virt: vbox: Only copy_from_user the request-header once
PATCH 1/1 virt: vbox: Only copy_from_user the request-header once
In vbg_misc_device_ioctl(), the header of the ioctl argument is copied from the userspace pointer 'arg' and saved to the kernel object 'hdr'. Then the 'version', 'size_in', and 'size_out' fields of 'hdr' are verified.
Before this commit, after the checks a buffer for the entire request would be allocated and then all data including the verified header would be copied from the userspace 'arg' pointer again.
Given that the 'arg' pointer resides in userspace, a malicious userspace process can race to change the data pointed to by 'arg' between the two copies. By doing so, the user can bypass the verifications on the ioctl argument.
This commit fixes this by using the already checked copy of the header to fill the header part of the allocated buffer and only copying the remainder of the data from userspace.
--- drivers/virt/vboxguest/vboxguest_linux.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/virt/vboxguest/vboxguest_linux.c +3 -1
@@ -121,7 +121,9 @@ static long vbg_misc_device_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int req,if (!buf)return -ENOMEM ; -if (copy_from_user (buf, (void *)arg, hdr.size_in)) { + *((struct vbg_ioctl_hdr *)buf) = hdr; +if (copy_from_user (buf +sizeof (hdr), (void *)arg +sizeof (hdr), + hdr.size_in -sizeof (hdr))) { ret = -EFAULT ; goto out; }
Signature · 1 line
2.17.0
Hi,
Quoted 13 lines · Hans de Goede
In
vbg_misc_device_ioctl(), the header of the ioctl argument is copied from the userspace pointer 'arg' and saved to the kernel object 'hdr'. Then the 'version', 'size_in', and 'size_out' fields of 'hdr' are verified.Before this commit, after the checks a buffer for the entire request would be allocated and then all data including the verified header would be copied from the userspace 'arg' pointer again.
Given that the 'arg' pointer resides in userspace, a malicious userspace process can race to change the data pointed to by 'arg' between the two copies. By doing so, the user can bypass the verifications on the ioctl argument.
Quoted 6 lines
This commit fixes this by using the already checked copy of the header to fill the header part of the allocated buffer and only copying the remainder of the data from userspace.
Reported-by Wenwen Wang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Wenwen just send a v2 of his patch, lets go with his (identical) version as he has done the hard work of tracking this down.
Regards,
Hans
Quoted 20 lines
--- drivers/virt/vboxguest/vboxguest_linux.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/virt/vboxguest/vboxguest_linux.c +3
-1@@ -121,7 +121,9 @@ static long vbg_misc_device_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int req,if (!buf)return -ENOMEM ; -if (copy_from_user (buf, (void *)arg, hdr.size_in)) { + *((struct vbg_ioctl_hdr *)buf) = hdr; +if (copy_from_user (buf +sizeof (hdr), (void *)arg +sizeof (hdr), + hdr.size_in -sizeof (hdr))) { ret = -EFAULT ; goto out; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 13 lines · Hans de Goede
In
vbg_misc_device_ioctl(), the header of the ioctl argument is copied from the userspace pointer 'arg' and saved to the kernel object 'hdr'. Then the 'version', 'size_in', and 'size_out' fields of 'hdr' are verified.Before this commit, after the checks a buffer for the entire request would be allocated and then all data including the verified header would be copied from the userspace 'arg' pointer again.
Given that the 'arg' pointer resides in userspace, a malicious userspace process can race to change the data pointed to by 'arg' between the two copies. By doing so, the user can bypass the verifications on the ioctl argument.
Quoted 6 lines
This commit fixes this by using the already checked copy of the header to fill the header part of the allocated buffer and only copying the remainder of the data from userspace.
Reported-by Wenwen Wang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
Does this need to go into 4.17-final? Any older kernels? Or can it wait for 4.18-rc1?
thanks,
greg k-h
Hi,
Quoted 18 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 17 lines · Hans de Goede
In
vbg_misc_device_ioctl(), the header of the ioctl argument is copied from the userspace pointer 'arg' and saved to the kernel object 'hdr'. Then the 'version', 'size_in', and 'size_out' fields of 'hdr' are verified.Before this commit, after the checks a buffer for the entire request would be allocated and then all data including the verified header would be copied from the userspace 'arg' pointer again.
Given that the 'arg' pointer resides in userspace, a malicious userspace process can race to change the data pointed to by 'arg' between the two copies. By doing so, the user can bypass the verifications on the ioctl argument.
This commit fixes this by using the already checked copy of the header to fill the header part of the allocated buffer and only copying the remainder of the data from userspace.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Reported-by Wenwen Wang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Hans de Goede <[email protected]>Does this need to go into 4.17-final? Any older kernels? Or can it wait for 4.18-rc1?
I believe this can wait for 4.18-rc1.
Regards,
Hans