open_by_handle() vs. EA inodes
Al Viro
maintainer On ea_inode-enabled ext4 open_by_handle() (as well as knfsd, etc.)
can get to EA inodes as long as it knows their inumbers - just pass it an fhandle with zeroed version bytes and the right inumber in it.
AFAICS, it's Not Nice(tm), especially since you can write to those,
whether they are shared or not.
Should we make ext4_nfs_get_inode() check for EXT4_EA_INODE_FL
and fail if it's set?
Quoted 6 lines · Al Viro
On ea_inode-enabled ext4
open_by_handle()(as well as knfsd,
etc.)
can get to EA inodes as long as it knows their inumbers - just pass it
an fhandle with zeroed version bytes and the right inumber in it.
Quoted 6 lines
AFAICS, it's Not Nice(tm), especially since you can write to
those,
whether they are shared or not.Should we make
ext4_nfs_get_inode()check forEXT4_EA_INODE_FL
and fail if it's set?
handle_to_path() requires CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH capabilities. Isn't that sufficiently restrictive for open_by_handle()?
Concerning knfsd, people can in theory enable subtree checking to enforce checking whether or not you are in an exported subtree. In practice that breaks rename, so people are strongly encouraged to disable subtree checking, and only to export complete filesystems.
Signature · 3 lines
Trond Myklebust Linux NFS client maintainer, Hammerspace [email protected]
Al Viro
maintainerQuoted 14 lines · Trond Myklebust
Quoted 6 lines · Al Viro
On ea_inode-enabled ext4
open_by_handle()(as well as knfsd,
etc.)
can get to EA inodes as long as it knows their inumbers - just pass it
an fhandle with zeroed version bytes and the right inumber in it.Quoted 6 lines
AFAICS, it's Not Nice(tm), especially since you can write to
those,
whether they are shared or not.Should we make
ext4_nfs_get_inode()check forEXT4_EA_INODE_FL
and fail if it's set?
Quoted 7 lines
handle_to_path()requiresCAP_DAC_READ_SEARCHcapabilities. Isn't that sufficiently restrictive foropen_by_handle()?Concerning knfsd, people can in theory enable subtree checking to enforce checking whether or not you are in an exported subtree. In practice that breaks rename, so people are strongly encouraged to disable subtree checking, and only to export complete filesystems.
Umm... Do we ever want those accessed via fhandles, capabilities or no capabilities? IOW, is there any reason for ext4 ->fh_to_dentry() to give access to such inodes? Those are implementation internals, same as e.g. journal inode...
Al Viro
maintainerQuoted 23 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 14 lines · Trond Myklebust
Quoted 6 lines · Al Viro
On ea_inode-enabled ext4
open_by_handle()(as well as knfsd,
etc.)
can get to EA inodes as long as it knows their inumbers - just pass it
an fhandle with zeroed version bytes and the right inumber in it.Quoted 6 lines
AFAICS, it's Not Nice(tm), especially since you can write to
those,
whether they are shared or not.Should we make
ext4_nfs_get_inode()check forEXT4_EA_INODE_FL
and fail if it's set?Quoted 7 lines
handle_to_path()requiresCAP_DAC_READ_SEARCHcapabilities. Isn't that sufficiently restrictive foropen_by_handle()?Concerning knfsd, people can in theory enable subtree checking to enforce checking whether or not you are in an exported subtree. In practice that breaks rename, so people are strongly encouraged to disable subtree checking, and only to export complete filesystems.
Quoted 4 lines
Umm... Do we ever want those accessed via fhandles, capabilities or no capabilities? IOW, is there any reason for ext4 ->fh_to_dentry() to give access to such inodes? Those are implementation internals, same as e.g. journal inode...
Note, BTW, that journal inode will be rejected by
if (ino < EXT4_FIRST_INO(sb) && ino != EXT4_ROOT_INO)
return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);in ext4_iget_normal(); EA inodes won't be, since their numbers are in the normal range. And looking at the commit that has introduced ext4_iget_normal(), I'd say that EA inodes fit the description in
commit f4bb2981024fc91b23b4d09a8817c415396dbabb
Author: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> Date: Sun Oct 5 22:56:00 2014 -0400
ext4: add ext4_iget_normal() which is to be used for dir tree lookups
If there is a corrupted file system which has directory entries that point at reserved, metadata inodes, prohibit them from being used by treating them the same way we treat Boot Loader inodes --- that is, mark them to be bad inodes. This prohibits them from being opened, deleted, or modified via chmod, chown, utimes, etc.
In particular, this prevents a corrupted file system which has a directory entry which points at the journal inode from being deleted and its blocks released, after which point Much Hilarity Ensues.
anyway. IOW, it might be better to have that check done not in ext4_nfs_get_inode() but in ext4_iget_normal(), as in
struct inode *ext4_iget_normal(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino)
{
struct inode *res;
if (ino < EXT4_FIRST_INO(sb) && ino != EXT4_ROOT_INO)
return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
res = ext4_iget(sb, ino);
if (IS_ERR(res) || likely(!(EXT4_I(res)->i_flags & EXT4_EA_INODE_FL)))
return res;
iput(res);
return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
}Objections?
Quoted 66 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 23 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 14 lines · Trond Myklebust
Quoted 6 lines · Al Viro
On ea_inode-enabled ext4
open_by_handle()(as well as knfsd,
etc.)
can get to EA inodes as long as it knows their inumbers - just pass it
an fhandle with zeroed version bytes and the right inumber in it.Quoted 6 lines
AFAICS, it's Not Nice(tm), especially since you can write to
those,
whether they are shared or not.Should we make
ext4_nfs_get_inode()check forEXT4_EA_INODE_FL
and fail if it's set?Quoted 7 lines
handle_to_path()requiresCAP_DAC_READ_SEARCHcapabilities. Isn't that sufficiently restrictive foropen_by_handle()?Concerning knfsd, people can in theory enable subtree checking to enforce checking whether or not you are in an exported subtree. In practice that breaks rename, so people are strongly encouraged to disable subtree checking, and only to export complete filesystems.
Quoted 4 lines
Umm... Do we ever want those accessed via fhandles, capabilities or no capabilities? IOW, is there any reason for ext4 ->fh_to_dentry() to give access to such inodes? Those are implementation internals, same as e.g. journal inode...
Note, BTW, that journal inode will be rejected by
if (ino < EXT4_FIRST_INO(sb) && ino != EXT4_ROOT_INO) return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);in
ext4_iget_normal(); EA inodes won't be, since their numbers are in the normal range. And looking at the commit that has introducedext4_iget_normal(), I'd say that EA inodes fit the description in
commitf4bb2981024fc91b23b4d09a8817c415396dbabbAuthor: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]> Date: Sun Oct 5 22:56:00 2014 -0400ext4: add
ext4_iget_normal()which is to be used for dir tree lookupsIf there is a corrupted file system which has directory entries that point at reserved, metadata inodes, prohibit them from being used by treating them the same way we treat Boot Loader inodes --- that is, mark them to be bad inodes. This prohibits them from being opened, deleted, or modified via chmod, chown, utimes, etc.
In particular, this prevents a corrupted file system which has a directory entry which points at the journal inode from being deleted and its blocks released, after which point Much Hilarity Ensues.
anyway. IOW, it might be better to have that check done not in
ext4_nfs_get_inode()but inext4_iget_normal(), as in
struct inode *ext4_iget_normal(structsuper_block*sb, unsigned long ino){ struct inode *res; if (ino < EXT4_FIRST_INO(sb) && ino != EXT4_ROOT_INO) return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED); res = ext4_iget(sb, ino); if (IS_ERR(res) || likely(!(EXT4_I(res)->i_flags & EXT4_EA_INODE_FL))) return res; iput(res); return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED); }
Quoted 1 line
Objections?
None here. :)
Based on my reading of how ea inodes work, these special inodes should never be directly reachable by userspace, ever. Only the ext4 xattr code should touch them.
--D