open08: rewrite to newlib
PATCH v2 1/1 open08: rewrite to newlib
EACCES testcase changed:
Test now creates file (0600) in tmpdir, that is owned by privileged user, and unprivileged user tries to open it for writing.
EFAULT testcase changed:
Comments say the intent is to use address outside of process mapped space. So, test is changed to map/unmap rather than map as PROT_NONE.
uclinux ifdefs dropped.
--- testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c | 140 +++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c +58 -82
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@/* * Copyright (c) 2013 Wanlong Gao <[email protected]> +* Copyright (c) 2018 Linux Test Project * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -39,7 +40,7 @@* 4. Attempt to open() a filename which is more than VFS_MAXNAMLEN, and * check for errno to be ENAMETOOLONG. * -* 5. Attempt to open a test executable in WRONLY mode, +* 5. Attempt to open a (0600) file owned by different user in WRONLY mode, * open(2) should fail with EACCES. * * 6. Attempt to pass an invalid pathname with an address pointing outside
@@ -56,113 +57,88 @@#include <fcntl.h> #include <signal.h> #include <pwd.h> -#include "test.h" -#include "safe_macros.h" - -static void setup (void ); -static void cleanup (void ); - -char *TCID ="open08" ; - -static char nobody_uid[] ="nobody" ; -static struct passwd *ltpuser; - -static char *bad_addr; +#include "tst_test.h" static char filename[40 ] ="" ; -static char fname[] ="/bin/cat" ; +static char user2_file[] ="user2_0600" ;static char bad_file[] ="abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyz" ; +struct test_case_t ; +static void setup_badfname_buf (struct test_case_t *t); +static struct test_case_t { +void (*setup)(struct test_case_t *t);char *fname;int flags;int error; -}TC [] = { - {filename,O_CREAT |O_EXCL ,EEXIST }, - {"/tmp" ,O_RDWR ,EISDIR }, - {filename,O_DIRECTORY ,ENOTDIR }, - {bad_file,O_RDWR ,ENAMETOOLONG }, - {fname,O_WRONLY ,EACCES }, -#if !defined(UCLINUX) - {(char *)-1 ,O_CREAT ,EFAULT } -#endif +} tcases[] = { + {NULL , filename,O_CREAT |O_EXCL ,EEXIST }, + {NULL ,"/tmp" ,O_RDWR ,EISDIR }, + {NULL , filename,O_DIRECTORY ,ENOTDIR }, + {NULL , bad_file,O_RDWR ,ENAMETOOLONG }, + {NULL , user2_file,O_WRONLY ,EACCES }, + {setup_badfname_buf,NULL ,O_CREAT ,EFAULT } }; -int TST_TOTAL =sizeof (TC ) /sizeof (TC [0 ]); - -int main (int ac,char **av) +void verify_open (unsigned int i) { -int lc; -int i; - -tst_parse_opts (ac, av,NULL ,NULL ); - -setup (); - -for (lc =0 ;TEST_LOOPING (lc); lc++) { - tst_count =0 ; - -for (i =0 ; i <TST_TOTAL ; i++) { -TEST (open (TC [i].fname,TC [i].flags, -S_IRUSR |S_IWUSR |S_IRGRP |S_IROTH )); - -if (TEST_RETURN !=-1 ) { -tst_resm (TFAIL ,"call succeeded unexpectedly" ); -continue ; - } - -if (TEST_ERRNO ==TC [i].error) { -tst_resm (TPASS ,"expected failure - " -"errno = %d : %s" ,TEST_ERRNO , -strerror (TEST_ERRNO )); - }else { -tst_resm (TFAIL ,"unexpected error - %d : %s - " -"expected %d" ,TEST_ERRNO , -strerror (TEST_ERRNO ),TC [i].error); - } - } +if (tcases[i].setup) + tcases[i].setup (&tcases[i]); + +TEST (open (tcases[i].fname, tcases[i].flags, +S_IRUSR |S_IWUSR |S_IRGRP |S_IROTH )); + +if (TEST_RETURN !=-1 ) { +tst_res (TFAIL ,"call succeeded unexpectedly" ); +return ; } -cleanup (); -tst_exit (); +if (TEST_ERRNO == tcases[i].error) { +tst_res (TPASS ,"expected failure - " +"errno = %d : %s" ,TEST_ERRNO , +strerror (TEST_ERRNO )); + }else { +tst_res (TFAIL ,"unexpected error - %d : %s - " +"expected %d" ,TEST_ERRNO , +strerror (TEST_ERRNO ), tcases[i].error); + } } -static void setup (void ) +static void setup_badfname_buf (struct test_case_t *t) { -int fildes; +char *bad_addr; +int len =getpagesize (); -tst_require_root (); + bad_addr =SAFE_MMAP (0 , len,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE , +MAP_PRIVATE |MAP_ANONYMOUS ,0 ,0 ); + t->fname = bad_addr; +SAFE_MUNMAP (bad_addr, len); +} -tst_sig (NOFORK ,DEF_HANDLER , cleanup); +static void setup (void ) +{ +int fildes; +char nobody_uid[] ="nobody" ; +struct passwd *ltpuser;umask (0 ); -TEST_PAUSE ; +SAFE_CREAT (user2_file,0600 );/* Switch to nobody user for correct error code collection */ ltpuser =getpwnam (nobody_uid); -SAFE_SETGID (NULL , ltpuser->pw_gid); -SAFE_SETUID (NULL , ltpuser->pw_uid); - -tst_tmpdir (); +SAFE_SETGID (ltpuser->pw_gid); +SAFE_SETUID (ltpuser->pw_uid);sprintf (filename,"open3.%d" ,getpid ()); - - fildes =SAFE_CREAT (cleanup, filename,0600 ); - + fildes =SAFE_CREAT (filename,0600 );close (fildes); - -#if !defined(UCLINUX ) - bad_addr =mmap (0 ,1 ,PROT_NONE , -MAP_PRIVATE_EXCEPT_UCLINUX |MAP_ANONYMOUS ,0 ,0 ); -if (bad_addr ==MAP_FAILED ) -tst_brkm (TBROK , cleanup,"mmap failed" ); - -TC [5 ].fname = bad_addr; -#endif } -static void cleanup (void ) -{ -tst_rmdir (); -} +static struct tst_test test = { + .tcnt =ARRAY_SIZE (tcases), + .needs_tmpdir =1 , + .needs_root =1 , + .setup = setup, + .test = verify_open, +};
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
PATCH v2 1/1 open08: rewrite to newlib
Quoted 55 lines · Jan Stancek
EACCES testcase changed:
Test now creates file (0600) in tmpdir, that is owned by privileged user, and unprivileged user tries to open it for writing.EFAULT testcase changed:
Comments say the intent is to use address outside of process mapped space. So, test is changed to map/unmap rather than map asPROT_NONE.uclinux ifdefs dropped.
Signed-off-by Jan Stancek <[email protected]>--- testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c | 140 +++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c +3
-13@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@/* * Copyright (c) 2013 Wanlong Gao <[email protected]> +* Copyright (c) 2018 Linux Test Project * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by @@ -39,7 +40,7 @@* 4. Attempt to open() a filename which is more than VFS_MAXNAMLEN, and * check for errno to be ENAMETOOLONG. * -* 5. Attempt to open a test executable in WRONLY mode, +* 5. Attempt to open a (0600) file owned by different user in WRONLY mode, * open(2) should fail with EACCES. * * 6. Attempt to pass an invalid pathname with an address pointing outside @@ -56,113 +57,88 @@#include <fcntl.h> #include <signal.h> #include <pwd.h> -#include "test.h" -#include "safe_macros.h" - -static void setup (void ); -static void cleanup (void ); - -char *TCID ="open08" ; - -static char nobody_uid[] ="nobody" ; -static struct passwd *ltpuser; - -static char *bad_addr; +#include "tst_test.h"
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c line 70
Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c +5
-1static char filename[40 ] ="" ; -static char fname[] ="/bin/cat" ; +static char user2_file[] ="user2_0600" ;static char bad_file[] ="abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyz" ; +struct test_case_t ; +static void setup_badfname_buf (struct test_case_t *t); + static struct test_case_t { + void (*setup)(struct test_case_t *t);
This function pointer named setup make me a little bit confused at first sight. It makes me thinking about what's the relationship to ltp steup() function for a while, actually it does not have.
To avoid the situation to other person, how about just using
void (*func) (struct test_case_t *t);
here?
And my propose change like:
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c +0 -0
@@ -64,10 +64,10 @@ static char user2_file[] = "user2_0600"; static char bad_file[] =
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghi
struct test_case_t;
-static void setup_badfname_buf(struct test_case_t *t); +static void get_badfname_buf(struct test_case_t *t);
static struct test_case_t {
- void (*setup)(struct test_case_t *t);
+ void (*func)(struct test_case_t *t);
char *fname;
int flags;
int error;@@ -77,13 +77,14 @@ static struct test_case_t {
{NULL, filename, O_DIRECTORY, ENOTDIR},
{NULL, bad_file, O_RDWR, ENAMETOOLONG},
{NULL, user2_file, O_WRONLY, EACCES},
- {setup_badfname_buf, NULL, O_CREAT, EFAULT}
+ {get_badfname_buf, NULL, O_CREAT, EFAULT}
};
+
void verify_open(unsigned int i)
{
- if (tcases[i].setup)
- tcases[i].setup(&tcases[i]);
+ if (tcases[i].func)
+ tcases[i].func(&tcases[i]);
TEST(open(tcases[i].fname, tcases[i].flags,
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH));
@@ -104,7 +105,7 @@ void verify_open(unsigned int i)
}}
-static void setup_badfname_buf(struct test_case_t *t) +static void get_badfname_buf(struct test_case_t *t)
{
char *bad_addr;
int len = getpagesize();And, I have to say this is a nice cleanup work. Others looks good to me.
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Li Wang
PATCH v2 1/1 open08: rewrite to newlib
Quoted 71 lines · Li Wang
Quoted 55 lines · Jan Stancek
EACCES testcase changed:
Test now creates file (0600) in tmpdir, that is owned by privileged user, and unprivileged user tries to open it for writing.EFAULT testcase changed:
Comments say the intent is to use address outside of process mapped space. So, test is changed to map/unmap rather than map asPROT_NONE.uclinux ifdefs dropped.
Signed-off-by Jan Stancek <[email protected]>--- testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c | 140 +++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c +3
-13@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@/* * Copyright (c) 2013 Wanlong Gao <[email protected]> +* Copyright (c) 2018 Linux Test Project * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by @@ -39,7 +40,7 @@* 4. Attempt to open() a filename which is more than VFS_MAXNAMLEN, and * check for errno to be ENAMETOOLONG. * -* 5. Attempt to open a test executable in WRONLY mode, +* 5. Attempt to open a (0600) file owned by different user in WRONLY mode, * open(2) should fail with EACCES. * * 6. Attempt to pass an invalid pathname with an address pointing outside @@ -56,113 +57,88 @@#include <fcntl.h> #include <signal.h> #include <pwd.h> -#include "test.h" -#include "safe_macros.h" - -static void setup (void ); -static void cleanup (void ); - -char *TCID ="open08" ; - -static char nobody_uid[] ="nobody" ; -static struct passwd *ltpuser; - -static char *bad_addr; +#include "tst_test.h" testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c line 70
Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c +5
-1static char filename[40 ] ="" ; -static char fname[] ="/bin/cat" ; +static char user2_file[] ="user2_0600" ;static char bad_file[] ="abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyz" ; +struct test_case_t ; +static void setup_badfname_buf (struct test_case_t *t); + static struct test_case_t { + void (*setup)(struct test_case_t *t);This function pointer named setup make me a little bit confused at first sight. It makes me thinking about what's the relationship to ltp
steup()function for a while, actually it does not have.
Quoted 3 lines
To avoid the situation to other person, how about just using
void (*func) (structtest_case_t*t);
here?
Or, maybe we could drop the func pointer in the test structure, and reset the badfname only in verify_open(). It's hard to say which method is better, but seems this can make things more easier I guess.
Which something differ with your patch too:
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c +0 -0
@@ -63,27 +63,30 @@ static char filename[40] = "";static char user2_file[] ="user2_0600" ; static char bad_file[] =
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyz";
-struct test_case_t;
-static void setup_badfname_buf(struct test_case_t *t); -
static struct test_case_t {
- void (*setup)(struct test_case_t *t);
char *fname;
int flags;
int error;
} tcases[] = {
- {NULL, filename, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, EEXIST},
- {NULL, "/tmp", O_RDWR, EISDIR},
- {NULL, filename, O_DIRECTORY, ENOTDIR},
- {NULL, bad_file, O_RDWR, ENAMETOOLONG},
- {NULL, user2_file, O_WRONLY, EACCES},
- {setup_badfname_buf, NULL, O_CREAT, EFAULT}
+ {filename, O_CREAT | O_EXCL, EEXIST},
+ {"/tmp", O_RDWR, EISDIR},
+ {filename, O_DIRECTORY, ENOTDIR},
+ {bad_file, O_RDWR, ENAMETOOLONG},
+ {user2_file, O_WRONLY, EACCES},
+ {NULL, O_CREAT, EFAULT}};
void verify_open(unsigned int i)
{
- if (tcases[i].setup)
- tcases[i].setup(&tcases[i]);
+ if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tcases) - 1) {
+ char *bad_addr;
+ int len = getpagesize();
+
+ bad_addr = SAFE_MMAP(0, len, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0);
+ tcases[i].fname = bad_addr;
+ SAFE_MUNMAP(bad_addr, len);
+ }
TEST(open(tcases[i].fname, tcases[i].flags,
S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH));
@@ -104,17 +107,6 @@ void verify_open(unsigned int i)
}}
-static void setup_badfname_buf(struct test_case_t *t) -{
- char *bad_addr;
- int len = getpagesize();
-
- bad_addr = SAFE_MMAP(0, len, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
- MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0);
- t->fname = bad_addr;
- SAFE_MUNMAP(bad_addr, len);
-}
-
static void setup(void)
{
int fildes;Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Li Wang
PATCH v2 1/1 open08: rewrite to newlib
----- Original Message -----
Quoted 115 lines · Li Wang
Quoted 79 lines · Jan Stancek
Quoted 62 lines
EACCES testcase changed:
Test now creates file (0600) in tmpdir, that is owned by privileged user, and unprivileged user tries to open it for writing.EFAULT testcase changed:
Comments say the intent is to use address outside of process mapped space. So, test is changed to map/unmap rather than map asPROT_NONE.uclinux ifdefs dropped.
Signed-off-by Jan Stancek <[email protected]>--- testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c | 140 +++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 58 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c +1
-0@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@/* * Copyright (c) 2013 Wanlong Gao <[email protected]> +* Copyright (c) 2018 Linux Test Project * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c +1
-1@@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ * 4. Attempt to open() a filename which is more than VFS_MAXNAMLEN, and * check for errno to be ENAMETOOLONG. * - * 5. Attempt to open a test executable in WRONLY mode, + * 5. Attempt to open a (0600) file owned by different user in WRONLY mode, * open(2) should fail with EACCES.*
* 6. Attempt to pass an invalid pathname with an address pointing
outsidetestcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c +1
-12@@ -56,113 +57,88 @@#include <fcntl.h> #include <signal.h> #include <pwd.h> -#include "test.h" -#include "safe_macros.h" - -static void setup (void ); -static void cleanup (void ); - -char *TCID ="open08" ; - -static char nobody_uid[] ="nobody" ; -static struct passwd *ltpuser; - -static char *bad_addr; +#include "tst_test.h" static char filename[40 ] ="" ;testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c line 71
Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c +5
-1-static char fname[] ="/bin/cat" ; +static char user2_file[] ="user2_0600" ;static char bad_file[] ="abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyz" ; +struct test_case_t ; +static void setup_badfname_buf (struct test_case_t *t); + static struct test_case_t { + void (*setup)(struct test_case_t *t);This function pointer named setup make me a little bit confused at first sight.
It makes me thinking about what's the relationship to ltpsteup()function for a while, actually it does not have.Quoted 3 lines
To avoid the situation to other person, how about just using
void (*func) (structtest_case_t*t);
here?Or, maybe we could drop the func pointer in the test structure, and reset the badfname only in
verify_open(). It's hard to say which method is better, but seems this can make things more easier I guess.Which something differ with your patch too:
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c +3
-10@@ -63,27 +63,30 @@ static char filename[40] = "";static char user2_file[] ="user2_0600" ;static char bad_file[] ="abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstmnopqrstuvwxyz" ; -struct test_case_t ; -static void setup_badfname_buf (struct test_case_t *t); -static struct test_case_t { -void (*setup)(struct test_case_t *t);char *fname;int flags;int error; } tcases[] = { - {NULL , filename,O_CREAT |O_EXCL ,EEXIST }, - {NULL ,"/tmp" ,O_RDWR ,EISDIR }, - {NULL , filename,O_DIRECTORY ,ENOTDIR }, - {NULL , bad_file,O_RDWR ,ENAMETOOLONG }, - {NULL , user2_file,O_WRONLY ,EACCES }, - {setup_badfname_buf,NULL ,O_CREAT ,EFAULT } + {filename,O_CREAT |O_EXCL ,EEXIST }, + {"/tmp" ,O_RDWR ,EISDIR }, + {filename,O_DIRECTORY ,ENOTDIR },
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c static char filename[40] = ""; · line 82
Quoted 10 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c +4
-2+ {bad_file, O_RDWR, ENAMETOOLONG}, + {user2_file, O_WRONLY, EACCES}, + {NULL, O_CREAT, EFAULT} };void verify_open (unsigned int i) { -if (tcases[i].setup) - tcases[i].setup (&tcases[i]); +if (i ==ARRAY_SIZE (tcases) -1 ) {
It's same as hardcoding index to array - if someone adds new testcase it breaks.
But we could set it to some special value (NULL) and check all cases against that. If it's NULL, then make a bad_addr.
Quoted 36 lines
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c +8
-0+char *bad_addr; +int len =getpagesize (); + + bad_addr =SAFE_MMAP (0 , len,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE , +MAP_PRIVATE |MAP_ANONYMOUS ,0 ,0 ); + tcases[i].fname = bad_addr; +SAFE_MUNMAP (bad_addr, len); + } TEST(open(tcases[i].fname, tcases[i].flags,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH));testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open08.c +0
-12@@ -104,17 +107,6 @@ void verify_open(unsigned int i) } } -static void setup_badfname_buf (struct test_case_t *t) -{ -char *bad_addr; -int len =getpagesize (); - - bad_addr =SAFE_MMAP (0 , len,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE , -MAP_PRIVATE |MAP_ANONYMOUS ,0 ,0 ); - t->fname = bad_addr; -SAFE_MUNMAP (bad_addr, len); -} -static void setup (void ) {int fildes; --Regards,
Li Wang
PATCH v2 1/1 open08: rewrite to newlib
Quoted 9 lines · Jan Stancek
Review
Quoted 6 lines
void
verify_open(unsigned int i)
{(quoted diff) +1
-2- if (tcases[i].setup) - tcases[i].setup(&tcases[i]); + if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(tcases) - 1) {It's same as hardcoding index to array - if someone adds new testcase it breaks.
Yes, to avoid that, new testcase should not be as the last one.
Quoted 3 lines
But we could set it to some special value (NULL) and check all cases against that. If it's NULL, then make a
bad_addr.
Agreed.
Signature · 2 lines
Regards, Li Wang
PATCH v2 1/1 open08: rewrite to newlib
Hi!
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
But we could set it to some special value (NULL) and check all cases against that. If it's NULL, then make a
bad_addr.Agreed.
Either we do that or make the addr pointer to a pointer in the test structure and make it to point to a global variable initialized in the test setup as we do in some tests as well.
Signature · 2 lines
Cyril Hrubis [email protected]