4.9.107-stable review
Subsystems (2)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainercover 4.9.107-stable review
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.107 release. There are 61 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu Jun 7 17:00:59 UTC 2018. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.107-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 4.9.107-rc1
Aleksey Makarov <[email protected]>
serial: pl011: add console matching function
David S. Miller <[email protected]>
sparc64: Don't clibber fixed registers in __multi4.
Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
mm: fix the NULL mapping case in __isolate_lru_page()
Al Viro <[email protected]>
fix io_destroy()/aio_complete() race
David S. Miller <[email protected]>
sparc64: Fix build warnings with gcc 7.
Ondrej Zary <[email protected]>
drm/i915: Disable LVDS on Radiant P845
Dhinakaran Pandiyan <[email protected]>
drm/psr: Fix missed entry in PSR setup time table.
Parav Pandit <[email protected]>
IB/core: Fix error code for invalid GID entry
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
hwtracing: stm: fix build error on some arches
Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
stm class: Use vmalloc for the master map
Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
scsi: scsi_transport_srp: Fix shost to rport translation
Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>
MIPS: prctl: Disallow FRE without FR with PR_SET_FP_MODE requests
Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>
MIPS: ptrace: Fix PTRACE_PEEKUSR requests for 64-bit FGRs
Martin Kelly <[email protected]>
iio:kfifo_buf: check for uint overflow
Sarah Newman <[email protected]>
net/mlx4_en: fix potential use-after-free with dma_unmap_page
Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
powerpc/64s: Add support for a store forwarding barrier at kernel entry/exit
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/64s: Fix section mismatch warnings from setup_rfi_flush()
Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <[email protected]>
powerpc/pseries: Restore default security feature flags on setup
Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <[email protected]>
powerpc: Move default security feature flags
Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <[email protected]>
powerpc/pseries: Fix clearing of security feature flags
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v2()
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v1()
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/pseries: Use the security flags in pseries_setup_rfi_flush()
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/powernv: Use the security flags in pnv_setup_rfi_flush()
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/64s: Enhance the information in cpu_show_meltdown()
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/64s: Move cpu_show_meltdown()
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/powernv: Set or clear security feature flags
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/pseries: Set or clear security feature flags
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc: Add security feature flags for Spectre/Meltdown
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/pseries: Add new H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS flags
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/rfi-flush: Call setup_rfi_flush() after LPM migration
Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <[email protected]>
powerpc/rfi-flush: Differentiate enabled and patched flush types
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/rfi-flush: Always enable fallback flush on pseries
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/rfi-flush: Make it possible to call setup_rfi_flush() again
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/rfi-flush: Move the logic to avoid a redo into the debugfs code
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/powernv: Support firmware disable of RFI flush
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/pseries: Support firmware disable of RFI flush
Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/rfi-flush: Move out of HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR #ifdef
Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
arm64/cpufeature: don't use mutex in bringup path
Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: Add hypervisor safe helper for checking constant capabilities
Potomski, MichalX <[email protected]>
scsi: ufs: Factor out ufshcd_read_desc_param
Tomas Winkler <[email protected]>
scsi: ufs: refactor device descriptor reading
Subhash Jadavani <[email protected]>
scsi: ufs: fix failure to read the string descriptor
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
tcp: avoid integer overflows in tcp_rcv_space_adjust()
Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
x86/amd: don't set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS when running under Xen
Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
xen: set cpu capabilities from xen_start_kernel()
Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
x86/amd: revert commit 944e0fc51a89c9827b9
Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
platform/chrome: cros_ec_lpc: remove redundant pointer request
Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
ASoC: Intel: sst: remove redundant variable dma_dev_name
Matthias Kaehlcke <[email protected]>
rtlwifi: rtl8192cu: Remove variable self-assignment in rf.c
Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
dma-buf: remove redundant initialization of sg_table
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
cfg80211: further limit wiphy names to 64 bytes
Sachin Grover <[email protected]>
selinux: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xattr_getsecurity
Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
tracing: Fix crash when freeing instances with event triggers
Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
Input: elan_i2c_smbus - fix corrupted stack
Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Revert "ima: limit file hash setting by user to fix and log modes"
Brian Foster <[email protected]>
xfs: detect agfl count corruption and reset agfl
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Revert "pinctrl: msm: Use dynamic GPIO numbering"
Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
USB: serial: cp210x: use tcflag_t to fix incompatible pointer type
Michael Neuling <[email protected]>
powerpc/64s: Clear PCR on boot
Will Deacon <[email protected]>
arm64: lse: Add early clobbers to some input/output asm operands
-------------
Diffstat:
Makefile | 4 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/atomic_lse.h | 22 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 27 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 10 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 28 ++- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 2 +- arch/mips/kernel/process.c | 4 + arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 +- arch/mips/kernel/ptrace32.c | 2 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h | 29 +++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h | 19 ++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h | 3 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h | 85 +++++++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/cpu_setup_power.S | 6 + arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 16 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c | 237 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 37 ++- arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 14 ++ arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c | 124 +++++++++- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c | 92 +++++-- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/mobility.c | 3 + arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pseries.h | 2 + arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c | 81 ++++-- arch/sparc/kernel/ds.c | 2 +- arch/sparc/lib/multi3.S | 24 +- arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c | 14 +- drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c | 2 +- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_helper.c | 1 + drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_lvds.c | 8 + drivers/hwtracing/stm/core.c | 7 +- drivers/iio/buffer/kfifo_buf.c | 7 + drivers/infiniband/core/cache.c | 2 +- drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_smbus.c | 22 +- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c | 13 +- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_rx.c | 32 ++- .../net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8192cu/rf.c | 3 - drivers/pinctrl/qcom/pinctrl-msm.c | 2 +- drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_lpc.c | 3 - drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_srp.c | 22 +- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufs.h | 34 +-- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufs_quirks.h | 28 +-- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 272 +++++++++++++++------ drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.h | 16 ++ drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c | 55 +++++ drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c | 8 +- fs/aio.c | 3 +- fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_alloc.c | 94 +++++++ fs/xfs/xfs_mount.h | 1 + fs/xfs/xfs_trace.h | 9 +- include/linux/tcp.h | 2 +- include/uapi/linux/nl80211.h | 2 +- kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c | 5 +- mm/vmscan.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 10 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 8 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2 +- sound/soc/intel/common/sst-firmware.c | 2 - 61 files changed, 1277 insertions(+), 297 deletions(-)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 1/61 arm64: lse: Add early clobbers to some input/output asm operands
4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
commit 32c3fa7cdf0c4a3eb8405fc3e13398de019e828b upstream.
For LSE atomics that read and write a register operand, we need to ensure that these operands are annotated as "early clobber" if the register is written before all of the input operands have been consumed. Failure to do so can result in the compiler allocating the same register to both operands, leading to splats such as:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 11111122222221 [...] x1 : 1111111122222222 x0 : 1111111122222221 Process swapper/0 (pid: 1, stack limit = 0x000000008209f908) Call trace: test_atomic64+0x1360/0x155c
where x0 has been allocated as both the value to be stored and also the atomic_t pointer.
This patch adds the missing clobbers.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/atomic_lse.h | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/atomic_lse.h +11 -11
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static inline void atomic_and(int i, ato/* LSE atomics */ " mvn %w[i], %w[i]\n" " stclr %w[i], %[v]") - : [i] "+r" (w0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) + : [i] "+&r" (w0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) : "r" (x1) : __LL_SC_CLOBBERS); }
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ static inline int atomic_fetch_and##name/* LSE atomics */ \" mvn %w[i], %w[i]\n" \ " ldclr" #mb " %w[i], %w[i], %[v]") \ - : [i] "+r" (w0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \ + : [i] "+&r" (w0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \ : "r" (x1) \ : __LL_SC_CLOBBERS, ##cl); \ \
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static inline void atomic_sub(int i, ato/* LSE atomics */ " neg %w[i], %w[i]\n" " stadd %w[i], %[v]") - : [i] "+r" (w0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) + : [i] "+&r" (w0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) : "r" (x1) : __LL_SC_CLOBBERS); }
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ static inline int atomic_sub_return##nam" neg %w[i], %w[i]\n" \ " ldadd" #mb " %w[i], w30, %[v]\n" \ " add %w[i], %w[i], w30") \ - : [i] "+r" (w0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \ + : [i] "+&r" (w0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \ : "r" (x1) \ : __LL_SC_CLOBBERS , ##cl); \ \
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static inline int atomic_fetch_sub##name/* LSE atomics */ \" neg %w[i], %w[i]\n" \ " ldadd" #mb " %w[i], %w[i], %[v]") \ - : [i] "+r" (w0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \ + : [i] "+&r" (w0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \ : "r" (x1) \ : __LL_SC_CLOBBERS, ##cl); \ \
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static inline void atomic64_and(long i,/* LSE atomics */ " mvn %[i], %[i]\n" " stclr %[i], %[v]") - : [i] "+r" (x0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) + : [i] "+&r" (x0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) : "r" (x1) : __LL_SC_CLOBBERS); }
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ static inline long atomic64_fetch_and##n/* LSE atomics */ \" mvn %[i], %[i]\n" \ " ldclr" #mb " %[i], %[i], %[v]") \ - : [i] "+r" (x0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \ + : [i] "+&r" (x0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \ : "r" (x1) \ : __LL_SC_CLOBBERS, ##cl); \ \
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ static inline void atomic64_sub(long i,/* LSE atomics */ " neg %[i], %[i]\n" " stadd %[i], %[v]") - : [i] "+r" (x0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) + : [i] "+&r" (x0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) : "r" (x1) : __LL_SC_CLOBBERS); }
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ static inline long atomic64_sub_return##" neg %[i], %[i]\n" \ " ldadd" #mb " %[i], x30, %[v]\n" \ " add %[i], %[i], x30") \ - : [i] "+r" (x0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \ + : [i] "+&r" (x0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \ : "r" (x1) \ : __LL_SC_CLOBBERS, ##cl); \ \
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ static inline long atomic64_fetch_sub##n/* LSE atomics */ \" neg %[i], %[i]\n" \ " ldadd" #mb " %[i], %[i], %[v]") \ - : [i] "+r" (x0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \ + : [i] "+&r" (x0), [v] "+Q" (v->counter) \ : "r" (x1) \ : __LL_SC_CLOBBERS, ##cl); \ \
@@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ static inline long __cmpxchg_double##nam" eor %[old1], %[old1], %[oldval1]\n" \" eor %[old2], %[old2], %[oldval2]\n" \ " orr %[old1], %[old1], %[old2]") \ - : [old1] "+r" (x0), [old2] "+r" (x1), \ + : [old1] "+&r" (x0), [old2] "+&r" (x1), \[v] " +Q " (*(unsigned long *)ptr) \ : [new1] " r" (x2), [new2] " r" (x3), [ptr] " r" (x4), \ [oldval1] " r" (oldval1), [oldval2] " r" (oldval2) \
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 2/61 powerpc/64s: Clear PCR on boot
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Neuling <[email protected]>
commit faf37c44a105f3608115785f17cbbf3500f8bc71 upstream.
Clear the PCR (Processor Compatibility Register) on boot to ensure we are not running in a compatibility mode.
We've seen this cause problems when a crash (and kdump) occurs while running compat mode guests. The kdump kernel then runs with the PCR set and causes problems. The symptom in the kdump kernel (also seen in petitboot after fast-reboot) is early userspace programs taking sigills on newer instructions (seen in libc).
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/cpu_setup_power.S | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/kernel/cpu_setup_power.S +6 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ _GLOBAL(__setup_cpu_power7) beqlr li r0,0 mtspr SPRN_LPID,r0 + mtspr SPRN_PCR,r0 mfspr r3,SPRN_LPCR bl __init_LPCR bl __init_tlb_power7
@@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ _GLOBAL(__restore_cpu_power7) beqlr li r0,0 mtspr SPRN_LPID,r0 + mtspr SPRN_PCR,r0 mfspr r3,SPRN_LPCR bl __init_LPCR bl __init_tlb_power7
@@ -57,6 +59,7 @@ _GLOBAL(__setup_cpu_power8) beqlr li r0,0 mtspr SPRN_LPID,r0 + mtspr SPRN_PCR,r0 mfspr r3,SPRN_LPCR ori r3, r3, LPCR_PECEDH bl __init_LPCR
@@ -78,6 +81,7 @@ _GLOBAL(__restore_cpu_power8) beqlr li r0,0 mtspr SPRN_LPID,r0 + mtspr SPRN_PCR,r0 mfspr r3,SPRN_LPCR ori r3, r3, LPCR_PECEDH bl __init_LPCR
@@ -98,6 +102,7 @@ _GLOBAL(__setup_cpu_power9) li r0,0 mtspr SPRN_LPID,r0 mtspr SPRN_PID,r0 + mtspr SPRN_PCR,r0 mfspr r3,SPRN_LPCR LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r4, LPCR_PECEDH | LPCR_PECE_HVEE | LPCR_HVICE) or r3, r3, r4
@@ -121,6 +126,7 @@ _GLOBAL(__restore_cpu_power9) li r0,0 mtspr SPRN_LPID,r0 mtspr SPRN_PID,r0 + mtspr SPRN_PCR,r0 mfspr r3,SPRN_LPCR LOAD_REG_IMMEDIATE(r4, LPCR_PECEDH | LPCR_PECE_HVEE | LPCR_HVICE) or r3, r3, r4
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 3/61 USB: serial: cp210x: use tcflag_t to fix incompatible pointer type
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
commit 009615ab7fd4e43b82a38e4e6adc5e23c1ee567f upstream.
On sparc32, tcflag_t is unsigned long, unlike all other architectures:
drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c: In function 'cp210x_get_termios':
drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c:717:3: warning: passing argument 2 of 'cp210x_get_termios_port' from incompatible pointer type
cp210x_get_termios_port(tty->driver_data,
^
drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c:35:13: note: expected 'unsigned int *' but argument is of type 'tcflag_t *'
static void cp210x_get_termios_port(struct usb_serial_port *port,
^Consistently use tcflag_t to fix this.
--- drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/serial/cp210x.c +4 -4
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static int cp210x_open(struct tty_structstatic void cp210x_close (struct usb_serial_port *);static void cp210x_get_termios (struct tty_struct *,struct usb_serial_port *);static void cp210x_get_termios_port (struct usb_serial_port *port, -unsigned int *cflagp,unsigned int *baudp); +tcflag_t *cflagp,unsigned int *baudp);static void cp210x_change_speed (struct tty_struct *,struct usb_serial_port *,struct ktermios *); static void cp210x_set_termios(struct tty_struct *, struct usb_serial_port *,
@@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ static void cp210x_get_termios(struct tt &tty->termios.c_cflag, &baud);tty_encode_baud_rate (tty, baud, baud); }else { -unsigned int cflag; +tcflag_t cflag; cflag =0 ;cp210x_get_termios_port (port, &cflag, &baud); }
@@ -739,10 +739,10 @@ static void cp210x_get_termios(struct tt* This is the heart of cp210x_get_termios which always uses a &usb_serial_port. */ static void cp210x_get_termios_port (struct usb_serial_port *port, -unsigned int *cflagp,unsigned int *baudp) +tcflag_t *cflagp,unsigned int *baudp) {struct device *dev = &port->dev; -unsigned int cflag; +tcflag_t cflag;struct cp210x_flow_ctl flow_ctl;u32 baud;u16 bits;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 4/61 Revert "pinctrl: msm: Use dynamic GPIO numbering"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
This reverts commit 0bd77073e693e8f93ff6ddba65a9f426153221cb which is commit a7aa75a2a7dba32594291a71c3704000a2fd7089 upstream.
There's been too many complaints about this. Personally I think it's going to blow up when people hit this in mainline, but hey, it's not my systems. At least we don't have to backport the mess to the stable kernels to give them some more life to live unscathed :)
--- drivers/pinctrl/qcom/pinctrl-msm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pinctrl/qcom/pinctrl-msm.c +1 -1
@@ -790,7 +790,7 @@ static int msm_gpio_init(struct msm_pincreturn -EINVAL ; chip = &pctrl->chip; - chip->base =-1 ; + chip->base =0 ; chip->ngpio = ngpio; chip->label =dev_name (pctrl->dev); chip->parent = pctrl->dev;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 5/61 xfs: detect agfl count corruption and reset agfl
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Brian Foster <[email protected]>
commit a27ba2607e60312554cbcd43fc660b2c7f29dc9c upstream.
The struct xfs_agfl v5 header was originally introduced with unexpected padding that caused the AGFL to operate with one less slot than intended. The header has since been packed, but the fix left an incompatibility for users who upgrade from an old kernel with the unpacked header to a newer kernel with the packed header while the AGFL happens to wrap around the end. The newer kernel recognizes one extra slot at the physical end of the AGFL that the previous kernel did not. The new kernel will eventually attempt to allocate a block from that slot, which contains invalid data, and cause a crash.
This condition can be detected by comparing the active range of the AGFL to the count. While this detects a padding mismatch, it can also trigger false positives for unrelated flcount corruption. Since we cannot distinguish a size mismatch due to padding from unrelated corruption, we can't trust the AGFL enough to simply repopulate the empty slot.
Instead, avoid unnecessarily complex detection logic and and use a solution that can handle any form of flcount corruption that slips through read verifiers: distrust the entire AGFL and reset it to an empty state. Any valid blocks within the AGFL are intentionally leaked. This requires xfs_repair to rectify (which was already necessary based on the state the AGFL was found in). The reset mitigates the side effect of the padding mismatch problem from a filesystem crash to a free space accounting inconsistency. The generic approach also means that this patch can be safely backported to kernels with or without a packed struct xfs_agfl.
Check the AGF for an invalid freelist count on initial read from disk. If detected, set a flag on the xfs_perag to indicate that a reset is required before the AGFL can be used. In the first transaction that attempts to use a flagged AGFL, reset it to empty, warn the user about the inconsistency and allow the freelist fixup code to repopulate the AGFL with new blocks. The xfs_perag flag is cleared to eliminate the need for repeated checks on each block allocation operation.
This allows kernels that include the packing fix commit 96f859d52bcb ("libxfs: pack the agfl header structure so XFS_AGFL_SIZE is correct") to handle older unpacked AGFL formats without a filesystem crash.
Reviewed-by Dave Chiluk <[email protected]>
--- fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_alloc.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/xfs/xfs_mount.h | 1 fs/xfs/xfs_trace.h | 9 +++- 3 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_alloc.c +94 -0
@@ -2035,6 +2035,93 @@ xfs_alloc_space_available( }/* +* Check the agfl fields of the agf for inconsistency or corruption. The purpose +* is to detect an agfl header padding mismatch between current and early v5 +* kernels. This problem manifests as a 1-slot size difference between the +* on-disk flcount and the active [first, last] range of a wrapped agfl. This +* may also catch variants of agfl count corruption unrelated to padding. Either +* way, we'll reset the agfl and warn the user. +* +* Return true if a reset is required before the agfl can be used, false +* otherwise. +*/ +static bool +xfs_agfl_needs_reset ( +struct xfs_mount *mp, +struct xfs_agf *agf) +{ +uint32_t f =be32_to_cpu (agf->agf_flfirst); +uint32_t l =be32_to_cpu (agf->agf_fllast); +uint32_t c =be32_to_cpu (agf->agf_flcount); +int agfl_size =XFS_AGFL_SIZE (mp); +int active; + +/* no agfl header on v4 supers */ +if (!xfs_sb_version_hascrc (&mp->m_sb)) +return false; + +/* +* The agf read verifier catches severe corruption of these fields. +* Repeat some sanity checks to cover a packed -> unpacked mismatch if +* the verifier allows it. +*/ +if (f >= agfl_size || l >= agfl_size) +return true; +if (c > agfl_size) +return true; + +/* +* Check consistency between the on-disk count and the active range. An +* agfl padding mismatch manifests as an inconsistent flcount. +*/ +if (c && l >= f) + active = l - f +1 ; +else if (c) + active = agfl_size - f + l +1 ; +else + active =0 ; + +return active != c; +} + +/* +* Reset the agfl to an empty state. Ignore/drop any existing blocks since the +* agfl content cannot be trusted. Warn the user that a repair is required to +* recover leaked blocks. +* +* The purpose of this mechanism is to handle filesystems affected by the agfl +* header padding mismatch problem. A reset keeps the filesystem online with a +* relatively minor free space accounting inconsistency rather than suffer the +* inevitable crash from use of an invalid agfl block. +*/ +static void +xfs_agfl_reset ( +struct xfs_trans *tp, +struct xfs_buf *agbp, +struct xfs_perag *pag) +{ +struct xfs_mount *mp = tp->t_mountp; +struct xfs_agf *agf =XFS_BUF_TO_AGF (agbp); + +ASSERT (pag->pagf_agflreset); +trace_xfs_agfl_reset (mp, agf,0 , _RET_IP_); + +xfs_warn (mp, +"WARNING: Reset corrupted AGFL on AG %u. %d blocks leaked. " +"Please unmount and run xfs_repair." , + pag->pag_agno, pag->pagf_flcount); + + agf->agf_flfirst =0 ; + agf->agf_fllast =cpu_to_be32 (XFS_AGFL_SIZE (mp) -1 ); + agf->agf_flcount =0 ; +xfs_alloc_log_agf (tp, agbp,XFS_AGF_FLFIRST |XFS_AGF_FLLAST | +XFS_AGF_FLCOUNT ); + + pag->pagf_flcount =0 ; + pag->pagf_agflreset = false; +} + +/* * Decide whether to use this allocation group for this allocation. * If so, fix up the btree freelist's size. */
@@ -2095,6 +2182,10 @@ xfs_alloc_fix_freelist( } } +/* reset a padding mismatched agfl before final free space check */ +if (pag->pagf_agflreset) +xfs_agfl_reset (tp, agbp, pag); +/* If there isn't enough total space or single-extent, reject it. */ need =xfs_alloc_min_freelist (mp, pag);if (!xfs_alloc_space_available (args, need, flags))
@@ -2251,6 +2342,7 @@ xfs_alloc_get_freelist( agf->agf_flfirst =0 ; pag =xfs_perag_get (mp,be32_to_cpu (agf->agf_seqno)); +ASSERT (!pag->pagf_agflreset);be32_add_cpu (&agf->agf_flcount,-1 );xfs_trans_agflist_delta (tp,-1 ); pag->pagf_flcount--;
@@ -2362,6 +2454,7 @@ xfs_alloc_put_freelist( agf->agf_fllast =0 ; pag =xfs_perag_get (mp,be32_to_cpu (agf->agf_seqno)); +ASSERT (!pag->pagf_agflreset);be32_add_cpu (&agf->agf_flcount,1 );xfs_trans_agflist_delta (tp,1 ); pag->pagf_flcount++;
@@ -2568,6 +2661,7 @@ xfs_alloc_read_agf( pag->pagb_count =0 ; pag->pagb_tree =RB_ROOT ; pag->pagf_init =1 ; + pag->pagf_agflreset =xfs_agfl_needs_reset (mp, agf); }#ifdef DEBUG else if (!XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(mp)) {
fs/xfs/xfs_mount.h +1 -0
@@ -368,6 +368,7 @@ typedef struct xfs_perag {char pagi_inodeok;/* The agi is ok for inodes */ __uint8_t pagf_levels[XFS_BTNUM_AGF ];/* # of levels in bno & cnt btree */ +bool pagf_agflreset;/* agfl requires reset before use */ __uint32_t pagf_flcount;/* count of blocks in freelist */ xfs_extlen_t pagf_freeblks;/* total free blocks */ xfs_extlen_t pagf_longest;/* longest free space */
fs/xfs/xfs_trace.h +8 -1
@@ -1516,7 +1516,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(xfs_trans_commit_lsn, __entry->lsn) ); -TRACE_EVENT(xfs_agf, +DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(xfs_agf_class, TP_PROTO(struct xfs_mount *mp, struct xfs_agf *agf, int flags, unsigned long caller_ip), TP_ARGS(mp, agf, flags, caller_ip),
@@ -1572,6 +1572,13 @@ TRACE_EVENT(xfs_agf, __entry->longest, (void *)__entry->caller_ip) ); +#define DEFINE_AGF_EVENT (name) \ +DEFINE_EVENT(xfs_agf_class, name, \ + TP_PROTO(struct xfs_mount *mp, struct xfs_agf *agf, int flags, \ + unsigned long caller_ip), \ + TP_ARGS(mp, agf, flags, caller_ip)) +DEFINE_AGF_EVENT (xfs_agf); +DEFINE_AGF_EVENT (xfs_agfl_reset); TRACE_EVENT(xfs_free_extent, TP_PROTO(struct xfs_mount *mp, xfs_agnumber_t agno, xfs_agblock_t agbno,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 6/61 Revert "ima: limit file hash setting by user to fix and log modes"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
commit f5acb3dcba1ffb7f0b8cbb9dba61500eea5d610b upstream.
Userspace applications have been modified to write security xattrs, but they are not context aware. In the case of security.ima, the security xattr can be either a file hash or a file signature. Permitting writing one, but not the other requires the application to be context aware.
In addition, userspace applications might write files to a staging area, which might not be in policy, and then change some file metadata (eg. owner) making it in policy. As a result, these files are not labeled properly.
This reverts commit c68ed80c97d9720f51ef31fe91560fdd1e121533, which prevents writing file hashes as security.ima xattrs.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +2 -6
@@ -389,14 +389,10 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *de result =ima_protect_xattr (dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len);if (result ==1 ) { -bool digsig; -if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >=IMA_XATTR_LAST ))return -EINVAL ; - digsig = (xvalue->type ==EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG ); -if (!digsig && (ima_appraise &IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE )) -return -EPERM ; -ima_reset_appraise_flags (d_backing_inode (dentry), digsig); +ima_reset_appraise_flags (d_backing_inode (dentry), + (xvalue->type ==EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG ) ?1 :0 ); result =0 ; }return result;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 7/61 Input: elan_i2c_smbus - fix corrupted stack
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
commit 40f7090bb1b4ec327ea1e1402ff5783af5b35195 upstream.
New ICs (like the one on the Lenovo T480s) answer to ETP_SMBUS_IAP_VERSION_CMD 4 bytes instead of 3. This corrupts the stack as i2c_smbus_read_block_data() uses the values returned by the i2c device to know how many data it need to return.
i2c_smbus_read_block_data() can read up to 32 bytes (I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX) and there is no safeguard on how many bytes are provided in the return value. Ensure we always have enough space for any future firmware. Also 0-initialize the values to prevent any access to uninitialized memory.
--- drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_smbus.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/input/mouse/elan_i2c_smbus.c +11 -11
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static int elan_smbus_get_baseline_data( bool max_baseline, u8 *value) { int error; -u8 val[3 ]; +u8 val[I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX ] = {0 }; error = i2c_smbus_read_block_data(client, max_baseline ?
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static int elan_smbus_get_version(struct bool iap, u8 *version) { int error; -u8 val[3 ]; +u8 val[I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX ] = {0 }; error = i2c_smbus_read_block_data(client, iap ? ETP_SMBUS_IAP_VERSION_CMD :
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static int elan_smbus_get_sm_version(str u8 *ic_type, u8 *version) {int error; -u8 val[3 ]; +u8 val[I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX ] = {0 }; error =i2c_smbus_read_block_data (client,ETP_SMBUS_SM_VERSION_CMD , val);
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ static int elan_smbus_get_sm_version(strstatic int elan_smbus_get_product_id (struct i2c_client *client,u16 *id) {int error; -u8 val[3 ]; +u8 val[I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX ] = {0 }; error =i2c_smbus_read_block_data (client,ETP_SMBUS_UNIQUEID_CMD , val);
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ static int elan_smbus_get_checksum(struc bool iap, u16 *csum) { int error; -u8 val[3 ]; +u8 val[I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX ] = {0 }; error = i2c_smbus_read_block_data(client, iap ? ETP_SMBUS_FW_CHECKSUM_CMD :
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static int elan_smbus_get_max(struct i2c {int ret;int error; -u8 val[3 ]; +u8 val[I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX ] = {0 }; ret =i2c_smbus_read_block_data (client,ETP_SMBUS_RANGE_CMD , val);if (ret !=3 ) {
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static int elan_smbus_get_resolution(str {int ret;int error; -u8 val[3 ]; +u8 val[I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX ] = {0 }; ret =i2c_smbus_read_block_data (client,ETP_SMBUS_RESOLUTION_CMD , val);if (ret !=3 ) {
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ static int elan_smbus_get_num_traces(str {int ret;int error; -u8 val[3 ]; +u8 val[I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX ] = {0 }; ret =i2c_smbus_read_block_data (client,ETP_SMBUS_XY_TRACENUM_CMD , val);if (ret !=3 ) {
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ static int elan_smbus_iap_get_mode(struc {int error;u16 constant; -u8 val[3 ]; +u8 val[I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX ] = {0 }; error =i2c_smbus_read_block_data (client,ETP_SMBUS_IAP_CTRL_CMD , val);if (error <0 ) {
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ static int elan_smbus_prepare_fw_update(int len;int error;enum tp_mode mode; -u8 val[3 ]; +u8 val[I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX ] = {0 };u8 cmd[4 ] = {0x0F ,0x78 ,0x00 ,0x06 };u16 password;
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ static int elan_smbus_write_fw_block(strstruct device *dev = &client->dev;int error;u16 result; -u8 val[3 ]; +u8 val[I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX ] = {0 };/* * Due to the limitation of smbus protocol limiting
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 8/61 tracing: Fix crash when freeing instances with event triggers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
commit 86b389ff22bd6ad8fd3cb98e41cd271886c6d023 upstream.
If a instance has an event trigger enabled when it is freed, it could cause an access of free memory. Here's the case that crashes:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing # mkdir instances/foo # echo snapshot > instances/foo/events/initcall/initcall_start/trigger # rmdir instances/foo
Would produce:
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI Modules linked in: tun bridge ... CPU: 5 PID: 6203 Comm: rmdir Tainted: G W 4.17.0-rc4-test+ #933 Hardware name: Hewlett-Packard HP Compaq Pro 6300 SFF/339A, BIOS K01 v03.03 07/14/2016 RIP: 0010:clear_event_triggers+0x3b/0x70 RSP: 0018:ffffc90003783de0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b2b RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8800c7130ba0 RBP: ffffc90003783e00 R08: ffff8801131993f8 R09: 0000000100230016 R10: ffffc90003783d80 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8800c7130ba0 R13: ffff8800c7130bd8 R14: ffff8800cc093768 R15: 00000000ffffff9c FS: 00007f6f4aa86700(0000) GS:ffff88011eb40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f6f4a5aed60 CR3: 00000000cd552001 CR4: 00000000001606e0 Call Trace: event_trace_del_tracer+0x2a/0xc5 instance_rmdir+0x15c/0x200 tracefs_syscall_rmdir+0x52/0x90 vfs_rmdir+0xdb/0x160 do_rmdir+0x16d/0x1c0 __x64_sys_rmdir+0x17/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
This was due to the call the clears out the triggers when an instance is being deleted not removing the trigger from the link list.
--- kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c +3 -2
@@ -481,9 +481,10 @@ clear_event_triggers(struct trace_arraystruct trace_event_file *file;list_for_each_entry (file, &tr->events, list) { -struct event_trigger_data *data; -list_for_each_entry_rcu (data, &file->triggers, list) { +struct event_trigger_data *data, *n; +list_for_each_entry_safe (data, n, &file->triggers, list) {trace_event_trigger_enable_disable (file,0 ); +list_del_rcu (&data->list);if (data->ops->free) data->ops->free (data->ops, data); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 9/61 selinux: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xattr_getsecurity
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sachin Grover <[email protected]>
commit efe3de79e0b52ca281ef6691480c8c68c82a4657 upstream.
Call trace: [<ffffff9203a8d7a8>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x428 [<ffffff9203a8dbf8>] show_stack+0x28/0x38 [<ffffff920409bfb8>] dump_stack+0xd4/0x124 [<ffffff9203d187e8>] print_address_description+0x68/0x258 [<ffffff9203d18c00>] kasan_report.part.2+0x228/0x2f0 [<ffffff9203d1927c>] kasan_report+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffff9203d1776c>] check_memory_region+0x12c/0x1c0 [<ffffff9203d17cdc>] memcpy+0x34/0x68 [<ffffff9203d75348>] xattr_getsecurity+0xe0/0x160 [<ffffff9203d75490>] vfs_getxattr+0xc8/0x120 [<ffffff9203d75d68>] getxattr+0x100/0x2c8 [<ffffff9203d76fb4>] SyS_fgetxattr+0x64/0xa0 [<ffffff9203a83f70>] el0_svc_naked+0x24/0x28
If user get root access and calls security.selinux setxattr() with an embedded NUL on a file and then if some process performs a getxattr() on that file with a length greater than the actual length of the string, it would result in a panic.
To fix this, add the actual length of the string to the security context instead of the length passed by the userspace process.
--- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/selinux/ss/services.c +1 -1
@@ -1435,7 +1435,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core( scontext_len, &context, def_sid);if (rc == -EINVAL && force) { context.str = str; - context.len = scontext_len; + context.len =strlen (str) +1 ; str =NULL ; }else if (rc) goto out_unlock;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 10/61 cfg80211: further limit wiphy names to 64 bytes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 814596495dd2b9d4aab92d8f89cf19060d25d2ea upstream.
wiphy names were recently limited to 128 bytes by commit a7cfebcb7594 ("cfg80211: limit wiphy names to 128 bytes"). As it turns out though, this isn't sufficient because dev_vprintk_emit() needs the syslog header string "SUBSYSTEM=ieee80211\0DEVICE=+ieee80211:$devname" to fit into 128 bytes. This triggered the "device/subsystem name too long" WARN when the device name was >= 90 bytes. As before, this was reproduced by syzbot by sending an HWSIM_CMD_NEW_RADIO command to the MAC80211_HWSIM generic netlink family.
Fix it by further limiting wiphy names to 64 bytes.
--- include/uapi/linux/nl80211.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/uapi/linux/nl80211.h +1 -1
@@ -2379,7 +2379,7 @@ enum nl80211_attrs {#define NL80211_ATTR_KEYS NL80211_ATTR_KEYS#define NL80211_ATTR_FEATURE_FLAGS NL80211_ATTR_FEATURE_FLAGS -#define NL80211_WIPHY_NAME_MAXLEN 128 +#define NL80211_WIPHY_NAME_MAXLEN 64#define NL80211_MAX_SUPP_RATES 32#define NL80211_MAX_SUPP_HT_RATES 77
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 11/61 dma-buf: remove redundant initialization of sg_table
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
commit 531beb067c6185aceabfdee0965234c6a8fd133b upstream.
sg_table is being initialized and is never read before it is updated again later on, hence making the initialization redundant. Remove the initialization.
Detected by clang scan-build:
"warning: Value stored to 'sg_table' during its initialization is never read"
--- drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/dma-buf/dma-buf.c +1 -1
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(dma_buf_detach);struct sg_table *dma_buf_map_attachment (struct dma_buf_attachment *attach,enum dma_data_direction direction) { -struct sg_table *sg_table =ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +struct sg_table *sg_table;might_sleep ();
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 12/61 rtlwifi: rtl8192cu: Remove variable self-assignment in rf.c
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matthias Kaehlcke <[email protected]>
commit fb239c1209bb0f0b4830cc72507cc2f2d63fadbd upstream.
In _rtl92c_get_txpower_writeval_by_regulatory() the variable writeVal is assigned to itself in an if ... else statement, apparently only to document that the branch condition is handled and that a previously read value should be returned unmodified. The self-assignment causes clang to raise the following warning:
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8192cu/rf.c:304:13:
error: explicitly assigning value of variable of type 'u32'
(aka 'unsigned int') to itself [-Werror,-Wself-assign]
writeVal = writeVal;
Delete the branch with the self-assignment.
--- drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8192cu/rf.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8192cu/rf.c +0 -3
@@ -304,9 +304,6 @@ static void _rtl92c_get_txpower_writeval writeVal =0x00000000 ;if (rtlpriv->dm.dynamic_txhighpower_lvl ==TXHIGHPWRLEVEL_BT1 ) writeVal = writeVal -0x06060606 ; -else if (rtlpriv->dm.dynamic_txhighpower_lvl == -TXHIGHPWRLEVEL_BT2 ) - writeVal = writeVal; *(p_outwriteval + rf) = writeVal; } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 13/61 ASoC: Intel: sst: remove redundant variable dma_dev_name
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
commit 271ef65b5882425d500e969e875c98e47a6b0c86 upstream.
The pointer dma_dev_name is assigned but never read, it is redundant and can therefore be removed.
Cleans up clang warning:sound/soc/intel/common/sst-firmware.c:288:3: warning: Value stored to 'dma_dev_name' is never read
--- sound/soc/intel/common/sst-firmware.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
sound/soc/intel/common/sst-firmware.c +0 -2
@@ -274,7 +274,6 @@ int sst_dma_new(struct sst_dsp *sst)struct sst_pdata *sst_pdata = sst->pdata;struct sst_dma *dma;struct resource mem; -const char *dma_dev_name;int ret =0 ;if (sst->pdata->resindex_dma_base ==-1 )
@@ -285,7 +284,6 @@ int sst_dma_new(struct sst_dsp *sst)* is attached to the ADSP IP. */ switch (sst->pdata->dma_engine) {case SST_DMA_TYPE_DW : - dma_dev_name ="dw_dmac" ;break ;default : dev_err(sst->dev, "error: invalid DMA engine %d\n",
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 14/61 platform/chrome: cros_ec_lpc: remove redundant pointer request
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
commit d3b56c566d4ba8cae688baf3cca94425d57ea783 upstream.
Pointer request is being assigned but never used, so remove it. Cleans up the clang warning:
drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_lpc.c:68:2: warning: Value stored to 'request' is never read
--- drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_lpc.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_lpc.c +0 -3
@@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ static int ec_response_timed_out(void)static int cros_ec_pkt_xfer_lpc (struct cros_ec_device *ec,struct cros_ec_command *msg) { -struct ec_host_request *request;struct ec_host_response response;u8 sum =0 ;int i;
@@ -62,8 +61,6 @@ static int cros_ec_pkt_xfer_lpc(struct cfor (i =0 ; i < ret; i++)outb (ec->dout[i],EC_LPC_ADDR_HOST_PACKET + i); - request = (struct ec_host_request *)ec->dout; -/* Here we go */ outb (EC_COMMAND_PROTOCOL_3 ,EC_LPC_ADDR_HOST_CMD );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 15/61 x86/amd: revert commit 944e0fc51a89c9827b9
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Revert commit 944e0fc51a89c9827b98813d65dc083274777c7f ("x86/amd: don't set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS when running under Xen") as it is lacking a prerequisite patch and is making things worse.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 5 ++--- arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +2 -3
@@ -857,9 +857,8 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86if (cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_3DNOW ) ||cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_LM ))set_cpu_cap (c,X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH ); -/* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */ -if (!cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_XENPV )) -set_cpu_bug (c,X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS ); +/* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET */ +set_cpu_bug (c,X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS ); }#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c +3 -1
@@ -1980,8 +1980,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xen_hvm_need_lapic);static void xen_set_cpu_features (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { -if (xen_pv_domain ()) +if (xen_pv_domain ()) { +clear_cpu_bug (c,X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS );set_cpu_cap (c,X86_FEATURE_XENPV ); + } }static void xen_pin_vcpu (int cpu)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 16/61 xen: set cpu capabilities from xen_start_kernel()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Upstream commit: 0808e80cb760de2733c0527d2090ed2205a1eef8 ("xen: set cpu capabilities from xen_start_kernel()")
There is no need to set the same capabilities for each cpu individually. This can easily be done for all cpus when starting the kernel.
--- arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c +9 -9
@@ -472,6 +472,14 @@ static void __init xen_init_cpuid_mask(v cpuid_leaf1_ecx_set_mask = (1 << (X86_FEATURE_MWAIT %32 )); } +static void __init xen_init_capabilities (void ) +{ +if (xen_pv_domain ()) { +setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_XENPV ); + } +} +static void xen_set_debugreg (int reg,unsigned long val) {HYPERVISOR_set_debugreg (reg, val);
@@ -1634,6 +1642,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init xen_staxen_init_irq_ops ();xen_init_cpuid_mask (); +xen_init_capabilities ();#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC /*
@@ -1978,14 +1987,6 @@ bool xen_hvm_need_lapic(void) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (xen_hvm_need_lapic); -static void xen_set_cpu_features (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) -{ -if (xen_pv_domain ()) { -clear_cpu_bug (c,X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS ); -set_cpu_cap (c,X86_FEATURE_XENPV ); - } -} -static void xen_pin_vcpu (int cpu) {static bool disable_pinning;
@@ -2032,7 +2033,6 @@ const struct hypervisor_x86 x86_hyper_xe .init_platform = xen_hvm_guest_init, #endif .x2apic_available = xen_x2apic_para_available, - .set_cpu_features = xen_set_cpu_features, .pin_vcpu = xen_pin_vcpu, };EXPORT_SYMBOL (x86_hyper_xen);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 17/61 x86/amd: dont set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS when running under Xen
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Juergen Gross <[email protected]>
Upstream commit: def9331a12977770cc6132d79f8e6565871e8e38 ("x86/amd:
don't set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS when running under Xen")
When running as Xen pv guest X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS must not be set on AMD cpus.
This bug/feature bit is kind of special as it will be used very early when switching threads. Setting the bit and clearing it a little bit later leaves a critical window where things can go wrong. This time window has enlarged a little bit by using setup_clear_cpu_cap() instead of the hypervisor's set_cpu_features callback. It seems this larger window now makes it rather easy to hit the problem.
The proper solution is to never set the bit in case of Xen.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 5 +++-- arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c | 4 +--- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +3 -2
@@ -857,8 +857,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86if (cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_3DNOW ) ||cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_LM ))set_cpu_cap (c,X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH ); -/* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET */ -set_cpu_bug (c,X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS ); +/* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */ +if (!cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_XENPV )) +set_cpu_bug (c,X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS ); }#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
arch/x86/xen/enlighten.c +1 -3
@@ -474,10 +474,8 @@ static void __init xen_init_cpuid_mask(vstatic void __init xen_init_capabilities (void ) { -if (xen_pv_domain ()) { -setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS ); +if (xen_pv_domain ())setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_XENPV ); - } }static void xen_set_debugreg (int reg,unsigned long val)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 18/61 tcp: avoid integer overflows in tcp_rcv_space_adjust()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
commit 607065bad9931e72207b0cac365d7d4abc06bd99 upstream.
When using large tcp_rmem[2] values (I did tests with 500 MB), I noticed overflows while computing rcvwin.
Lets fix this before the following patch.
--- include/linux/tcp.h | 2 +- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 10 ++++++---- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
include/linux/tcp.h +1 -1
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ struct tcp_sock {/* Receiver queue space */ struct { -int space; +u32 space;u32 seq;u32 time; } rcvq_space;
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +6 -4
@@ -581,8 +581,8 @@ static inline void tcp_rcv_rtt_measure_tvoid tcp_rcv_space_adjust (struct sock *sk) {struct tcp_sock *tp =tcp_sk (sk); +u32 copied;int time; -int copied; time = tcp_time_stamp - tp->rcvq_space.time;if (time < (tp->rcv_rtt_est.rtt >>3 ) || tp->rcv_rtt_est.rtt ==0 )
@@ -604,12 +604,13 @@ void tcp_rcv_space_adjust(struct sock *sif (sysctl_tcp_moderate_rcvbuf && !(sk->sk_userlocks &SOCK_RCVBUF_LOCK )) { -int rcvwin, rcvmem, rcvbuf; +int rcvmem, rcvbuf; +u64 rcvwin;/* minimal window to cope with packet losses, assuming * steady state. Add some cushion because of small variations. */ - rcvwin = (copied <<1 ) +16 * tp->advmss; + rcvwin = ((u64 )copied <<1 ) +16 * tp->advmss;/* If rate increased by 25%, * assume slow start, rcvwin = 3 * copied
@@ -629,7 +630,8 @@ void tcp_rcv_space_adjust(struct sock *swhile (tcp_win_from_space (rcvmem) < tp->advmss) rcvmem +=128 ; - rcvbuf =min (rcvwin / tp->advmss * rcvmem, sysctl_tcp_rmem[2 ]); +do_div (rcvwin, tp->advmss); + rcvbuf =min_t (u64, rcvwin * rcvmem, sysctl_tcp_rmem[2 ]);if (rcvbuf > sk->sk_rcvbuf) { sk->sk_rcvbuf = rcvbuf;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 19/61 scsi: ufs: fix failure to read the string descriptor
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Subhash Jadavani <[email protected]>
commit bde44bb665d049468b6a1a2fa7d666434de4f83f upstream.
While reading variable size descriptors (like string descriptor), some UFS devices may report the "LENGTH" (field in "Transaction Specific fields" of Query Response UPIU) same as what was requested in Query Request UPIU instead of reporting the actual size of the variable size descriptor. Although it's safe to ignore the "LENGTH" field for variable size descriptors as we can always derive the length of the descriptor from the descriptor header fields. Hence this change impose the length match check only for fixed size descriptors (for which we always request the correct size as part of Query Request UPIU).
--- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +31 -8
@@ -2086,18 +2086,41 @@ static int ufshcd_read_desc_param(struct desc_id, desc_index,0 , desc_buf, &buff_len); -if (ret || (buff_len < ufs_query_desc_max_size[desc_id]) || - (desc_buf[QUERY_DESC_LENGTH_OFFSET ] != - ufs_query_desc_max_size[desc_id]) - || (desc_buf[QUERY_DESC_DESC_TYPE_OFFSET ] != desc_id)) { -dev_err (hba->dev,"%s: Failed reading descriptor. desc_id %d param_offset %d buff_len %d ret %d" , - __func__, desc_id, param_offset, buff_len, ret); -if (!ret) - ret = -EINVAL ; +if (ret) { +dev_err (hba->dev,"%s: Failed reading descriptor. desc_id %d, desc_index %d, param_offset %d, ret %d" , + __func__, desc_id, desc_index, param_offset, ret); goto out; } +/* Sanity check */ +if (desc_buf[QUERY_DESC_DESC_TYPE_OFFSET ] != desc_id) { +dev_err (hba->dev,"%s: invalid desc_id %d in descriptor header" , + __func__, desc_buf[QUERY_DESC_DESC_TYPE_OFFSET ]); + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } + +/* +* While reading variable size descriptors (like string descriptor), +* some UFS devices may report the "LENGTH" (field in "Transaction +* Specific fields" of Query Response UPIU) same as what was requested +* in Query Request UPIU instead of reporting the actual size of the +* variable size descriptor. +* Although it's safe to ignore the "LENGTH" field for variable size +* descriptors as we can always derive the length of the descriptor from +* the descriptor header fields. Hence this change impose the length +* match check only for fixed size descriptors (for which we always +* request the correct size as part of Query Request UPIU). +*/ +if ((desc_id !=QUERY_DESC_IDN_STRING ) && + (buff_len != desc_buf[QUERY_DESC_LENGTH_OFFSET ])) { +dev_err (hba->dev,"%s: desc_buf length mismatch: buff_len %d, buff_len(desc_header) %d" , + __func__, buff_len, desc_buf[QUERY_DESC_LENGTH_OFFSET ]); + ret = -EINVAL ; + goto out; + } +if (is_kmalloc)memcpy (param_read_buf, &desc_buf[param_offset], param_size); out:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 20/61 scsi: ufs: refactor device descriptor reading
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tomas Winkler <[email protected]>
commit 93fdd5ac64bbe80dac6416f048405362d7ef0945 upstream.
Pull device descriptor reading out of ufs quirk so it can be used also for other purposes.
Revamp the fixup setup:
1. Rename ufs_device_info to ufs_dev_desc as very similar name ufs_dev_info is already in use.
2. Make the handlers static as they are not used out of the ufshdc.c file.
[mkp: applied by hand]
--- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufs.h | 12 ++++++++++++ drivers/scsi/ufs/ufs_quirks.h | 28 ++++++---------------------- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufs.h +12 -0
@@ -522,4 +522,16 @@ struct ufs_dev_info { bool is_lu_power_on_wp; }; +#define MAX_MODEL_LEN 16 +/** +* ufs_dev_desc - ufs device details from the device descriptor +* +* @wmanufacturerid: card details +* @model: card model +*/ +struct ufs_dev_desc { +u16 wmanufacturerid; +char model[MAX_MODEL_LEN +1 ]; +}; +#endif /* End of Header */
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufs_quirks.h +6 -22
@@ -21,41 +21,28 @@#define UFS_ANY_VENDOR 0xFFFF#define UFS_ANY_MODEL "ANY_MODEL" -#define MAX_MODEL_LEN 16 -#define UFS_VENDOR_TOSHIBA 0x198#define UFS_VENDOR_SAMSUNG 0x1CE#define UFS_VENDOR_SKHYNIX 0x1AD/** -* ufs_device_info - ufs device details -* @wmanufacturerid: card details -* @model: card model -*/ -struct ufs_device_info { -u16 wmanufacturerid; -char model[MAX_MODEL_LEN +1 ]; -}; - -/** * ufs_dev_fix - ufs device quirk info * @card: ufs card details * @quirk: device quirk */ struct ufs_dev_fix { -struct ufs_device_info card; +struct ufs_dev_desc card;unsigned int quirk; };#define END_FIX { { 0 }, 0 }/* add specific device quirk */ -#define UFS_FIX (_vendor, _model, _quirk) \ - { \ - .card.wmanufacturerid = (_vendor),\ - .card.model = (_model), \ - .quirk = (_quirk), \ - } +#define UFS_FIX (_vendor, _model, _quirk) { \ + .card.wmanufacturerid = (_vendor),\ + .card.model = (_model), \ + .quirk = (_quirk), \ +}/* * If UFS device is having issue in processing LCC (Line Control
@@ -144,7 +131,4 @@ struct ufs_dev_fix {*/ #define UFS_DEVICE_QUIRK_HOST_PA_SAVECONFIGTIME (1 << 8) -struct ufs_hba ; -void ufs_advertise_fixup_device (struct ufs_hba *hba); -#endif /* UFS_QUIRKS_H_ */
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +19 -21
@@ -4906,8 +4906,8 @@ out:return ret; } -static int ufs_get_device_info (struct ufs_hba *hba, -struct ufs_device_info *card_data) +static int ufs_get_device_desc (struct ufs_hba *hba, +struct ufs_dev_desc *dev_desc) {int err;u8 model_index;
@@ -4926,7 +4926,7 @@ static int ufs_get_device_info(struct uf* getting vendor (manufacturerID) and Bank Index in big endian * format */ - card_data->wmanufacturerid = desc_buf[DEVICE_DESC_PARAM_MANF_ID ] <<8 | + dev_desc->wmanufacturerid = desc_buf[DEVICE_DESC_PARAM_MANF_ID ] <<8 | desc_buf[DEVICE_DESC_PARAM_MANF_ID +1 ]; model_index = desc_buf[DEVICE_DESC_PARAM_PRDCT_NAME ];
@@ -4940,36 +4940,26 @@ static int ufs_get_device_info(struct uf } str_desc_buf[QUERY_DESC_STRING_MAX_SIZE ] ='\0' ; -strlcpy (card_data->model, (str_desc_buf +QUERY_DESC_HDR_SIZE ), +strlcpy (dev_desc->model, (str_desc_buf +QUERY_DESC_HDR_SIZE ),min_t (u8, str_desc_buf[QUERY_DESC_LENGTH_OFFSET ],MAX_MODEL_LEN ));/* Null terminate the model string */ - card_data->model[MAX_MODEL_LEN ] ='\0' ; + dev_desc->model[MAX_MODEL_LEN ] ='\0' ; out:return err; } -void ufs_advertise_fixup_device (struct ufs_hba *hba) +static void ufs_fixup_device_setup (struct ufs_hba *hba, +struct ufs_dev_desc *dev_desc) { -int err;struct ufs_dev_fix *f; -struct ufs_device_info card_data; - - card_data.wmanufacturerid =0 ; - - err =ufs_get_device_info (hba, &card_data); -if (err) { -dev_err (hba->dev,"%s: Failed getting device info. err = %d\n" , - __func__, err); -return ; - }for (f = ufs_fixups; f->quirk; f++) { -if (((f->card.wmanufacturerid == card_data.wmanufacturerid) || - (f->card.wmanufacturerid ==UFS_ANY_VENDOR )) && - (STR_PRFX_EQUAL (f->card.model, card_data.model) || +if ((f->card.wmanufacturerid == dev_desc->wmanufacturerid || + f->card.wmanufacturerid ==UFS_ANY_VENDOR ) && + (STR_PRFX_EQUAL (f->card.model, dev_desc->model) || !strcmp (f->card.model,UFS_ANY_MODEL ))) hba->dev_quirks |= f->quirk; }
@@ -5147,6 +5137,7 @@ static void ufshcd_tune_unipro_params(st*/ static int ufshcd_probe_hba (struct ufs_hba *hba) { +struct ufs_dev_desc card = {0 };int ret; ret =ufshcd_link_startup (hba);
@@ -5170,7 +5161,14 @@ static int ufshcd_probe_hba(struct ufs_hif (ret) goto out; -ufs_advertise_fixup_device (hba); + ret =ufs_get_device_desc (hba, &card); +if (ret) { +dev_err (hba->dev,"%s: Failed getting device info. err = %d\n" , + __func__, ret); + goto out; + } + +ufs_fixup_device_setup (hba, &card);ufshcd_tune_unipro_params (hba); ret = ufshcd_set_vccq_rail_unused(hba,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 21/61 scsi: ufs: Factor out ufshcd_read_desc_param
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Potomski, MichalX <[email protected]>
commit a4b0e8a4e92b1baa860e744847fbdb84a50a5071 upstream.
Since in UFS 2.1 specification some of the descriptor lengths differs from 2.0 specification and some devices, which are reporting spec version 2.0 have different descriptor lengths we can not rely on hardcoded values taken from 2.0 specification. This patch introduces reading these lengths per each device from descriptor headers at probe time to ensure their correctness.
--- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufs.h | 22 +--- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 231 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.h | 16 +++ 3 files changed, 197 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufs.h +8 -14
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ enum attr_idn {/* Descriptor idn for Query requests */ enum desc_idn {QUERY_DESC_IDN_DEVICE =0x0 , -QUERY_DESC_IDN_CONFIGURAION =0x1 , +QUERY_DESC_IDN_CONFIGURATION =0x1 ,QUERY_DESC_IDN_UNIT =0x2 ,QUERY_DESC_IDN_RFU_0 =0x3 ,QUERY_DESC_IDN_INTERCONNECT =0x4 ,
@@ -161,19 +161,13 @@ enum desc_header_offset { QUERY_DESC_DESC_TYPE_OFFSET = 0x01, }; -enum ufs_desc_max_size { -QUERY_DESC_DEVICE_MAX_SIZE =0x1F , -QUERY_DESC_CONFIGURAION_MAX_SIZE =0x90 , -QUERY_DESC_UNIT_MAX_SIZE =0x23 , -QUERY_DESC_INTERCONNECT_MAX_SIZE =0x06 , -/* -* Max. 126 UNICODE characters (2 bytes per character) plus 2 bytes -* of descriptor header. -*/ -QUERY_DESC_STRING_MAX_SIZE =0xFE , -QUERY_DESC_GEOMETRY_MAX_SIZE =0x44 , -QUERY_DESC_POWER_MAX_SIZE =0x62 , -QUERY_DESC_RFU_MAX_SIZE =0x00 , +enum ufs_desc_def_size { +QUERY_DESC_DEVICE_DEF_SIZE =0x40 , +QUERY_DESC_CONFIGURATION_DEF_SIZE =0x90 , +QUERY_DESC_UNIT_DEF_SIZE =0x23 , +QUERY_DESC_INTERCONNECT_DEF_SIZE =0x06 , +QUERY_DESC_GEOMETRY_DEF_SIZE =0x44 , +QUERY_DESC_POWER_DEF_SIZE =0x62 , };/* Unit descriptor parameters offsets in bytes*/
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +173 -58
329 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.h +16 -0
@@ -205,6 +205,15 @@ struct ufs_dev_cmd {struct ufs_query query; }; +struct ufs_desc_size { +int dev_desc; +int pwr_desc; +int geom_desc; +int interc_desc; +int unit_desc; +int conf_desc; +}; +/** * struct ufs_clk_info - UFS clock related info * @list: list headed by hba->clk_list_head
@@ -388,6 +397,7 @@ struct ufs_init_prefetch {* @clk_list_head: UFS host controller clocks list node head * @pwr_info: holds current power mode * @max_pwr_info: keeps the device max valid pwm +* @desc_size: descriptor sizes reported by device * @urgent_bkops_lvl: keeps track of urgent bkops level for device * @is_urgent_bkops_lvl_checked: keeps track if the urgent bkops level for * device is known or not.
@@ -563,6 +573,8 @@ struct ufs_hba {enum bkops_status urgent_bkops_lvl;bool is_urgent_bkops_lvl_checked; + +struct ufs_desc_size desc_size; };/* Returns true if clocks can be gated. Otherwise false */
@@ -736,6 +748,10 @@ int ufshcd_query_flag(struct ufs_hba *hb enum flag_idn idn, bool *flag_res);int ufshcd_hold (struct ufs_hba *hba,bool async);void ufshcd_release (struct ufs_hba *hba); + +int ufshcd_map_desc_id_to_length (struct ufs_hba *hba,enum desc_idn desc_id, +int *desc_length); +u32 ufshcd_get_local_unipro_ver (struct ufs_hba *hba);/* Wrapper functions for safely calling variant operations */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 22/61 arm64: Add hypervisor safe helper for checking constant capabilities
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
commit a4023f682739439b434165b54af7cb3676a4766e upstream.
The hypervisor may not have full access to the kernel data structures and hence cannot safely use cpus_have_cap() helper for checking the system capability. Add a safe helper for hypervisors to check a constant system capability, which *doesn't* fall back to checking the bitmap maintained by the kernel. With this, make the cpus_have_cap() only check the bitmask and force constant cap checks to use the new API for quicker checks.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 19 ++++++++++++------- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 5 +++-- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 2 +- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c | 13 +------------ 7 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +12 -7
@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@#ifndef __ASM_CPUFEATURE_H#define __ASM_CPUFEATURE_H -#include <linux/jump_label.h> -#include <asm/cpucaps.h> #include <asm/hwcap.h> #include <asm/sysreg.h>
@@ -27,6 +25,8 @@#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +#include <linux/bug.h> +#include <linux/jump_label.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> /* CPU feature register tracking */
@@ -104,14 +104,19 @@ static inline bool cpu_have_feature(unsireturn elf_hwcap & (1UL << num); } +/* System capability check for constant caps */ +static inline bool cpus_have_const_cap (int num) +{ +if (num >=ARM64_NCAPS ) +return false; +return static_branch_unlikely (&cpu_hwcap_keys[num]); +} +static inline bool cpus_have_cap (unsigned int num) {if (num >=ARM64_NCAPS )return false; -if (__builtin_constant_p (num)) -return static_branch_unlikely (&cpu_hwcap_keys[num]); -else -return test_bit (num, cpu_hwcaps); +return test_bit (num, cpu_hwcaps); }static inline void cpus_set_cap (unsigned int num)
@@ -200,7 +205,7 @@ static inline bool cpu_supports_mixed_enstatic inline bool system_supports_32bit_el0 (void ) { -return cpus_have_cap (ARM64_HAS_32BIT_EL0 ); +return cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_32BIT_EL0 ); }static inline bool system_supports_mixed_endian_el0 (void )
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -1
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ static inline void __cpu_init_stage2(voistatic inline bool kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor (void ) { -return cpus_have_cap (ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR ); +return cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR ); }#endif /* __ARM64_KVM_HOST_H__ */
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h +1 -1
@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(v vect = __bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start + data->hyp_vectors_slot *SZ_2K ; -if (!cpus_have_cap (ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN )) +if (!cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN )) vect =lm_alias (vect); }
arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h +1 -1
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ typedef struct {static inline bool arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0 (void ) {return IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 ) && -cpus_have_cap (ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 ); +cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 ); }typedef void (*bp_hardening_cb_t )(void );
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +3 -2
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ unsigned int compat_elf_hwcap2 __read_mo#endif DECLARE_BITMAP (cpu_hwcaps,ARM64_NCAPS ); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (cpu_hwcaps);DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_ARRAY_FALSE (cpu_hwcap_keys,ARM64_NCAPS );EXPORT_SYMBOL (cpu_hwcap_keys);
@@ -762,7 +763,7 @@ static bool unmap_kernel_at_el0(const st* ThunderX leads to apparent I-cache corruption of kernel text, which * ends as well as you might imagine. Don't even try. */ -if (cpus_have_cap (ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456 )) { +if (cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456 )) { str ="ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_27456" ; __kpti_forced =-1 ; }
@@ -1203,5 +1204,5 @@ void __init setup_cpu_features(void)static bool __maybe_unused cpufeature_pan_not_uao (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,int __unused) { -return (cpus_have_cap (ARM64_HAS_PAN ) && !cpus_have_cap (ARM64_HAS_UAO )); +return (cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_PAN ) && !cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_UAO )); }
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +1 -1
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flagmemset (childregs,0 ,sizeof (struct pt_regs )); childregs->pstate = PSR_MODE_EL1h;if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_ARM64_UAO ) && -cpus_have_cap (ARM64_HAS_UAO )) +cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_HAS_UAO )) childregs->pstate |=PSR_UAO_BIT ; p->thread.cpu_context.x19 = stack_start; p->thread.cpu_context.x20 = stk_sz;
drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c +1 -12
@@ -120,11 +120,10 @@ static void gic_redist_wait_for_rwp(void }#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64 -static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (is_cavium_thunderx);static u64 __maybe_unused gic_read_iar (void ) { -if (static_branch_unlikely (&is_cavium_thunderx)) +if (cpus_have_const_cap (ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_23154 ))return gic_read_iar_cavium_thunderx ();else return gic_read_iar_common ();
@@ -908,14 +907,6 @@ static const struct irq_domain_ops parti .select = gic_irq_domain_select, }; -static void gicv3_enable_quirks (void ) -{ -#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64 -if (cpus_have_cap (ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_23154 )) -static_branch_enable (&is_cavium_thunderx); -#endif -} - static int __init gic_init_bases(void __iomem *dist_base, struct redist_region *rdist_regs, u32 nr_redist_regions,
@@ -938,8 +929,6 @@ static int __init gic_init_bases(void __ gic_data.nr_redist_regions = nr_redist_regions; gic_data.redist_stride = redist_stride; -gicv3_enable_quirks (); -/* * Find out how many interrupts are supported. * The GIC only supports up to 1020 interrupt sources (SGI+PPI+SPI)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 23/61 arm64/cpufeature: dont use mutex in bringup path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
commit 63a1e1c95e60e798fa09ab3c536fb555aa5bbf2b upstream.
Currently, cpus_set_cap() calls static_branch_enable_cpuslocked(), which must take the jump_label mutex.
We call cpus_set_cap() in the secondary bringup path, from the idle thread where interrupts are disabled. Taking a mutex in this path "is a NONO" regardless of whether it's contended, and something we must avoid. We didn't spot this until recently, as ___might_sleep() won't warn for this case until all CPUs have been brought up.
This patch avoids taking the mutex in the secondary bringup path. The poking of static keys is deferred until enable_cpu_capabilities(), which runs in a suitable context on the boot CPU. To account for the static keys being set later, cpus_have_const_cap() is updated to use another static key to check whether the const cap keys have been initialised, falling back to the caps bitmap until this is the case.
This means that users of cpus_have_const_cap() gain should only gain a single additional NOP in the fast path once the const caps are initialised, but should always see the current cap value.
The hyp code should never dereference the caps array, since the caps are initialized before we run the module initcall to initialise hyp. A check is added to the hyp init code to document this requirement.
This change will sidestep a number of issues when the upcoming hotplug locking rework is merged.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 12 ++++++++++-- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 8 ++++++-- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +10 -2
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ struct arm64_cpu_capabilities { extern DECLARE_BITMAP(cpu_hwcaps, ARM64_NCAPS);extern struct static_key_false cpu_hwcap_keys[ARM64_NCAPS ]; +extern struct static_key_false arm64_const_caps_ready;bool this_cpu_has_cap (unsigned int cap);
@@ -105,7 +106,7 @@ static inline bool cpu_have_feature(unsi }/* System capability check for constant caps */ -static inline bool cpus_have_const_cap (int num) +static inline bool __cpus_have_const_cap (int num) {if (num >=ARM64_NCAPS )return false;
@@ -119,6 +120,14 @@ static inline bool cpus_have_cap(unsignereturn test_bit (num, cpu_hwcaps); } +static inline bool cpus_have_const_cap (int num) +{ +if (static_branch_likely (&arm64_const_caps_ready)) +return __cpus_have_const_cap (num); +else +return cpus_have_cap (num); +} +static inline void cpus_set_cap (unsigned int num) {if (num >=ARM64_NCAPS ) {
@@ -126,7 +135,6 @@ static inline void cpus_set_cap(unsigned num, ARM64_NCAPS); }else {__set_bit (num, cpu_hwcaps); -static_branch_enable (&cpu_hwcap_keys[num]); } }
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +6 -2
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@#include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/kvm_types.h> +#include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/kvm.h> #include <asm/kvm_asm.h> #include <asm/kvm_mmio.h>
@@ -358,9 +359,12 @@ static inline void __cpu_init_hyp_mode(p unsigned long vector_ptr) {/* -* Call initialization code, and switch to the full blown -* HYP code. +* Call initialization code, and switch to the full blown HYP code. +* If the cpucaps haven't been finalized yet, something has gone very +* wrong, and hyp will crash and burn when it uses any +* cpus_have_const_cap() wrapper. */ +BUG_ON (!static_branch_likely (&arm64_const_caps_ready));__kvm_call_hyp ((void *)pgd_ptr, hyp_stack_ptr, vector_ptr); }
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +21 -2
@@ -1052,8 +1052,16 @@ void update_cpu_capabilities(const struc*/ void __init enable_cpu_capabilities (const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *caps) { -for (; caps->matches; caps++) -if (caps->enable &&cpus_have_cap (caps->capability)) +for (; caps->matches; caps++) { +unsigned int num = caps->capability; + +if (!cpus_have_cap (num)) +continue ; + +/* Ensure cpus_have_const_cap(num) works */ +static_branch_enable (&cpu_hwcap_keys[num]); + +if (caps->enable) {/* * Use stop_machine() as it schedules the work allowing * us to modify PSTATE, instead of on_each_cpu() which
@@ -1061,6 +1069,8 @@ void __init enable_cpu_capabilities(cons* we return. */ stop_machine (caps->enable, (void *)caps, cpu_online_mask); + } + } }/*
@@ -1164,6 +1174,14 @@ static void __init setup_feature_capabilenable_cpu_capabilities (arm64_features); } +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (arm64_const_caps_ready); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (arm64_const_caps_ready); + +static void __init mark_const_caps_ready (void ) +{ +static_branch_enable (&arm64_const_caps_ready); +} +extern const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[];bool this_cpu_has_cap (unsigned int cap)
@@ -1180,6 +1198,7 @@ void __init setup_cpu_features(void)/* Set the CPU feature capabilies */ setup_feature_capabilities ();enable_errata_workarounds (); +mark_const_caps_ready ();setup_elf_hwcaps (arm64_elf_hwcaps);if (system_supports_32bit_el0 ())
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 24/61 powerpc/rfi-flush: Move out of HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR #ifdef
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
The backport of the RFI flush support, done by me, has a minor bug in that the code is inside an #ifdef CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR, which is incorrect.
This doesn't matter with common configs because we enable HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR, but with future patches it will break the build. So fix it.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +1 -1
@@ -679,6 +679,7 @@ static int __init disable_hardlockup_det return 0; }early_initcall (disable_hardlockup_detector); +#endif /* CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR */ #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 static enum l1d_flush_type enabled_flush_types;
@@ -806,4 +807,3 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); }#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */ -#endif
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 25/61 powerpc/pseries: Support firmware disable of RFI flush
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
commit 582605a429e20ae68fd0b041b2e840af296edd08 upstream.
Some versions of firmware will have a setting that can be configured to disable the RFI flush, add support for it.
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c +2 -1
@@ -473,7 +473,8 @@ static void pseries_setup_rfi_flush(voidif (types ==L1D_FLUSH_NONE ) types =L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK ; -if (!(result.behaviour &H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR )) +if ((!(result.behaviour &H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR )) || + (!(result.behaviour &H_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY ))) enable = false; }else {/* Default to fallback if case hcall is not available */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 26/61 powerpc/powernv: Support firmware disable of RFI flush
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
commit eb0a2d2620ae431c543963c8c7f08f597366fc60 upstream.
Some versions of firmware will have a setting that can be configured to disable the RFI flush, add support for it.
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c +4 -0
@@ -79,6 +79,10 @@ static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush(void)if (np &&of_property_read_bool (np,"disabled" )) enable--; + np =of_get_child_by_name (fw_features,"speculation-policy-favor-security" ); +if (np &&of_property_read_bool (np,"disabled" )) + enable =0 ; +of_node_put (np);of_node_put (fw_features); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 27/61 powerpc/rfi-flush: Move the logic to avoid a redo into the debugfs code
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
commit 1e2a9fc7496955faacbbed49461d611b704a7505 upstream.
rfi_flush_enable() includes a check to see if we're already enabled (or disabled), and in that case does nothing.
But that means calling setup_rfi_flush() a 2nd time doesn't actually work, which is a bit confusing.
Move that check into the debugfs code, where it really belongs.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +8 -5
@@ -717,9 +717,6 @@ static void do_nothing(void *unused)void rfi_flush_enable (bool enable) { -if (rfi_flush == enable) -return ; -if (enable) {do_rfi_flush_fixups (enabled_flush_types);on_each_cpu (do_nothing,NULL ,1 );
@@ -773,13 +770,19 @@ void __init setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flu#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS static int rfi_flush_set (void *data,u64 val) { +bool enable; +if (val ==1 ) -rfi_flush_enable (true); + enable = true;else if (val ==0 ) -rfi_flush_enable (false); + enable = false;else return -EINVAL ; +/* Only do anything if we're changing state */ +if (enable != rfi_flush) +rfi_flush_enable (enable); +return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 28/61 powerpc/rfi-flush: Make it possible to call setup_rfi_flush() again
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
commit abf110f3e1cea40f5ea15e85f5d67c39c14568a7 upstream.
For PowerVM migration we want to be able to call setup_rfi_flush() again after we've migrated the partition.
To support that we need to check that we're not trying to allocate the fallback flush area after memblock has gone away (i.e., boot-time only).
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 6 +++++- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h +1 -1
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ enum l1d_flush_type { L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG = 0x8, }; -void __init setup_rfi_flush (enum l1d_flush_type ,bool enable); +void setup_rfi_flush (enum l1d_flush_type ,bool enable);void do_rfi_flush_fixups (enum l1d_flush_type types);#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +5 -1
@@ -731,6 +731,10 @@ static void init_fallback_flush(void)u64 l1d_size, limit;int cpu; +/* Only allocate the fallback flush area once (at boot time). */ +if (l1d_flush_fallback_area) +return ; + l1d_size = ppc64_caches.dsize; limit =min (safe_stack_limit (), ppc64_rma_size);
@@ -748,7 +752,7 @@ static void init_fallback_flush(void) } } -void __init setup_rfi_flush (enum l1d_flush_type types,bool enable) +void setup_rfi_flush (enum l1d_flush_type types,bool enable) {if (types &L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK ) {pr_info ("rfi-flush: Using fallback displacement flush\n" );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 29/61 powerpc/rfi-flush: Always enable fallback flush on pseries
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
commit 84749a58b6e382f109abf1e734bc4dd43c2c25bb upstream.
This ensures the fallback flush area is always allocated on pseries, so in case a LPAR is migrated from a patched to an unpatched system, it is possible to enable the fallback flush in the target system.
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c | 10 +--------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c +1 -9
@@ -459,26 +459,18 @@ static void pseries_setup_rfi_flush(void/* Enable by default */ enable = true; + types =L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK ; rc =plpar_get_cpu_characteristics (&result);if (rc ==H_SUCCESS ) { - types =L1D_FLUSH_NONE ; -if (result.character &H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 ) types |=L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG ;if (result.character &H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 ) types |=L1D_FLUSH_ORI ; -/* Use fallback if nothing set in hcall */ -if (types ==L1D_FLUSH_NONE ) - types =L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK ; -if ((!(result.behaviour &H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR )) || (!(result.behaviour &H_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY ))) enable = false; - }else { -/* Default to fallback if case hcall is not available */ - types =L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK ; }setup_rfi_flush (types, enable);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 30/61 powerpc/rfi-flush: Differentiate enabled and patched flush types
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <[email protected]>
commit 0063d61ccfc011f379a31acaeba6de7c926fed2c upstream.
Currently the rfi-flush messages print 'Using <type> flush' for all enabled_flush_types, but that is not necessarily true -- as now the fallback flush is always enabled on pseries, but the fixup function overwrites its nop/branch slot with other flush types, if available.
So, replace the 'Using <type> flush' messages with '<type> flush is available'.
Also, print the patched flush types in the fixup function, so users can know what is (not) being used (e.g., the slower, fallback flush, or no flush type at all if flush is disabled via the debugfs switch).
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 6 +++--- arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c | 9 ++++++++- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +3 -3
@@ -755,15 +755,15 @@ static void init_fallback_flush(void)void setup_rfi_flush (enum l1d_flush_type types,bool enable) {if (types &L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK ) { -pr_info ("rfi-flush: Using fallback displacement flush\n" ); +pr_info ("rfi-flush: fallback displacement flush available\n" );init_fallback_flush (); }if (types &L1D_FLUSH_ORI ) -pr_info ("rfi-flush: Using ori type flush\n" ); +pr_info ("rfi-flush: ori type flush available\n" );if (types &L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG ) -pr_info ("rfi-flush: Using mttrig type flush\n" ); +pr_info ("rfi-flush: mttrig type flush available\n" ); enabled_flush_types = types;
arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c +8 -1
@@ -153,7 +153,14 @@ void do_rfi_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_ patch_instruction(dest + 2, instrs[2]); } -printk (KERN_DEBUG "rfi-flush: patched %d locations\n" , i); +printk (KERN_DEBUG "rfi-flush: patched %d locations (%s flush)\n" , i, + (types ==L1D_FLUSH_NONE ) ?"no" : + (types ==L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK ) ?"fallback displacement" : + (types &L1D_FLUSH_ORI ) ? (types &L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG ) + ?"ori+mttrig type" + :"ori type" : + (types &L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG ) ?"mttrig type" + :"unknown" ); }#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 31/61 powerpc/rfi-flush: Call setup_rfi_flush() after LPM migration
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
commit 921bc6cf807ceb2ab8005319cf39f33494d6b100 upstream.
We might have migrated to a machine that uses a different flush type, or doesn't need flushing at all.
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/mobility.c | 3 +++ arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pseries.h | 2 ++ arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/mobility.c +3 -0
@@ -314,6 +314,9 @@ void post_mobility_fixup(void)printk (KERN_ERR "Post-mobility device tree update " "failed: %d\n" , rc); +/* Possibly switch to a new RFI flush type */ +pseries_setup_rfi_flush (); +return ; }
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pseries.h +2 -0
@@ -79,4 +79,6 @@ extern struct pci_controller_ops pseriesunsigned long pseries_memory_block_size (void ); +void pseries_setup_rfi_flush (void ); +#endif /* _PSERIES_PSERIES_H */
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c +1 -1
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ static void __init find_and_init_phbs(voof_pci_check_probe_only (); } -static void pseries_setup_rfi_flush (void ) +void pseries_setup_rfi_flush (void ) {struct h_cpu_char_result result;enum l1d_flush_type types;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 32/61 powerpc/pseries: Add new H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS flags
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
commit c4bc36628d7f8b664657d8bd6ad1c44c177880b7 upstream.
Add some additional values which have been defined for the H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS hypercall.
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/hvcall.h +3 -0
@@ -313,6 +313,9 @@#define H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 (1ull << 61) // IBM bit 2#define H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 (1ull << 60) // IBM bit 3#define H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV (1ull << 59) // IBM bit 4 +#define H_CPU_CHAR_BRANCH_HINTS_HONORED (1ull << 58) // IBM bit 5 +#define H_CPU_CHAR_THREAD_RECONFIG_CTRL (1ull << 57) // IBM bit 6 +#define H_CPU_CHAR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED (1ull << 56) // IBM bit 7#define H_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY (1ull << 63) // IBM bit 0#define H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR (1ull << 62) // IBM bit 1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 33/61 powerpc: Add security feature flags for Spectre/Meltdown
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
commit 9a868f634349e62922c226834aa23e3d1329ae7f upstream.
This commit adds security feature flags to reflect the settings we receive from firmware regarding Spectre/Meltdown mitigations.
The feature names reflect the names we are given by firmware on bare metal machines. See the hostboot source for details.
Arguably these could be firmware features, but that then requires them to be read early in boot so they're available prior to asm feature patching, but we don't actually want to use them for patching. We may also want to dynamically update them in future, which would be incompatible with the way firmware features work (at the moment at least). So for now just make them separate flags.
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 2 arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c | 15 ++++++ 3 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h new file +65 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */ +/* +* Security related feature bit definitions. +* +* Copyright 2018, Michael Ellerman, IBM Corporation. +*/ + +#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_SECURITY_FEATURES_H +#define _ASM_POWERPC_SECURITY_FEATURES_H + + +extern unsigned long powerpc_security_features; + +static inline void security_ftr_set (unsigned long feature) +{ + powerpc_security_features |= feature; +} + +static inline void security_ftr_clear (unsigned long feature) +{ + powerpc_security_features &= ~feature; +} + +static inline bool security_ftr_enabled (unsigned long feature) +{ +return !!(powerpc_security_features & feature); +} + + +// Features indicating support for Spectre/Meltdown mitigations + +// The L1-D cache can be flushed with ori r30,r30,0 +#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 0x0000000000000001ull + +// The L1-D cache can be flushed with mtspr 882,r0 (aka SPRN_TRIG2) +#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 0x0000000000000002ull + +// ori r31,r31,0 acts as a speculation barrier +#define SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 0x0000000000000004ull + +// Speculation past bctr is disabled +#define SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED 0x0000000000000008ull + +// Entries in L1-D are private to a SMT thread +#define SEC_FTR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV 0x0000000000000010ull + +// Indirect branch prediction cache disabled +#define SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED 0x0000000000000020ull + + +// Features indicating need for Spectre/Meltdown mitigations + +// The L1-D cache should be flushed on MSR[HV] 1->0 transition (hypervisor to guest) +#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV 0x0000000000000040ull + +// The L1-D cache should be flushed on MSR[PR] 0->1 transition (kernel to userspace) +#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR 0x0000000000000080ull + +// A speculation barrier should be used for bounds checks (Spectre variant 1) +#define SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR 0x0000000000000100ull + +// Firmware configuration indicates user favours security over performance +#define SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY 0x0000000000000200ull + +#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_SECURITY_FEATURES_H */
arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PPC64) += setup_64.o sys_p obj-$(CONFIG_VDSO32) += vdso32/ obj-$(CONFIG_HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT) += hw_breakpoint.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64) += cpu_setup_ppc970.o cpu_setup_pa6t.o -obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64) += cpu_setup_power.o +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64) += cpu_setup_power.o security.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64) += mce.o mce_power.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3E_64) += exceptions-64e.o idle_book3e.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC64) += vdso64/
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c new file +15 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ +// +// Security related flags and so on. +// +// Copyright 2018, Michael Ellerman, IBM Corporation. + +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <asm/security_features.h> + + +unsigned long powerpc_security_features __read_mostly = \ +SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV | \ +SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR | \ +SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR | \ +SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 34/61 powerpc/pseries: Set or clear security feature flags
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
commit f636c14790ead6cc22cf62279b1f8d7e11a67116 upstream.
Now that we have feature flags for security related things, set or clear them based on what we receive from the hypercall.
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c +43 -0
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@#include <asm/reg.h> #include <asm/plpar_wrappers.h> #include <asm/kexec.h> +#include <asm/security_features.h> #include "pseries.h"
@@ -450,6 +451,40 @@ static void __init find_and_init_phbs(voof_pci_check_probe_only (); } +static void init_cpu_char_feature_flags (struct h_cpu_char_result *result) +{ +if (result->character &H_CPU_CHAR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 ) +security_ftr_set (SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 ); + +if (result->character &H_CPU_CHAR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED ) +security_ftr_set (SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED ); + +if (result->character &H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 ) +security_ftr_set (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 ); + +if (result->character &H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 ) +security_ftr_set (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 ); + +if (result->character &H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV ) +security_ftr_set (SEC_FTR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV ); + +if (result->character &H_CPU_CHAR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED ) +security_ftr_set (SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED ); + +/* +* The features below are enabled by default, so we instead look to see +* if firmware has *disabled* them, and clear them if so. +*/ +if (!(result->character &H_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY )) +security_ftr_clear (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ); + +if (!(result->character &H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR )) +security_ftr_clear (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR ); + +if (!(result->character &H_CPU_BEHAV_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR )) +security_ftr_clear (SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR ); +} +void pseries_setup_rfi_flush (void ) {struct h_cpu_char_result result;
@@ -463,6 +498,8 @@ void pseries_setup_rfi_flush(void) rc =plpar_get_cpu_characteristics (&result);if (rc ==H_SUCCESS ) { +init_cpu_char_feature_flags (&result); +if (result.character &H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 ) types |=L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG ;if (result.character &H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 )
@@ -473,6 +510,12 @@ void pseries_setup_rfi_flush(void) enable = false; } +/* +* We're the guest so this doesn't apply to us, clear it to simplify +* handling of it elsewhere. +*/ +security_ftr_clear (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV ); +setup_rfi_flush (types, enable); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 35/61 powerpc/powernv: Set or clear security feature flags
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
commit 77addf6e95c8689e478d607176b399a6242a777e upstream.
Now that we have feature flags for security related things, set or clear them based on what we see in the device tree provided by firmware.
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c +56 -0
@@ -37,9 +37,63 @@#include <asm/smp.h> #include <asm/tm.h> #include <asm/setup.h> +#include <asm/security_features.h> #include "powernv.h" + +static bool fw_feature_is (const char *state,const char *name, +struct device_node *fw_features) +{ +struct device_node *np; +bool rc = false; + + np =of_get_child_by_name (fw_features, name); +if (np) { + rc =of_property_read_bool (np, state); +of_node_put (np); + } + +return rc; +} + +static void init_fw_feat_flags (struct device_node *np) +{ +if (fw_feature_is ("enabled" ,"inst-spec-barrier-ori31,31,0" , np)) +security_ftr_set (SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 ); + +if (fw_feature_is ("enabled" ,"fw-bcctrl-serialized" , np)) +security_ftr_set (SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED ); + +if (fw_feature_is ("enabled" ,"inst-spec-barrier-ori31,31,0" , np)) +security_ftr_set (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 ); + +if (fw_feature_is ("enabled" ,"inst-l1d-flush-trig2" , np)) +security_ftr_set (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 ); + +if (fw_feature_is ("enabled" ,"fw-l1d-thread-split" , np)) +security_ftr_set (SEC_FTR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV ); + +if (fw_feature_is ("enabled" ,"fw-count-cache-disabled" , np)) +security_ftr_set (SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED ); + +/* +* The features below are enabled by default, so we instead look to see +* if firmware has *disabled* them, and clear them if so. +*/ +if (fw_feature_is ("disabled" ,"speculation-policy-favor-security" , np)) +security_ftr_clear (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ); + +if (fw_feature_is ("disabled" ,"needs-l1d-flush-msr-pr-0-to-1" , np)) +security_ftr_clear (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR ); + +if (fw_feature_is ("disabled" ,"needs-l1d-flush-msr-hv-1-to-0" , np)) +security_ftr_clear (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV ); + +if (fw_feature_is ("disabled" ,"needs-spec-barrier-for-bound-checks" , np)) +security_ftr_clear (SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR ); +} +static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush (void ) {struct device_node *np, *fw_features;
@@ -55,6 +109,8 @@ static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush(void)of_node_put (np);if (fw_features) { +init_fw_feat_flags (fw_features); + np =of_get_child_by_name (fw_features,"inst-l1d-flush-trig2" );if (np &&of_property_read_bool (np,"enabled" )) type =L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 36/61 powerpc/64s: Move cpu_show_meltdown()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
commit 8ad33041563a10b34988800c682ada14b2612533 upstream.
This landed in setup_64.c for no good reason other than we had nowhere else to put it. Now that we have a security-related file, that is a better place for it so move it.
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c | 11 +++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 8 -------- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h +1 -0
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@extern unsigned long powerpc_security_features; +extern bool rfi_flush;static inline void security_ftr_set (unsigned long feature) {
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +11 -0
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@// Copyright 2018, Michael Ellerman, IBM Corporation. #include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/device.h> +#include <asm/security_features.h>
@@ -13,3 +15,12 @@ unsigned long powerpc_security_featuresSEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR | \SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR | \SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ; + + +ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown (struct device *dev,struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) +{ +if (rfi_flush) +return sprintf (buf,"Mitigation: RFI Flush\n" ); + +return sprintf (buf,"Vulnerable\n" ); +}
arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +0 -8
@@ -805,12 +805,4 @@ static __init int rfi_flush_debugfs_init }device_initcall (rfi_flush_debugfs_init);#endif - -ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown (struct device *dev,struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) -{ -if (rfi_flush) -return sprintf (buf,"Mitigation: RFI Flush\n" ); - -return sprintf (buf,"Vulnerable\n" ); -}#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 37/61 powerpc/64s: Enhance the information in cpu_show_meltdown()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
commit ff348355e9c72493947be337bb4fae4fc1a41eba upstream.
Now that we have the security feature flags we can make the information displayed in the "meltdown" file more informative.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +28 -2
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/device.h> +#include <linux/seq_buf.h> #include <asm/security_features.h>
@@ -19,8 +20,33 @@ unsigned long powerpc_security_featuresssize_t cpu_show_meltdown (struct device *dev,struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) { -if (rfi_flush) -return sprintf (buf,"Mitigation: RFI Flush\n" ); +bool thread_priv; + + thread_priv =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV ); + +if (rfi_flush || thread_priv) { +struct seq_buf s; +seq_buf_init (&s, buf,PAGE_SIZE -1 ); + +seq_buf_printf (&s,"Mitigation: " ); + +if (rfi_flush) +seq_buf_printf (&s,"RFI Flush" ); + +if (rfi_flush && thread_priv) +seq_buf_printf (&s,", " ); + +if (thread_priv) +seq_buf_printf (&s,"L1D private per thread" ); + +seq_buf_printf (&s,"\n" ); + +return s.len; + } + +if (!security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV ) && + !security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR )) +return sprintf (buf,"Not affected\n" );return sprintf (buf,"Vulnerable\n" ); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 38/61 powerpc/powernv: Use the security flags in pnv_setup_rfi_flush()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
commit 37c0bdd00d3ae83369ab60a6712c28e11e6458d5 upstream.
Now that we have the security flags we can significantly simplify the code in pnv_setup_rfi_flush(), because we can use the flags instead of checking device tree properties and because the security flags have pessimistic defaults.
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c | 41 ++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c +10 -31
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void init_fw_feat_flags(struct deif (fw_feature_is ("enabled" ,"fw-bcctrl-serialized" , np))security_ftr_set (SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED ); -if (fw_feature_is ("enabled" ,"inst-spec-barrier-ori31,31,0" , np)) +if (fw_feature_is ("enabled" ,"inst-l1d-flush-ori30,30,0" , np))security_ftr_set (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 );if (fw_feature_is ("enabled" ,"inst-l1d-flush-trig2" , np))
@@ -98,11 +98,10 @@ static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush(void) {struct device_node *np, *fw_features;enum l1d_flush_type type; -int enable; +bool enable;/* Default to fallback in case fw-features are not available */ type =L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK ; - enable =1 ; np =of_find_node_by_name (NULL ,"ibm,opal" ); fw_features =of_get_child_by_name (np,"fw-features" );
@@ -110,40 +109,20 @@ static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush(void)if (fw_features) {init_fw_feat_flags (fw_features); +of_node_put (fw_features); - np =of_get_child_by_name (fw_features,"inst-l1d-flush-trig2" ); -if (np &&of_property_read_bool (np,"enabled" )) +if (security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 )) type =L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG ; -of_node_put (np); - - np =of_get_child_by_name (fw_features,"inst-l1d-flush-ori30,30,0" ); -if (np &&of_property_read_bool (np,"enabled" )) +if (security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 )) type =L1D_FLUSH_ORI ; - -of_node_put (np); - -/* Enable unless firmware says NOT to */ - enable =2 ; - np =of_get_child_by_name (fw_features,"needs-l1d-flush-msr-hv-1-to-0" ); -if (np &&of_property_read_bool (np,"disabled" )) - enable--; - -of_node_put (np); - - np =of_get_child_by_name (fw_features,"needs-l1d-flush-msr-pr-0-to-1" ); -if (np &&of_property_read_bool (np,"disabled" )) - enable--; - - np =of_get_child_by_name (fw_features,"speculation-policy-favor-security" ); -if (np &&of_property_read_bool (np,"disabled" )) - enable =0 ; - -of_node_put (np); -of_node_put (fw_features); } -setup_rfi_flush (type, enable >0 ); + enable =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ) && \ + (security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR ) || \ +security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV )); + +setup_rfi_flush (type, enable); }static void __init pnv_setup_arch (void )
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 39/61 powerpc/pseries: Use the security flags in pseries_setup_rfi_flush()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
commit 2e4a16161fcd324b1f9bf6cb6856529f7eaf0689 upstream.
Now that we have the security flags we can simplify the code in pseries_setup_rfi_flush() because the security flags have pessimistic defaults.
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c | 27 ++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c +12 -15
@@ -492,30 +492,27 @@ void pseries_setup_rfi_flush(void)bool enable;long rc; -/* Enable by default */ - enable = true; - types =L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK ; - rc =plpar_get_cpu_characteristics (&result); -if (rc ==H_SUCCESS ) { +if (rc ==H_SUCCESS )init_cpu_char_feature_flags (&result); -if (result.character &H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 ) - types |=L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG ; -if (result.character &H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 ) - types |=L1D_FLUSH_ORI ; - -if ((!(result.behaviour &H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR )) || - (!(result.behaviour &H_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY ))) - enable = false; - } -/* * We're the guest so this doesn't apply to us, clear it to simplify * handling of it elsewhere. */ security_ftr_clear (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV ); + types =L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK ; + +if (security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_TRIG2 )) + types |=L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG ; + +if (security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ORI30 )) + types |=L1D_FLUSH_ORI ; + + enable =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ) && \ +security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR ); +setup_rfi_flush (types, enable); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 40/61 powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v1()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
commit 56986016cb8cd9050e601831fe89f332b4e3c46e upstream.
Add a definition for cpu_show_spectre_v1() to override the generic version. Currently this just prints "Not affected" or "Vulnerable" based on the firmware flag.
Although the kernel does have array_index_nospec() in a few places, we haven't yet audited all the powerpc code to see where it's necessary, so for now we don't list that as a mitigation.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +8 -0
@@ -50,3 +50,11 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct devicereturn sprintf (buf,"Vulnerable\n" ); } + +ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1 (struct device *dev,struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) +{ +if (!security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR )) +return sprintf (buf,"Not affected\n" ); + +return sprintf (buf,"Vulnerable\n" ); +}
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 41/61 powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v2()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
commit d6fbe1c55c55c6937cbea3531af7da84ab7473c3 upstream.
Add a definition for cpu_show_spectre_v2() to override the generic version. This has several permuations, though in practice some may not occur we cater for any combination.
The most verbose is:
Mitigation: Indirect branch serialisation (kernel only), Indirect branch cache disabled, ori31 speculation barrier enabled
We don't treat the ori31 speculation barrier as a mitigation on its own, because it has to be *used* by code in order to be a mitigation and we don't know if userspace is doing that. So if that's all we see we say:
Vulnerable, ori31 speculation barrier enabled
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +33 -0
@@ -58,3 +58,36 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct devicreturn sprintf (buf,"Vulnerable\n" ); } + +ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2 (struct device *dev,struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) +{ +bool bcs, ccd, ori; +struct seq_buf s; + +seq_buf_init (&s, buf,PAGE_SIZE -1 ); + + bcs =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_BCCTRL_SERIALISED ); + ccd =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_COUNT_CACHE_DISABLED ); + ori =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 ); + +if (bcs || ccd) { +seq_buf_printf (&s,"Mitigation: " ); + +if (bcs) +seq_buf_printf (&s,"Indirect branch serialisation (kernel only)" ); + +if (bcs && ccd) +seq_buf_printf (&s,", " ); + +if (ccd) +seq_buf_printf (&s,"Indirect branch cache disabled" ); + }else +seq_buf_printf (&s,"Vulnerable" ); + +if (ori) +seq_buf_printf (&s,", ori31 speculation barrier enabled" ); + +seq_buf_printf (&s,"\n" ); + +return s.len; +}
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 42/61 powerpc/pseries: Fix clearing of security feature flags
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <[email protected]>
commit 0f9bdfe3c77091e8704d2e510eb7c2c2c6cde524 upstream.
The H_CPU_BEHAV_* flags should be checked for in the 'behaviour' field of 'struct h_cpu_char_result' -- 'character' is for H_CPU_CHAR_* flags.
Found by playing around with QEMU's implementation of the hypercall:
H_CPU_CHAR=0xf000000000000000
H_CPU_BEHAV=0x0000000000000000
This clears H_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY and H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR so pseries_setup_rfi_flush() disables 'rfi_flush'; and it also clears H_CPU_CHAR_L1D_THREAD_PRIV flag. So there is no RFI flush mitigation at all for cpu_show_meltdown() to report; but currently it does:
Original kernel:
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
Mitigation: RFI FlushPatched kernel:
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
Not affected H_CPU_CHAR=0x0000000000000000
H_CPU_BEHAV=0xf000000000000000
This sets H_CPU_BEHAV_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR so cpu_show_spectre_v1() should report vulnerable; but currently it doesn't:
Original kernel:
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
Not affectedPatched kernel:
# cat /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
Vulnerable--- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c +3 -3
@@ -475,13 +475,13 @@ static void init_cpu_char_feature_flags(* The features below are enabled by default, so we instead look to see * if firmware has *disabled* them, and clear them if so. */ -if (!(result->character &H_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY )) +if (!(result->behaviour &H_CPU_BEHAV_FAVOUR_SECURITY ))security_ftr_clear (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ); -if (!(result->character &H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR )) +if (!(result->behaviour &H_CPU_BEHAV_L1D_FLUSH_PR ))security_ftr_clear (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR ); -if (!(result->character &H_CPU_BEHAV_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR )) +if (!(result->behaviour &H_CPU_BEHAV_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR ))security_ftr_clear (SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR ); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 43/61 powerpc: Move default security feature flags
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <[email protected]>
commit e7347a86830f38dc3e40c8f7e28c04412b12a2e7 upstream.
This moves the definition of the default security feature flags (i.e., enabled by default) closer to the security feature flags.
This can be used to restore current flags to the default flags.
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h | 8 ++++++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c | 7 +------ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h +8 -0
@@ -63,4 +63,12 @@ static inline bool security_ftr_enabled(// Firmware configuration indicates user favours security over performance #define SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY 0x0000000000000200ull + +// Features enabled by default +#define SEC_FTR_DEFAULT \ + (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV | \ + SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR | \ + SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR | \ + SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) +#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_SECURITY_FEATURES_H */
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +1 -6
@@ -11,12 +11,7 @@#include <asm/security_features.h> -unsigned long powerpc_security_features __read_mostly = \ -SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV | \ -SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR | \ -SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR | \ -SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ; - +unsigned long powerpc_security_features__read_mostly =SEC_FTR_DEFAULT ;ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown (struct device *dev,struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 44/61 powerpc/pseries: Restore default security feature flags on setup
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <[email protected]>
commit 6232774f1599028a15418179d17f7df47ede770a upstream.
After migration the security feature flags might have changed (e.g., destination system with unpatched firmware), but some flags are not set/clear again in init_cpu_char_feature_flags() because it assumes the security flags to be the defaults.
Additionally, if the H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS hypercall fails then init_cpu_char_feature_flags() does not run again, which potentially might leave the system in an insecure or sub-optimal configuration.
So, just restore the security feature flags to the defaults assumed by init_cpu_char_feature_flags() so it can set/clear them correctly, and to ensure safe settings are in place in case the hypercall fail.
Depends-on: 19887d6a28e2 ("powerpc: Move default security feature flags")
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c +11 -0
@@ -453,6 +453,10 @@ static void __init find_and_init_phbs(vostatic void init_cpu_char_feature_flags (struct h_cpu_char_result *result) { +/* +* The features below are disabled by default, so we instead look to see +* if firmware has *enabled* them, and set them if so. +*/ if (result->character &H_CPU_CHAR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 )security_ftr_set (SEC_FTR_SPEC_BAR_ORI31 );
@@ -492,6 +496,13 @@ void pseries_setup_rfi_flush(void)bool enable;long rc; +/* +* Set features to the defaults assumed by init_cpu_char_feature_flags() +* so it can set/clear again any features that might have changed after +* migration, and in case the hypercall fails and it is not even called. +*/ + powerpc_security_features =SEC_FTR_DEFAULT ; + rc =plpar_get_cpu_characteristics (&result);if (rc ==H_SUCCESS )init_cpu_char_feature_flags (&result);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 45/61 powerpc/64s: Fix section mismatch warnings from setup_rfi_flush()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
commit 501a78cbc17c329fabf8e9750a1e9ab810c88a0e upstream.
The recent LPM changes to setup_rfi_flush() are causing some section mismatch warnings because we removed the __init annotation on setup_rfi_flush():
The function setup_rfi_flush() references
the function __init ppc64_bolted_size().
the function __init memblock_alloc_base().
The references are actually in init_fallback_flush(), but that is inlined into setup_rfi_flush().
These references are safe because:
- only pseries calls setup_rfi_flush() at runtime
- pseries always passes L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK at boot
- so the fallback flush area will always be allocated
- so the check in init_fallback_flush() will always return early:
/* Only allocate the fallback flush area once (at boot time). */ if (l1d_flush_fallback_area)
return;
- and therefore we won't actually call the freed init routines.
We should rework the code to make it safer by default rather than relying on the above, but for now as a quick-fix just add a __ref annotation to squash the warning.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +1 -1
@@ -726,7 +726,7 @@ void rfi_flush_enable(bool enable) rfi_flush = enable; } -static void init_fallback_flush (void ) +static void __ref init_fallback_flush (void ) {u64 l1d_size, limit;int cpu;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 47/61 net/mlx4_en: fix potential use-after-free with dma_unmap_page
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sarah Newman <[email protected]>
[ Not relevant upstream, therefore no upstream commit. ]
To fix, unmap the page as soon as possible.
When swiotlb is in use, calling dma_unmap_page means that the original page mapped with dma_map_page must still be valid, as swiotlb will copy data from its internal cache back to the originally requested DMA location.
When GRO is enabled, before this patch all references to the original frag may be put and the page freed before dma_unmap_page in mlx4_en_free_frag is called.
It is possible there is a path where the use-after-free occurs even with GRO disabled, but this has not been observed so far.
The bug can be trivially detected by doing the following:
* Compile the kernel with DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
* Run the kernel as a Xen Dom0
* Leave GRO enabled on the interface
* Run a 10 second or more test with iperf over the interface.
This bug was likely introduced in
commit 4cce66cdd14a ("mlx4_en: map entire pages to increase throughput"), first part of u3.6.
It was incidentally fixed in
commit 34db548bfb95 ("mlx4: add page recycling in receive path"), first part of v4.12.
This version applies to the v4.9 series.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_rx.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_rx.c +20 -12
@@ -142,16 +142,17 @@ static void mlx4_en_free_frag(struct mlx struct mlx4_en_rx_alloc *frags, int i) { -const struct mlx4_en_frag_info *frag_info = &priv->frag_info[i]; -u32 next_frag_end = frags[i].page_offset +2 * frag_info->frag_stride; - - -if (next_frag_end > frags[i].page_size) -dma_unmap_page (priv->ddev, frags[i].dma, frags[i].page_size, - frag_info->dma_dir); + if (frags[i].page) { +const struct mlx4_en_frag_info *frag_info = &priv->frag_info[i]; +u32 next_frag_end = frags[i].page_offset + +2 * frag_info->frag_stride; -if (frags[i].page) +if (next_frag_end > frags[i].page_size) { +dma_unmap_page (priv->ddev, frags[i].dma, + frags[i].page_size, frag_info->dma_dir); + }put_page (frags[i].page); + } } static int mlx4_en_init_allocator(struct mlx4_en_priv *priv,
@@ -586,21 +587,28 @@ static int mlx4_en_complete_rx_desc(stru int length) {struct skb_frag_struct *skb_frags_rx =skb_shinfo (skb)->frags; -struct mlx4_en_frag_info *frag_info;int nr;dma_addr_t dma;/* Collect used fragments while replacing them in the HW descriptors */ for (nr =0 ; nr < priv->num_frags; nr++) { - frag_info = &priv->frag_info[nr]; +struct mlx4_en_frag_info *frag_info = &priv->frag_info[nr]; +u32 next_frag_end = frags[nr].page_offset + +2 * frag_info->frag_stride; +if (length <= frag_info->frag_prefix_size)break ;if (unlikely (!frags[nr].page)) goto fail; dma =be64_to_cpu (rx_desc->data[nr].addr); -dma_sync_single_for_cpu (priv->ddev, dma, frag_info->frag_size, -DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); +if (next_frag_end > frags[nr].page_size) +dma_unmap_page (priv->ddev, frags[nr].dma, + frags[nr].page_size, frag_info->dma_dir); +else +dma_sync_single_for_cpu (priv->ddev, dma, + frag_info->frag_size, +DMA_FROM_DEVICE );/* Save page reference in skb */ __skb_frag_set_page (&skb_frags_rx[nr], frags[nr].page);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 48/61 iio:kfifo_buf: check for uint overflow
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Martin Kelly <[email protected]>
commit 3d13de4b027d5f6276c0f9d3a264f518747d83f2 upstream.
Currently, the following causes a kernel OOPS in memcpy:
echo 1073741825 > buffer/length
echo 1 > buffer/enable
Note that using 1073741824 instead of 1073741825 causes "write error:
Cannot allocate memory" but no OOPS.
This is because 1073741824 == 2^30 and 1073741825 == 2^30+1. Since kfifo rounds up to the nearest power of 2, it will actually call kmalloc with roundup_pow_of_two(length) * bytes_per_datum.
Using length == 1073741825 and bytes_per_datum == 2, we get:
kmalloc(roundup_pow_of_two(1073741825) * 2
or kmalloc(2147483648 * 2)
or kmalloc(4294967296)
or kmalloc(UINT_MAX + 1)
so this overflows to 0, causing kmalloc to return ZERO_SIZE_PTR and subsequent memcpy to fail once the device is enabled.
Fix this by checking for overflow prior to allocating a kfifo. With this check added, the above code returns -EINVAL when enabling the buffer, rather than causing an OOPS.
--- drivers/iio/buffer/kfifo_buf.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/iio/buffer/kfifo_buf.c +7 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,13 @@ static inline int __iio_allocate_kfifo(sif ((length ==0 ) || (bytes_per_datum ==0 ))return -EINVAL ; +/* +* Make sure we don't overflow an unsigned int after kfifo rounds up to +* the next power of 2. +*/ +if (roundup_pow_of_two (length) >UINT_MAX / bytes_per_datum) +return -EINVAL ; +return __kfifo_alloc ((struct __kfifo *)&buf->kf, length, bytes_per_datum,GFP_KERNEL ); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 49/61 MIPS: ptrace: Fix PTRACE_PEEKUSR requests for 64-bit FGRs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>
commit c7e814628df65f424fe197dde73bfc67e4a244d7 upstream.
Use 64-bit accesses for 64-bit floating-point general registers with PTRACE_PEEKUSR, removing the truncation of their upper halves in the FR=1 mode, caused by commit bbd426f542cb ("MIPS: Simplify FP context access"), which inadvertently switched them to using 32-bit accesses.
The PTRACE_POKEUSR side is fine as it's never been broken and continues using 64-bit accesses.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/19334/
--- arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 +- arch/mips/kernel/ptrace32.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c +1 -1
@@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *chi break; }#endif - tmp =get_fpr32 (&fregs[addr -FPR_BASE ],0 ); + tmp =get_fpr64 (&fregs[addr -FPR_BASE ],0 );break ;case PC : tmp = regs->cp0_epc;
arch/mips/kernel/ptrace32.c +1 -1
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_stru addr & 1);break ; } - tmp =get_fpr32 (&fregs[addr -FPR_BASE ],0 ); + tmp =get_fpr64 (&fregs[addr -FPR_BASE ],0 );break ;case PC : tmp = regs->cp0_epc;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 50/61 MIPS: prctl: Disallow FRE without FR with PR_SET_FP_MODE requests
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>
commit 28e4213dd331e944e7fca1954a946829162ed9d4 upstream.
Having PR_FP_MODE_FRE (i.e. Config5.FRE) set without PR_FP_MODE_FR (i.e. Status.FR) is not supported as the lone purpose of Config5.FRE is to emulate Status.FR=0 handling on FPU hardware that has Status.FR=1 hardwired[1][2]. Also we do not handle this case elsewhere, and assume throughout our code that TIF_HYBRID_FPREGS and TIF_32BIT_FPREGS cannot be set both at once for a task, leading to inconsistent behaviour if this does happen.
Return unsuccessfully then from prctl(2) PR_SET_FP_MODE calls requesting PR_FP_MODE_FRE to be set with PR_FP_MODE_FR clear. This corresponds to modes allowed by `mips_set_personality_fp'.
References:
[1] "MIPS Architecture For Programmers, Vol. III: MIPS32 / microMIPS32 Privileged Resource Architecture", Imagination Technologies, Document Number: MD00090, Revision 6.02, July 10, 2015, Table 9.69 "Config5 Register Field Descriptions", p. 262
[2] "MIPS Architecture For Programmers, Volume III: MIPS64 / microMIPS64 Privileged Resource Architecture", Imagination Technologies, Document Number: MD00091, Revision 6.03, December 22, 2015, Table 9.72 "Config5 Register Field Descriptions", p. 288
Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/19327/
--- arch/mips/kernel/process.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/mips/kernel/process.c +4 -0
@@ -699,6 +699,10 @@ int mips_set_process_fp_mode(struct taskif (value & ~known_bits)return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +/* Setting FRE without FR is not supported. */ +if ((value & (PR_FP_MODE_FR |PR_FP_MODE_FRE )) ==PR_FP_MODE_FRE ) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +/* Avoid inadvertently triggering emulation */ if ((value &PR_FP_MODE_FR ) && raw_cpu_has_fpu && !(raw_current_cpu_data.fpu_id &MIPS_FPIR_F64 ))
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 51/61 scsi: scsi_transport_srp: Fix shost to rport translation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
commit c9ddf73476ff4fffb7a87bd5107a0705bf2cf64b upstream.
Since an SRP remote port is attached as a child to shost->shost_gendev and as the only child, the translation from the shost pointer into an rport pointer must happen by looking up the shost child that is an rport. This patch fixes the following KASAN complaint:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in srp_timed_out+0x57/0x110 [scsi_transport_srp] Read of size 4 at addr ffff880035d3fcc0 by task kworker/1:0H/19 CPU: 1 PID: 19 Comm: kworker/1:0H Not tainted 4.16.0-rc3-dbg+ #1 Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_timeout_work Call Trace: dump_stack+0x85/0xc7 print_address_description+0x65/0x270 kasan_report+0x231/0x350 srp_timed_out+0x57/0x110 [scsi_transport_srp] scsi_times_out+0xc7/0x3f0 [scsi_mod] blk_mq_terminate_expired+0xc2/0x140 bt_iter+0xbc/0xd0 blk_mq_queue_tag_busy_iter+0x1c7/0x350 blk_mq_timeout_work+0x325/0x3f0 process_one_work+0x441/0xa50 worker_thread+0x76/0x6c0 kthread+0x1b2/0x1d0 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
--- drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_srp.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_srp.c +20 -2
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ struct srp_internal {struct transport_container rport_attr_cont; }; +static int scsi_is_srp_rport (const struct device *dev); +#define to_srp_internal (tmpl) container_of(tmpl, struct srp_internal, t)#define dev_to_rport (d) container_of(d, struct srp_rport, dev)
@@ -61,9 +63,24 @@ static inline struct Scsi_Host *rport_toreturn dev_to_shost (r->dev.parent); } +static int find_child_rport (struct device *dev,void *data) +{ +struct device **child = data; + +if (scsi_is_srp_rport (dev)) { +WARN_ON_ONCE (*child); + *child = dev; + } +return 0 ; +} +static inline struct srp_rport *shost_to_rport (struct Scsi_Host *shost) { -return transport_class_to_srp_rport (&shost->shost_gendev); +struct device *child =NULL ; + +WARN_ON_ONCE (device_for_each_child (&shost->shost_gendev, &child, + find_child_rport) <0 ); +return child ?dev_to_rport (child) :NULL ; }/**
@@ -637,7 +654,8 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return srp_timestruct srp_rport *rport =shost_to_rport (shost);pr_debug ("timeout for sdev %s\n" ,dev_name (&sdev->sdev_gendev)); -return rport->fast_io_fail_tmo <0 && rport->dev_loss_tmo <0 && +return rport && rport->fast_io_fail_tmo <0 && + rport->dev_loss_tmo <0 && i->f->reset_timer_if_blocked &&scsi_device_blocked (sdev) ?BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER :BLK_EH_NOT_HANDLED ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 52/61 stm class: Use vmalloc for the master map
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
commit b5e2ced9bf81393034072dd4d372f6b430bc1f0a upstream.
Fengguang is running into a warning from the buddy allocator:
Quoted 4 lines
swapper/0: page allocation failure: order:9, mode:0x14040c0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_COMP), nodemask=(null)
CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc1 #262 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace:
...
Quoted 2 lines
__kmalloc+0x14b/0x180: ____cache_alloc at mm/slab.c:3127 stm_register_device+0xf3/0x5c0: stm_register_device at drivers/hwtracing/stm/core.c:695
...
Which is basically a result of the stm class trying to allocate ~512kB for the dummy_stm with its default parameters. There's no reason, however, for it not to be vmalloc()ed instead, which is what this patch does.
--- drivers/hwtracing/stm/core.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/hwtracing/stm/core.c +3 -3
@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ static void stm_device_release(struct de {struct stm_device *stm =to_stm_device (dev); -kfree (stm); +vfree (stm); } int stm_register_device(struct device *parent, struct stm_data *stm_data,
@@ -699,7 +699,7 @@ int stm_register_device(struct device *preturn -EINVAL ; nmasters = stm_data->sw_end - stm_data->sw_start +1 ; - stm =kzalloc (sizeof (*stm) + nmasters *sizeof (void *),GFP_KERNEL ); + stm =vzalloc (sizeof (*stm) + nmasters *sizeof (void *));if (!stm)return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ err_device:/* matches device_initialize() above */ put_device (&stm->dev); err_free: -kfree (stm); +vfree (stm);return err; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 53/61 hwtracing: stm: fix build error on some arches
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit 806e30873f0e74d9d41b0ef761bd4d3e55c7d510 upstream.
Commit b5e2ced9bf81 ("stm class: Use vmalloc for the master map") caused a build error on some arches as vmalloc.h was not explicitly included.
Fix that by adding it to the list of includes.
--- drivers/hwtracing/stm/core.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/hwtracing/stm/core.c +1 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@#include <linux/stm.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include "stm.h" #include <uapi/linux/stm.h>
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 54/61 IB/core: Fix error code for invalid GID entry
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Parav Pandit <[email protected]>
commit a840c93ca7582bb6c88df2345a33f979b7a67874 upstream.
When a GID entry is invalid EAGAIN is returned. This is an incorrect error code, there is nothing that will make this GID entry valid again in bounded time.
Some user space tools fail incorrectly if EAGAIN is returned here, and this represents a small ABI change from earlier kernels.
The first patch in the Fixes list makes entries that were valid before to become invalid, allowing this code to trigger, while the second patch in the Fixes list introduced the wrong EAGAIN.
Therefore revert the return result to EINVAL which matches the historical expectations of the ibv_query_gid_type() API of the libibverbs user space library.
--- drivers/infiniband/core/cache.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/infiniband/core/cache.c +1 -1
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ static int __ib_cache_gid_get(struct ib_return -EINVAL ;if (table->data_vec[index].props &GID_TABLE_ENTRY_INVALID ) -return -EAGAIN ; +return -EINVAL ;memcpy (gid, &table->data_vec[index].gid,sizeof (*gid));if (attr) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 55/61 drm/psr: Fix missed entry in PSR setup time table.
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dhinakaran Pandiyan <[email protected]>
commit bdcc02cf1bb508fc700df7662f55058f651f2621 upstream.
Entry corresponding to 220 us setup time was missing. I am not aware of any specific bug this fixes, but this could potentially result in enabling PSR on a panel with a higher setup time requirement than supported by the hardware.
I verified the value is present in eDP spec versions 1.3, 1.4 and 1.4a.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_helper.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_helper.c +1 -0
@@ -1065,6 +1065,7 @@ int drm_dp_psr_setup_time(const u8 psr_cstatic const u16 psr_setup_time_us[] = {PSR_SETUP_TIME (330 ),PSR_SETUP_TIME (275 ), +PSR_SETUP_TIME (220 ),PSR_SETUP_TIME (165 ),PSR_SETUP_TIME (110 ),PSR_SETUP_TIME (55 ),
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Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 58/61 fix io_destroy()/aio_complete() race
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
commit 4faa99965e027cc057c5145ce45fa772caa04e8d upstream.
If io_destroy() gets to cancelling everything that can be cancelled and gets to kiocb_cancel() calling the function driver has left in ->ki_cancel, it becomes vulnerable to a race with IO completion. At that point req is already taken off the list and aio_complete() does *NOT* spin until we (in free_ioctx_users()) releases ->ctx_lock. As the result, it proceeds to kiocb_free(), freing req just it gets passed to ->ki_cancel().
Fix is simple - remove from the list after the call of kiocb_cancel(). All instances of ->ki_cancel() already have to cope with the being called with iocb still on list - that's what happens in io_cancel(2).
--- fs/aio.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/aio.c +1 -2
@@ -636,9 +636,8 @@ static void free_ioctx_users(struct percwhile (!list_empty (&ctx->active_reqs)) { req =list_first_entry (&ctx->active_reqs, struct aio_kiocb, ki_list); - -list_del_init (&req->ki_list);kiocb_cancel (req); +list_del_init (&req->ki_list); }spin_unlock_irq (&ctx->ctx_lock);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 59/61 mm: fix the NULL mapping case in __isolate_lru_page()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
commit 145e1a71e090575c74969e3daa8136d1e5b99fc8 upstream.
George Boole would have noticed a slight error in 4.16 commit 69d763fc6d3a ("mm: pin address_space before dereferencing it while isolating an LRU page"). Fix it, to match both the comment above it, and the original behaviour.
Although anonymous pages are not marked PageDirty at first, we have an old habit of calling SetPageDirty when a page is removed from swap
cache: so there's a category of ex-swap pages that are easily migratable, but were inadvertently excluded from compaction's async migration in 4.16.
--- mm/vmscan.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/vmscan.c +1 -1
@@ -1393,7 +1393,7 @@ int __isolate_lru_page(struct page *pagereturn ret; mapping =page_mapping (page); - migrate_dirty = mapping && mapping->a_ops->migratepage; + migrate_dirty = !mapping || mapping->a_ops->migratepage;unlock_page (page);if (!migrate_dirty)return ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 60/61 sparc64: Dont clibber fixed registers in __multi4.
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
commit 79db795833bf5c3e798bcd7a5aeeee3fb0505927 upstream.
%g4 and %g5 are fixed registers used by the kernel for the thread pointer and the per-cpu offset. Use %o4 and %g7 instead.
Diagnosis by Anthony Yznaga.
--- arch/sparc/lib/multi3.S | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/sparc/lib/multi3.S +12 -12
@@ -5,26 +5,26 @@ .align 4 ENTRY(__multi3) /* %o0 = u, %o1 = v */ mov %o1, %g1 - srl %o3, 0, %g4 - mulx %g4, %g1, %o1 + srl %o3, 0, %o4 + mulx %o4, %g1, %o1 srlx %g1, 0x20, %g3 - mulx %g3, %g4, %g5 - sllx %g5, 0x20, %o5 - srl %g1, 0, %g4 + mulx %g3, %o4, %g7 + sllx %g7, 0x20, %o5 + srl %g1, 0, %o4 sub %o1, %o5, %o5 srlx %o5, 0x20, %o5 - addcc %g5, %o5, %g5 + addcc %g7, %o5, %g7 srlx %o3, 0x20, %o5 - mulx %g4, %o5, %g4 + mulx %o4, %o5, %o4 mulx %g3, %o5, %o5 sethi %hi(0x80000000), %g3 - addcc %g5, %g4, %g5 - srlx %g5, 0x20, %g5 + addcc %g7, %o4, %g7 + srlx %g7, 0x20, %g7 add %g3, %g3, %g3 movcc %xcc, %g0, %g3 - addcc %o5, %g5, %o5 - sllx %g4, 0x20, %g4 - add %o1, %g4, %o1 + addcc %o5, %g7, %o5 + sllx %o4, 0x20, %o4 + add %o1, %o4, %o1 add %o5, %g3, %g2 mulx %g1, %o2, %g1 add %g1, %g2, %g1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 61/61 serial: pl011: add console matching function
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Aleksey Makarov <[email protected]>
commit 10879ae5f12e9cab3c4e8e9504c1aaa8a033bde7 upstream.
This patch adds function pl011_console_match() that implements method match of struct console. It allows to match consoles against data specified in a string, for example taken from command line or compiled by ACPI SPCR table handler.
This patch was merged to tty-next but then reverted because of conflict with
commit 46e36683f433 ("serial: earlycon: Extend earlycon command line option to support 64-bit addresses")
Now it is fixed.
--- drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+)
drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c +55 -0
@@ -2320,12 +2320,67 @@ static int __init pl011_console_setup(streturn uart_set_options (&uap->port, co, baud, parity, bits, flow); } +/** +* pl011_console_match - non-standard console matching +* @co: registering console +* @name: name from console command line +* @idx: index from console command line +* @options: ptr to option string from console command line +* +* Only attempts to match console command lines of the form: +* console=pl011,mmio|mmio32,<addr>[,<options>] +* console=pl011,0x<addr>[,<options>] +* This form is used to register an initial earlycon boot console and +* replace it with the amba_console at pl011 driver init. +* +* Performs console setup for a match (as required by interface) +* If no <options> are specified, then assume the h/w is already setup. +* +* Returns 0 if console matches; otherwise non-zero to use default matching +*/ +static int __init pl011_console_match (struct console *co,char *name,int idx, +char *options) +{ +unsigned char iotype; +resource_size_t addr; +int i; + +if (strcmp (name,"pl011" ) !=0 ) +return -ENODEV ; + +if (uart_parse_earlycon (options, &iotype, &addr, &options)) +return -ENODEV ; + +if (iotype !=UPIO_MEM && iotype !=UPIO_MEM32 ) +return -ENODEV ; + +/* try to match the port specified on the command line */ +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (amba_ports); i++) { +struct uart_port *port; + +if (!amba_ports[i]) +continue ; + + port = &amba_ports[i]->port; + +if (port->mapbase != addr) +continue ; + + co->index = i; + port->cons = co; +return pl011_console_setup (co, options); + } + +return -ENODEV ; +} +static struct uart_driver amba_reg;static struct console amba_console = { .name ="ttyAMA" , .write = pl011_console_write, .device = uart_console_device, .setup = pl011_console_setup, + .match = pl011_console_match, .flags =CON_PRINTBUFFER , .index =-1 , .data = &amba_reg,
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.107 release. There are 61 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu Jun 7 17:00:59 UTC 2018. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 9 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.107-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 15 lines · Shuah Khan
Quoted 14 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.107 release. There are 61 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu Jun 7 17:00:59 UTC 2018. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.107-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
thanks,
greg k-h
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
Thanks for testing these and letting me know.
greg k-h
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.107 release. There are 61 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu Jun 7 17:00:59 UTC 2018. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.107-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm and x86_64.
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.9.107-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.9.y
git commit: 0a593cdaaec3e50857380c79ccf9eaebcde7f862
git describe: v4.9.106-62-g0a593cdaaec3
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.9-oe/build/v4.9.106-62-g0a593cdaaec3
No regressions (compared to build v4.9.106-60-gc9f5af2d0154)
Ran 9882 total tests in the following environments and test suites.
Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_x86_64
- x15
- x86_64
Test Suites
-----------
* boot
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none
Signature · 2 lines
Linaro LKFT https://lkft.linaro.org
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.107 release. There are 61 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu Jun 7 17:00:59 UTC 2018. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Build results:
total: 148 pass: 148 fail: 0 Qemu test results: total: 139 pass: 139 fail: 0
Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders/.
Guenter
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 10 lines · Guenter Roeck
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.107 release. There are 61 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Thu Jun 7 17:00:59 UTC 2018. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Quoted 6 lines
Build results:
total: 148 pass: 148 fail: 0 Qemu test results: total: 139 pass: 139 fail: 0Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders/.
Great, thanks for testing and letting me know.
greg k-h