ucma: fix a use-after-free in ucma_resolve_ip()
PATCH 1/1 ucma: fix a use-after-free in ucma_resolve_ip()
There is a race condition between ucma_close() and ucma_resolve_ip():
CPU0 CPU1ucma_resolve_ip(): ucma_close():
ctx = ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id);
list_for_each_entry_safe(ctx, tmp, &file->ctx_list, list) {
mutex_lock(&mut);
idr_remove(&ctx_idr, ctx->id);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
...
mutex_lock(&mut);
if (!ctx->closing) {
mutex_unlock(&mut);
rdma_destroy_id(ctx->cm_id);
...
ucma_free_ctx(ctx);ret = rdma_resolve_addr();ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
Before idr_remove(), ucma_get_ctx() could still find the ctx and after rdma_destroy_id(), rdma_resolve_addr() may still access id_priv pointer. Also, ucma_put_ctx() may use ctx after ucma_free_ctx() too.
ucma_close() should call ucma_put_ctx() too which tests the refcnt and waits for the last one releasing it. The similar pattern is already used by ucma_destroy_id().
--- drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +2 -0
@@ -1759,6 +1759,8 @@ static int ucma_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)mutex_lock (&mut);if (!ctx->closing) {mutex_unlock (&mut); +ucma_put_ctx (ctx); +wait_for_completion (&ctx->comp);/* rdma_destroy_id ensures that no event handlers are * inflight for that id before releasing it. */
Signature · 1 line
2.14.4
Quoted 37 lines · Cong Wang
There is a race condition between
ucma_close()anducma_resolve_ip():CPU0 CPU1
ucma_resolve_ip():ucma_close():ctx =
ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id);list_for_each_entry_safe(ctx, tmp, &file->ctx_list, list) { mutex_lock(&mut); idr_remove(&ctx_idr, ctx->id); mutex_unlock(&mut); ... mutex_lock(&mut); if (!ctx->closing) { mutex_unlock(&mut); rdma_destroy_id(ctx->cm_id); ... ucma_free_ctx(ctx);ret =
rdma_resolve_addr();ucma_put_ctx(ctx);Before
idr_remove(),ucma_get_ctx()could still find the ctx and afterrdma_destroy_id(),rdma_resolve_addr()may still accessid_privpointer. Also,ucma_put_ctx()may use ctx afterucma_free_ctx()too.
ucma_close()should callucma_put_ctx()too which tests the refcnt and waits for the last one releasing it. The similar pattern is already used byucma_destroy_id().Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]Reported-by [email protected]Cc Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>Cc Doug Ledford <[email protected]>Cc Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Quoted 4 lines
--- drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
Thanks,
Doug Ledford
AppliedQuoted 31 lines · Cong Wang
There is a race condition between
ucma_close()anducma_resolve_ip():CPU0 CPU1
ucma_resolve_ip():ucma_close():ctx =
ucma_get_ctx(file, cmd.id);list_for_each_entry_safe(ctx, tmp, &file->ctx_list, list) { mutex_lock(&mut); idr_remove(&ctx_idr, ctx->id); mutex_unlock(&mut); ... mutex_lock(&mut); if (!ctx->closing) { mutex_unlock(&mut); rdma_destroy_id(ctx->cm_id); ... ucma_free_ctx(ctx);ret =
rdma_resolve_addr();ucma_put_ctx(ctx);Before
idr_remove(),ucma_get_ctx()could still find the ctx and afterrdma_destroy_id(),rdma_resolve_addr()may still accessid_privpointer. Also,ucma_put_ctx()may use ctx afterucma_free_ctx()too.
ucma_close()should callucma_put_ctx()too which tests the refcnt and waits for the last one releasing it. The similar pattern is already used byucma_destroy_id().
Quoted 6 lines
Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]Reported-by [email protected]Cc Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>Cc Doug Ledford <[email protected]>Cc Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Thanks, applied to for-rc.
Signature · 3 lines
Doug Ledford <[email protected]> GPG KeyID: B826A3330E572FDD Key fingerprint = AE6B 1BDA 122B 23B4 265B 1274 B826 A333 0E57 2FDD