perf fixes
Linus,
Please pull the latest perf-urgent-for-linus git tree from:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git perf-urgent-for-linus
# HEAD: 4e9ae0d3d5bf4e2f1b466ba451bd18f2c5b69845 Merge tag 'perf-urgent-for-mingo-4.17-20180602' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux into perf/urgent
Leftover perf tooling fixes from the v4.17 cycle: they sync up updated ABI headers with their tooling versions.
Thanks,
Ingo
------------------>
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo (4):
perf trace beauty prctl: Default header_dir to cwd to work without parms tools headers: Synchronize prctl.h ABI header
tools headers: Sync x86 cpufeatures.h with the kernel sources perf tools intel-pt-decoder: Update insn.h from the kernel sources
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 20 ++++++++++++++------ tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 12 ++++++++++++ tools/perf/trace/beauty/prctl_option.sh | 2 +- tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/insn.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +14 -6
@@ -198,7 +198,6 @@#define X86_FEATURE_CAT_L2 ( 7*32+ 5)/* Cache Allocation Technology L2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3 ( 7*32+ 6)/* Code and Data Prioritization L3 */ #define X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE ( 7*32+ 7)/* Effectively INVPCID && CR4.PCIDE=1 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8)/* AMD HW-PState */ #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9)/* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */ #define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10)/* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
@@ -207,13 +206,19 @@#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13)/* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14)/* Intel Processor Inventory Number */ #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15)/* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */ - +#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16)/* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SSBD ( 7*32+17)/* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ #define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18)/* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */ #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19)/* "" Fill RSB on context switches */ #define X86_FEATURE_SEV ( 7*32+20)/* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ -#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21)/* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW ( 7*32+22)/* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23)/* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */ +#define X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD ( 7*32+24)/* "" AMD SSBD implementation via LS_CFG MSR */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS ( 7*32+25)/* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ +#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+26)/* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ +#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP ( 7*32+27)/* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ +#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN ( 7*32+28)/* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17 (Zen) */ /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */ #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0)/* Intel TPR Shadow */
@@ -274,9 +279,10 @@#define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO (13*32+ 0)/* CLZERO instruction */ #define X86_FEATURE_IRPERF (13*32+ 1)/* Instructions Retired Count */ #define X86_FEATURE_XSAVEERPTR (13*32+ 2)/* Always save/restore FP error pointers */ -#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB (13*32+12)/* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ -#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS (13*32+14)/* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ -#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP (13*32+15)/* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB (13*32+12)/* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS (13*32+14)/* "" Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP (13*32+15)/* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ +#define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD (13*32+25)/* Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */ #define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM (14*32+ 0)/* Digital Thermal Sensor */
@@ -334,6 +340,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26)/* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */ #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27)/* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */ #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (18*32+29)/* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (18*32+31)/* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */ /* * BUG word(s)
@@ -363,5 +370,6 @@#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN X86_BUG(14)/* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */ #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1 X86_BUG(15)/* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */ #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 X86_BUG(16)/* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */ +#define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS X86_BUG(17)/* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
tools/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h +12 -0
@@ -207,4 +207,16 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {# define PR_SVE_VL_LEN_MASK 0xffff# define PR_SVE_VL_INHERIT (1 << 17)/* inherit across exec */ +/* Per task speculation control */ +#define PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL 52 +#define PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 53 +/* Speculation control variants */ +# define PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS 0 +/* Return and control values for PR_SET/GET_SPECULATION_CTRL */ +# define PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED 0 +# define PR_SPEC_PRCTL (1UL << 0) +# define PR_SPEC_ENABLE (1UL << 1) +# define PR_SPEC_DISABLE (1UL << 2) +# define PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE (1UL << 3) +#endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
tools/perf/trace/beauty/prctl_option.sh +1 -1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ #!/bin/sh -header_dir=$1 +[ $# -eq 1 ] && header_dir=$1 || header_dir=tools/include/uapi/linux/ printf "static const char *prctl_options[] = {\n" regex='^#define[[:space:]]+PR_([GS]ET\w+)[[:space:]]*([[:xdigit:]]+).*'
tools/perf/util/intel-pt-decoder/insn.h +18 -0
@@ -208,4 +208,22 @@ static inline int insn_offset_immediate(struct insn *insn) return insn_offset_displacement(insn) + insn->displacement.nbytes; } +#define POP_SS_OPCODE 0x1f +#define MOV_SREG_OPCODE 0x8e + +/* +* Intel SDM Vol.3A 6.8.3 states; +* "Any single-step trap that would be delivered following the MOV to SS +* instruction or POP to SS instruction (because EFLAGS.TF is 1) is +* suppressed." +* This function returns true if @insn is MOV SS or POP SS. On these +* instructions, single stepping is suppressed. +*/ +static inline int insn_masking_exception (struct insn *insn) +{ +return insn->opcode.bytes[0 ] ==POP_SS_OPCODE || + (insn->opcode.bytes[0 ] ==MOV_SREG_OPCODE && +X86_MODRM_REG (insn->modrm.bytes[0 ]) ==2 ); +} +#endif /* _ASM_X86_INSN_H */