           +1-919-301-3266
Virtualization:  qemu.org | libvirt.org
#34 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v10 26/28] qmp: add query-sev-capabilities command

Quoted 13 lines · Eric Blake
Quoted 11 lines · Brijesh Singh

The command can be used by libvirt to query the SEV capabilities.

Cc "Daniel P. Berrangé" <[email protected]>
Cc "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <[email protected]>
Cc Markus Armbruster <[email protected]>

---
  monitor.c             |  7 +++++++
  qapi-schema.json      | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/i386/monitor.c |  5 +++++

  3 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
Quoted 3 lines

And another rebase victim.

I will wait for couple of days for more feedback then rebase the series.

Quoted 11 lines

qapi-schema.json line 3309

Quoted 4 lines
qapi-schema.json +4 -0
+##
+# @query-sev-capabilities:
+#
+# This command is used to get the SEV capabilities and supported on AMD

grammar suggestion: s/capabilities and/capabilities, and is/

Quoted 1 line

+# X86 platform only.

s/platform/platforms/

Will fix it.

Quoted 5 lines

Review

Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2 -0
+#
+# Returns: a list of SevCapability objects.

This says it returns a list of objects...

Earlier I thought we may need list but we really need one element. I will fix it.

Quoted 20 lines

qapi-schema.json line 3318

Quoted 6 lines
qapi-schema.json +6 -0
+#
+# Since: 2.12
+#
+# Example:
+#
+# -> { "execute": "query-sev-capabilities" }

...but this says it returns a single object.

Quoted 11 lines
qapi-schema.json +5 -0
+# <- { "return": { "pdh": "8CCDD8DDD", "cert-chain": "888CCCDDDEE",
+#                  "cbitpos": 47, "reduced-phys-bits": 5}}
+#
+##
+{ 'command': 'query-sev-capabilities', 'returns': 'SevCapability' }
target/i386/monitor.c +0 -0
index 577d50eebaaa..1b55dd0fff88 100644
@@ -737,3 +737,8 @@ SevLaunchMeasureInfo 
 *qmp_query_sev_launch_measure(Error **errp)
Quoted 9 lines

target/i386/monitor.c SevLaunchMeasureInfo *qmp_query_sev_launch_measure(Error **errp) · line 743

Quoted 6 lines
target/i386/monitor.c +4 -0
       return info;
   }
+
+SevCapability *qmp_query_sev_capabilities(Error **errp)
+{
+    return NULL;

Should call error_setg() before returning NULL.

Later in the patches this function gets filled with capability call and we set the error before returning NULL.

#35 lore raw

PATCH v10 27/28 sev/i386: add sev_get_capabilities()

In reply to Brijesh Singh

The function can be used to get the current SEV capabilities. The capabilities include platform diffie-hellman key (pdh) and certificate chain. The key can be provided to the external entities which wants to establish a trusted channel between SEV firmware and guest owner.

Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
Cc Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]>
---
 target/i386/monitor.c  | 10 ++++++-
 target/i386/sev-stub.c |  5 ++++
 target/i386/sev.c      | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/sev_i386.h |  1 +
 4 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
target/i386/monitor.c +9 -1
index 1b55dd0fff88..b914915d9171 100644
@@ -740,5 +740,13 @@ SevLaunchMeasureInfo *qmp_query_sev_launch_measure(Error **errp)
 
 SevCapability *qmp_query_sev_capabilities(Error **errp)
 {
-    return NULL;
+    SevCapability *data;
+
+    data = sev_get_capabilities();
+    if (!data) {
+        error_setg(errp, "SEV feature is not available");
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return data;
 }
target/i386/sev-stub.c +5 -0
index 2f61c32ec975..59a003a4ebe6 100644
@@ -44,3 +44,8 @@ char *sev_get_launch_measurement(void)
 {
     return NULL;
 }
+
+SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(void)
+{
+    return NULL;
+}
target/i386/sev.c +78 -0

84 lines not on this page · raw message

target/i386/sev_i386.h +1 -0
index 2ecca66f6e64..cc89e273ccf6 100644
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ extern SevInfo *sev_get_info(void);
 extern uint32_t sev_get_cbit_position(void);
 extern uint32_t sev_get_reduced_phys_bits(void);
 extern char *sev_get_launch_measurement(void);
+extern SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(void);
 
 typedef struct QSevGuestInfo QSevGuestInfo;
 typedef struct QSevGuestInfoClass QSevGuestInfoClass;
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#36 lore raw

PATCH v10 28/28 tests/qmp-test: blacklist sev specific qmp commands

In reply to Brijesh Singh

Blacklist the following commands to fix the 'make check' failure.

query-sev-launch-measure: it returns meaninful data only when we launch SEV guest otherwise the command returns an error.

query-sev: it return an error when SEV is not available on host (e.g non X86 platform or KVM is disabled at the build time)

query-sev-capabilities: it returns an error when SEV feature is not available on host machine.

Cc "Daniel P. Berrangé" <[email protected]>
Cc "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <[email protected]>
Cc Markus Armbruster <[email protected]>

---
Hi Dave,

I updated the patch to include other SEV specific QMP command so that build passes on non x86 arch, I have still kept your R-b, if you don't agree with changes then let me know.

thanks

 tests/qmp-test.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
tests/qmp-test.c +5 -0
index 580848307ad1..50573dbf4fbd 100644
@@ -203,6 +203,11 @@ static bool query_is_blacklisted(const char *cmd)
         "query-gic-capabilities", /* arm */
         /* Success depends on target-specific build configuration: */
         "query-pci",              /* CONFIG_PCI */
+        /* Success depends on launching SEV guest */
+        "query-sev-launch-measure",
+        /* Success depends on Host or Hypervisor SEV support */
+        "query-sev",
+        "query-sev-capabilities",
         NULL
     };
     int i;
Signature · 1 line
2.14.3
#37 lore raw
In reply to Brijesh Singh

Please ignore the cover letters patch count (00/29), the series contains 28 patches. thanks

Quoted 193 lines · Brijesh Singh

This patch series provides support for AMD's new Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature.

SEV is an extension to the AMD-V architecture which supports running multiple VMs under the control of a hypervisor. The SEV feature allows the memory contents of a virtual machine (VM) to be transparently encrypted with a key unique to the guest VM. The memory controller contains a high performance encryption engine which can be programmed with multiple keys for use by a different VMs in the system. The programming and management of these keys is handled by the AMD Secure Processor firmware which exposes a commands for these tasks.

The KVM SEV patch series introduced a new ioctl (KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPTION_OP) which is used by qemu to issue the SEV commands to assist performing common hypervisor activities such as a launching, running, snapshooting, migration and debugging guests.

The following links provide additional details:

AMD Memory Encryption whitepaper:

http://amd-dev.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf

AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual:
http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf
SME is section 7.10
SEV is section 15.34

Secure Encrypted Virutualization Key Management:
http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM API_Specification.pdf

KVM Forum slides:
http://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf

Video of the KVM Forum Talk:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RcvQ1xN55Ew

---

The complete patch series is available :
https://github.com/codomania/qemu/tree/v10

Using these patches we have succesfully booted and tested a guest both with and without SEV enabled.

TODO:

* Add SEV guest migration support
* Add SEV guest snapshot and restore support

Changes since v9:
- move sev specific header definition in target/i386/sev_i386.h
- add new QMP query-sev-capabilities - the command will be used by libvirt to query the SEV capabilities information.
- move sev specific QMP command implementation in target/i386/monitor.c. The sev commands are disabled for non x86 architecture
- update 'info sev' command to display human readiable format for policy
- use g_new0 to allocate to structure memory
- update qemu-options.hx to include cbitspos and reduced-phys-bit field

Changes since v8:
- update 'query-sev' command to use enum type for SEV state.
- populate memory encryption cpuid when only SEV is enabled.

Changes since v7:
- move sev.c from accel/kvm to target/i386
- update query-sev-launch-measure to return error when measurement is not available
- update flatview_read to use slow path when attrs.debug=1 is set
- fix the buffer overflow
- use '-' when adding new member in SevInfo QMP structure

Changes since v6:
- add support to specify cbitpos in sev-guest object
- add 'info sev' HMP command
- add 'query-sev' and 'query-launch-measure' QMP commands
- rework the logic to query the memory encryption mask when walking guest pagetable for debug

Changes since v5:
- drop MEMTXTATTRS_DEBUG macro, caller now specify attrs.debug=1 when needed.
- drop DPRINTF and use trace points to output the debug messages

Changes since v4:
- extend sev-guest object to add new properties 'dh-cert-file', 'session-file' etc.
- emit SEV_MEASUREMENT event when measurement is available
- add migration blocker
- add memory encryption cpuid support
- rebase the series with recent qemu tree

Changes since v3:
- update to newer SEV spec (0.12 -> 0.14)
- update to newer KVM RFC and use KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPTION_OP ioctl instead of KVM_ISSUE_SEV.
- add support to encrypt plfash

Changes since v2:
- rename ram_ops to ram_debug_ops
- use '-' rather than '_' when adding new member in KvmInfo struct
- update sev object to use link properties when referencing other objects
- use ldq_phys_debug in tlb_info_64 and mem_info_64.
- remove sev-guest-policy object, we will revisit it after basic SEV guest support is merged.
- remove kernel API from doc and add SEV guest LAUNCH model. The doc will be updated as we integerate the remaining SEV APIs.

Changes since v1:
- Added Documentation
- Added security-policy object.
- Drop sev config parsing support and create new objects to get/set SEV specific parameters
- Added sev-guest-info object.
- Added sev-launch-info object.
- Added kvm_memory_encrytion_* APIs. The idea behind this was to allow adding a non SEV memory encrytion object without modifying interfaces.
- Drop patch to load OS image at fixed location.
- updated LAUNCH_FINISH command structure. Now the structure contains just 'measurement' field. Other fields are not used and will also be removed from newer SEV firmware API spec.

Brijesh Singh (28):
memattrs: add debug attribute
exec: add ram_debug_ops support
exec: add debug version of physical memory read and write API monitor/i386: use debug APIs when accessing guest memory
machine: add -memory-encryption property
kvm: update kvm.h to include memory encryption ioctls
docs: add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) target/i386: add Secure Encrypted Virtulization (SEV) object
qmp: add query-sev command
include: add psp-sev.h header file
sev/i386: add command to initialize the memory encryption context sev/i386: register the guest memory range which may contain encrypted
data
kvm: introduce memory encryption APIs
hmp: add 'info sev' command
sev/i386: add command to create launch memory encryption context sev/i386: add command to encrypt guest memory region target/i386: encrypt bios rom
sev/i386: add support to LAUNCH_MEASURE command
sev/i386: finalize the SEV guest launch flow
hw/i386: set ram_debug_ops when memory encryption is enabled sev/i386: add debug encrypt and decrypt commands target/i386: clear C-bit when walking SEV guest page table
qmp: add query-sev-launch-measure command
sev/i386: add migration blocker
cpu/i386: populate CPUID 0x8000_001F when SEV is active
qmp: add query-sev-capabilities command
sev/i386: add sev_get_capabilities()
tests/qmp-test: blacklist sev specific qmp commands

 accel/kvm/kvm-all.c            |  48 +++
 accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c         |  14 +
 cpus.c                         |   2 +-
 disas.c                        |   2 +-
 docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 109 ++++++
 exec.c                         |  83 +++-
 hmp-commands-info.hx           |  16 +
 hmp.h                          |   1 +
 hw/core/machine.c              |  22 ++
 hw/i386/pc.c                   |   9 +
 hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c             |  19 +
 include/exec/cpu-common.h      |  15 +
 include/exec/memattrs.h        |   2 +
 include/exec/memory.h          |  30 +-
 include/hw/boards.h            |   1 +
 include/sysemu/kvm.h           |  25 ++
 include/sysemu/sev.h           |  22 ++
 linux-headers/linux/kvm.h      |  90 +++++
 linux-headers/linux/psp-sev.h  | 142 +++++++
 monitor.c                      |  27 +-
 qapi-schema.json               | 132 +++++++
 qemu-options.hx                |  49 ++-
 stubs/Makefile.objs            |   1 +
 stubs/sev.c                    |  30 ++
 target/i386/Makefile.objs      |   4 +-
 target/i386/cpu.c              |  13 +
 target/i386/helper.c           |  31 +-
 target/i386/monitor.c          | 193 ++++++---
 target/i386/sev-stub.c         |  51 +++
 target/i386/sev.c              | 860 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/sev_i386.h         |  93 +++++
 target/i386/trace-events       |  11 +
 tests/qmp-test.c               |   5 +
 33 files changed, 2067 insertions(+), 85 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt
 create mode 100644 include/sysemu/sev.h
 create mode 100644 linux-headers/linux/psp-sev.h
 create mode 100644 stubs/sev.c
 create mode 100644 target/i386/sev-stub.c
 create mode 100644 target/i386/sev.c
 create mode 100644 target/i386/sev_i386.h