powerpc/tm: Fix userspace r13 corruption
PATCH 1/1 powerpc/tm: Fix userspace r13 corruption
When we treclaim we store the userspace checkpointed r13 to a scratch SPR and then later save the scratch SPR to the user thread struct.
Unfortunately, this doesn't work as accessing the user thread struct can take an SLB fault and the SLB fault handler will write the same scratch SPRG that now contains the userspace r13.
To fix this, we store r13 to the kernel stack (which can't fault) before we access the user thread struct.
Found by running P8 guest + powervm + disable_1tb_segments + TM. Seen as a random userspace segfault with r13 looking like a kernel address.
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/tm.S | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/tm.S +9 -2
@@ -176,13 +176,20 @@ _GLOBAL(tm_reclaim) std r1, PACATMSCRATCH(r13) ld r1, PACAR1(r13) - /* Store the PPR in r11 and reset to decent value */ std r11, GPR11(r1) /* Temporary stash */ + /* Store r13 away so we can free up the scratch SPR for the + * SLB fault handler (needed once we start access the + * thread_struct) + */ + GET_SCRATCH0(r11) + std r11, GPR13(r1) + /* Reset MSR RI so we can take SLB faults again */ li r11, MSR_RI mtmsrd r11, 1 + /* Store the PPR in r11 and reset to decent value */ mfspr r11, SPRN_PPR HMT_MEDIUM
@@ -211,7 +218,7 @@ _GLOBAL(tm_reclaim) ld r4, GPR7(r1) /* user r7 */ ld r5, GPR11(r1) /* user r11 */ ld r6, GPR12(r1) /* user r12 */ - GET_SCRATCH0(8) /* user r13 */ + ld r8, GPR13(r1) /* user r13 */ std r3, GPR1(r7) std r4, GPR7(r7) std r5, GPR11(r7)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Hi Mikey,
Quoted 7 lines · Michael Neuling
When we treclaim we store the userspace checkpointed r13 to a scratch SPR and then later save the scratch SPR to the user thread struct.
Unfortunately, this doesn't work as accessing the user thread struct can take an SLB fault and the SLB fault handler will write the same scratch SPRG that now contains the userspace r13.
Quoted 7 lines
To fix this, we store r13 to the kernel stack (which can't fault) before we access the user thread struct.
Found by running P8 guest + powervm +
disable_1tb_segments+ TM. Seen as a random userspace segfault with r13 looking like a kernel address.Signed-off-by Michael Neuling <[email protected]>
I am wondering if the same problem could not happen with r1 as well, since r1 is kept in the paca->tm_scratch after MSR[RI] is enabled, in a code similar to this:
std r1, PACATMSCRATCH(r13)
..
li r11, MSR_RI
mtmsrd r11, 1
....
ld r3, PACATMSCRATCH(r13) /* user r1 */
std r3, GPR1(r7)There might be a corruption if the exception that is raised just after MSR[RI] is enabled somehow exits through 'fast_exception_return' (being called by most of the exception handlers as I understand) which will overwrite paca->tm_scratch with the upcoming MSR (aka SRR1) just before the SRR1, as:
ld r3,_MSR(r1) ... std r3, PACATMSCRATCH(r13) /* Stash returned-to MSR */
It seems that slb_miss_common and instruction_access_slb does not go through this path, but handle_page_fault calls ret_from_except_lite->fast_exception_return, which might cause this 'possible' issue.
Anyway, I would like to investigate if this problem might happen or not for real, but I do not fully understand what are the exceptions that might be raised when just MSR[RI] is enabled.
Quoted 17 lines · Breno Leitao
Hi Mikey,
=20Quoted 13 lines · Michael Neuling
When we treclaim we store the userspace checkpointed r13 to a scratch SPR and then later save the scratch SPR to the user thread struct. =20
Unfortunately, this doesn't work as accessing the user thread struct can take an SLB fault and the SLB fault handler will write the same scratch SPRG that now contains the userspace r13.
=20
To fix this, we store r13 to the kernel stack (which can't fault) before we access the user thread struct.
=20
Found by running P8 guest + powervm +disable_1tb_segments+ TM. Seen as a random userspace segfault with r13 looking like a kernel address. =20Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Michael Neuling <[email protected]>
Quoted 4 lines
=20
Reviewed-by Breno Leitao <[email protected]>=20
I am wondering if the same problem could not happen with r1 as well, sinc=
e r1
Quoted 1 line
is kept in the
paca->tm_scratchafter MSR[RI] is enabled, in a code simil=
ar
Quoted 9 lines
to this:
=20std r1, PACATMSCRATCH(r13) .. li r11, MSR_RI mtmsrd r11, 1 .... ld r3, PACATMSCRATCH(r13) /* user r1 */ std r3, GPR1(r7)
Quoted 5 lines
=20
There might be a corruption if the exception that is raised just after MSR[RI] is enabled somehow exits through 'fast_exception_return' (being called by most of the exception handlers as I understand) which will overwritepaca->tm_scratchwith the upcoming MSR (aka SRR1) just before t=
he
Quoted 9 lines
SRR1, as:
=20ld r3,_MSR(r1) =20 ... std r3, PACATMSCRATCH(r13) /* Stash returned-to MSR */=20
=20
It seems thatslb_miss_commonandinstruction_access_slbdoes not go thro=
ugh
Quoted 3 lines
this path, but
handle_page_faultcallsret_from_except_lite->fast_exception_return, which might cause this 'possible' issue.
Yeah, good catch! I think we are ok but it's delicate.=20
I'll store it in the kernel stack and avoid PACATMSCRATCH before I turn RI = on. =20
This look ok?
arch/powerpc/kernel/tm.S +0 -0
@@ -178,6 +178,12 @@ _GLOBAL(tm_reclaim)
=20
std r11, GPR11(r1) /* Temporary stash */
=20
+ /* Move r1 to kernel stack in case PACATMSCRATCH is used once
+ * we turn on RI
+ */
+ ld r11, PACATMSCRATCH(r13)
+ std r11, GPR1(r1)
+
/* Store r13 away so we can free up the scratch SPR for the
* SLB fault handler (needed once we start access the
* thread_struct)
@@ -214,7 +220,7 @@ _GLOBAL(tm_reclaim)
SAVE_GPR(8, r7) /* user r8 */
SAVE_GPR(9, r7) /* user r9 */
SAVE_GPR(10, r7) /* user r10 */
- ld r3, PACATMSCRATCH(r13) /* user r1 */
+ ld r3, GPR1(r1) /* user r1 */
ld r4, GPR7(r1) /* user r7 */
ld r5, GPR11(r1) /* user r11 */
ld r6, GPR12(r1) /* user r12 */
Hi Mikey,
Quoted 50 lines · Michael Neuling
Quoted 44 lines · Breno Leitao
Hi Mikey,
Quoted 7 lines · Michael Neuling
When we treclaim we store the userspace checkpointed r13 to a scratch SPR and then later save the scratch SPR to the user thread struct.
Unfortunately, this doesn't work as accessing the user thread struct can take an SLB fault and the SLB fault handler will write the same scratch SPRG that now contains the userspace r13.
Quoted 7 lines
To fix this, we store r13 to the kernel stack (which can't fault) before we access the user thread struct.
Found by running P8 guest + powervm +
disable_1tb_segments+ TM. Seen as a random userspace segfault with r13 looking like a kernel address.Signed-off-by Michael Neuling <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Breno Leitao <[email protected]>I am wondering if the same problem could not happen with r1 as well, since r1 is kept in the
paca->tm_scratchafter MSR[RI] is enabled, in a code similar to this:std r1, PACATMSCRATCH(r13) .. li r11, MSR_RI mtmsrd r11, 1 .... ld r3, PACATMSCRATCH(r13) /* user r1 */ std r3, GPR1(r7)There might be a corruption if the exception that is raised just after MSR[RI] is enabled somehow exits through '
fast_exception_return' (being called by most of the exception handlers as I understand) which will overwritepaca->tm_scratchwith the upcoming MSR (aka SRR1) just before the SRR1, as:ld r3,_MSR(r1) ... std r3, PACATMSCRATCH(r13) /* Stash returned-to MSR */Quoted 4 lines
It seems that
slb_miss_commonandinstruction_access_slbdoes not go through this path, buthandle_page_faultcallsret_from_except_lite->fast_exception_return, which might cause this 'possible' issue.
Quoted 5 lines
Yeah, good catch! I think we are ok but it's delicate.
I'll store it in the kernel stack and avoid PACATMSCRATCH before I turn RI on.
This look ok?
Yes, That is exactly what I though when I looked at the code. Thanks for fixing it.
Michael Ellerman
AppliedQuoted 7 lines · Michael Neuling
When we treclaim we store the userspace checkpointed r13 to a scratch SPR and then later save the scratch SPR to the user thread struct.
Unfortunately, this doesn't work as accessing the user thread struct can take an SLB fault and the SLB fault handler will write the same scratch SPRG that now contains the userspace r13.
Quoted 8 lines
To fix this, we store r13 to the kernel stack (which can't fault) before we access the user thread struct.
Found by running P8 guest + powervm +
disable_1tb_segments+ TM. Seen as a random userspace segfault with r13 looking like a kernel address.Signed-off-by Michael Neuling <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
Applied to powerpc fixes, thanks.
https://git.kernel.org/powerpc/c/cf13435b730a502e814c63c84d93db
cheers