x86/spectre: Expand test for vulnerability to empty RSB exploits
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 x86/spectre: Expand test for vulnerability to empty RSB exploits
Skylake-era Intel CPUs are vulnerable to exploits of empty RSB conditions. On hardware, platform vulnerability can be determined simply by checking the processor's DisplayModel/DisplayFamily signature. However, when running in a VM, the operating system should also query IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.RSBA[bit 2], a synthetic bit that can be set by a hypervisor to indicate that the VM might run on a vulnerable physical processor, regardless of the DisplayModel/DisplayFamily reported by CPUID.
Note that IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.RSBA[bit 2] is always clear on hardware, so the DisplayModel/DisplayFamily check is still required.
For all of the details, see the Intel white paper, "Retpoline: A Branch Target Injection Mitigation" (document number 337131-001), section 5.3: Virtual Machine CPU Identification.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +1 -0
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@#define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO (1 << 0)/* Not susceptible to Meltdown */ #define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL (1 << 1)/* Enhanced IBRS support */ +#define ARCH_CAP_RSBA (1 << 2)/* Vulnerable to empty RSB */ #define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO (1 << 4)/* * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass * attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +13 -1
@@ -330,6 +330,18 @@ static bool __init is_skylake_era(void)return false; } +/* Check for vulnerability to exploits of empty RSB conditions */ +static bool __init is_vulnerable_to_empty_rsb (void ) +{ +u64 ia32_cap =0 ; + +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES )) +rdmsrl (MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES , ia32_cap); + +return (ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_RSBA ) ||is_skylake_era (); +} + +static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation (void ) {enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd =spectre_v2_parse_cmdline ();
@@ -402,7 +414,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)* switch is required. */ if ((!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_PTI ) && - !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SMEP )) ||is_skylake_era ()) { + !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SMEP )) ||is_vulnerable_to_empty_rsb ()) {setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW );pr_info ("Spectre v2 mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n" ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.18.0.597.ga71716f1ad-goog
Quoted 12 lines · Jim Mattson
Skylake-era Intel CPUs are vulnerable to exploits of empty RSB conditions. On hardware, platform vulnerability can be determined simply by checking the processor's DisplayModel/DisplayFamily signature. However, when running in a VM, the operating system should also query IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.RSBA[bit 2], a synthetic bit that can be set by a hypervisor to indicate that the VM might run on a vulnerable physical processor, regardless of the DisplayModel/DisplayFamily reported by CPUID.
Note that IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.RSBA[bit 2] is always clear on hardware, so the DisplayModel/DisplayFamily check is still required.
Quoted 6 lines
For all of the details, see the Intel white paper, "Retpoline: A Branch Target Injection Mitigation" (document number 337131-001), section 5.3: Virtual Machine CPU Identification.
Signed-off-by Jim Mattson <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Peter Shier <[email protected]>
Thank you as it saves me from doing this :-)
Quoted 52 lines
--- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +1
-0@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@#define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO (1 << 0)/* Not susceptible to Meltdown */ #define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL (1 << 1)/* Enhanced IBRS support */ +#define ARCH_CAP_RSBA (1 << 2)/* Vulnerable to empty RSB */ #define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO (1 << 4)/* * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass * attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +13
-1@@ -330,6 +330,18 @@ static bool __init is_skylake_era(void)return false; } +/* Check for vulnerability to exploits of empty RSB conditions */ +static bool __init is_vulnerable_to_empty_rsb (void ) +{ +u64 ia32_cap =0 ; + +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES )) +rdmsrl (MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES , ia32_cap); + +return (ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_RSBA ) ||is_skylake_era (); +} + +static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation (void ) {enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd =spectre_v2_parse_cmdline ();@@ -402,7 +414,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)* switch is required. */ if ((!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_PTI ) && - !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SMEP )) ||is_skylake_era ()) { + !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_SMEP )) ||is_vulnerable_to_empty_rsb ()) {setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW );pr_info ("Spectre v2 mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n" ); }Signature · 1 line
2.18.0.597.ga71716f1ad-goog
Quoted 12 lines · Jim Mattson
Skylake-era Intel CPUs are vulnerable to exploits of empty RSB conditions. On hardware, platform vulnerability can be determined simply by checking the processor's DisplayModel/DisplayFamily signature. However, when running in a VM, the operating system should also query IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.RSBA[bit 2], a synthetic bit that can be set by a hypervisor to indicate that the VM might run on a vulnerable physical processor, regardless of the DisplayModel/DisplayFamily reported by CPUID.
Note that IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.RSBA[bit 2] is always clear on hardware, so the DisplayModel/DisplayFamily check is still required.
Quoted 6 lines
For all of the details, see the Intel white paper, "Retpoline: A Branch Target Injection Mitigation" (document number 337131-001), section 5.3: Virtual Machine CPU Identification.
Signed-off-by Jim Mattson <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Peter Shier <[email protected]>
That has been superseeded by:
fdf82a7856b3 ("x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB")
right? At least it does not apply anymore...
Thanks,
tglx
Quoted 19 lines · Thomas Gleixner
Quoted 16 lines · Jim Mattson
Skylake-era Intel CPUs are vulnerable to exploits of empty RSB conditions. On hardware, platform vulnerability can be determined simply by checking the processor's DisplayModel/DisplayFamily signature. However, when running in a VM, the operating system should also query IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.RSBA[bit 2], a synthetic bit that can be set by a hypervisor to indicate that the VM might run on a vulnerable physical processor, regardless of the DisplayModel/DisplayFamily reported by CPUID.
Note that IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.RSBA[bit 2] is always clear on hardware, so the DisplayModel/DisplayFamily check is still required.
For all of the details, see the Intel white paper, "Retpoline: A Branch Target Injection Mitigation" (document number 337131-001), section 5.3: Virtual Machine CPU Identification.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Jim Mattson <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Peter Shier <[email protected]>That has been superseeded by:
fdf82a7856b3("x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB")right? At least it does not apply anymore...
Right. It doesn't appear that Skylake CPUs get any special treatment any more.
Quoted 23 lines · Jim Mattson
Quoted 22 lines · Thomas Gleixner
Quoted 18 lines · Jim Mattson
Skylake-era Intel CPUs are vulnerable to exploits of empty RSB conditions. On hardware, platform vulnerability can be determined simply by checking the processor's DisplayModel/DisplayFamily signature. However, when running in a VM, the operating system should also query IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.RSBA[bit 2], a synthetic bit that can be set by a hypervisor to indicate that the VM might run on a vulnerable physical processor, regardless of the DisplayModel/DisplayFamily reported by CPUID.
Note that IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.RSBA[bit 2] is always clear on hardware, so the DisplayModel/DisplayFamily check is still required.
For all of the details, see the Intel white paper, "Retpoline: A Branch Target Injection Mitigation" (document number 337131-001), section 5.3: Virtual Machine CPU Identification.
Signed-off-by Jim Mattson <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Peter Shier <[email protected]>
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
That has been superseeded by:
fdf82a7856b3("x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB")right? At least it does not apply anymore...
Right. It doesn't appear that Skylake CPUs get any special treatment any more.
Yeah, it's universally f*cked up by now.
Thanks,
tglx