tpm: fix response size validation in tpm_get_random()
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 tpm: fix response size validation in tpm_get_random()
When checking whether the response is large enough to be able to contain the received random bytes in tpm_get_random() and tpm2_get_random(), they fail to take account the header size, which should be added to the minimum size. This commit fixes this issue.
--- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 3 ++- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c +2 -1
@@ -1321,7 +1321,8 @@ int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *out, size_t max) } rlength =be32_to_cpu (tpm_cmd.header.out.length); -if (rlength < offsetof(struct tpm_getrandom_out , rng_data) + +if (rlength <TPM_HEADER_SIZE + + offsetof(struct tpm_getrandom_out , rng_data) + recd) { total = -EFAULT ;break ;
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +3 -1
@@ -329,7 +329,9 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE ]; recd =min_t (u32,be16_to_cpu (out->size), num_bytes);if (tpm_buf_length (&buf) < - offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out , buffer) + recd) { +TPM_HEADER_SIZE + + offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out , buffer) + + recd) { err = -EFAULT ; goto out; }
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Quoted 8 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
When checking whether the response is large enough to be able to contain the received random bytes in
tpm_get_random()andtpm2_get_random(), they fail to take account the header size, which should be added to the minimum size. This commit fixes this issue.Cc stable at vger.kernel.orgFixes c659af78eb7b ("tpm: Check size of response before accessing data")Signed-off-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Stefan, you did the original commit. Does this look right to you?
/Jarkko
Quoted 32 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
When checking whether the response is large enough to be able to contain the received random bytes in
tpm_get_random()andtpm2_get_random(), they fail to take account the header size, which should be added to the minimum size. This commit fixes this issue.Cc stable at vger.kernel.orgFixes c659af78eb7b ("tpm: Check size of response before accessing data")Signed-off-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>--- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 3 ++- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c +2
-1@@ -1321,7 +1321,8 @@ int tpm_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *out, size_t max) } rlength =be32_to_cpu (tpm_cmd.header.out.length); -if (rlength < offsetof(struct tpm_getrandom_out , rng_data) + +if (rlength <TPM_HEADER_SIZE + + offsetof(struct tpm_getrandom_out , rng_data) + recd) { total = -EFAULT ;break ;drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +0
-0
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) · line 337
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +3
-1@@ -329,7 +329,9 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE ]; recd =min_t (u32,be16_to_cpu (out->size), num_bytes);if (tpm_buf_length (&buf) < - offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out , buffer) + recd) { +TPM_HEADER_SIZE + + offsetof(struct tpm2_get_random_out , buffer) + + recd) { err = -EFAULT ; goto out; }