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crypto: lrw - Fixes and improvements

PATCH In review Ondrej Mosnacek 3 participants 8 messages Sep 13, 2018 – Sep 30, 2018

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#0 lore raw

v4 cover crypto: lrw - Fixes and improvements

This patchset contains a corner-case fix and several improvements for the LRW template.

The first patch fixes an out-of-bounds array access (and subsequently incorrect cipher output) when the LRW counter goes from all ones to all zeros. This patch should be applied to the crypto-2.6 tree and also go to stable.

The second patch adds a test vector for lrw(aes) that covers the above bug.

The third patch is a small optimization of the LRW tweak computation.

The fourth patch is a follow-up to a similar patch for XTS (it simplifies away the use of dynamically allocated auxiliary buffer to cache the computed tweak values):
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10588775/

Patches 2-4 should be applied only to cryptodev-2.6, but they all depend on the first patch.

Changes in v4:
- applied various corrections/suggestions from Eric Biggers
- added a fix for buggy behavior on counter wrap-around (+ test vector)

v3: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg34946.html
Changes in v3:
- fix a copy-paste error

v2: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg34890.html
Changes in v2:
- small cleanup suggested by Eric Biggers

v1: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg34871.html

Ondrej Mosnacek (4):
crypto: lrw - Fix out-of bounds access on counter overflow
crypto: testmgr - Add test for LRW counter wrap-around
crypto: lrw - Optimize tweak computation
crypto: lrw - Do not use auxiliary buffer

 crypto/lrw.c     | 342 +++++++++++++----------------------------------
 crypto/testmgr.h |  21 +++
 2 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 251 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH v4 1/4 crypto: lrw - Fix out-of bounds access on counter overflow

When the LRW block counter overflows, the current implementation returns 128 as the index to the precomputed multiplication table, which has 128 entries. This patch fixes it to return the correct value (127).

Fixes 64470f1b8510 ("[CRYPTO] lrw: Liskov Rivest Wagner, a tweakable narrow block cipher mode")
Cc <[email protected]> # 2.6.20+
---
 crypto/lrw.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
crypto/lrw.c +6 -1
index 393a782679c7..5504d1325a56 100644
@@ -143,7 +143,12 @@ static inline int get_index128(be128 *block)
 		return x + ffz(val);
 	}
 
-	return x;
+	/*
+	 * If we get here, then x == 128 and we are incrementing the counter
+	 * from all ones to all zeros. This means we must return index 127, i.e.
+	 * the one corresponding to key2*{ 1,...,1 }.
+	 */
+	return 127;
 }
 
 static int post_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#2 lore raw

PATCH v4 2/4 crypto: testmgr - Add test for LRW counter wrap-around

In reply to Ondrej Mosnacek

This patch adds a test vector for lrw(aes) that triggers wrap-around of the counter, which is a tricky corner case.

---
 crypto/testmgr.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
crypto/testmgr.h +21 -0
index 0b3d7cadbe93..47629cb1efd3 100644
@@ -13145,6 +13145,27 @@ static const struct cipher_testvec aes_lrw_tv_template[] = {
 		.ctext	= "\x5b\x90\x8e\xc1\xab\xdd\x67\x5f"
 			  "\x3d\x69\x8a\x95\x53\xc8\x9c\xe5",
 		.len	= 16,
+	}, { /* Test counter wrap-around, modified from LRW-32-AES 1 */
+		.key    = "\x45\x62\xac\x25\xf8\x28\x17\x6d"
+			  "\x4c\x26\x84\x14\xb5\x68\x01\x85"
+			  "\x25\x8e\x2a\x05\xe7\x3e\x9d\x03"
+			  "\xee\x5a\x83\x0c\xcc\x09\x4c\x87",
+		.klen   = 32,
+		.iv     = "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff"
+			  "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff",
+		.ptext	= "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37"
+			  "\x38\x39\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46"
+			  "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37"
+			  "\x38\x39\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46"
+			  "\x30\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37"
+			  "\x38\x39\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46",
+		.ctext	= "\x47\x90\x50\xf6\xf4\x8d\x5c\x7f"
+			  "\x84\xc7\x83\x95\x2d\xa2\x02\xc0"
+			  "\xda\x7f\xa3\xc0\x88\x2a\x0a\x50"
+			  "\xfb\xc1\x78\x03\x39\xfe\x1d\xe5"
+			  "\xf1\xb2\x73\xcd\x65\xa3\xdf\x5f"
+			  "\xe9\x5d\x48\x92\x54\x63\x4e\xb8",
+		.len	= 48,
 	}, {
 /* http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg00173.html */
 		.key    = "\xf8\xd4\x76\xff\xd6\x46\xee\x6c"
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#3 lore raw

PATCH v4 3/4 crypto: lrw - Optimize tweak computation

In reply to Ondrej Mosnacek

This patch rewrites the tweak computation to a slightly simpler method that performs less bswaps. Based on performance measurements the new code seems to provide slightly better performance than the old one.

PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS (x86_64)
Performed using: https://gitlab.com/omos/linux-crypto-bench
Crypto driver used: lrw(ecb-aes-aesni)

Before:

       ALGORITHM KEY (b)        DATA (B)   TIME ENC (ns)   TIME DEC (ns)
        lrw(aes)     256              64             204             286
        lrw(aes)     320              64             227             203
        lrw(aes)     384              64             208             204
        lrw(aes)     256             512             441             439
        lrw(aes)     320             512             456             455
        lrw(aes)     384             512             469             483
        lrw(aes)     256            4096            2136            2190
        lrw(aes)     320            4096            2161            2213
        lrw(aes)     384            4096            2295            2369
        lrw(aes)     256           16384            7692            7868
        lrw(aes)     320           16384            8230            8691
        lrw(aes)     384           16384            8971            8813
        lrw(aes)     256           32768           15336           15560
        lrw(aes)     320           32768           16410           16346
        lrw(aes)     384           32768           18023           17465

After:

       ALGORITHM KEY (b)        DATA (B)   TIME ENC (ns)   TIME DEC (ns)
        lrw(aes)     256              64             200             203
        lrw(aes)     320              64             202             204
        lrw(aes)     384              64             204             205
        lrw(aes)     256             512             415             415
        lrw(aes)     320             512             432             440
        lrw(aes)     384             512             449             451
        lrw(aes)     256            4096            1838            1995
        lrw(aes)     320            4096            2123            1980
        lrw(aes)     384            4096            2100            2119
        lrw(aes)     256           16384            7183            6954
        lrw(aes)     320           16384            7844            7631
        lrw(aes)     384           16384            8256            8126
        lrw(aes)     256           32768           14772           14484
        lrw(aes)     320           32768           15281           15431
        lrw(aes)     384           32768           16469           16293
---
 crypto/lrw.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
crypto/lrw.c +37 -24
index 5504d1325a56..7377b5b486fd 100644
@@ -120,27 +120,28 @@ static int setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *parent, const u8 *key,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void inc(be128 *iv)
-{
-	be64_add_cpu(&iv->b, 1);
-	if (!iv->b)
-		be64_add_cpu(&iv->a, 1);
-}
-
-/* this returns the number of consequative 1 bits starting
- * from the right, get_index128(00 00 00 00 00 00 ... 00 00 10 FB) = 2 */
-static inline int get_index128(be128 *block)
+/*
+ * Returns the number of trailing '1' bits in the words of the counter, which is
+ * represented by 4 32-bit words, arranged from least to most significant.
+ * At the same time, increments the counter by one.
+ *
+ * For example:
+ *
+ * u32 counter[4] = { 0xFFFFFFFF, 0x1, 0x0, 0x0 };
+ * int i = next_index(&counter);
+ * // i == 33, counter == { 0x0, 0x2, 0x0, 0x0 }
+ */
+static int next_index(u32 *counter)
 {
-	int x;
-	__be32 *p = (__be32 *) block;
+	int i, res = 0;
 
-	for (p += 3, x = 0; x < 128; p--, x += 32) {
-		u32 val = be32_to_cpup(p);
-
-		if (!~val)
-			continue;
-
-		return x + ffz(val);
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+		if (counter[i] + 1 != 0) {
+			res += ffz(counter[i]++);
+			break;
+		}
+		counter[i] = 0;
+		res += 32;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -214,8 +215,9 @@ static int pre_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 	struct scatterlist *sg;
 	unsigned cryptlen;
 	unsigned offset;
-	be128 *iv;
 	bool more;
+	__be32 *iv;
+	u32 counter[4];
 	int err;
 
 	subreq = &rctx->subreq;
@@ -230,7 +232,12 @@ static int pre_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 				   cryptlen, req->iv);
 
 	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&w, subreq, false);
-	iv = w.iv;
+	iv = (__be32 *)w.iv;
+
+	counter[0] = be32_to_cpu(iv[3]);
+	counter[1] = be32_to_cpu(iv[2]);
+	counter[2] = be32_to_cpu(iv[1]);
+	counter[3] = be32_to_cpu(iv[0]);
 
 	while (w.nbytes) {
 		unsigned int avail = w.nbytes;
@@ -247,10 +254,16 @@ static int pre_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 			/* T <- I*Key2, using the optimization
 			 * discussed in the specification */
 			be128_xor(&rctx->t, &rctx->t,
-				  &ctx->mulinc[get_index128(iv)]);
-			inc(iv);
+				  &ctx->mulinc[next_index(counter)]);
 		} while ((avail -= bs) >= bs);
 
+		if (w.nbytes == w.total) {
+			iv[0] = cpu_to_be32(counter[3]);
+			iv[1] = cpu_to_be32(counter[2]);
+			iv[2] = cpu_to_be32(counter[1]);
+			iv[3] = cpu_to_be32(counter[0]);
+		}
+
 		err = skcipher_walk_done(&w, avail);
 	}
 
@@ -548,7 +561,7 @@ static int create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
 	inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->base.cra_priority;
 	inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = LRW_BLOCK_SIZE;
 	inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->base.cra_alignmask |
-				       (__alignof__(u64) - 1);
+				       (__alignof__(__be32) - 1);
 
 	inst->alg.ivsize = LRW_BLOCK_SIZE;
 	inst->alg.min_keysize = crypto_skcipher_alg_min_keysize(alg) +
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#4 lore raw

PATCH v4 4/4 crypto: lrw - Do not use auxiliary buffer

In reply to Ondrej Mosnacek

This patch simplifies the LRW template to recompute the LRW tweaks from scratch in the second pass and thus also removes the need to allocate a dynamic buffer using kmalloc().

As discussed at [1], the use of kmalloc causes deadlocks with dm-crypt.

PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS (x86_64)
Performed using: https://gitlab.com/omos/linux-crypto-bench
Crypto driver used: lrw(ecb-aes-aesni)

The results show that the new code has about the same performance as the old code. For 512-byte message it seems to be even slightly faster, but that might be just noise.

Before:

       ALGORITHM KEY (b)        DATA (B)   TIME ENC (ns)   TIME DEC (ns)
        lrw(aes)     256              64             200             203
        lrw(aes)     320              64             202             204
        lrw(aes)     384              64             204             205
        lrw(aes)     256             512             415             415
        lrw(aes)     320             512             432             440
        lrw(aes)     384             512             449             451
        lrw(aes)     256            4096            1838            1995
        lrw(aes)     320            4096            2123            1980
        lrw(aes)     384            4096            2100            2119
        lrw(aes)     256           16384            7183            6954
        lrw(aes)     320           16384            7844            7631
        lrw(aes)     384           16384            8256            8126
        lrw(aes)     256           32768           14772           14484
        lrw(aes)     320           32768           15281           15431
        lrw(aes)     384           32768           16469           16293

After:

       ALGORITHM KEY (b)        DATA (B)   TIME ENC (ns)   TIME DEC (ns)
        lrw(aes)     256              64             197             196
        lrw(aes)     320              64             200             197
        lrw(aes)     384              64             203             199
        lrw(aes)     256             512             385             380
        lrw(aes)     320             512             401             395
        lrw(aes)     384             512             415             415
        lrw(aes)     256            4096            1869            1846
        lrw(aes)     320            4096            2080            1981
        lrw(aes)     384            4096            2160            2109
        lrw(aes)     256           16384            7077            7127
        lrw(aes)     320           16384            7807            7766
        lrw(aes)     384           16384            8108            8357
        lrw(aes)     256           32768           14111           14454
        lrw(aes)     320           32768           15268           15082
        lrw(aes)     384           32768           16581           16250

[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/8/23/1315

---
 crypto/lrw.c | 280 ++++++++++-----------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 229 deletions(-)
crypto/lrw.c +51 -229
index 7377b5b486fd..6fcf0d431185 100644
@@ -29,8 +29,6 @@
 #include <crypto/b128ops.h>
 #include <crypto/gf128mul.h>
 
-#define LRW_BUFFER_SIZE 128u
-
 #define LRW_BLOCK_SIZE 16
 
 struct priv {
@@ -56,19 +54,7 @@ struct priv {
 };
 
 struct rctx {
-	be128 buf[LRW_BUFFER_SIZE / sizeof(be128)];
-
 	be128 t;
-
-	be128 *ext;
-
-	struct scatterlist srcbuf[2];
-	struct scatterlist dstbuf[2];
-	struct scatterlist *src;
-	struct scatterlist *dst;
-
-	unsigned int left;
-
 	struct skcipher_request subreq;
 };
 
@@ -152,86 +138,31 @@ static int next_index(u32 *counter)
 	return 127;
 }
 
-static int post_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+/*
+ * We compute the tweak masks twice (both before and after the ECB encryption or
+ * decryption) to avoid having to allocate a temporary buffer and/or make
+ * mutliple calls to the 'ecb(..)' instance, which usually would be slower than
+ * just doing the next_index() calls again.
+ */
+static int xor_tweak(struct skcipher_request *req, bool second_pass)
 {
-	struct rctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
-	be128 *buf = rctx->ext ?: rctx->buf;
-	struct skcipher_request *subreq;
 	const int bs = LRW_BLOCK_SIZE;
-	struct skcipher_walk w;
-	struct scatterlist *sg;
-	unsigned offset;
-	int err;
-
-	subreq = &rctx->subreq;
-	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&w, subreq, false);
-
-	while (w.nbytes) {
-		unsigned int avail = w.nbytes;
-		be128 *wdst;
-
-		wdst = w.dst.virt.addr;
-
-		do {
-			be128_xor(wdst, buf++, wdst);
-			wdst++;
-		} while ((avail -= bs) >= bs);
-
-		err = skcipher_walk_done(&w, avail);
-	}
-
-	rctx->left -= subreq->cryptlen;
-
-	if (err || !rctx->left)
-		goto out;
-
-	rctx->dst = rctx->dstbuf;
-
-	scatterwalk_done(&w.out, 0, 1);
-	sg = w.out.sg;
-	offset = w.out.offset;
-
-	if (rctx->dst != sg) {
-		rctx->dst[0] = *sg;
-		sg_unmark_end(rctx->dst);
-		scatterwalk_crypto_chain(rctx->dst, sg_next(sg), 2);
-	}
-	rctx->dst[0].length -= offset - sg->offset;
-	rctx->dst[0].offset = offset;
-
-out:
-	return err;
-}
-
-static int pre_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
-{
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
-	struct rctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
 	struct priv *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
-	be128 *buf = rctx->ext ?: rctx->buf;
-	struct skcipher_request *subreq;
-	const int bs = LRW_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	struct rctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
+	be128 t = rctx->t;
 	struct skcipher_walk w;
-	struct scatterlist *sg;
-	unsigned cryptlen;
-	unsigned offset;
-	bool more;
 	__be32 *iv;
 	u32 counter[4];
 	int err;
 
-	subreq = &rctx->subreq;
-	skcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, tfm);
-
-	cryptlen = subreq->cryptlen;
-	more = rctx->left > cryptlen;
-	if (!more)
-		cryptlen = rctx->left;
-
-	skcipher_request_set_crypt(subreq, rctx->src, rctx->dst,
-				   cryptlen, req->iv);
+	if (second_pass) {
+		req = &rctx->subreq;
+		/* set to our TFM to enforce correct alignment: */
+		skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, tfm);
+	}
 
-	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&w, subreq, false);
+	err = skcipher_walk_virt(&w, req, false);
 	iv = (__be32 *)w.iv;
 
 	counter[0] = be32_to_cpu(iv[3]);
@@ -248,16 +179,14 @@ static int pre_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 		wdst = w.dst.virt.addr;
 
 		do {
-			*buf++ = rctx->t;
-			be128_xor(wdst++, &rctx->t, wsrc++);
+			be128_xor(wdst++, &t, wsrc++);
 
 			/* T <- I*Key2, using the optimization
 			 * discussed in the specification */
-			be128_xor(&rctx->t, &rctx->t,
-				  &ctx->mulinc[next_index(counter)]);
+			be128_xor(&t, &t, &ctx->mulinc[next_index(counter)]);
 		} while ((avail -= bs) >= bs);
 
-		if (w.nbytes == w.total) {
+		if (second_pass && w.nbytes == w.total) {
 			iv[0] = cpu_to_be32(counter[3]);
 			iv[1] = cpu_to_be32(counter[2]);
 			iv[2] = cpu_to_be32(counter[1]);
@@ -267,175 +196,68 @@ static int pre_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 		err = skcipher_walk_done(&w, avail);
 	}
 
-	skcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->child);
-	skcipher_request_set_crypt(subreq, rctx->dst, rctx->dst,
-				   cryptlen, NULL);
-
-	if (err || !more)
-		goto out;
-
-	rctx->src = rctx->srcbuf;
-
-	scatterwalk_done(&w.in, 0, 1);
-	sg = w.in.sg;
-	offset = w.in.offset;
-
-	if (rctx->src != sg) {
-		rctx->src[0] = *sg;
-		sg_unmark_end(rctx->src);
-		scatterwalk_crypto_chain(rctx->src, sg_next(sg), 2);
-	}
-	rctx->src[0].length -= offset - sg->offset;
-	rctx->src[0].offset = offset;
-
-out:
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int init_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, crypto_completion_t done)
+static int xor_tweak_pre(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
-	struct priv *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
-	struct rctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
-	struct skcipher_request *subreq;
-	gfp_t gfp;
-
-	subreq = &rctx->subreq;
-	skcipher_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags, done, req);
-
-	gfp = req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP ? GFP_KERNEL :
-							   GFP_ATOMIC;
-	rctx->ext = NULL;
-
-	subreq->cryptlen = LRW_BUFFER_SIZE;
-	if (req->cryptlen > LRW_BUFFER_SIZE) {
-		unsigned int n = min(req->cryptlen, (unsigned int)PAGE_SIZE);
-
-		rctx->ext = kmalloc(n, gfp);
-		if (rctx->ext)
-			subreq->cryptlen = n;
-	}
-
-	rctx->src = req->src;
-	rctx->dst = req->dst;
-	rctx->left = req->cryptlen;
-
-	/* calculate first value of T */
-	memcpy(&rctx->t, req->iv, sizeof(rctx->t));
-
-	/* T <- I*Key2 */
-	gf128mul_64k_bbe(&rctx->t, ctx->table);
-
-	return 0;
+	return xor_tweak(req, false);
 }
 
-static void exit_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+static int xor_tweak_post(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
-	struct rctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
-
-	rctx->left = 0;
-
-	if (rctx->ext)
-		kzfree(rctx->ext);
+	return xor_tweak(req, true);
 }
 
-static int do_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req, int err)
-{
-	struct rctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
-	struct skcipher_request *subreq;
-
-	subreq = &rctx->subreq;
-
-	while (!err && rctx->left) {
-		err = pre_crypt(req) ?:
-		      crypto_skcipher_encrypt(subreq) ?:
-		      post_crypt(req);
-
-		if (err == -EINPROGRESS || err == -EBUSY)
-			return err;
-	}
-
-	exit_crypt(req);
-	return err;
-}
-
-static void encrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
+static void crypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
 {
 	struct skcipher_request *req = areq->data;
-	struct skcipher_request *subreq;
-	struct rctx *rctx;
-
-	rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
-
-	if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
-		if (rctx->left != req->cryptlen)
-			return;
-		goto out;
-	}
 
-	subreq = &rctx->subreq;
-	subreq->base.flags &= CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG;
+	if (!err)
+		err = xor_tweak_post(req);
 
-	err = do_encrypt(req, err ?: post_crypt(req));
-	if (rctx->left)
-		return;
-
-out:
 	skcipher_request_complete(req, err);
 }
 
-static int encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
-{
-	return do_encrypt(req, init_crypt(req, encrypt_done));
-}
-
-static int do_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req, int err)
+static void init_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
+	struct priv *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
 	struct rctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
-	struct skcipher_request *subreq;
+	struct skcipher_request *subreq = &rctx->subreq;
 
-	subreq = &rctx->subreq;
-
-	while (!err && rctx->left) {
-		err = pre_crypt(req) ?:
-		      crypto_skcipher_decrypt(subreq) ?:
-		      post_crypt(req);
+	skcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->child);
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags, crypt_done, req);
+	/* pass req->iv as IV (will be used by xor_tweak, ECB will ignore it) */
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->dst, req->dst,
+				   req->cryptlen, req->iv);
 
-		if (err == -EINPROGRESS || err == -EBUSY)
-			return err;
-	}
+	/* calculate first value of T */
+	memcpy(&rctx->t, req->iv, sizeof(rctx->t));
 
-	exit_crypt(req);
-	return err;
+	/* T <- I*Key2 */
+	gf128mul_64k_bbe(&rctx->t, ctx->table);
 }
 
-static void decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *areq, int err)
+static int encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
-	struct skcipher_request *req = areq->data;
-	struct skcipher_request *subreq;
-	struct rctx *rctx;
-
-	rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
-
-	if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
-		if (rctx->left != req->cryptlen)
-			return;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	subreq = &rctx->subreq;
-	subreq->base.flags &= CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG;
-
-	err = do_decrypt(req, err ?: post_crypt(req));
-	if (rctx->left)
-		return;
+	struct rctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
+	struct skcipher_request *subreq = &rctx->subreq;
 
-out:
-	skcipher_request_complete(req, err);
+	init_crypt(req);
+	return xor_tweak_pre(req) ?:
+		crypto_skcipher_encrypt(subreq) ?:
+		xor_tweak_post(req);
 }
 
 static int decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
 {
-	return do_decrypt(req, init_crypt(req, decrypt_done));
+	struct rctx *rctx = skcipher_request_ctx(req);
+	struct skcipher_request *subreq = &rctx->subreq;
+
+	init_crypt(req);
+	return xor_tweak_pre(req) ?:
+		crypto_skcipher_decrypt(subreq) ?:
+		xor_tweak_post(req);
 }
 
 static int init_tfm(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
maintainer
#5 lore raw
In reply to Ondrej Mosnacek
Quoted 41 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek

This patchset contains a corner-case fix and several improvements for the LRW template.

The first patch fixes an out-of-bounds array access (and subsequently incorrect cipher output) when the LRW counter goes from all ones to all zeros. This patch should be applied to the crypto-2.6 tree and also go to stable.

The second patch adds a test vector for lrw(aes) that covers the above bug.

The third patch is a small optimization of the LRW tweak computation.

The fourth patch is a follow-up to a similar patch for XTS (it simplifies away the use of dynamically allocated auxiliary buffer to cache the computed tweak values):
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10588775/

Patches 2-4 should be applied only to cryptodev-2.6, but they all depend on the first patch.

Changes in v4:
- applied various corrections/suggestions from Eric Biggers
- added a fix for buggy behavior on counter wrap-around (+ test vector)

v3: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg34946.html
Changes in v3:
- fix a copy-paste error

v2: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg34890.html
Changes in v2:
- small cleanup suggested by Eric Biggers

v1: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg34871.html

Ondrej Mosnacek (4):
crypto: lrw - Fix out-of bounds access on counter overflow
crypto: testmgr - Add test for LRW counter wrap-around
crypto: lrw - Optimize tweak computation
crypto: lrw - Do not use auxiliary buffer

Quoted 3 lines
 crypto/lrw.c     | 342 +++++++++++++----------------------------------
 crypto/testmgr.h |  21 +++
 2 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 251 deletions(-)

All applied. Thanks.

Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
#6 lore raw
Quoted 42 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 41 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek

This patchset contains a corner-case fix and several improvements for the LRW template.

The first patch fixes an out-of-bounds array access (and subsequently incorrect cipher output) when the LRW counter goes from all ones to all zeros. This patch should be applied to the crypto-2.6 tree and also go to stable.

The second patch adds a test vector for lrw(aes) that covers the above bug.

The third patch is a small optimization of the LRW tweak computation.

The fourth patch is a follow-up to a similar patch for XTS (it simplifies away the use of dynamically allocated auxiliary buffer to cache the computed tweak values):
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10588775/

Patches 2-4 should be applied only to cryptodev-2.6, but they all depend on the first patch.

Changes in v4:
- applied various corrections/suggestions from Eric Biggers
- added a fix for buggy behavior on counter wrap-around (+ test vector)

v3: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg34946.html
Changes in v3:
- fix a copy-paste error

v2: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg34890.html
Changes in v2:
- small cleanup suggested by Eric Biggers

v1: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg34871.html

Ondrej Mosnacek (4):
crypto: lrw - Fix out-of bounds access on counter overflow
crypto: testmgr - Add test for LRW counter wrap-around
crypto: lrw - Optimize tweak computation
crypto: lrw - Do not use auxiliary buffer

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
 crypto/lrw.c     | 342 +++++++++++++----------------------------------
 crypto/testmgr.h |  21 +++
 2 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 251 deletions(-)

All applied. Thanks.

I am seeing tcrypt failures with this code:

alg: skcipher: Test 8 failed (invalid result) on encryption for lrw(ecb-aes-ce) 00000000: 47 90 50 f6 f4 8d 5c 7f 84 c7 83 95 2d a2 02 c0 00000010: da 7f a3 c0 88 2a 0a 50 fb c1 78 03 39 fe 1d e5 00000020: 47 90 50 f6 f4 8d 5c 7f 84 c7 83 95 2d a2 02 c0

reproduced on both arm64 and ARM (the latter in LE and BE modes)

#7 lore raw
Quoted 49 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 42 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 41 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek

This patchset contains a corner-case fix and several improvements for the LRW template.

The first patch fixes an out-of-bounds array access (and subsequently incorrect cipher output) when the LRW counter goes from all ones to all zeros. This patch should be applied to the crypto-2.6 tree and also go to stable.

The second patch adds a test vector for lrw(aes) that covers the above bug.

The third patch is a small optimization of the LRW tweak computation.

The fourth patch is a follow-up to a similar patch for XTS (it simplifies away the use of dynamically allocated auxiliary buffer to cache the computed tweak values):
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10588775/

Patches 2-4 should be applied only to cryptodev-2.6, but they all depend on the first patch.

Changes in v4:
- applied various corrections/suggestions from Eric Biggers
- added a fix for buggy behavior on counter wrap-around (+ test vector)

v3: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg34946.html
Changes in v3:
- fix a copy-paste error

v2: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg34890.html
Changes in v2:
- small cleanup suggested by Eric Biggers

v1: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-crypto/msg34871.html

Ondrej Mosnacek (4):
crypto: lrw - Fix out-of bounds access on counter overflow
crypto: testmgr - Add test for LRW counter wrap-around
crypto: lrw - Optimize tweak computation
crypto: lrw - Do not use auxiliary buffer

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
 crypto/lrw.c     | 342 +++++++++++++----------------------------------
 crypto/testmgr.h |  21 +++
 2 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 251 deletions(-)

All applied. Thanks.

Quoted 8 lines

I am seeing tcrypt failures with this code:

alg: skcipher: Test 8 failed (invalid result) on encryption for lrw(ecb-aes-ce) 00000000: 47 90 50 f6 f4 8d 5c 7f 84 c7 83 95 2d a2 02 c0 00000010: da 7f a3 c0 88 2a 0a 50 fb c1 78 03 39 fe 1d e5 00000020: 47 90 50 f6 f4 8d 5c 7f 84 c7 83 95 2d a2 02 c0

reproduced on both arm64 and ARM (the latter in LE and BE modes)

This fixes it for me

crypto/lrw.c +3 -4
index 6fcf0d431185..0430ccd08728 100644
@@ -122,10 +122,9 @@ static int next_index(u32 *counter)
        int i, res = 0;
 
        for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
-               if (counter[i] + 1 != 0) {
-                       res += ffz(counter[i]++);
-                       break;
-               }
+               if (counter[i] + 1 != 0)
+                       return res + ffz(counter[i]++);
+
                counter[i] = 0;
                res += 32;
        }

since otherwise, the function always returns 127 (!)