4.16.15-stable review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.16.15 release. There are 48 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Mon Jun 11 14:59:28 UTC 2018. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.16.15-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.16.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 4.16.15-rc1

Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>
PCI: hv: Do not wait forever on a device that has disappeared

Jason Wang <[email protected]>
vhost_net: flush batched heads before trying to busy polling

Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
net: netsec: reduce DMA mask to 40 bits

Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>
ip_tunnel: restore binding to ifaces with a large mtu

Jason Wang <[email protected]>
virtio-net: correctly redirect linearized packet

Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>
net : sched: cls_api: deal with egdev path only if needed

Arun Parameswaran <[email protected]>
net: dsa: b53: Fix for brcm tag issue in Cygnus SoC

Jason Wang <[email protected]>
virtio-net: correctly check num_buf during err path

Toshiaki Makita <[email protected]>
tun: Fix NULL pointer dereference in XDP redirect

Eran Ben Elisha <[email protected]>
net/mlx5e: When RXFCS is set, add FCS data into checksum calculation

Jack Morgenstein <[email protected]>
net/mlx4: Fix irq-unsafe spinlock usage

Jason Wang <[email protected]>
virtio-net: fix leaking page for gso packet during mergeable XDP

Jason Wang <[email protected]>
virtio-net: correctly transmit XDP buff after linearizing

Alexander Duyck <[email protected]>
net-sysfs: Fix memory leak in XPS configuration

Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>
net: phy: broadcom: Fix auxiliary control register reads

Mathieu Xhonneux <[email protected]>
ipv6: sr: fix memory OOB access in seg6_do_srh_encap/inline

Stephen Suryaputra <[email protected]>
vrf: check the original netdevice for generating redirect

Jason Wang <[email protected]>
vhost: synchronize IOTLB message with dev cleanup

Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
team: use netdev_features_t instead of u32

Xin Long <[email protected]>
sctp: not allow transport timeout value less than HZ/5 for hb_timer

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
rtnetlink: validate attributes in do_setlink()

Shahed Shaikh <[email protected]>
qed: Fix mask for physical address in ILT entry

Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
packet: fix reserve calculation

Daniele Palmas <[email protected]>
net: usb: cdc_mbim: add flag FLAG_SEND_ZLP

Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>
net: phy: broadcom: Fix bcm_write_exp()

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
net/packet: refine check for priv area size

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
net: metrics: add proper netlink validation

Roopa Prabhu <[email protected]>
net: ipv4: add missing RTA_TABLE to rtm_ipv4_policy

Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
net: ethernet: davinci_emac: fix error handling in probe()

Cong Wang <[email protected]>
netdev-FAQ: clarify DaveM's position for stable backports

Petr Machata <[email protected]>
mlxsw: spectrum: Forbid creation of VLAN 1 over port/LAG

Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>
l2tp: fix refcount leakage on PPPoL2TP sockets

Kirill Tkhai <[email protected]>
kcm: Fix use-after-free caused by clonned sockets

Wenwen Wang <[email protected]>
isdn: eicon: fix a missing-check bug

Michal Kubecek <[email protected]>
ipv6: omit traffic class when calculating flow hash

Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>
ipv4: remove warning in ip_recv_error

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
ipmr: properly check rhltable_init() return value

Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>

    ip6_tunnel: remove magic mtu value 0xFFF8

Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>
ip6mr: only set ip6mr_table from setsockopt when ip6mr_new_table succeeds

Govindarajulu Varadarajan <[email protected]>
enic: set DMA mask to 47 bit

Alexey Kodanev <[email protected]>
dccp: don't free ccid2_hc_tx_sock struct in dccp_disconnect()

Paul Blakey <[email protected]>
cls_flower: Fix incorrect idr release when failing to modify rule

Julia Lawall <[email protected]>
bnx2x: use the right constant

Suresh Reddy <[email protected]>
be2net: Fix error detection logic for BE3

Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
kconfig: Avoid format overflow warning from GCC 8.1

Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
netfilter: nf_flow_table: attach dst to skbs

Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
mmap: relax file size limit for regular files

Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
mmap: introduce sane default mmap limits

-------------

Diffstat:

 Documentation/networking/netdev-FAQ.txt          |  9 +++++
 Makefile                                         |  4 +--
 drivers/isdn/hardware/eicon/diva.c               | 22 ++++++++----
 drivers/isdn/hardware/eicon/diva.h               |  5 +--
 drivers/isdn/hardware/eicon/divasmain.c          | 18 ++++++----
 drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_common.c                 | 15 +++++++-
 drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_priv.h                   |  2 ++
 drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_srab.c                   |  4 +--
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_link.c |  2 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/enic_main.c      |  8 ++---
 drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c      |  4 ++-
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/qp.c          |  4 +--
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rx.c  | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.c   |  5 +++
 drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_cxt.c        |  2 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/socionext/netsec.c          |  4 +--
 drivers/net/ethernet/ti/davinci_emac.c           | 22 ++++++------
 drivers/net/phy/bcm-cygnus.c                     |  6 ++--
 drivers/net/phy/bcm-phy-lib.c                    |  2 +-
 drivers/net/phy/bcm-phy-lib.h                    |  7 ++++
 drivers/net/phy/bcm7xxx.c                        |  4 +--
 drivers/net/team/team.c                          |  3 +-
 drivers/net/tun.c                                | 15 ++++----
 drivers/net/usb/cdc_mbim.c                       |  2 +-
 drivers/net/virtio_net.c                         | 21 ++++++-----
 drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c                    | 46 +++++++++++++++++-------
 drivers/vhost/net.c                              | 37 ++++++++++++-------
 drivers/vhost/vhost.c                            |  3 ++
 include/net/ipv6.h                               |  5 +++
 mm/mmap.c                                        | 32 +++++++++++++++++
 net/core/flow_dissector.c                        |  2 +-
 net/core/net-sysfs.c                             |  6 ++--
 net/core/rtnetlink.c                             |  8 ++---
 net/dccp/proto.c                                 |  2 --
 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c                          |  1 +
 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c                         |  4 +++
 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c                           |  2 --
 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c                             |  8 ++---
 net/ipv4/ipmr.c                                  |  7 +++-
 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_flow_table_ipv4.c          |  5 +--
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c                            |  3 +-
 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c                            | 11 ++++--
 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c                                 |  3 +-
 net/ipv6/ndisc.c                                 |  6 ++++
 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_flow_table_ipv6.c          |  1 +
 net/ipv6/route.c                                 |  2 +-
 net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c                         |  4 +--
 net/ipv6/sit.c                                   |  5 +--
 net/kcm/kcmsock.c                                |  2 +-
 net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c                              | 35 +++++++++---------
 net/packet/af_packet.c                           |  4 +--
 net/sched/cls_api.c                              |  2 +-
 net/sched/cls_flower.c                           |  2 +-
 net/sctp/transport.c                             |  2 +-
 scripts/kconfig/confdata.c                       |  2 +-
 55 files changed, 338 insertions(+), 146 deletions(-)

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

commit be83bbf806822b1b89e0a0f23cd87cddc409e429 upstream.

The internal VM "mmap()" interfaces are based on the mmap target doing everything using page indexes rather than byte offsets, because traditionally (ie 32-bit) we had the situation that the byte offset didn't fit in a register. So while the mmap virtual address was limited by the word size of the architecture, the backing store was not.

So we're basically passing "pgoff" around as a page index, in order to be able to describe backing store locations that are much bigger than the word size (think files larger than 4GB etc).

But while this all makes a ton of sense conceptually, we've been dogged by various drivers that don't really understand this, and internally work with byte offsets, and then try to work with the page index by turning it into a byte offset with "pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT".

Which obviously can overflow.

Adding the size of the mapping to it to get the byte offset of the end of the backing store just exacerbates the problem, and if you then use this overflow-prone value to check various limits of your device driver mmap capability, you're just setting yourself up for problems.

The correct thing for drivers to do is to do their limit math in page indices, the way the interface is designed. Because the generic mmap code _does_ test that the index doesn't overflow, since that's what the mmap code really cares about.

HOWEVER.

Finding and fixing various random drivers is a sisyphean task, so let's just see if we can just make the core mmap() code do the limiting for us. Realistically, the only "big" backing stores we need to care about are regular files and block devices, both of which are known to do this properly, and which have nice well-defined limits for how much data they can access.

So let's special-case just those two known cases, and then limit other random mmap users to a backing store that still fits in "unsigned long". Realistically, that's not much of a limit at all on 64-bit, and on 32-bit architectures the only worry might be the GPU drivers, which can have big physical address spaces.

To make it possible for drivers like that to say that they are 64-bit clean, this patch does repurpose the "FMODE_UNSIGNED_OFFSET" bit in the file flags to allow drivers to mark their file descriptors as safe in the full 64-bit mmap address space.

[ The timing for doing this is less than optimal, and this should really
go in a merge window. But realistically, this needs wide testing more than it needs anything else, and being main-line is the only way to do that.

So the earlier the better, even if it's outside the proper development
cycle - Linus ]

---
 mm/mmap.c |   32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+)

@@ -1315,6 +1315,35 @@ static inline int mlock_future_check(str
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline u64 file_mmap_size_max(struct file *file, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+		return inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes;
+
+	if (S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode))
+		return MAX_LFS_FILESIZE;
+
+	/* Special "we do even unsigned file positions" case */
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_UNSIGNED_OFFSET)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Yes, random drivers might want more. But I'm tired of buggy drivers */
+	return ULONG_MAX;
+}
+
+static inline bool file_mmap_ok(struct file *file, struct inode *inode,
+				unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long len)
+{
+	u64 maxsize = file_mmap_size_max(file, inode);
+
+	if (maxsize && len > maxsize)
+		return false;
+	maxsize -= len;
+	if (pgoff > maxsize >> PAGE_SHIFT)
+		return false;
+	return true;
+}
+
 /*
  * The caller must hold down_write(&current->mm->mmap_sem).
  */

@@ -1389,6 +1418,9 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,
 		struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 		unsigned long flags_mask;
 
+		if (!file_mmap_ok(file, inode, pgoff, len))
+			return -EOVERFLOW;
+
 		flags_mask = LEGACY_MAP_MASK | file->f_op->mmap_supported_flags;
 
 		switch (flags & MAP_TYPE) {

Thanks for pointing this out, now queued up.

greg k-h

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

commit 423913ad4ae5b3e8fb8983f70969fb522261ba26 upstream.

Commit be83bbf80682 ("mmap: introduce sane default mmap limits") was introduced to catch problems in various ad-hoc character device drivers doing mmap and getting the size limits wrong. In the process, it used "known good" limits for the normal cases of mapping regular files and block device drivers.

It turns out that the "s_maxbytes" limit was less "known good" than I thought. In particular, /proc doesn't set it, but exposes one regular file to mmap: /proc/vmcore. As a result, that file got limited to the default MAX_INT s_maxbytes value.

This went unnoticed for a while, because apparently the only thing that needs it is the s390 kernel zfcpdump, but there might be other tools that use this too.

Vasily suggested just changing s_maxbytes for all of /proc, which isn't wrong, but makes me nervous at this stage. So instead, just make the new mmap limit always be MAX_LFS_FILESIZE for regular files, which won't affect anything else. It wasn't the regular file case I was worried about.

I'd really prefer for maxsize to have been per-inode, but that is not how things are today.

---
 mm/mmap.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1318,7 +1318,7 @@ static inline int mlock_future_check(str
 static inline u64 file_mmap_size_max(struct file *file, struct inode *inode)
 {
 	if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
-		return inode->i_sb->s_maxbytes;
+		return MAX_LFS_FILESIZE;
 
 	if (S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode))
 		return MAX_LFS_FILESIZE;

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>

commit 2a79fd3908acd88e6cb0e620c314d7b1fee56a02 upstream.

Some drivers, such as vxlan and wireguard, use the skb's dst in order to determine things like PMTU. They therefore loose functionality when flow offloading is enabled. So, we ensure the skb has it before xmit'ing it in the offloading path.

---
 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_flow_table_ipv4.c |    5 +++--
 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_flow_table_ipv6.c |    1 +
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ nf_flow_offload_ip_hook(void *priv, stru
 	enum flow_offload_tuple_dir dir;
 	struct flow_offload *flow;
 	struct net_device *outdev;
-	const struct rtable *rt;
+	struct rtable *rt;
 	struct iphdr *iph;
 	__be32 nexthop;
 

@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ nf_flow_offload_ip_hook(void *priv, stru
 	dir = tuplehash->tuple.dir;
 	flow = container_of(tuplehash, struct flow_offload, tuplehash[dir]);
 
-	rt = (const struct rtable *)flow->tuplehash[dir].tuple.dst_cache;
+	rt = (struct rtable *)flow->tuplehash[dir].tuple.dst_cache;
 	if (unlikely(nf_flow_exceeds_mtu(skb, rt)))
 		return NF_ACCEPT;
 

@@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ nf_flow_offload_ip_hook(void *priv, stru
 
 	skb->dev = outdev;
 	nexthop = rt_nexthop(rt, flow->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.src_v4.s_addr);
+	skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &rt->dst);
 	neigh_xmit(NEIGH_ARP_TABLE, outdev, &nexthop, skb);
 
 	return NF_STOLEN;

@@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ nf_flow_offload_ipv6_hook(void *priv, st
 
 	skb->dev = outdev;
 	nexthop = rt6_nexthop(rt, &flow->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.src_v6);
+	skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &rt->dst);
 	neigh_xmit(NEIGH_ND_TABLE, outdev, nexthop, skb);
 
 	return NF_STOLEN;

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Suresh Reddy <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d2c2725c2cdbcc108a191f50953d31c7b6556761 ]

Check for 0xE00 (RECOVERABLE_ERR) along with ARMFW UE (0x0) in be_detect_error() to know whether the error is valid error or not

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -3309,7 +3309,9 @@ void be_detect_error(struct be_adapter *
 				if ((val & POST_STAGE_FAT_LOG_START)
 				     != POST_STAGE_FAT_LOG_START &&
 				    (val & POST_STAGE_ARMFW_UE)
-				     != POST_STAGE_ARMFW_UE)
+				     != POST_STAGE_ARMFW_UE &&
+				    (val & POST_STAGE_RECOVERABLE_ERR)
+				     != POST_STAGE_RECOVERABLE_ERR)
 					return;
 			}
 

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Julia Lawall <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dd612f18a49b63af8b3a5f572d999bdb197385bc ]

Nearby code that also tests port suggests that the P0 constant should be used when port is zero.

The semantic match that finds this problem is as follows:
(http://coccinelle.lip6.fr/)

// <smpl>
@@
expression e,e1;
@@

* e ? e1 : e1
// </smpl>

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_link.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ static void bnx2x_ets_e3b0_nig_disabled(
 	 * slots for the highest priority.
 	 */
 	REG_WR(bp, (port) ? NIG_REG_P1_TX_ARB_NUM_STRICT_ARB_SLOTS :
-		   NIG_REG_P1_TX_ARB_NUM_STRICT_ARB_SLOTS, 0x100);
+		   NIG_REG_P0_TX_ARB_NUM_STRICT_ARB_SLOTS, 0x100);
 	/* Mapping between the CREDIT_WEIGHT registers and actual client
 	 * numbers
 	 */

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Blakey <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8258d2da9f9f521dce7019e018360c28d116354e ]

When we fail to modify a rule, we incorrectly release the idr handle of the unmodified old rule.

Fix that by checking if we need to release it.

---
 net/sched/cls_flower.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -974,7 +974,7 @@ static int fl_change(struct net *net, st
 	return 0;
 
 errout_idr:
-	if (fnew->handle)
+	if (!fold)
 		idr_remove(&head->handle_idr, fnew->handle);
 errout:
 	tcf_exts_destroy(&fnew->exts);

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexey Kodanev <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2677d20677314101293e6da0094ede7b5526d2b1 ]

Syzbot reported the use-after-free in timer_is_static_object() [1].

This can happen because the structure for the rto timer (ccid2_hc_tx_sock) is removed in dccp_disconnect(), and ccid2_hc_tx_rto_expire() can be called after that.

The report [1] is similar to the one in commit 120e9dabaf55 ("dccp:
defer ccid_hc_tx_delete() at dismantle time"). And the fix is the same, delay freeing ccid2_hc_tx_sock structure, so that it is freed in dccp_sk_destruct().

[1]

==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in timer_is_static_object+0x80/0x90
kernel/time/timer.c:607
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801bebb5118 by task syz-executor2/25299

CPU: 1 PID: 25299 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc5+ #54
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
  <IRQ>
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
  dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
  print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
  kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
  kasan_report.cold.7+0x242/0x2fe mm/kasan/report.c:412
  __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:433
  timer_is_static_object+0x80/0x90 kernel/time/timer.c:607
  debug_object_activate+0x2d9/0x670 lib/debugobjects.c:508
  debug_timer_activate kernel/time/timer.c:709 [inline]
  debug_activate kernel/time/timer.c:764 [inline]
  __mod_timer kernel/time/timer.c:1041 [inline]
  mod_timer+0x4d3/0x13b0 kernel/time/timer.c:1102
  sk_reset_timer+0x22/0x60 net/core/sock.c:2742
  ccid2_hc_tx_rto_expire+0x587/0x680 net/dccp/ccids/ccid2.c:147
  call_timer_fn+0x230/0x940 kernel/time/timer.c:1326
  expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1363 [inline]
  __run_timers+0x79e/0xc50 kernel/time/timer.c:1666
  run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0x70 kernel/time/timer.c:1692
  __do_softirq+0x2e0/0xaf5 kernel/softirq.c:285
  invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:365 [inline]
  irq_exit+0x1d1/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405
  exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:525 [inline]
  smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x17e/0x710 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052
  apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:863
  </IRQ>
...
Allocated by task 25374:
  save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
  set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
  kasan_kmalloc+0xc4/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:553
  kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:490
  kmem_cache_alloc+0x12e/0x760 mm/slab.c:3554
  ccid_new+0x25b/0x3e0 net/dccp/ccid.c:151
  dccp_hdlr_ccid+0x27/0x150 net/dccp/feat.c:44
  __dccp_feat_activate+0x184/0x270 net/dccp/feat.c:344
  dccp_feat_activate_values+0x3a7/0x819 net/dccp/feat.c:1538
  dccp_create_openreq_child+0x472/0x610 net/dccp/minisocks.c:128
  dccp_v4_request_recv_sock+0x12c/0xca0 net/dccp/ipv4.c:408
  dccp_v6_request_recv_sock+0x125d/0x1f10 net/dccp/ipv6.c:415
  dccp_check_req+0x455/0x6a0 net/dccp/minisocks.c:197
  dccp_v4_rcv+0x7b8/0x1f3f net/dccp/ipv4.c:841
  ip_local_deliver_finish+0x2e3/0xd80 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:215
  NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:288 [inline]
  ip_local_deliver+0x1e1/0x720 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:256
  dst_input include/net/dst.h:450 [inline]
  ip_rcv_finish+0x81b/0x2200 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:396
  NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:288 [inline]
  ip_rcv+0xb70/0x143d net/ipv4/ip_input.c:492
  __netif_receive_skb_core+0x26f5/0x3630 net/core/dev.c:4592
  __netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:4657
  process_backlog+0x219/0x760 net/core/dev.c:5337
  napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5735 [inline]
  net_rx_action+0x7b7/0x1930 net/core/dev.c:5801
  __do_softirq+0x2e0/0xaf5 kernel/softirq.c:285

Freed by task 25374:
  save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:448
  set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:460 [inline]
  __kasan_slab_free+0x11a/0x170 mm/kasan/kasan.c:521
  kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/kasan.c:528
  __cache_free mm/slab.c:3498 [inline]
  kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x2d0 mm/slab.c:3756
  ccid_hc_tx_delete+0xc3/0x100 net/dccp/ccid.c:190
  dccp_disconnect+0x130/0xc66 net/dccp/proto.c:286
  dccp_close+0x3bc/0xe60 net/dccp/proto.c:1045
  inet_release+0x104/0x1f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:427
  inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:460
  sock_release+0x96/0x1b0 net/socket.c:594
  sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1149
  __fput+0x34d/0x890 fs/file_table.c:209
  ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:243
  task_work_run+0x1e4/0x290 kernel/task_work.c:113
  tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:191 [inline]
  exit_to_usermode_loop+0x2bd/0x310 arch/x86/entry/common.c:166
  prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:196 [inline]
  syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:265 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0x6ac/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801bebb4cc0
  which belongs to the cache ccid2_hc_tx_sock of size 1240
The buggy address is located 1112 bytes inside of
  1240-byte region [ffff8801bebb4cc0, ffff8801bebb5198)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0006faed00 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801bebb41c0
index:0xffff8801bebb5240 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x2fffc0000008100(slab|head)
raw: 02fffc0000008100 ffff8801bebb41c0 ffff8801bebb5240 0000000100000003
raw: ffff8801cdba3138 ffffea0007634120 ffff8801cdbaab40 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

...
==================================================================

---
 net/dccp/proto.c |    2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

@@ -283,9 +283,7 @@ int dccp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int
 
 	dccp_clear_xmit_timers(sk);
 	ccid_hc_rx_delete(dp->dccps_hc_rx_ccid, sk);
-	ccid_hc_tx_delete(dp->dccps_hc_tx_ccid, sk);
 	dp->dccps_hc_rx_ccid = NULL;
-	dp->dccps_hc_tx_ccid = NULL;
 
 	__skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
 	__skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_write_queue);

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Govindarajulu Varadarajan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 322eaa06d55ebc1402a4a8d140945cff536638b4 ]

In commit 624dbf55a359b ("driver/net: enic: Try DMA 64 first, then failover to DMA") DMA mask was changed from 40 bits to 64 bits. Hardware actually supports only 47 bits.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/enic_main.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -2704,11 +2704,11 @@ static int enic_probe(struct pci_dev *pd
 	pci_set_master(pdev);
 
 	/* Query PCI controller on system for DMA addressing
-	 * limitation for the device.  Try 64-bit first, and
+	 * limitation for the device.  Try 47-bit first, and
 	 * fail to 32-bit.
 	 */
 
-	err = pci_set_dma_mask(pdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(64));
+	err = pci_set_dma_mask(pdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(47));
 	if (err) {
 		err = pci_set_dma_mask(pdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32));
 		if (err) {

@@ -2722,10 +2722,10 @@ static int enic_probe(struct pci_dev *pd
 			goto err_out_release_regions;
 		}
 	} else {
-		err = pci_set_consistent_dma_mask(pdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(64));
+		err = pci_set_consistent_dma_mask(pdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(47));
 		if (err) {
 			dev_err(dev, "Unable to obtain %u-bit DMA "
-				"for consistent allocations, aborting\n", 64);
+				"for consistent allocations, aborting\n", 47);
 			goto err_out_release_regions;
 		}
 		using_dac = 1;

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sabrina Dubroca <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 848235edb5c93ed086700584c8ff64f6d7fc778d ]

Currently, raw6_sk(sk)->ip6mr_table is set unconditionally during ip6_mroute_setsockopt(MRT6_TABLE). A subsequent attempt at the same setsockopt will fail with -ENOENT, since we haven't actually created that table.

A similar fix for ipv4 was included in commit 5e1859fbcc3c ("ipv4: ipmr:
various fixes and cleanups").

---
 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1800,7 +1800,8 @@ int ip6_mroute_setsockopt(struct sock *s
 		ret = 0;
 		if (!ip6mr_new_table(net, v))
 			ret = -ENOMEM;
-		raw6_sk(sk)->ip6mr_table = v;
+		else
+			raw6_sk(sk)->ip6mr_table = v;
 		rtnl_unlock();
 		return ret;
 	}

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f7ff1fde9441b4fcc8ffb6e66e6e5a00d008937e ]

I don't know where this value comes from (probably a copy and paste and paste and paste ...).
Let's use standard values which are a bit greater.

---
 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c |   11 ++++++++---
 net/ipv6/sit.c        |    5 +++--
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -1688,8 +1688,13 @@ int ip6_tnl_change_mtu(struct net_device
 		if (new_mtu < ETH_MIN_MTU)
 			return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	if (new_mtu > 0xFFF8 - dev->hard_header_len)
-		return -EINVAL;
+	if (tnl->parms.proto == IPPROTO_IPV6 || tnl->parms.proto == 0) {
+		if (new_mtu > IP6_MAX_MTU - dev->hard_header_len)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		if (new_mtu > IP_MAX_MTU - dev->hard_header_len)
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
 	dev->mtu = new_mtu;
 	return 0;
 }

@@ -1837,7 +1842,7 @@ ip6_tnl_dev_init_gen(struct net_device *
 	if (!(t->parms.flags & IP6_TNL_F_IGN_ENCAP_LIMIT))
 		dev->mtu -= 8;
 	dev->min_mtu = ETH_MIN_MTU;
-	dev->max_mtu = 0xFFF8 - dev->hard_header_len;
+	dev->max_mtu = IP6_MAX_MTU - dev->hard_header_len;
 
 	return 0;
 

@@ -1371,7 +1371,7 @@ static void ipip6_tunnel_setup(struct ne
 	dev->hard_header_len	= LL_MAX_HEADER + t_hlen;
 	dev->mtu		= ETH_DATA_LEN - t_hlen;
 	dev->min_mtu		= IPV6_MIN_MTU;
-	dev->max_mtu		= 0xFFF8 - t_hlen;
+	dev->max_mtu		= IP6_MAX_MTU - t_hlen;
 	dev->flags		= IFF_NOARP;
 	netif_keep_dst(dev);
 	dev->addr_len		= 4;

@@ -1583,7 +1583,8 @@ static int ipip6_newlink(struct net *src
 	if (tb[IFLA_MTU]) {
 		u32 mtu = nla_get_u32(tb[IFLA_MTU]);
 
-		if (mtu >= IPV6_MIN_MTU && mtu <= 0xFFF8 - dev->hard_header_len)
+		if (mtu >= IPV6_MIN_MTU &&
+		    mtu <= IP6_MAX_MTU - dev->hard_header_len)
 			dev->mtu = mtu;
 	}
 

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 66fb33254f45df4b049f487aff1cbde1ef919390 ]

commit 8fb472c09b9d ("ipmr: improve hash scalability") added a call to rhltable_init() without checking its return value.

This problem was then later copied to IPv6 and factorized in commit 0bbbf0e7d0e7 ("ipmr, ip6mr: Unite creation of new mr_table")

kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access

general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
   (ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 31552 Comm: syz-executor7 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc5+ #60
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:rht_key_hashfn include/linux/rhashtable.h:277 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__rhashtable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:630 [inline]
RIP: 0010:rhltable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:716 [inline]
RIP: 0010:mr_mfc_find_parent+0x2ad/0xbb0 net/ipv4/ipmr_base.c:63
RSP: 0018:ffff8801826aef70 EFLAGS: 00010203
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffc90001ea0000
RDX: 0000000000000079 RSI: ffffffff8661e859 RDI: 000000000000000c
RBP: ffff8801826af1c0 R08: ffff8801b2212000 R09: ffffed003b5e46c2
R10: ffffed003b5e46c2 R11: ffff8801daf23613 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffff8801826af198 R14: ffff8801cf8225c0 R15: ffff8801826af658
FS:  00007ff7fa732700(0000) GS:ffff8801daf00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000003ffffff9c CR3: 00000001b0210000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 ip6mr_cache_find_parent net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:981 [inline]
 ip6mr_mfc_delete+0x1fe/0x6b0 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1221
 ip6_mroute_setsockopt+0x15c6/0x1d70 net/ipv6/ip6mr.c:1698
 do_ipv6_setsockopt.isra.9+0x422/0x4660 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:163
 ipv6_setsockopt+0xbd/0x170 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:922
 rawv6_setsockopt+0x59/0x140 net/ipv6/raw.c:1060
 sock_common_setsockopt+0x9a/0xe0 net/core/sock.c:3039
 __sys_setsockopt+0x1bd/0x390 net/socket.c:1903
 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1914 [inline]
 __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:1911 [inline]
 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xbe/0x150 net/socket.c:1911
 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

---
 net/ipv4/ipmr.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -356,6 +356,7 @@ static const struct rhashtable_params ip
 static struct mr_table *ipmr_new_table(struct net *net, u32 id)
 {
 	struct mr_table *mrt;
+	int err;
 
 	/* "pimreg%u" should not exceed 16 bytes (IFNAMSIZ) */
 	if (id != RT_TABLE_DEFAULT && id >= 1000000000)

@@ -371,7 +372,11 @@ static struct mr_table *ipmr_new_table(s
 	write_pnet(&mrt->net, net);
 	mrt->id = id;
 
-	rhltable_init(&mrt->mfc_hash, &ipmr_rht_params);
+	err = rhltable_init(&mrt->mfc_hash, &ipmr_rht_params);
+	if (err) {
+		kfree(mrt);
+		return ERR_PTR(err);
+	}
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mrt->mfc_cache_list);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mrt->mfc_unres_queue);
 

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 730c54d59403658a62af6517338fa8d4922c1b28 ]

A precondition check in ip_recv_error triggered on an otherwise benign race. Remove the warning.

The warning triggers when passing an ipv6 socket to this ipv4 error handling function. RaceFuzzer was able to trigger it due to a race in setsockopt IPV6_ADDRFORM.

  ---
  CPU0
    do_ipv6_setsockopt
      sk->sk_socket->ops = &inet_dgram_ops;

  ---
  CPU1
    sk->sk_prot->recvmsg
      udp_recvmsg
        ip_recv_error
          WARN_ON_ONCE(sk->sk_family == AF_INET6);

  ---
  CPU0
    do_ipv6_setsockopt
      sk->sk_family = PF_INET;

This socket option converts a v6 socket that is connected to a v4 peer to an v4 socket. It updates the socket on the fly, changing fields in sk as well as other structs. This is inherently non-atomic. It races with the lockless udp_recvmsg path.

No other code makes an assumption that these fields are updated atomically. It is benign here, too, as ip_recv_error cares only about the protocol of the skbs enqueued on the error queue, for which sk_family is not a precise predictor (thanks to another isue with IPV6_ADDRFORM).

---
 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c |    2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

@@ -511,8 +511,6 @@ int ip_recv_error(struct sock *sk, struc
 	int err;
 	int copied;
 
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(sk->sk_family == AF_INET6);
-
 	err = -EAGAIN;
 	skb = sock_dequeue_err_skb(sk);
 	if (!skb)

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michal Kubecek <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fa1be7e01ea863e911349e30456706749518eeab ]

Some of the code paths calculating flow hash for IPv6 use flowlabel member of struct flowi6 which, despite its name, encodes both flow label and traffic class. If traffic class changes within a TCP connection (as e.g. ssh does), ECMP route can switch between path. It's also inconsistent with other code paths where ip6_flowlabel() (returning only flow label) is used to feed the key.

Use only flow label everywhere, including one place where hash key is set using ip6_flowinfo().

---
 include/net/ipv6.h        |    5 +++++
 net/core/flow_dissector.c |    2 +-
 net/ipv6/route.c          |    2 +-
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -918,6 +918,11 @@ static inline __be32 ip6_make_flowinfo(u
 	return htonl(tclass << IPV6_TCLASS_SHIFT) | flowlabel;
 }
 
+static inline __be32 flowi6_get_flowlabel(const struct flowi6 *fl6)
+{
+	return fl6->flowlabel & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK;
+}
+
 /*
  *	Prototypes exported by ipv6
  */

@@ -1334,7 +1334,7 @@ __u32 __get_hash_from_flowi6(const struc
 	keys->ports.src = fl6->fl6_sport;
 	keys->ports.dst = fl6->fl6_dport;
 	keys->keyid.keyid = fl6->fl6_gre_key;
-	keys->tags.flow_label = (__force u32)fl6->flowlabel;
+	keys->tags.flow_label = (__force u32)flowi6_get_flowlabel(fl6);
 	keys->basic.ip_proto = fl6->flowi6_proto;
 
 	return flow_hash_from_keys(keys);

@@ -1850,7 +1850,7 @@ out:
 	keys->control.addr_type = FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV6_ADDRS;
 	keys->addrs.v6addrs.src = key_iph->saddr;
 	keys->addrs.v6addrs.dst = key_iph->daddr;
-	keys->tags.flow_label = ip6_flowinfo(key_iph);
+	keys->tags.flow_label = ip6_flowlabel(key_iph);
 	keys->basic.ip_proto = key_iph->nexthdr;
 }
 

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wenwen Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6009d1fe6ba3bb2dab55921da60465329cc1cd89 ]

In divasmain.c, the function divas_write() firstly invokes the function diva_xdi_open_adapter() to open the adapter that matches with the adapter number provided by the user, and then invokes the function diva_xdi_write() to perform the write operation using the matched adapter. The two functions diva_xdi_open_adapter() and diva_xdi_write() are located in diva.c.

In diva_xdi_open_adapter(), the user command is copied to the object 'msg' from the userspace pointer 'src' through the function pointer 'cp_fn', which eventually calls copy_from_user() to do the copy. Then, the adapter number 'msg.adapter' is used to find out a matched adapter from the 'adapter_queue'. A matched adapter will be returned if it is found. Otherwise, NULL is returned to indicate the failure of the verification on the adapter number.

As mentioned above, if a matched adapter is returned, the function diva_xdi_write() is invoked to perform the write operation. In this function, the user command is copied once again from the userspace pointer 'src', which is the same as the 'src' pointer in diva_xdi_open_adapter() as both of them are from the 'buf' pointer in divas_write(). Similarly, the copy is achieved through the function pointer 'cp_fn', which finally calls copy_from_user(). After the successful copy, the corresponding command processing handler of the matched adapter is invoked to perform the write operation.

It is obvious that there are two copies here from userspace, one is in diva_xdi_open_adapter(), and one is in diva_xdi_write(). Plus, both of these two copies share the same source userspace pointer, i.e., the 'buf' pointer in divas_write(). Given that a malicious userspace process can race to change the content pointed by the 'buf' pointer, this can pose potential security issues. For example, in the first copy, the user provides a valid adapter number to pass the verification process and a valid adapter can be found. Then the user can modify the adapter number to an invalid number. This way, the user can bypass the verification process of the adapter number and inject inconsistent data.

This patch reuses the data copied in
diva_xdi_open_adapter() and passes it to diva_xdi_write(). This way, the above issues can be avoided.

---
 drivers/isdn/hardware/eicon/diva.c      |   22 +++++++++++++++-------
 drivers/isdn/hardware/eicon/diva.h      |    5 +++--
 drivers/isdn/hardware/eicon/divasmain.c |   18 +++++++++++-------
 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

@@ -388,10 +388,10 @@ void divasa_xdi_driver_unload(void)
 **  Receive and process command from user mode utility
 */
 void *diva_xdi_open_adapter(void *os_handle, const void __user *src,
-			    int length,
+			    int length, void *mptr,
 			    divas_xdi_copy_from_user_fn_t cp_fn)
 {
-	diva_xdi_um_cfg_cmd_t msg;
+	diva_xdi_um_cfg_cmd_t *msg = (diva_xdi_um_cfg_cmd_t *)mptr;
 	diva_os_xdi_adapter_t *a = NULL;
 	diva_os_spin_lock_magic_t old_irql;
 	struct list_head *tmp;

@@ -401,21 +401,21 @@ void *diva_xdi_open_adapter(void *os_han
 			 length, sizeof(diva_xdi_um_cfg_cmd_t)))
 			return NULL;
 	}
-	if ((*cp_fn) (os_handle, &msg, src, sizeof(msg)) <= 0) {
+	if ((*cp_fn) (os_handle, msg, src, sizeof(*msg)) <= 0) {
 		DBG_ERR(("A: A(?) open, write error"))
 			return NULL;
 	}
 	diva_os_enter_spin_lock(&adapter_lock, &old_irql, "open_adapter");
 	list_for_each(tmp, &adapter_queue) {
 		a = list_entry(tmp, diva_os_xdi_adapter_t, link);
-		if (a->controller == (int)msg.adapter)
+		if (a->controller == (int)msg->adapter)
 			break;
 		a = NULL;
 	}
 	diva_os_leave_spin_lock(&adapter_lock, &old_irql, "open_adapter");
 
 	if (!a) {
-		DBG_ERR(("A: A(%d) open, adapter not found", msg.adapter))
+		DBG_ERR(("A: A(%d) open, adapter not found", msg->adapter))
 			}
 
 	return (a);

@@ -437,8 +437,10 @@ void diva_xdi_close_adapter(void *adapte
 
 int
 diva_xdi_write(void *adapter, void *os_handle, const void __user *src,
-	       int length, divas_xdi_copy_from_user_fn_t cp_fn)
+	       int length, void *mptr,
+	       divas_xdi_copy_from_user_fn_t cp_fn)
 {
+	diva_xdi_um_cfg_cmd_t *msg = (diva_xdi_um_cfg_cmd_t *)mptr;
 	diva_os_xdi_adapter_t *a = (diva_os_xdi_adapter_t *) adapter;
 	void *data;
 

@@ -459,7 +461,13 @@ diva_xdi_write(void *adapter, void *os_h
 			return (-2);
 	}
 
-	length = (*cp_fn) (os_handle, data, src, length);
+	if (msg) {
+		*(diva_xdi_um_cfg_cmd_t *)data = *msg;
+		length = (*cp_fn) (os_handle, (char *)data + sizeof(*msg),
+				   src + sizeof(*msg), length - sizeof(*msg));
+	} else {
+		length = (*cp_fn) (os_handle, data, src, length);
+	}
 	if (length > 0) {
 		if ((*(a->interface.cmd_proc))
 		    (a, (diva_xdi_um_cfg_cmd_t *) data, length)) {

@@ -20,10 +20,11 @@ int diva_xdi_read(void *adapter, void *o
 		  int max_length, divas_xdi_copy_to_user_fn_t cp_fn);
 
 int diva_xdi_write(void *adapter, void *os_handle, const void __user *src,
-		   int length, divas_xdi_copy_from_user_fn_t cp_fn);
+		   int length, void *msg,
+		   divas_xdi_copy_from_user_fn_t cp_fn);
 
 void *diva_xdi_open_adapter(void *os_handle, const void __user *src,
-			    int length,
+			    int length, void *msg,
 			    divas_xdi_copy_from_user_fn_t cp_fn);
 
 void diva_xdi_close_adapter(void *adapter, void *os_handle);

@@ -591,19 +591,22 @@ static int divas_release(struct inode *i
 static ssize_t divas_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			   size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	diva_xdi_um_cfg_cmd_t msg;
 	int ret = -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!file->private_data) {
 		file->private_data = diva_xdi_open_adapter(file, buf,
-							   count,
+							   count, &msg,
 							   xdi_copy_from_user);
-	}
-	if (!file->private_data) {
-		return (-ENODEV);
+		if (!file->private_data)
+			return (-ENODEV);
+		ret = diva_xdi_write(file->private_data, file,
+				     buf, count, &msg, xdi_copy_from_user);
+	} else {
+		ret = diva_xdi_write(file->private_data, file,
+				     buf, count, NULL, xdi_copy_from_user);
 	}
 
-	ret = diva_xdi_write(file->private_data, file,
-			     buf, count, xdi_copy_from_user);
 	switch (ret) {
 	case -1:		/* Message should be removed from rx mailbox first */
 		ret = -EBUSY;

@@ -622,11 +625,12 @@ static ssize_t divas_write(struct file *
 static ssize_t divas_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 			  size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	diva_xdi_um_cfg_cmd_t msg;
 	int ret = -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!file->private_data) {
 		file->private_data = diva_xdi_open_adapter(file, buf,
-							   count,
+							   count, &msg,
 							   xdi_copy_from_user);
 	}
 	if (!file->private_data) {

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kirill Tkhai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit eb7f54b90bd8f469834c5e86dcf72ebf9a629811 ]

(resend for properly queueing in patchwork)

kcm_clone() creates kernel socket, which does not take net counter. Thus, the net may die before the socket is completely destructed, i.e. kcm_exit_net() is executed before kcm_done().

---
 net/kcm/kcmsock.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1671,7 +1671,7 @@ static struct file *kcm_clone(struct soc
 	__module_get(newsock->ops->owner);
 
 	newsk = sk_alloc(sock_net(osock->sk), PF_KCM, GFP_KERNEL,
-			 &kcm_proto, true);
+			 &kcm_proto, false);
 	if (!newsk) {
 		sock_release(newsock);
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Guillaume Nault <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3d609342cc04129ff7568e19316ce3d7451a27e8 ]

Commit d02ba2a6110c ("l2tp: fix race in pppol2tp_release with session object destroy") tried to fix a race condition where a PPPoL2TP socket would disappear while the L2TP session was still using it. However, it missed the root issue which is that an L2TP session may accept to be reconnected if its associated socket has entered the release process.

The tentative fix makes the session hold the socket it is connected to. That saves the kernel from crashing, but introduces refcount leakage, preventing the socket from completing the release process. Once stalled, everything the socket depends on can't be released anymore, including the L2TP session and the l2tp_ppp module.

The root issue is that, when releasing a connected PPPoL2TP socket, the session's ->sk pointer (RCU-protected) is reset to NULL and we have to wait for a grace period before destroying the socket. The socket drops the session in its ->sk_destruct callback function, so the session will exist until the last reference on the socket is dropped. Therefore, there is a time frame where pppol2tp_connect() may accept reconnecting a session, as it only checks ->sk to figure out if the session is connected. This time frame is shortened by the fact that pppol2tp_release() calls l2tp_session_delete(), making the session unreachable before resetting ->sk. However, pppol2tp_connect() may grab the session before it gets unhashed by l2tp_session_delete(), but it may test ->sk after the later got reset. The race is not so hard to trigger and syzbot found a pretty reliable reproducer:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=418578d2a4389074524e04d641eacb091961b2cf

Before d02ba2a6110c, another race could let pppol2tp_release() overwrite the ->__sk pointer of an L2TP session, thus tricking pppol2tp_put_sk() into calling sock_put() on a socket that is different than the one for which pppol2tp_release() was originally called. To get there, we had to trigger the race described above, therefore having one PPPoL2TP socket being released, while the session it is connected to is reconnecting to a different PPPoL2TP socket. When releasing this new socket fast enough, pppol2tp_release() overwrites the session's ->__sk pointer with the address of the new socket, before the first pppol2tp_put_sk() call gets scheduled. Then the pppol2tp_put_sk() call invoked by the original socket will sock_put() the new socket, potentially dropping its last reference. When the second pppol2tp_put_sk() finally runs, its socket has already been freed.

With d02ba2a6110c, the session takes a reference on both sockets. Furthermore, the session's ->sk pointer is reset in the pppol2tp_session_close() callback function rather than in pppol2tp_release(). Therefore, ->__sk can't be overwritten and pppol2tp_put_sk() is called only once (l2tp_session_delete() will only run pppol2tp_session_close() once, to protect the session against concurrent deletion requests). Now pppol2tp_put_sk() will properly sock_put() the original socket, but the new socket will remain, as l2tp_session_delete() prevented the release process from completing. Here, we don't depend on the ->__sk race to trigger the bug. Getting into the pppol2tp_connect() race is enough to leak the reference, no matter when new socket is released.

So it all boils down to pppol2tp_connect() failing to realise that the session has already been connected. This patch drops the unneeded extra reference counting (mostly reverting d02ba2a6110c) and checks that neither ->sk nor ->__sk is set before allowing a session to be connected.

---
 net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c |   35 +++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

@@ -428,16 +428,6 @@ static void pppol2tp_put_sk(struct rcu_h
  */
 static void pppol2tp_session_close(struct l2tp_session *session)
 {
-	struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
-
-	ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
-	mutex_lock(&ps->sk_lock);
-	ps->__sk = rcu_dereference_protected(ps->sk,
-					     lockdep_is_held(&ps->sk_lock));
-	RCU_INIT_POINTER(ps->sk, NULL);
-	if (ps->__sk)
-		call_rcu(&ps->rcu, pppol2tp_put_sk);
-	mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
 }
 
 /* Really kill the session socket. (Called from sock_put() if

@@ -480,15 +470,24 @@ static int pppol2tp_release(struct socke
 	sock_orphan(sk);
 	sock->sk = NULL;
 
-	/* If the socket is associated with a session,
-	 * l2tp_session_delete will call pppol2tp_session_close which
-	 * will drop the session's ref on the socket.
-	 */
 	session = pppol2tp_sock_to_session(sk);
 	if (session) {
+		struct pppol2tp_session *ps;
+
 		l2tp_session_delete(session);
-		/* drop the ref obtained by pppol2tp_sock_to_session */
-		sock_put(sk);
+
+		ps = l2tp_session_priv(session);
+		mutex_lock(&ps->sk_lock);
+		ps->__sk = rcu_dereference_protected(ps->sk,
+						     lockdep_is_held(&ps->sk_lock));
+		RCU_INIT_POINTER(ps->sk, NULL);
+		mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
+		call_rcu(&ps->rcu, pppol2tp_put_sk);
+
+		/* Rely on the sock_put() call at the end of the function for
+		 * dropping the reference held by pppol2tp_sock_to_session().
+		 * The last reference will be dropped by pppol2tp_put_sk().
+		 */
 	}
 
 	release_sock(sk);

@@ -742,7 +741,8 @@ static int pppol2tp_connect(struct socke
 		 */
 		mutex_lock(&ps->sk_lock);
 		if (rcu_dereference_protected(ps->sk,
-					      lockdep_is_held(&ps->sk_lock))) {
+					      lockdep_is_held(&ps->sk_lock)) ||
+		    ps->__sk) {
 			mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);
 			error = -EEXIST;
 			goto end;

@@ -803,7 +803,6 @@ static int pppol2tp_connect(struct socke
 
 out_no_ppp:
 	/* This is how we get the session context from the socket. */
-	sock_hold(sk);
 	sk->sk_user_data = session;
 	rcu_assign_pointer(ps->sk, sk);
 	mutex_unlock(&ps->sk_lock);

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Petr Machata <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 47bf9df2e8201d07c40670e093629f8dfd1b5d9f ]

VLAN 1 is internally used for untagged traffic. Prevent creation of explicit netdevice for that VLAN, because that currently isn't supported and leads to the NULL pointer dereference cited below.

Fix by preventing creation of VLAN devices with VID of 1 over mlxsw devices or LAG devices that involve mlxsw devices.

[  327.175816] ================================================================================
[  327.184544] UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_fid.c:200:12
[  327.193667] member access within null pointer of type 'const struct mlxsw_sp_fid'
[  327.201226] CPU: 0 PID: 8983 Comm: ip Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4-petrm_net_ip6gre_headroom-custom-140 #11
[  327.210496] Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. "MSN2410-CB2F"/"SA000874", BIOS 4.6.5 03/08/2016
[  327.219872] Call Trace:
[  327.222384]  dump_stack+0xc3/0x12b
[  327.234007]  ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x49
[  327.237638]  ubsan_type_mismatch_common+0x1f9/0x2d0
[  327.255769]  __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch+0x90/0xa7
[  327.264716]  mlxsw_sp_fid_type+0x35/0x50 [mlxsw_spectrum]
[  327.270255]  mlxsw_sp_port_vlan_router_leave+0x46/0xc0 [mlxsw_spectrum]
[  327.277019]  mlxsw_sp_inetaddr_port_vlan_event+0xe1/0x340 [mlxsw_spectrum]
[  327.315031]  mlxsw_sp_netdevice_vrf_event+0xa8/0x100 [mlxsw_spectrum]
[  327.321626]  mlxsw_sp_netdevice_event+0x276/0x430 [mlxsw_spectrum]
[  327.367863]  notifier_call_chain+0x4c/0x150
[  327.372128]  __netdev_upper_dev_link+0x1b3/0x260
[  327.399450]  vrf_add_slave+0xce/0x170 [vrf]
[  327.403703]  do_setlink+0x658/0x1d70
[  327.508998]  rtnl_newlink+0x908/0xf20
[  327.559128]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x50c/0x720
[  327.571720]  netlink_rcv_skb+0x16a/0x1f0
[  327.583450]  netlink_unicast+0x2ca/0x3e0
[  327.599305]  netlink_sendmsg+0x3e2/0x7f0
[  327.616655]  sock_sendmsg+0x76/0xc0
[  327.620207]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x494/0x5d0
[  327.666117]  __sys_sendmsg+0xc2/0x130
[  327.690953]  do_syscall_64+0x66/0x370
[  327.694677]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[  327.699782] RIP: 0033:0x7f4c2f3f8037
[  327.703393] RSP: 002b:00007ffe8c389708 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
[  327.711035] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000005b03f53e RCX: 00007f4c2f3f8037
[  327.718229] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffe8c389760 RDI: 0000000000000003
[  327.725431] RBP: 00007ffe8c389760 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f4c2f443630
[  327.732632] R10: 00000000000005eb R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[  327.739833] R13: 00000000006774e0 R14: 00007ffe8c3897e8 R15: 0000000000000000
[  327.747096] ================================================================================

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -4870,6 +4870,11 @@ static int mlxsw_sp_netdevice_port_upper
 				       "spectrum: Can not put a VLAN on an OVS port");
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
+		if (is_vlan_dev(upper_dev) &&
+		    vlan_dev_vlan_id(upper_dev) == 1) {
+			NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "Creating a VLAN device with VID 1 is unsupported: VLAN 1 carries untagged traffic");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
 		break;
 	case NETDEV_CHANGEUPPER:
 		upper_dev = info->upper_dev;

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 75d4e704fa8d2cf33ff295e5b441317603d7f9fd ]

Per discussion with David at netconf 2018, let's clarify DaveM's position of handling stable backports in netdev-FAQ.

This is important for people relying on upstream -stable releases.

---
 Documentation/networking/netdev-FAQ.txt |    9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

@@ -179,6 +179,15 @@ A: No.  See above answer.  In short, if
    dash marker line as described in Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst to
    temporarily embed that information into the patch that you send.
 
+Q: Are all networking bug fixes backported to all stable releases?
+
+A: Due to capacity, Dave could only take care of the backports for the last
+   2 stable releases. For earlier stable releases, each stable branch maintainer
+   is supposed to take care of them. If you find any patch is missing from an
+   earlier stable branch, please notify [email protected] with either a
+   commit ID or a formal patch backported, and CC Dave and other relevant
+   networking developers.
+
 Q: Someone said that the comment style and coding convention is different
    for the networking content.  Is this true?
 

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8005b09d99fac78e6f5fb9da30b5ae94840af03b ]

The current error handling code has an issue where it does:

	if (priv->txchan)
		cpdma_chan_destroy(priv->txchan);

The problem is that ->txchan is either valid or an error pointer (which would lead to an Oops). I've changed it to use multiple error labels so that the test can be removed.

Also there were some missing calls to netif_napi_del().

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/ti/davinci_emac.c |   22 ++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

@@ -1873,7 +1873,7 @@ static int davinci_emac_probe(struct pla
 	if (IS_ERR(priv->txchan)) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "error initializing tx dma channel\n");
 		rc = PTR_ERR(priv->txchan);
-		goto no_cpdma_chan;
+		goto err_free_dma;
 	}
 
 	priv->rxchan = cpdma_chan_create(priv->dma, EMAC_DEF_RX_CH,

@@ -1881,14 +1881,14 @@ static int davinci_emac_probe(struct pla
 	if (IS_ERR(priv->rxchan)) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "error initializing rx dma channel\n");
 		rc = PTR_ERR(priv->rxchan);
-		goto no_cpdma_chan;
+		goto err_free_txchan;
 	}
 
 	res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_IRQ, 0);
 	if (!res) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "error getting irq res\n");
 		rc = -ENOENT;
-		goto no_cpdma_chan;
+		goto err_free_rxchan;
 	}
 	ndev->irq = res->start;
 

@@ -1914,7 +1914,7 @@ static int davinci_emac_probe(struct pla
 		pm_runtime_put_noidle(&pdev->dev);
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "%s: failed to get_sync(%d)\n",
 			__func__, rc);
-		goto no_cpdma_chan;
+		goto err_napi_del;
 	}
 
 	/* register the network device */

@@ -1924,7 +1924,7 @@ static int davinci_emac_probe(struct pla
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "error in register_netdev\n");
 		rc = -ENODEV;
 		pm_runtime_put(&pdev->dev);
-		goto no_cpdma_chan;
+		goto err_napi_del;
 	}
 
 

@@ -1937,11 +1937,13 @@ static int davinci_emac_probe(struct pla
 
 	return 0;
 
-no_cpdma_chan:
-	if (priv->txchan)
-		cpdma_chan_destroy(priv->txchan);
-	if (priv->rxchan)
-		cpdma_chan_destroy(priv->rxchan);
+err_napi_del:
+	netif_napi_del(&priv->napi);
+err_free_rxchan:
+	cpdma_chan_destroy(priv->rxchan);
+err_free_txchan:
+	cpdma_chan_destroy(priv->txchan);
+err_free_dma:
 	cpdma_ctlr_destroy(priv->dma);
 no_pdata:
 	if (of_phy_is_fixed_link(np))

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Roopa Prabhu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2eabd764cb5512f1338d06ffc054c8bc9fbe9104 ]

---
 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -643,6 +643,7 @@ const struct nla_policy rtm_ipv4_policy[
 	[RTA_ENCAP]		= { .type = NLA_NESTED },
 	[RTA_UID]		= { .type = NLA_U32 },
 	[RTA_MARK]		= { .type = NLA_U32 },
+	[RTA_TABLE]		= { .type = NLA_U32 },
 };
 
 static int rtm_to_fib_config(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb,

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5b5e7a0de2bbf2a1afcd9f49e940010e9fb80d53 ]

Before using nla_get_u32(), better make sure the attribute is of the proper size.

Code recently was changed, but bug has been there from beginning of git.

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in rtnetlink_put_metrics+0x553/0x960 net/core/rtnetlink.c:746
CPU: 1 PID: 14139 Comm: syz-executor6 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc5+ #103
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 kmsan_report+0x149/0x260 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1084
 __msan_warning_32+0x6e/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:686
 rtnetlink_put_metrics+0x553/0x960 net/core/rtnetlink.c:746
 fib_dump_info+0xc42/0x2190 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1361
 rtmsg_fib+0x65f/0x8c0 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:419
 fib_table_insert+0x2314/0x2b50 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1287
 inet_rtm_newroute+0x210/0x340 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:779
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xa32/0x1560 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4646
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x378/0x600 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2448
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4664
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x1678/0x1750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
 netlink_sendmsg+0x104f/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2117
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
 do_syscall_64+0x152/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x455a09
RSP: 002b:00007faae5fd8c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007faae5fd96d4 RCX: 0000000000455a09
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000013
RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 00000000000005d0 R14: 00000000006fdc20 R15: 0000000000000000

Uninit was stored to memory at:

 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:279 [inline]
 kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:294 [inline]
 kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x12b/0x210 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:685
 __msan_chain_origin+0x69/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:529
 fib_convert_metrics net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1056 [inline]
 fib_create_info+0x2d46/0x9dc0 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1150
 fib_table_insert+0x3e4/0x2b50 net/ipv4/fib_trie.c:1146
 inet_rtm_newroute+0x210/0x340 net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:779
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xa32/0x1560 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4646
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x378/0x600 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2448
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4664
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x1678/0x1750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
 netlink_sendmsg+0x104f/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2117
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
 do_syscall_64+0x152/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Uninit was created at:
 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:279 [inline]
 kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:189
 kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:315
 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:322
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2753 [inline]
 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb32/0x11b0 mm/slub.c:4395
 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
 __alloc_skb+0x2cb/0x9e0 net/core/skbuff.c:206
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:988 [inline]
 netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1182 [inline]
 netlink_sendmsg+0x76e/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1876
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2117
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
 do_syscall_64+0x152/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

---
 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

@@ -717,6 +717,8 @@ bool fib_metrics_match(struct fib_config
 			nla_strlcpy(tmp, nla, sizeof(tmp));
 			val = tcp_ca_get_key_by_name(fi->fib_net, tmp, &ecn_ca);
 		} else {
+			if (nla_len(nla) != sizeof(u32))
+				return false;
 			val = nla_get_u32(nla);
 		}
 

@@ -1043,6 +1045,8 @@ fib_convert_metrics(struct fib_info *fi,
 			if (val == TCP_CA_UNSPEC)
 				return -EINVAL;
 		} else {
+			if (nla_len(nla) != sizeof(u32))
+				return -EINVAL;
 			val = nla_get_u32(nla);
 		}
 		if (type == RTAX_ADVMSS && val > 65535 - 40)

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit eb73190f4fbeedf762394e92d6a4ec9ace684c88 ]

syzbot was able to trick af_packet again [1]

Various commits tried to address the problem in the past, but failed to take into account V3 header size.

[1]

tpacket_rcv: packet too big, clamped from 72 to 4294967224. macoff=96

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in prb_run_all_ft_ops net/packet/af_packet.c:1016 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in prb_fill_curr_block.isra.59+0x4e5/0x5c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:1039
Write of size 2 at addr ffff8801cb62000e by task kworker/1:2/2106

CPU: 1 PID: 2106 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc7+ #77
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x1b9/0x294 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 print_address_description+0x6c/0x20b mm/kasan/report.c:256
 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:354 [inline]
 kasan_report.cold.7+0x242/0x2fe mm/kasan/report.c:412
 __asan_report_store2_noabort+0x17/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:436
 prb_run_all_ft_ops net/packet/af_packet.c:1016 [inline]
 prb_fill_curr_block.isra.59+0x4e5/0x5c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:1039
 __packet_lookup_frame_in_block net/packet/af_packet.c:1094 [inline]
 packet_current_rx_frame net/packet/af_packet.c:1117 [inline]
 tpacket_rcv+0x1866/0x3340 net/packet/af_packet.c:2282
 dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x891/0xb90 net/core/dev.c:2018
 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3049 [inline]
 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x16b/0xc10 net/core/dev.c:3069
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2724/0x34c0 net/core/dev.c:3584
 dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 net/core/dev.c:3617
 neigh_resolve_output+0x679/0xad0 net/core/neighbour.c:1358
 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:482 [inline]
 ip6_finish_output2+0xc9c/0x2810 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:120
 ip6_finish_output+0x5fe/0xbc0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:154
 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:277 [inline]
 ip6_output+0x227/0x9b0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:171
 dst_output include/net/dst.h:444 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:288 [inline]
 ndisc_send_skb+0x100d/0x1570 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:491
 ndisc_send_ns+0x3c1/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:633
 addrconf_dad_work+0xbef/0x1340 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4033
 process_one_work+0xc1e/0x1b50 kernel/workqueue.c:2145
 worker_thread+0x1cc/0x1440 kernel/workqueue.c:2279
 kthread+0x345/0x410 kernel/kthread.c:240
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:412

The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00072d8800 count:0 mapcount:-127 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff8801cb620e80
flags: 0x2fffc0000000000()
raw: 02fffc0000000000 0000000000000000 ffff8801cb620e80 00000000ffffff80
raw: ffffea00072e3820 ffffea0007132d20 0000000000000002 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8801cb61ff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 ffff8801cb61ff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff8801cb620000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
                      ^
 ffff8801cb620080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
 ffff8801cb620100: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff

---
 net/packet/af_packet.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -4284,7 +4284,7 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *
 			goto out;
 		if (po->tp_version >= TPACKET_V3 &&
 		    req->tp_block_size <=
-			  BLK_PLUS_PRIV((u64)req_u->req3.tp_sizeof_priv))
+		    BLK_PLUS_PRIV((u64)req_u->req3.tp_sizeof_priv) + sizeof(struct tpacket3_hdr))
 			goto out;
 		if (unlikely(req->tp_frame_size < po->tp_hdrlen +
 					po->tp_reserve))

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 79fb218d97980d4fee9a64f4c8ff05289364ba25 ]

On newer PHYs, we need to select the expansion register to write with setting bits [11:8] to 0xf. This was done correctly by bcm7xxx.c prior to being migrated to generic code under bcm-phy-lib.c which unfortunately used the older implementation from the BCM54xx days.

Fix this by creating an inline stub: bcm_write_exp_sel() which adds the correct value (MII_BCM54XX_EXP_SEL_ER) and update both the Cygnus PHY and BCM7xxx PHY drivers which require setting these bits.

broadcom.c is unchanged because some PHYs even use a different selector method, so let them specify it directly (e.g: SerDes secondary selector).

---
 drivers/net/phy/bcm-cygnus.c  |    6 +++---
 drivers/net/phy/bcm-phy-lib.h |    7 +++++++
 drivers/net/phy/bcm7xxx.c     |    4 ++--
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -61,17 +61,17 @@ static int bcm_cygnus_afe_config(struct
 		return rc;
 
 	/* make rcal=100, since rdb default is 000 */
-	rc = bcm_phy_write_exp(phydev, MII_BRCM_CORE_EXPB1, 0x10);
+	rc = bcm_phy_write_exp_sel(phydev, MII_BRCM_CORE_EXPB1, 0x10);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		return rc;
 
 	/* CORE_EXPB0, Reset R_CAL/RC_CAL Engine */
-	rc = bcm_phy_write_exp(phydev, MII_BRCM_CORE_EXPB0, 0x10);
+	rc = bcm_phy_write_exp_sel(phydev, MII_BRCM_CORE_EXPB0, 0x10);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		return rc;
 
 	/* CORE_EXPB0, Disable Reset R_CAL/RC_CAL Engine */
-	rc = bcm_phy_write_exp(phydev, MII_BRCM_CORE_EXPB0, 0x00);
+	rc = bcm_phy_write_exp_sel(phydev, MII_BRCM_CORE_EXPB0, 0x00);
 
 	return 0;
 }

@@ -14,11 +14,18 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_BCM_PHY_LIB_H
 #define _LINUX_BCM_PHY_LIB_H
 
+#include <linux/brcmphy.h>
 #include <linux/phy.h>
 
 int bcm_phy_write_exp(struct phy_device *phydev, u16 reg, u16 val);
 int bcm_phy_read_exp(struct phy_device *phydev, u16 reg);
 
+static inline int bcm_phy_write_exp_sel(struct phy_device *phydev,
+					u16 reg, u16 val)
+{
+	return bcm_phy_write_exp(phydev, reg | MII_BCM54XX_EXP_SEL_ER, val);
+}
+
 int bcm54xx_auxctl_write(struct phy_device *phydev, u16 regnum, u16 val);
 int bcm54xx_auxctl_read(struct phy_device *phydev, u16 regnum);
 

@@ -65,10 +65,10 @@ struct bcm7xxx_phy_priv {
 static void r_rc_cal_reset(struct phy_device *phydev)
 {
 	/* Reset R_CAL/RC_CAL Engine */
-	bcm_phy_write_exp(phydev, 0x00b0, 0x0010);
+	bcm_phy_write_exp_sel(phydev, 0x00b0, 0x0010);
 
 	/* Disable Reset R_AL/RC_CAL Engine */
-	bcm_phy_write_exp(phydev, 0x00b0, 0x0000);
+	bcm_phy_write_exp_sel(phydev, 0x00b0, 0x0000);
 }
 
 static int bcm7xxx_28nm_b0_afe_config_init(struct phy_device *phydev)

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Willem de Bruijn <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9aad13b087ab0a588cd68259de618f100053360e ]

Commit b84bbaf7a6c8 ("packet: in packet_snd start writing at link layer allocation") ensures that packet_snd always starts writing the link layer header in reserved headroom allocated for this purpose.

This is needed because packets may be shorter than hard_header_len, in which case the space up to hard_header_len may be zeroed. But that necessary padding is not accounted for in skb->len.

The fix, however, is buggy. It calls skb_push, which grows skb->len when moving skb->data back. But in this case packet length should not change.

Instead, call skb_reserve, which moves both skb->data and skb->tail back, without changing length.

---
 net/packet/af_packet.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -2911,7 +2911,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *soc
 		if (unlikely(offset < 0))
 			goto out_free;
 	} else if (reserve) {
-		skb_push(skb, reserve);
+		skb_reserve(skb, -reserve);
 	}
 
 	/* Returns -EFAULT on error */

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shahed Shaikh <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fdd13dd350dda1826579eb5c333d76b14513b812 ]

ILT entry requires 12 bit right shifted physical address. Existing mask for ILT entry of physical address i.e. ILT_ENTRY_PHY_ADDR_MASK is not sufficient to handle 64bit address because upper 8 bits of 64 bit address were getting masked which resulted in completer abort error on PCIe bus due to invalid address.

Fix that mask to handle 64bit physical address.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_cxt.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@
 #define ILT_CFG_REG(cli, reg)	PSWRQ2_REG_ ## cli ## _ ## reg ## _RT_OFFSET
 
 /* ILT entry structure */
-#define ILT_ENTRY_PHY_ADDR_MASK		0x000FFFFFFFFFFFULL
+#define ILT_ENTRY_PHY_ADDR_MASK		(~0ULL >> 12)
 #define ILT_ENTRY_PHY_ADDR_SHIFT	0
 #define ILT_ENTRY_VALID_MASK		0x1ULL
 #define ILT_ENTRY_VALID_SHIFT		52

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 644c7eebbfd59e72982d11ec6cc7d39af12450ae ]

It seems that rtnl_group_changelink() can call do_setlink while a prior call to validate_linkmsg(dev = NULL, ...) could not validate IFLA_ADDRESS / IFLA_BROADCAST

Make sure do_setlink() calls validate_linkmsg() instead of letting its callers having this responsibility.

With help from Dmitry Vyukov, thanks a lot !

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in is_valid_ether_addr include/linux/etherdevice.h:199 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in eth_prepare_mac_addr_change net/ethernet/eth.c:275 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in eth_mac_addr+0x203/0x2b0 net/ethernet/eth.c:308
CPU: 1 PID: 8695 Comm: syz-executor3 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc5+ #103
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 kmsan_report+0x149/0x260 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1084
 __msan_warning_32+0x6e/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:686
 is_valid_ether_addr include/linux/etherdevice.h:199 [inline]
 eth_prepare_mac_addr_change net/ethernet/eth.c:275 [inline]
 eth_mac_addr+0x203/0x2b0 net/ethernet/eth.c:308
 dev_set_mac_address+0x261/0x530 net/core/dev.c:7157
 do_setlink+0xbc3/0x5fc0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2317
 rtnl_group_changelink net/core/rtnetlink.c:2824 [inline]
 rtnl_newlink+0x1fe9/0x37a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2976
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xa32/0x1560 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4646
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x378/0x600 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2448
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4664
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x1678/0x1750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
 netlink_sendmsg+0x104f/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2117
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
 do_syscall_64+0x152/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x455a09
RSP: 002b:00007fc07480ec68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fc07480f6d4 RCX: 0000000000455a09
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200003c0 RDI: 0000000000000014
RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 00000000000005d0 R14: 00000000006fdc20 R15: 0000000000000000

Uninit was stored to memory at:

 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:279 [inline]
 kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:294 [inline]
 kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x12b/0x210 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:685
 kmsan_memcpy_origins+0x11d/0x170 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:527
 __msan_memcpy+0x109/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:478
 do_setlink+0xb84/0x5fc0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2315
 rtnl_group_changelink net/core/rtnetlink.c:2824 [inline]
 rtnl_newlink+0x1fe9/0x37a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2976
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xa32/0x1560 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4646
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x378/0x600 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2448
 rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4664
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x1678/0x1750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336
 netlink_sendmsg+0x104f/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2117
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
 do_syscall_64+0x152/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Uninit was created at:
 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:279 [inline]
 kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:189
 kmsan_kmalloc+0x94/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:315
 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:322
 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2753 [inline]
 __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb32/0x11b0 mm/slub.c:4395
 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
 __alloc_skb+0x2cb/0x9e0 net/core/skbuff.c:206
 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:988 [inline]
 netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1182 [inline]
 netlink_sendmsg+0x76e/0x1350 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1876
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:639 [inline]
 ___sys_sendmsg+0xec0/0x1310 net/socket.c:2117
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2155 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2164 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2162 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x331/0x460 net/socket.c:2162
 do_syscall_64+0x152/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

---
 net/core/rtnetlink.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -2245,6 +2245,10 @@ static int do_setlink(const struct sk_bu
 	const struct net_device_ops *ops = dev->netdev_ops;
 	int err;
 
+	err = validate_linkmsg(dev, tb);
+	if (err < 0)
+		return err;
+
 	if (tb[IFLA_NET_NS_PID] || tb[IFLA_NET_NS_FD] || tb[IFLA_IF_NETNSID]) {
 		struct net *net = rtnl_link_get_net_capable(skb, dev_net(dev),
 							    tb, CAP_NET_ADMIN);

@@ -2608,10 +2612,6 @@ static int rtnl_setlink(struct sk_buff *
 		goto errout;
 	}
 
-	err = validate_linkmsg(dev, tb);
-	if (err < 0)
-		goto errout;
-
 	err = do_setlink(skb, dev, ifm, extack, tb, ifname, 0);
 errout:
 	return err;

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1d88ba1ebb2763aa86172cd7ca05dedbeccc0d35 ]

syzbot reported a rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU which is caused by too small value set on rto_min with SCTP_RTOINFO sockopt. With this value, hb_timer will get stuck there, as in its timer handler it starts this timer again with this value, then goes to the timer handler again.

This problem is there since very beginning, and thanks to Eric for the reproducer shared from a syzbot mail.

This patch fixes it by not allowing sctp_transport_timeout to return a smaller value than HZ/5 for hb_timer, which is based on TCP's min rto.

Note that it doesn't fix this issue by limiting rto_min, as some users are still using small rto and no proper value was found for it yet.

---
 net/sctp/transport.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ unsigned long sctp_transport_timeout(str
 	    trans->state != SCTP_PF)
 		timeout += trans->hbinterval;
 
-	return timeout;
+	return max_t(unsigned long, timeout, HZ / 5);
 }
 
 /* Reset transport variables to their initial values */

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 25ea66544bfd1d9df1b7e1502f8717e85fa1e6e6 ]

This code was introduced in 2011 around the same time that we made netdev_features_t a u64 type. These days a u32 is not big enough to hold all the potential features.

---
 drivers/net/team/team.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1004,7 +1004,8 @@ static void team_port_disable(struct tea
 static void __team_compute_features(struct team *team)
 {
 	struct team_port *port;
-	u32 vlan_features = TEAM_VLAN_FEATURES & NETIF_F_ALL_FOR_ALL;
+	netdev_features_t vlan_features = TEAM_VLAN_FEATURES &
+					  NETIF_F_ALL_FOR_ALL;
 	netdev_features_t enc_features  = TEAM_ENC_FEATURES;
 	unsigned short max_hard_header_len = ETH_HLEN;
 	unsigned int dst_release_flag = IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE |

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jason Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1b15ad683ab42a203f98b67045b40720e99d0e9a ]

DaeRyong Jeong reports a race between vhost_dev_cleanup() and vhost_process_iotlb_msg():

Thread interleaving:
CPU0 (vhost_process_iotlb_msg) CPU1 (vhost_dev_cleanup)
(In the case of both VHOST_IOTLB_UPDATE and
VHOST_IOTLB_INVALIDATE)

===== =====

						vhost_umem_clean(dev->iotlb);
if (!dev->iotlb) {
	        ret = -EFAULT;
		        break;
}
						dev->iotlb = NULL;

The reason is we don't synchronize between them, fixing by protecting vhost_process_iotlb_msg() with dev mutex.

---
 drivers/vhost/vhost.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -981,6 +981,7 @@ static int vhost_process_iotlb_msg(struc
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	mutex_lock(&dev->mutex);
 	vhost_dev_lock_vqs(dev);
 	switch (msg->type) {
 	case VHOST_IOTLB_UPDATE:

@@ -1016,6 +1017,8 @@ static int vhost_process_iotlb_msg(struc
 	}
 
 	vhost_dev_unlock_vqs(dev);
+	mutex_unlock(&dev->mutex);
+
 	return ret;
 }
 ssize_t vhost_chr_write_iter(struct vhost_dev *dev,

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stephen Suryaputra <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2f17becfbea5e9a0529b51da7345783e96e69516 ]

Use the right device to determine if redirect should be sent especially when using vrf. Same as well as when sending the redirect.

---
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c |    3 ++-
 net/ipv6/ndisc.c      |    6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -507,7 +507,8 @@ int ip6_forward(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	   send redirects to source routed frames.
 	   We don't send redirects to frames decapsulated from IPsec.
 	 */
-	if (skb->dev == dst->dev && opt->srcrt == 0 && !skb_sec_path(skb)) {
+	if (IP6CB(skb)->iif == dst->dev->ifindex &&
+	    opt->srcrt == 0 && !skb_sec_path(skb)) {
 		struct in6_addr *target = NULL;
 		struct inet_peer *peer;
 		struct rt6_info *rt;

@@ -1576,6 +1576,12 @@ void ndisc_send_redirect(struct sk_buff
 	   ops_data_buf[NDISC_OPS_REDIRECT_DATA_SPACE], *ops_data = NULL;
 	bool ret;
 
+	if (netif_is_l3_master(skb->dev)) {
+		dev = __dev_get_by_index(dev_net(skb->dev), IPCB(skb)->iif);
+		if (!dev)
+			return;
+	}
+
 	if (ipv6_get_lladdr(dev, &saddr_buf, IFA_F_TENTATIVE)) {
 		ND_PRINTK(2, warn, "Redirect: no link-local address on %s\n",
 			  dev->name);

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mathieu Xhonneux <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bbb40a0b75209734ff9286f3326171638c9f6569 ]

seg6_do_srh_encap and seg6_do_srh_inline can possibly do an out-of-bounds access when adding the SRH to the packet. This no longer happen when expanding the skb not only by the size of the SRH (+ outer IPv6 header), but also by skb->mac_len.

[   53.793056] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in seg6_do_srh_encap+0x284/0x620
[   53.794564] Write of size 14 at addr ffff88011975ecfa by task ping/674

[   53.796665] CPU: 0 PID: 674 Comm: ping Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3-ARCH+ #90
[   53.796670] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
[   53.796673] Call Trace:
[   53.796679]  <IRQ>
[   53.796689]  dump_stack+0x71/0xab
[   53.796700]  print_address_description+0x6a/0x270
[   53.796707]  kasan_report+0x258/0x380
[   53.796715]  ? seg6_do_srh_encap+0x284/0x620
[   53.796722]  memmove+0x34/0x50
[   53.796730]  seg6_do_srh_encap+0x284/0x620
[   53.796741]  ? seg6_do_srh+0x29b/0x360
[   53.796747]  seg6_do_srh+0x29b/0x360
[   53.796756]  seg6_input+0x2e/0x2e0
[   53.796765]  lwtunnel_input+0x93/0xd0
[   53.796774]  ipv6_rcv+0x690/0x920
[   53.796783]  ? ip6_input+0x170/0x170
[   53.796791]  ? eth_gro_receive+0x2d0/0x2d0
[   53.796800]  ? ip6_input+0x170/0x170
[   53.796809]  __netif_receive_skb_core+0xcc0/0x13f0
[   53.796820]  ? netdev_info+0x110/0x110
[   53.796827]  ? napi_complete_done+0xb6/0x170
[   53.796834]  ? e1000_clean+0x6da/0xf70
[   53.796845]  ? process_backlog+0x129/0x2a0
[   53.796853]  process_backlog+0x129/0x2a0
[   53.796862]  net_rx_action+0x211/0x5c0
[   53.796870]  ? napi_complete_done+0x170/0x170
[   53.796887]  ? run_rebalance_domains+0x11f/0x150
[   53.796891]  __do_softirq+0x10e/0x39e
[   53.796894]  do_softirq_own_stack+0x2a/0x40
[   53.796895]  </IRQ>
[   53.796898]  do_softirq.part.16+0x54/0x60
[   53.796900]  __local_bh_enable_ip+0x5b/0x60
[   53.796903]  ip6_finish_output2+0x416/0x9f0
[   53.796906]  ? ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x110/0x110
[   53.796909]  ? ip6_sk_dst_lookup_flow+0x390/0x390
[   53.796911]  ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x66/0x80
[   53.796913]  ? ip6_mtu+0x44/0xf0
[   53.796916]  ? ip6_output+0xfc/0x220
[   53.796918]  ip6_output+0xfc/0x220
[   53.796921]  ? ip6_finish_output+0x2b0/0x2b0
[   53.796923]  ? memcpy+0x34/0x50
[   53.796926]  ip6_send_skb+0x43/0xc0
[   53.796929]  rawv6_sendmsg+0x1216/0x1530
[   53.796932]  ? __orc_find+0x6b/0xc0
[   53.796934]  ? rawv6_rcv_skb+0x160/0x160
[   53.796937]  ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x66/0x80
[   53.796939]  ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x66/0x80
[   53.796942]  ? is_bpf_text_address+0x1e/0x30
[   53.796944]  ? kernel_text_address+0xec/0x100
[   53.796946]  ? __kernel_text_address+0xe/0x30
[   53.796948]  ? unwind_get_return_address+0x2f/0x50
[   53.796950]  ? __save_stack_trace+0x92/0x100
[   53.796954]  ? save_stack+0x89/0xb0
[   53.796956]  ? kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
[   53.796958]  ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xd2/0x1f0
[   53.796961]  ? prepare_creds+0x23/0x160
[   53.796963]  ? __x64_sys_capset+0x252/0x3e0
[   53.796966]  ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x160
[   53.796968]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   53.796971]  ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x170/0x380
[   53.796973]  ? __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x12c0/0x12c0
[   53.796977]  ? tty_vhangup+0x20/0x20
[   53.796979]  ? policy_nodemask+0x1a/0x90
[   53.796982]  ? __mod_node_page_state+0x8d/0xa0
[   53.796986]  ? __check_object_size+0xe7/0x240
[   53.796989]  ? __sys_sendto+0x229/0x290
[   53.796991]  ? rawv6_rcv_skb+0x160/0x160
[   53.796993]  __sys_sendto+0x229/0x290
[   53.796996]  ? __ia32_sys_getpeername+0x50/0x50
[   53.796999]  ? commit_creds+0x2de/0x520
[   53.797002]  ? security_capset+0x57/0x70
[   53.797004]  ? __x64_sys_capset+0x29f/0x3e0
[   53.797007]  ? __x64_sys_rt_sigsuspend+0xe0/0xe0
[   53.797011]  ? __do_page_fault+0x664/0x770
[   53.797014]  __x64_sys_sendto+0x74/0x90
[   53.797017]  do_syscall_64+0x69/0x160
[   53.797019]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   53.797022] RIP: 0033:0x7f43b7a6714a
[   53.797023] RSP: 002b:00007ffd891bd368 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
000000000000002c
[   53.797026] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006129c0 RCX: 00007f43b7a6714a
[   53.797028] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 00000000006129c0 RDI: 0000000000000004
[   53.797029] RBP: 00007ffd891be640 R08: 0000000000610940 R09: 000000000000001c
[   53.797030] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000040
[   53.797032] R13: 000000000060e6a0 R14: 0000000000008004 R15: 000000000040b661

[   53.797171] Allocated by task 642:
[   53.797460]  kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
[   53.797463]  kmem_cache_alloc+0xd2/0x1f0
[   53.797465]  getname_flags+0x40/0x210
[   53.797467]  user_path_at_empty+0x1d/0x40
[   53.797469]  do_faccessat+0x12a/0x320
[   53.797471]  do_syscall_64+0x69/0x160
[   53.797473]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

[   53.797607] Freed by task 642:
[   53.797869]  __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180
[   53.797871]  kmem_cache_free+0xa8/0x230
[   53.797872]  filename_lookup+0x15b/0x230
[   53.797874]  do_faccessat+0x12a/0x320
[   53.797876]  do_syscall_64+0x69/0x160
[   53.797878]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

[   53.798014] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88011975e600
                which belongs to the cache names_cache of size 4096
[   53.799043] The buggy address is located 1786 bytes inside of
                4096-byte region [ffff88011975e600, ffff88011975f600)
[   53.800013] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[   53.800414] page:ffffea000465d600 count:1 mapcount:0
mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[   53.801259] flags: 0x17fff0000008100(slab|head)
[   53.801640] raw: 017fff0000008100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
0000000100070007
[   53.803147] raw: dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff88011b185a40
0000000000000000
[   53.803787] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[   53.804384] Memory state around the buggy address:
[   53.804788]  ffff88011975eb80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
fb fb fb fb
[   53.805384]  ffff88011975ec00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
fb fb fb fb
[   53.805979] >ffff88011975ec80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
fb fb fb fb
[   53.806577]                                                                 ^
[   53.807165]  ffff88011975ed00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
fb fb fb fb
[   53.807762]  ffff88011975ed80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
fb fb fb fb
[   53.808356] ==================================================================
[   53.808949] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

---
 net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ int seg6_do_srh_encap(struct sk_buff *sk
 	hdrlen = (osrh->hdrlen + 1) << 3;
 	tot_len = hdrlen + sizeof(*hdr);
 
-	err = skb_cow_head(skb, tot_len);
+	err = skb_cow_head(skb, tot_len + skb->mac_len);
 	if (unlikely(err))
 		return err;
 

@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ int seg6_do_srh_inline(struct sk_buff *s
 
 	hdrlen = (osrh->hdrlen + 1) << 3;
 
-	err = skb_cow_head(skb, hdrlen);
+	err = skb_cow_head(skb, hdrlen + skb->mac_len);
 	if (unlikely(err))
 		return err;
 

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 733a969a7ed14fc5786bcc59c1bdda83c7ddb46e ]

We are currently doing auxiliary control register reads with the shadow register value 0b111 (0x7) which incidentally is also the selector value that should be present in bits [2:0]. Fix this by using the appropriate selector mask which is defined (MII_BCM54XX_AUXCTL_SHDWSEL_MASK).

This does not have a functional impact yet because we always access the MII_BCM54XX_AUXCTL_SHDWSEL_MISC (0x7) register in the current code. This might change at some point though.

---
 drivers/net/phy/bcm-phy-lib.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ int bcm54xx_auxctl_read(struct phy_devic
 	/* The register must be written to both the Shadow Register Select and
 	 * the Shadow Read Register Selector
 	 */
-	phy_write(phydev, MII_BCM54XX_AUX_CTL, regnum |
+	phy_write(phydev, MII_BCM54XX_AUX_CTL, MII_BCM54XX_AUXCTL_SHDWSEL_MASK |
 		  regnum << MII_BCM54XX_AUXCTL_SHDWSEL_READ_SHIFT);
 	return phy_read(phydev, MII_BCM54XX_AUX_CTL);
 }

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexander Duyck <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 664088f8d68178809b848ca450f2797efb34e8e7 ]

This patch reorders the error cases in showing the XPS configuration so that we hold off on memory allocation until after we have verified that we can support XPS on a given ring.

---
 net/core/net-sysfs.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -1214,9 +1214,6 @@ static ssize_t xps_cpus_show(struct netd
 	cpumask_var_t mask;
 	unsigned long index;
 
-	if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&mask, GFP_KERNEL))
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
 	index = get_netdev_queue_index(queue);
 
 	if (dev->num_tc) {

@@ -1226,6 +1223,9 @@ static ssize_t xps_cpus_show(struct netd
 			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&mask, GFP_KERNEL))
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	dev_maps = rcu_dereference(dev->xps_maps);
 	if (dev_maps) {

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jason Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5d458a13dd59d04b4d6658a6d5b94d42732b15ae ]

We should not go for the error path after successfully transmitting a XDP buffer after linearizing. Since the error path may try to pop and drop next packet and increase the drop counters. Fixing this by simply drop the refcnt of original page and go for xmit path.

---
 drivers/net/virtio_net.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *receive_mergeable
 			}
 			*xdp_xmit = true;
 			if (unlikely(xdp_page != page))
-				goto err_xdp;
+				put_page(page);
 			rcu_read_unlock();
 			goto xdp_xmit;
 		case XDP_REDIRECT:

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jason Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3d62b2a0db505bbf9ed0755f254e45d775f9807f ]

We need to drop refcnt to xdp_page if we see a gso packet. Otherwise it will be leaked. Fixing this by moving the check of gso packet above the linearizing logic. While at it, remove useless comment as well.

---
 drivers/net/virtio_net.c |   15 +++++++--------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -707,6 +707,13 @@ static struct sk_buff *receive_mergeable
 		void *data;
 		u32 act;
 
+		/* Transient failure which in theory could occur if
+		 * in-flight packets from before XDP was enabled reach
+		 * the receive path after XDP is loaded.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely(hdr->hdr.gso_type))
+			goto err_xdp;
+
 		/* This happens when rx buffer size is underestimated
 		 * or headroom is not enough because of the buffer
 		 * was refilled before XDP is set. This should only

@@ -727,14 +734,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *receive_mergeable
 			xdp_page = page;
 		}
 
-		/* Transient failure which in theory could occur if
-		 * in-flight packets from before XDP was enabled reach
-		 * the receive path after XDP is loaded. In practice I
-		 * was not able to create this condition.
-		 */
-		if (unlikely(hdr->hdr.gso_type))
-			goto err_xdp;
-
 		/* Allow consuming headroom but reserve enough space to push
 		 * the descriptor on if we get an XDP_TX return code.
 		 */

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jack Morgenstein <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d546b67cda015fb92bfee93d5dc0ceadb91deaee ]

spin_lock/unlock was used instead of spin_un/lock_irq in a procedure used in process space, on a spinlock which can be grabbed in an interrupt.

This caused the stack trace below to be displayed (on kernel 4.17.0-rc1 compiled with Lock Debugging enabled):

[  154.661474] WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected
[  154.668909] 4.17.0-rc1-rdma_rc_mlx+ #3 Tainted: G          I
[  154.675856] -----------------------------------------------------
[  154.682706] modprobe/10159 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire:
[  154.690254] 00000000f3b0e495 (&(&qp_table->lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: mlx4_qp_remove+0x20/0x50 [mlx4_core]
[  154.700927]
and this task is already holding:
[  154.707461] 0000000094373b5d (&(&cq->lock)->rlock/1){....}, at: destroy_qp_common+0x111/0x560 [mlx4_ib]
[  154.718028] which would create a new lock dependency:
[  154.723705]  (&(&cq->lock)->rlock/1){....} -> (&(&qp_table->lock)->rlock){+.+.}
[  154.731922]
but this new dependency connects a SOFTIRQ-irq-safe lock:
[  154.740798]  (&(&cq->lock)->rlock){..-.}
[  154.740800]
... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-safe at:
[  154.752163]   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3e/0x50
[  154.757163]   mlx4_ib_poll_cq+0x36/0x900 [mlx4_ib]
[  154.762554]   ipoib_tx_poll+0x4a/0xf0 [ib_ipoib]
...
to a SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe lock:
[  154.815603]  (&(&qp_table->lock)->rlock){+.+.}
[  154.815604]
... which became SOFTIRQ-irq-unsafe at:
[  154.827718] ...
[  154.827720]   _raw_spin_lock+0x35/0x50
[  154.833912]   mlx4_qp_lookup+0x1e/0x50 [mlx4_core]
[  154.839302]   mlx4_flow_attach+0x3f/0x3d0 [mlx4_core]

Since mlx4_qp_lookup() is called only in process space, we can simply replace the spin_un/lock calls with spin_un/lock_irq calls.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/qp.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -393,11 +393,11 @@ struct mlx4_qp *mlx4_qp_lookup(struct ml
 	struct mlx4_qp_table *qp_table = &mlx4_priv(dev)->qp_table;
 	struct mlx4_qp *qp;
 
-	spin_lock(&qp_table->lock);
+	spin_lock_irq(&qp_table->lock);
 
 	qp = __mlx4_qp_lookup(dev, qpn);
 
-	spin_unlock(&qp_table->lock);
+	spin_unlock_irq(&qp_table->lock);
 	return qp;
 }
 

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eran Ben Elisha <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 902a545904c71d719ed144234d67df75f31db63b ]

When RXFCS feature is enabled, the HW do not strip the FCS data, however it is not present in the checksum calculated by the HW.

Fix that by manually calculating the FCS checksum and adding it to the SKB checksum field.

Add helper function to find the FCS data for all SKB forms (linear, one fragment or more).

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rx.c |   42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+)

@@ -635,6 +635,45 @@ static inline bool is_last_ethertype_ip(
 	return (ethertype == htons(ETH_P_IP) || ethertype == htons(ETH_P_IPV6));
 }
 
+static __be32 mlx5e_get_fcs(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	int last_frag_sz, bytes_in_prev, nr_frags;
+	u8 *fcs_p1, *fcs_p2;
+	skb_frag_t *last_frag;
+	__be32 fcs_bytes;
+
+	if (!skb_is_nonlinear(skb))
+		return *(__be32 *)(skb->data + skb->len - ETH_FCS_LEN);
+
+	nr_frags = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
+	last_frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[nr_frags - 1];
+	last_frag_sz = skb_frag_size(last_frag);
+
+	/* If all FCS data is in last frag */
+	if (last_frag_sz >= ETH_FCS_LEN)
+		return *(__be32 *)(skb_frag_address(last_frag) +
+				   last_frag_sz - ETH_FCS_LEN);
+
+	fcs_p2 = (u8 *)skb_frag_address(last_frag);
+	bytes_in_prev = ETH_FCS_LEN - last_frag_sz;
+
+	/* Find where the other part of the FCS is - Linear or another frag */
+	if (nr_frags == 1) {
+		fcs_p1 = skb_tail_pointer(skb);
+	} else {
+		skb_frag_t *prev_frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[nr_frags - 2];
+
+		fcs_p1 = skb_frag_address(prev_frag) +
+			    skb_frag_size(prev_frag);
+	}
+	fcs_p1 -= bytes_in_prev;
+
+	memcpy(&fcs_bytes, fcs_p1, bytes_in_prev);
+	memcpy(((u8 *)&fcs_bytes) + bytes_in_prev, fcs_p2, last_frag_sz);
+
+	return fcs_bytes;
+}
+
 static inline void mlx5e_handle_csum(struct net_device *netdev,
 				     struct mlx5_cqe64 *cqe,
 				     struct mlx5e_rq *rq,

@@ -663,6 +702,9 @@ static inline void mlx5e_handle_csum(str
 			skb->csum = csum_partial(skb->data + ETH_HLEN,
 						 network_depth - ETH_HLEN,
 						 skb->csum);
+		if (unlikely(netdev->features & NETIF_F_RXFCS))
+			skb->csum = csum_add(skb->csum,
+					     (__force __wsum)mlx5e_get_fcs(skb));
 		rq->stats.csum_complete++;
 		return;
 	}

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Toshiaki Makita <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6547e387d7f52f2ba681a229de3c13e5b9e01ee1 ]

Calling XDP redirection requires bh disabled. Softirq can call another XDP function and redirection functions, then the percpu static variable ri->map can be overwritten to NULL.

This is a generic XDP case called from tun.

[ 3535.736058] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
[ 3535.743974] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 3535.746530] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 3535.750049] Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost tap tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter sunrpc vfat fat ext4 mbcache jbd2 intel_rapl skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm ipmi_ssif irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc ses aesni_intel crypto_simd cryptd enclosure hpwdt hpilo glue_helper ipmi_si pcspkr wmi mei_me ioatdma mei ipmi_devintf shpchp dca ipmi_msghandler lpc_ich acpi_power_meter sch_fq_codel ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm smartpqi i40e crc32c_intel scsi_transport_sas tg3 i2c_core ptp pps_core
[ 3535.813456] CPU: 5 PID: 1630 Comm: vhost-1614 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc4 #2
[ 3535.820127] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL360 Gen10/ProLiant DL360 Gen10, BIOS U32 11/14/2017
[ 3535.828732] RIP: 0010:__xdp_map_lookup_elem+0x5/0x30
[ 3535.833740] RSP: 0018:ffffb4bc47bf7c58 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 3535.839009] RAX: ffff9fdfcfea1c40 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff9fdf27fe3100
[ 3535.846205] RDX: ffff9fdfca769200 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 3535.853402] RBP: ffffb4bc491d9000 R08: 00000000000045ad R09: 0000000000000ec0
[ 3535.860597] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff9fdf26c3ce4e R12: ffff9fdf9e72c000
[ 3535.867794] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: fffffffffffffff2 R15: ffff9fdfc82cdd00
[ 3535.874990] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9fdfcfe80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 3535.883152] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 3535.888948] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000bde724004 CR4: 00000000007626e0
[ 3535.896145] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 3535.903342] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 3535.910538] PKRU: 55555554
[ 3535.913267] Call Trace:
[ 3535.915736]  xdp_do_generic_redirect+0x7a/0x310
[ 3535.920310]  do_xdp_generic.part.117+0x285/0x370
[ 3535.924970]  tun_get_user+0x5b9/0x1260 [tun]
[ 3535.929279]  tun_sendmsg+0x52/0x70 [tun]
[ 3535.933237]  handle_tx+0x2ad/0x5f0 [vhost_net]
[ 3535.937721]  vhost_worker+0xa5/0x100 [vhost]
[ 3535.942030]  kthread+0xf5/0x130
[ 3535.945198]  ? vhost_dev_ioctl+0x3b0/0x3b0 [vhost]
[ 3535.950031]  ? kthread_bind+0x10/0x10
[ 3535.953727]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 3535.957334] Code: 0e 74 15 83 f8 10 75 05 e9 49 aa b3 ff f3 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 c3 e9 29 9d b3 ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 <8b> 47 18 83 f8 0e 74 0d 83 f8 10 75 05 e9 49 a9 b3 ff 31 c0 c3
[ 3535.976387] RIP: __xdp_map_lookup_elem+0x5/0x30 RSP: ffffb4bc47bf7c58
[ 3535.982883] CR2: 0000000000000018
[ 3535.987096] ---[ end trace 383b299dd1430240 ]---
[ 3536.131325] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 3536.137484] Kernel Offset: 0x26a00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
[ 3536.281406] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---

And a kernel with generic case fixed still panics in tun driver XDP redirect, because it disabled only preemption, but not bh.

[ 2055.128746] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000018
[ 2055.136662] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 2055.139219] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 2055.142736] Modules linked in: vhost_net vhost tap tun bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter sunrpc vfat fat ext4 mbcache jbd2 intel_rapl skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc ses aesni_intel ipmi_ssif crypto_simd enclosure cryptd hpwdt glue_helper ioatdma hpilo wmi dca pcspkr ipmi_si acpi_power_meter ipmi_devintf shpchp mei_me ipmi_msghandler mei lpc_ich sch_fq_codel ip_tables xfs libcrc32c sd_mod mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops ttm drm i40e smartpqi tg3 scsi_transport_sas crc32c_intel i2c_core ptp pps_core
[ 2055.206142] CPU: 6 PID: 1693 Comm: vhost-1683 Tainted: G        W         4.17.0-rc5-fix-tun+ #1
[ 2055.215011] Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL360 Gen10/ProLiant DL360 Gen10, BIOS U32 11/14/2017
[ 2055.223617] RIP: 0010:__xdp_map_lookup_elem+0x5/0x30
[ 2055.228624] RSP: 0018:ffff998b07607cc0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 2055.233892] RAX: ffff8dbd8e235700 RBX: ffff8dbd8ff21c40 RCX: 0000000000000004
[ 2055.241089] RDX: ffff998b097a9000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 2055.248286] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000000000065a8 R09: 0000000000005d80
[ 2055.255483] R10: 0000000000000040 R11: ffff8dbcf0100000 R12: ffff998b097a9000
[ 2055.262681] R13: ffff8dbd8c98c000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff998b07607d78
[ 2055.269879] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8dbd8ff00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 2055.278039] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 2055.283834] CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 0000000c0c8cc005 CR4: 00000000007626e0
[ 2055.291030] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 2055.298227] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 2055.305424] PKRU: 55555554
[ 2055.308153] Call Trace:
[ 2055.310624]  xdp_do_redirect+0x7b/0x380
[ 2055.314499]  tun_get_user+0x10fe/0x12a0 [tun]
[ 2055.318895]  tun_sendmsg+0x52/0x70 [tun]
[ 2055.322852]  handle_tx+0x2ad/0x5f0 [vhost_net]
[ 2055.327337]  vhost_worker+0xa5/0x100 [vhost]
[ 2055.331646]  kthread+0xf5/0x130
[ 2055.334813]  ? vhost_dev_ioctl+0x3b0/0x3b0 [vhost]
[ 2055.339646]  ? kthread_bind+0x10/0x10
[ 2055.343343]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 2055.346950] Code: 0e 74 15 83 f8 10 75 05 e9 e9 aa b3 ff f3 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 c3 e9 c9 9d b3 ff 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 <8b> 47 18 83 f8 0e 74 0d 83 f8 10 75 05 e9 e9 a9 b3 ff 31 c0 c3
[ 2055.366004] RIP: __xdp_map_lookup_elem+0x5/0x30 RSP: ffff998b07607cc0
[ 2055.372500] CR2: 0000000000000018
[ 2055.375856] ---[ end trace 2a2dcc5e9e174268 ]---
[ 2055.523626] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 2055.529796] Kernel Offset: 0x2e000000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
[ 2055.677539] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---

v2:
- Removed preempt_disable/enable since local_bh_disable will prevent preemption as well, feedback from Jason Wang.

---
 drivers/net/tun.c |   15 +++++++++------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -1632,7 +1632,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *tun_build_skb(str
 	else
 		*skb_xdp = 0;
 
-	preempt_disable();
+	local_bh_disable();
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	xdp_prog = rcu_dereference(tun->xdp_prog);
 	if (xdp_prog && !*skb_xdp) {

@@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *tun_build_skb(str
 			if (err)
 				goto err_redirect;
 			rcu_read_unlock();
-			preempt_enable();
+			local_bh_enable();
 			return NULL;
 		case XDP_TX:
 			xdp_xmit = true;

@@ -1679,7 +1679,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *tun_build_skb(str
 	skb = build_skb(buf, buflen);
 	if (!skb) {
 		rcu_read_unlock();
-		preempt_enable();
+		local_bh_enable();
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	}
 

@@ -1692,12 +1692,12 @@ static struct sk_buff *tun_build_skb(str
 		skb->dev = tun->dev;
 		generic_xdp_tx(skb, xdp_prog);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
-		preempt_enable();
+		local_bh_enable();
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-	preempt_enable();
+	local_bh_enable();
 
 	return skb;
 

@@ -1705,7 +1705,7 @@ err_redirect:
 	put_page(alloc_frag->page);
 err_xdp:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-	preempt_enable();
+	local_bh_enable();
 	this_cpu_inc(tun->pcpu_stats->rx_dropped);
 	return NULL;
 }

@@ -1901,16 +1901,19 @@ static ssize_t tun_get_user(struct tun_s
 		struct bpf_prog *xdp_prog;
 		int ret;
 
+		local_bh_disable();
 		rcu_read_lock();
 		xdp_prog = rcu_dereference(tun->xdp_prog);
 		if (xdp_prog) {
 			ret = do_xdp_generic(xdp_prog, skb);
 			if (ret != XDP_PASS) {
 				rcu_read_unlock();
+				local_bh_enable();
 				return total_len;
 			}
 		}
 		rcu_read_unlock();
+		local_bh_enable();
 	}
 
 	rcu_read_lock();

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jason Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 850e088d5bbb333342fd4def08d0a4035f2b7126 ]

If we successfully linearize the packet, num_buf will be set to zero which may confuse error handling path which assumes num_buf is at least 1 and this can lead the code tries to pop the descriptor of next buffer. Fixing this by checking num_buf against 1 before decreasing.

---
 drivers/net/virtio_net.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ err_xdp:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 err_skb:
 	put_page(page);
-	while (--num_buf) {
+	while (num_buf-- > 1) {
 		buf = virtqueue_get_buf(rq->vq, &len);
 		if (unlikely(!buf)) {
 			pr_debug("%s: rx error: %d buffers missing\n",

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Or Gerlitz <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f8f4bef322e4600c5856911c7a632c0e3da920d6 ]

When dealing with ingress rule on a netdev, if we did fine through the conventional path, there's no need to continue into the egdev route, and we can stop right there.

Not doing so may cause a 2nd rule to be added by the cls api layer with the ingress being the egdev.

For example, under sriov switchdev scheme, a user rule of VFR A --> VFR B will end up with two HW rules (1) VF A --> VF B and (2) uplink --> VF B

---
 net/sched/cls_api.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1587,7 +1587,7 @@ int tc_setup_cb_call(struct tcf_block *b
 		return ret;
 	ok_count = ret;
 
-	if (!exts)
+	if (!exts || ok_count)
 		return ok_count;
 	ret = tc_exts_setup_cb_egdev_call(exts, type, type_data, err_stop);
 	if (ret < 0)

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jason Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6890418bbb780f0ee9cf124055afa79777f1b4f1 ]

After a linearized packet was redirected by XDP, we should not go for the err path which will try to pop buffers for the next packet and increase the drop counter. Fixing this by just drop the page refcnt for the original page.

---
 drivers/net/virtio_net.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -786,7 +786,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *receive_mergeable
 			}
 			*xdp_xmit = true;
 			if (unlikely(xdp_page != page))
-				goto err_xdp;
+				put_page(page);
 			rcu_read_unlock();
 			goto xdp_xmit;
 		default:

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nicolas Dichtel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 82612de1c98e610d194e34178bde3cca7dedce41 ]

After commit f6cc9c054e77, the following conf is broken (note that the default loopback mtu is 65536, ie IP_MAX_MTU + 1):

$ ip tunnel add gre1 mode gre local 10.125.0.1 remote 10.125.0.2 dev lo
add tunnel "gre0" failed: Invalid argument
$ ip l a type dummy
$ ip l s dummy1 up
$ ip l s dummy1 mtu 65535
$ ip tunnel add gre1 mode gre local 10.125.0.1 remote 10.125.0.2 dev dummy1
add tunnel "gre0" failed: Invalid argument

dev_set_mtu() doesn't allow to set a mtu which is too large. First, let's cap the mtu returned by ip_tunnel_bind_dev(). Second, remove the magic value 0xFFF8 and use IP_MAX_MTU instead.
0xFFF8 seems to be there for ages, I don't know why this value was used.

With a recent kernel, it's also possible to set a mtu > IP_MAX_MTU:

$ ip l s dummy1 mtu 66000
After that patch, it's also possible to bind an ip tunnel on that kind of
interface.

---
 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ static int ip_tunnel_bind_dev(struct net
 
 	if (tdev) {
 		hlen = tdev->hard_header_len + tdev->needed_headroom;
-		mtu = tdev->mtu;
+		mtu = min(tdev->mtu, IP_MAX_MTU);
 	}
 
 	dev->needed_headroom = t_hlen + hlen;

@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ static struct ip_tunnel *ip_tunnel_creat
 	nt = netdev_priv(dev);
 	t_hlen = nt->hlen + sizeof(struct iphdr);
 	dev->min_mtu = ETH_MIN_MTU;
-	dev->max_mtu = 0xFFF8 - dev->hard_header_len - t_hlen;
+	dev->max_mtu = IP_MAX_MTU - dev->hard_header_len - t_hlen;
 	ip_tunnel_add(itn, nt);
 	return nt;
 

@@ -948,7 +948,7 @@ int __ip_tunnel_change_mtu(struct net_de
 {
 	struct ip_tunnel *tunnel = netdev_priv(dev);
 	int t_hlen = tunnel->hlen + sizeof(struct iphdr);
-	int max_mtu = 0xFFF8 - dev->hard_header_len - t_hlen;
+	int max_mtu = IP_MAX_MTU - dev->hard_header_len - t_hlen;
 
 	if (new_mtu < ETH_MIN_MTU)
 		return -EINVAL;

@@ -1119,7 +1119,7 @@ int ip_tunnel_newlink(struct net_device
 
 	mtu = ip_tunnel_bind_dev(dev);
 	if (tb[IFLA_MTU]) {
-		unsigned int max = 0xfff8 - dev->hard_header_len - nt->hlen;
+		unsigned int max = IP_MAX_MTU - dev->hard_header_len - nt->hlen;
 
 		mtu = clamp(dev->mtu, (unsigned int)ETH_MIN_MTU,
 			    (unsigned int)(max - sizeof(struct iphdr)));

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 312564269535892cc082bc80592150cd1f5e8ec3 ]

The netsec network controller IP can drive 64 address bits for DMA, and the DMA mask is set accordingly in the driver. However, the SynQuacer SoC, which is the only silicon incorporating this IP at the moment, integrates this IP in a manner that leaves address bits [63:40] unconnected.

Up until now, this has not resulted in any problems, given that the DDR controller doesn't decode those bits to begin with. However, recent firmware updates for platforms incorporating this SoC allow the IOMMU to be enabled, which does decode address bits [47:40], and allocates top down from the IOVA space, producing DMA addresses that have bits set that have been left unconnected.

Both the DT and ACPI (IORT) descriptions of the platform take this into account, and only describe a DMA address space of 40 bits (using either dma-ranges DT properties, or DMA address limits in IORT named component nodes). However, even though our IOMMU and bus layers may take such limitations into account by setting a narrower DMA mask when creating the platform device, the netsec probe() entrypoint follows the common practice of setting the DMA mask uncondionally, according to the capabilities of the IP block itself rather than to its integration into the chip.

It is currently unclear what the correct fix is here. We could hack around it by only setting the DMA mask if it deviates from its default value of DMA_BIT_MASK(32). However, this makes it impossible for the bus layer to use DMA_BIT_MASK(32) as the bus limit, and so it appears that a more comprehensive approach is required to take DMA limits imposed by the SoC as a whole into account.

In the mean time, let's limit the DMA mask to 40 bits. Given that there is currently only one SoC that incorporates this IP, this is a reasonable approach that can be backported to -stable and buys us some time to come up with a proper fix going forward.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/socionext/netsec.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1674,8 +1674,8 @@ static int netsec_probe(struct platform_
 	if (ret)
 		goto unreg_napi;
 
-	if (dma_set_mask_and_coherent(&pdev->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(64)))
-		dev_warn(&pdev->dev, "Failed to enable 64-bit DMA\n");
+	if (dma_set_mask_and_coherent(&pdev->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(40)))
+		dev_warn(&pdev->dev, "Failed to set DMA mask\n");
 
 	ret = register_netdev(ndev);
 	if (ret) {

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jason Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f5a4941aa6d190e676065e8f4ed35999f52a01c3 ]

After commit e2b3b35eb989 ("vhost_net: batch used ring update in rx"), we tend to batch updating used heads. But it doesn't flush batched heads before trying to do busy polling, this will cause vhost to wait for guest TX which waits for the used RX. Fixing by flush batched heads before busy loop.

1 byte TCP_RR performance recovers from 13107.83 to 50402.65.

---
 drivers/vhost/net.c |   37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

@@ -101,7 +101,9 @@ struct vhost_net_virtqueue {
 	/* vhost zerocopy support fields below: */
 	/* last used idx for outstanding DMA zerocopy buffers */
 	int upend_idx;
-	/* first used idx for DMA done zerocopy buffers */
+	/* For TX, first used idx for DMA done zerocopy buffers
+	 * For RX, number of batched heads
+	 */
 	int done_idx;
 	/* an array of userspace buffers info */
 	struct ubuf_info *ubuf_info;

@@ -620,6 +622,18 @@ static int sk_has_rx_data(struct sock *s
 	return skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
 }
 
+static void vhost_rx_signal_used(struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq)
+{
+	struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = &nvq->vq;
+	struct vhost_dev *dev = vq->dev;
+
+	if (!nvq->done_idx)
+		return;
+
+	vhost_add_used_and_signal_n(dev, vq, vq->heads, nvq->done_idx);
+	nvq->done_idx = 0;
+}
+
 static int vhost_net_rx_peek_head_len(struct vhost_net *net, struct sock *sk)
 {
 	struct vhost_net_virtqueue *rvq = &net->vqs[VHOST_NET_VQ_RX];

@@ -629,6 +643,8 @@ static int vhost_net_rx_peek_head_len(st
 	int len = peek_head_len(rvq, sk);
 
 	if (!len && vq->busyloop_timeout) {
+		/* Flush batched heads first */
+		vhost_rx_signal_used(rvq);
 		/* Both tx vq and rx socket were polled here */
 		mutex_lock_nested(&vq->mutex, 1);
 		vhost_disable_notify(&net->dev, vq);

@@ -756,7 +772,7 @@ static void handle_rx(struct vhost_net *
 	};
 	size_t total_len = 0;
 	int err, mergeable;
-	s16 headcount, nheads = 0;
+	s16 headcount;
 	size_t vhost_hlen, sock_hlen;
 	size_t vhost_len, sock_len;
 	struct socket *sock;

@@ -784,8 +800,8 @@ static void handle_rx(struct vhost_net *
 	while ((sock_len = vhost_net_rx_peek_head_len(net, sock->sk))) {
 		sock_len += sock_hlen;
 		vhost_len = sock_len + vhost_hlen;
-		headcount = get_rx_bufs(vq, vq->heads + nheads, vhost_len,
-					&in, vq_log, &log,
+		headcount = get_rx_bufs(vq, vq->heads + nvq->done_idx,
+					vhost_len, &in, vq_log, &log,
 					likely(mergeable) ? UIO_MAXIOV : 1);
 		/* On error, stop handling until the next kick. */
 		if (unlikely(headcount < 0))

@@ -856,12 +872,9 @@ static void handle_rx(struct vhost_net *
 			vhost_discard_vq_desc(vq, headcount);
 			goto out;
 		}
-		nheads += headcount;
-		if (nheads > VHOST_RX_BATCH) {
-			vhost_add_used_and_signal_n(&net->dev, vq, vq->heads,
-						    nheads);
-			nheads = 0;
-		}
+		nvq->done_idx += headcount;
+		if (nvq->done_idx > VHOST_RX_BATCH)
+			vhost_rx_signal_used(nvq);
 		if (unlikely(vq_log))
 			vhost_log_write(vq, vq_log, log, vhost_len);
 		total_len += vhost_len;

@@ -872,9 +885,7 @@ static void handle_rx(struct vhost_net *
 	}
 	vhost_net_enable_vq(net, vq);
 out:
-	if (nheads)
-		vhost_add_used_and_signal_n(&net->dev, vq, vq->heads,
-					    nheads);
+	vhost_rx_signal_used(nvq);
 	mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
 }
 

4.16-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>

commit c3635da2a336441253c33298b87b3042db100725 upstream.

Before the guest finishes the device initialization, the device can be removed anytime by the host, and after that the host won't respond to the guest's request, so the guest should be prepared to handle this case.

Add a polling mechanism to detect device presence.

---
 drivers/pci/host/pci-hyperv.c |   46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

@@ -556,6 +556,26 @@ static void put_pcichild(struct hv_pci_d
 static void get_hvpcibus(struct hv_pcibus_device *hv_pcibus);
 static void put_hvpcibus(struct hv_pcibus_device *hv_pcibus);
 
+/*
+ * There is no good way to get notified from vmbus_onoffer_rescind(),
+ * so let's use polling here, since this is not a hot path.
+ */
+static int wait_for_response(struct hv_device *hdev,
+			     struct completion *comp)
+{
+	while (true) {
+		if (hdev->channel->rescind) {
+			dev_warn_once(&hdev->device, "The device is gone.\n");
+			return -ENODEV;
+		}
+
+		if (wait_for_completion_timeout(comp, HZ / 10))
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /**
  * devfn_to_wslot() - Convert from Linux PCI slot to Windows
  * @devfn:	The Linux representation of PCI slot

@@ -1568,7 +1588,8 @@ static struct hv_pci_dev *new_pcichild_d
 	if (ret)
 		goto error;
 
-	wait_for_completion(&comp_pkt.host_event);
+	if (wait_for_response(hbus->hdev, &comp_pkt.host_event))
+		goto error;
 
 	hpdev->desc = *desc;
 	refcount_set(&hpdev->refs, 1);

@@ -2061,15 +2082,16 @@ static int hv_pci_protocol_negotiation(s
 				sizeof(struct pci_version_request),
 				(unsigned long)pkt, VM_PKT_DATA_INBAND,
 				VMBUS_DATA_PACKET_FLAG_COMPLETION_REQUESTED);
+		if (!ret)
+			ret = wait_for_response(hdev, &comp_pkt.host_event);
+
 		if (ret) {
 			dev_err(&hdev->device,
-				"PCI Pass-through VSP failed sending version reqquest: %#x",
+				"PCI Pass-through VSP failed to request version: %d",
 				ret);
 			goto exit;
 		}
 
-		wait_for_completion(&comp_pkt.host_event);
-
 		if (comp_pkt.completion_status >= 0) {
 			pci_protocol_version = pci_protocol_versions[i];
 			dev_info(&hdev->device,

@@ -2278,11 +2300,12 @@ static int hv_pci_enter_d0(struct hv_dev
 	ret = vmbus_sendpacket(hdev->channel, d0_entry, sizeof(*d0_entry),
 			       (unsigned long)pkt, VM_PKT_DATA_INBAND,
 			       VMBUS_DATA_PACKET_FLAG_COMPLETION_REQUESTED);
+	if (!ret)
+		ret = wait_for_response(hdev, &comp_pkt.host_event);
+
 	if (ret)
 		goto exit;
 
-	wait_for_completion(&comp_pkt.host_event);
-
 	if (comp_pkt.completion_status < 0) {
 		dev_err(&hdev->device,
 			"PCI Pass-through VSP failed D0 Entry with status %x\n",

@@ -2322,11 +2345,10 @@ static int hv_pci_query_relations(struct
 
 	ret = vmbus_sendpacket(hdev->channel, &message, sizeof(message),
 			       0, VM_PKT_DATA_INBAND, 0);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+	if (!ret)
+		ret = wait_for_response(hdev, &comp);
 
-	wait_for_completion(&comp);
-	return 0;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /**

@@ -2396,11 +2418,11 @@ static int hv_send_resources_allocated(s
 				size_res, (unsigned long)pkt,
 				VM_PKT_DATA_INBAND,
 				VMBUS_DATA_PACKET_FLAG_COMPLETION_REQUESTED);
+		if (!ret)
+			ret = wait_for_response(hdev, &comp_pkt.host_event);
 		if (ret)
 			break;
 
-		wait_for_completion(&comp_pkt.host_event);
-
 		if (comp_pkt.completion_status < 0) {
 			ret = -EPROTO;
 			dev_err(&hdev->device,

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm and x86_64.

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 4.16.15-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.16.y
git commit: 0f447b621dc169007a7c7a87db5a5ca0b8070833
git describe: v4.16.14-49-g0f447b621dc1
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.16-oe/build/v4.16.14-49-g0f447b621dc1

No regressions (compared to build v4.16.14)

Ran 11375 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64

Test Suites
-----------
* boot
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none

Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

Wonderful, thanks for testing two of these and letting me know.

Are you going to also test the 4.17.1-rc1 tree, or have you not set up a 4.17 test tree yet?

thanks,

greg k-h

4.17 test tree setup not yet done.
We will do it on Monday and let you know results.

- Naresh

Build results:

	total: 145 pass: 145 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 144 pass: 144 fail: 0

Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders/.

Guenter

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah