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AVB using OP-TEE

PATCH Superseded Jens Wiklander 3 participants 47 messages Sep 25, 2018 – Oct 9, 2018

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#0 lore raw

v4 cover AVB using OP-TEE

Hi,

This adds support for storing AVB rollback indexes in the RPMB partition. The RPMB partition (content and key) is managed by OP-TEE
(https://www.op-tee.org/) which is a secure OS leveraging ARM TrustZone.

The Linux kernel can already support OP-TEE with reading and updating rollback indexes in the RPMB partition, the catch is that this is needed before the kernel has booted.

The design here is the same as what is in the Linux kernel, with the exception that the user space daemon tee-supplicant is integrated in the OP-TEE driver here (drivers/tee/optee/supplicant.c) instead. A new uclass (UCLASS_TEE) is introduced to provide an abstraction for interfacing with a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). There's also the OP-TEE driver using UCLASS_TEE for registration.

A Trusted Application (TA) interface is added to be used by the AVB verify functions which are updated accordingly. The TA is managed by OP-TEE and is executed in a secure TrustZone protected environment.

The header files drivers/tee/optee/optee_{msg,msg_supplicant,smc}.h and include/tee/optee_ta_avb.h are copied from
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/tree/master more or less unmodified. They may need to be updated from time to time in order to support new features.

In MMC there's a new function, mmc_rpmb_route_frames(), which as the name suggests is used to route RPMB frames to/from the MMC. This saves OP-TEE from implementing an MMC driver which would need to share resources with its counterpart here in U-Boot.

This was tested on a Hikey (Kirin 620) board.

I've added myself as maintainer of the TEE stuff.

changes in v4:
* Addressed review comments from Simon Glass
* Rebased on v2018.09
* "avb_verify: bugfix avb_ops_free() skipping free" removed due to the rebase
* Commits "dt/bindings: add bindings for optee",
"sandbox: imply CONFIG_TEE (TEE uclass)",
"tee: add sandbox driver",
"avb_verify: support using OP-TEE TA AVB",
"test_avb: Update pymark.buildconfigspec information for the AVB tests", "Kconfig: sandbox: enable cmd_avb and dependencies",

* Added descriptions of additional structs and functions
* In commit "avb_verify: support sandbox configuration" avoid the #ifdef CONFIG_SANDBOX in get_sector_buf() as suggested by Simon.

changes in v3:
* Addressed review comments from Simon Glass
* A few new patches
- "avb_verify: bugfix avb_ops_free() skipping free"
- "tee: add sandbox driver"
- "test_avb: Update pymark.buildconfigspec information for the AVB tests"
- "avb_verify: support sandbox configuration"
- "Kconfig: sandbox: enable cmd_avb and dependencies"
* "sandbox: imply CONFIG_TEE (TEE uclass)", replacing
"configs: sandbox: enable CONFIG_TEE (TEE uclass)"
* Moved sandbox driver to drivers/tee and added code to emulate the AVB TA
* Enabled a few AVB tests (test/py/tests/test_avb.py) for sandbox
* Bugfix tee_find_device()
* Commits "dm: fdt: scan for devices under /firmware too", "cmd: avb read_rb: print rb_idx in hexadecimal",
"cmd: avb: print error message if command fails",
"Add UCLASS_TEE for Trusted Execution Environment",
"tee: add OP-TEE driver",
"Documentation: tee uclass and op-tee driver",
"test: tee: test TEE uclass",
"arm: dt: hikey: Add optee node" and
"sandbox: dt: add sandbox_tee node"

changes in v2:
* Added sandbox driver and a test in test/dm for the new TEE uclass:
Commit ("test: tee: test TEE uclass") and the enabling commits ("sandbox: dt: add sandbox_tee node") and
("configs: sandbox: enable CONFIG_TEE (TEE uclass)")
* Added descriptions of exported structs and functions
* Added documentation for the TEE uclass and the OP-TEE driver with the new commit ("Documentation: tee uclass and op-tee driver")
* Added documentation for the changes in avb_verify
* Addressed review comments from Simon Glass
* Added the commit ("cmd: avb: print error message if command fails")
* Made a few functions static in the OP-TEE driver
* Commit ("cmd: avb read_rb: print rb_idx in hexadecimal") and ("tee: optee: support AVB trusted application");

Thanks,
Jens

Jens Wiklander (19):
dm: fdt: scan for devices under /firmware too
cmd: avb read_rb: print rb_idx in hexadecimal
cmd: avb: print error message if command fails
mmc: rpmb: add mmc_rpmb_route_frames()
Add UCLASS_TEE for Trusted Execution Environment dt/bindings: add bindings for optee
tee: add OP-TEE driver
Documentation: tee uclass and op-tee driver
arm: dt: hikey: Add optee node
optee: support routing of rpmb data frames to mmc
tee: optee: support AVB trusted application
sandbox: dt: add sandbox_tee node
sandbox: imply CONFIG_TEE (TEE uclass)
tee: add sandbox driver
test: tee: test TEE uclass
avb_verify: support using OP-TEE TA AVB
test_avb: Update pymark.buildconfigspec information for the AVB tests
avb_verify: support sandbox configuration
Kconfig: sandbox: enable cmd_avb and dependencies

 MAINTAINERS                                   |   7 +
 arch/Kconfig                                  |   5 +
 arch/arm/dts/hi6220-hikey.dts                 |   7 +
 arch/sandbox/dts/sandbox.dts                  |   4 +
 arch/sandbox/dts/sandbox64.dts                |   4 +
 arch/sandbox/dts/test.dts                     |   4 +
 cmd/avb.c                                     |  19 +-
 common/avb_verify.c                           | 118 +++-
 doc/README.avb2                               |  13 +
 doc/README.tee                                | 112 +++
 .../firmware/linaro,optee-tz.txt              |  31 +
 drivers/Kconfig                               |   2 +
 drivers/Makefile                              |   1 +
 drivers/core/root.c                           |  15 +-
 drivers/fastboot/Kconfig                      |   2 +
 drivers/mmc/rpmb.c                            | 160 +++++
 drivers/tee/Kconfig                           |  35 +
 drivers/tee/Makefile                          |   5 +
 drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig                     |  27 +
 drivers/tee/optee/Makefile                    |   5 +
 drivers/tee/optee/core.c                      | 662 ++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h                 | 425 +++++++++++
 drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg_supplicant.h      | 240 +++++++
 drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h             |  65 ++
 drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h                 | 450 ++++++++++++
 drivers/tee/optee/rpmb.c                      | 181 +++++
 drivers/tee/optee/supplicant.c                |  96 +++
 drivers/tee/sandbox.c                         | 308 ++++++++
 drivers/tee/tee-uclass.c                      | 233 ++++++
 include/avb_verify.h                          |   7 +-
 include/dm/uclass-id.h                        |   1 +
 include/mmc.h                                 |  19 +
 include/sandboxtee.h                          |  21 +
 include/tee.h                                 | 374 ++++++++++
 include/tee/optee_ta_avb.h                    |  48 ++
 test/dm/Makefile                              |   1 +
 test/dm/tee.c                                 |  98 +++
 test/py/tests/test_avb.py                     |   8 +-
 38 files changed, 3802 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 doc/README.tee
 create mode 100644 doc/device-tree-bindings/firmware/linaro,optee-tz.txt
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/Makefile
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/Makefile
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/core.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg_supplicant.h
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/rpmb.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/supplicant.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/sandbox.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/tee-uclass.c
 create mode 100644 include/sandboxtee.h
 create mode 100644 include/tee.h
 create mode 100644 include/tee/optee_ta_avb.h
 create mode 100644 test/dm/tee.c
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH v4 1/19 dm: fdt: scan for devices under /firmware too

Just as /chosen may contain devices /firmware may contain devices, scan for devices under /firmware too.

---
 drivers/core/root.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/core/root.c +10 -5
index 72bcc7d7f2a3..0dca507e1187 100644
@@ -265,9 +265,15 @@ static int dm_scan_fdt_node(struct udevice *parent, const void *blob,
 	for (offset = fdt_first_subnode(blob, offset);
 	     offset > 0;
 	     offset = fdt_next_subnode(blob, offset)) {
-		/* "chosen" node isn't a device itself but may contain some: */
-		if (!strcmp(fdt_get_name(blob, offset, NULL), "chosen")) {
-			pr_debug("parsing subnodes of \"chosen\"\n");
+		const char *node_name = fdt_get_name(blob, offset, NULL);
+
+		/*
+		 * The "chosen" and "firmware" nodes aren't devices
+		 * themselves but may contain some:
+		 */
+		if (!strcmp(node_name, "chosen") ||
+		    !strcmp(node_name, "firmware")) {
+			pr_debug("parsing subnodes of \"%s\"\n", node_name);
 
 			err = dm_scan_fdt_node(parent, blob, offset,
 					       pre_reloc_only);
@@ -286,8 +292,7 @@ static int dm_scan_fdt_node(struct udevice *parent, const void *blob,
 		err = lists_bind_fdt(parent, offset_to_ofnode(offset), NULL);
 		if (err && !ret) {
 			ret = err;
-			debug("%s: ret=%d\n", fdt_get_name(blob, offset, NULL),
-			      ret);
+			debug("%s: ret=%d\n", node_name, ret);
 		}
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#2 lore raw

PATCH v4 1/19 dm: fdt: scan for devices under /firmware too

Quoted 5 lines · Jens Wiklander

Just as /chosen may contain devices /firmware may contain devices, scan for devices under /firmware too.

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#3 lore raw

PATCH v4 2/19 cmd: avb read_rb: print rb_idx in hexadecimal

In reply to Jens Wiklander

Prior to this patch was do_avb_write_rb() reading supplied rb_idx as a hexadecimal number while do_avb_read_rb() printed the read out rb_idx as decimal number. For consistency change do_avb_read_rb() to print rb_idx as a hexadecimal number too.

---
 cmd/avb.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
cmd/avb.c +1 -1
index f045a0c64c4a..ca4b26d5d7b3 100644
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int do_avb_read_rb(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[])
 
 	if (avb_ops->read_rollback_index(avb_ops, index, &rb_idx) ==
 	    AVB_IO_RESULT_OK) {
-		printf("Rollback index: %llu\n", rb_idx);
+		printf("Rollback index: %llx\n", rb_idx);
 		return CMD_RET_SUCCESS;
 	}
 	return CMD_RET_FAILURE;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#4 lore raw

PATCH v4 2/19 cmd: avb read_rb: print rb_idx in hexadecimal

Quoted 8 lines · Jens Wiklander

Prior to this patch was do_avb_write_rb() reading supplied rb_idx as a hexadecimal number while do_avb_read_rb() printed the read out rb_idx as decimal number. For consistency change do_avb_read_rb() to print rb_idx as a hexadecimal number too.

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#5 lore raw

PATCH v4 3/19 cmd: avb: print error message if command fails

In reply to Jens Wiklander
---
 cmd/avb.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
cmd/avb.c +17 -0
index ca4b26d5d7b3..ff00be4cee38 100644
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ int do_avb_init(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[])
 	if (avb_ops)
 		return CMD_RET_SUCCESS;
 
+	printf("Failed to initialize avb2\n");
+
 	return CMD_RET_FAILURE;
 }
 
@@ -65,6 +67,8 @@ int do_avb_read_part(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[])
 		return CMD_RET_SUCCESS;
 	}
 
+	printf("Failed to read from partition\n");
+
 	return CMD_RET_FAILURE;
 }
 
@@ -108,6 +112,8 @@ int do_avb_read_part_hex(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc,
 		return CMD_RET_SUCCESS;
 	}
 
+	printf("Failed to read from partition\n");
+
 	free(buffer);
 	return CMD_RET_FAILURE;
 }
@@ -138,6 +144,8 @@ int do_avb_write_part(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[])
 		return CMD_RET_SUCCESS;
 	}
 
+	printf("Failed to write in partition\n");
+
 	return CMD_RET_FAILURE;
 }
 
@@ -161,6 +169,9 @@ int do_avb_read_rb(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[])
 		printf("Rollback index: %llx\n", rb_idx);
 		return CMD_RET_SUCCESS;
 	}
+
+	printf("Failed to read rollback index\n");
+
 	return CMD_RET_FAILURE;
 }
 
@@ -184,6 +195,8 @@ int do_avb_write_rb(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[])
 	    AVB_IO_RESULT_OK)
 		return CMD_RET_SUCCESS;
 
+	printf("Failed to write rollback index\n");
+
 	return CMD_RET_FAILURE;
 }
 
@@ -210,6 +223,8 @@ int do_avb_get_uuid(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag,
 		return CMD_RET_SUCCESS;
 	}
 
+	printf("Failed to read UUID\n");
+
 	return CMD_RET_FAILURE;
 }
 
@@ -320,6 +335,8 @@ int do_avb_is_unlocked(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag,
 		return CMD_RET_SUCCESS;
 	}
 
+	printf("Can't determine device lock state.\n");
+
 	return CMD_RET_FAILURE;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#6 lore raw

PATCH v4 3/19 cmd: avb: print error message if command fails

Quoted 2 lines · Jens Wiklander

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#7 lore raw

PATCH v4 4/19 mmc: rpmb: add mmc_rpmb_route_frames()

In reply to Jens Wiklander

Adds mmc_rpmb_route_frames() to route RPMB data frames from/to an external entity.

---
 drivers/mmc/rpmb.c | 160 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/mmc.h      |  19 ++++++
 2 files changed, 179 insertions(+)
drivers/mmc/rpmb.c +160 -0
index dfbdb0deb107..908f19208955 100644
@@ -321,3 +321,163 @@ int mmc_rpmb_write(struct mmc *mmc, void *addr, unsigned short blk,
 	}
 	return i;
 }
+
+static int send_write_mult_block(struct mmc *mmc, const struct s_rpmb *frm,
+				 unsigned short cnt)
+{
+	struct mmc_cmd cmd = {
+		.cmdidx = MMC_CMD_WRITE_MULTIPLE_BLOCK,
+		.resp_type = MMC_RSP_R1b,
+	};
+	struct mmc_data data = {
+		.src = (const void *)frm,
+		.blocks = cnt,
+		.blocksize = sizeof(*frm),
+		.flags = MMC_DATA_WRITE,
+	};
+
+	return mmc_send_cmd(mmc, &cmd, &data);
+}
+
+static int send_read_mult_block(struct mmc *mmc, struct s_rpmb *frm,
+				unsigned short cnt)
+{
+	struct mmc_cmd cmd = {
+		.cmdidx = MMC_CMD_READ_MULTIPLE_BLOCK,
+		.resp_type = MMC_RSP_R1,
+	};
+	struct mmc_data data = {
+		.dest = (void *)frm,
+		.blocks = cnt,
+		.blocksize = sizeof(*frm),
+		.flags = MMC_DATA_READ,
+	};
+
+	return mmc_send_cmd(mmc, &cmd, &data);
+}
+
+static int rpmb_route_write_req(struct mmc *mmc, struct s_rpmb *req,
+				unsigned short req_cnt, struct s_rpmb *rsp,
+				unsigned short rsp_cnt)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * Send the write request.
+	 */
+	ret = mmc_set_blockcount(mmc, req_cnt, true);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = send_write_mult_block(mmc, req, req_cnt);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * Read the result of the request.
+	 */
+	ret = mmc_set_blockcount(mmc, 1, false);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	memset(rsp, 0, sizeof(*rsp));
+	rsp->request = cpu_to_be16(RPMB_REQ_STATUS);
+	ret = send_write_mult_block(mmc, rsp, 1);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = mmc_set_blockcount(mmc, 1, false);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	return send_read_mult_block(mmc, rsp, 1);
+}
+
+static int rpmb_route_read_req(struct mmc *mmc, struct s_rpmb *req,
+			       unsigned short req_cnt, struct s_rpmb *rsp,
+			       unsigned short rsp_cnt)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * Send the read request.
+	 */
+	ret = mmc_set_blockcount(mmc, 1, false);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = send_write_mult_block(mmc, req, 1);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * Read the result of the request.
+	 */
+
+	ret = mmc_set_blockcount(mmc, rsp_cnt, false);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	return send_read_mult_block(mmc, rsp, rsp_cnt);
+}
+
+static int rpmb_route_frames(struct mmc *mmc, struct s_rpmb *req,
+			     unsigned short req_cnt, struct s_rpmb *rsp,
+			     unsigned short rsp_cnt)
+{
+	unsigned short n;
+
+	/*
+	 * If multiple request frames are provided, make sure that all are
+	 * of the same type.
+	 */
+	for (n = 1; n < req_cnt; n++)
+		if (req[n].request != req->request)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+	switch (be16_to_cpu(req->request)) {
+	case RPMB_REQ_KEY:
+		if (req_cnt != 1 || rsp_cnt != 1)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return rpmb_route_write_req(mmc, req, req_cnt, rsp, rsp_cnt);
+
+	case RPMB_REQ_WRITE_DATA:
+		if (!req_cnt || rsp_cnt != 1)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return rpmb_route_write_req(mmc, req, req_cnt, rsp, rsp_cnt);
+
+	case RPMB_REQ_WCOUNTER:
+		if (req_cnt != 1 || rsp_cnt != 1)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return rpmb_route_read_req(mmc, req, req_cnt, rsp, rsp_cnt);
+
+	case RPMB_REQ_READ_DATA:
+		if (req_cnt != 1 || !req_cnt)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		return rpmb_route_read_req(mmc, req, req_cnt, rsp, rsp_cnt);
+
+	default:
+		debug("Unsupported message type: %d\n",
+		      be16_to_cpu(req->request));
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+}
+
+int mmc_rpmb_route_frames(struct mmc *mmc, void *req, unsigned long reqlen,
+			  void *rsp, unsigned long rsplen)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Whoever crafted the data supplied to this function knows how to
+	 * format the PRMB frames and which response is expected. If
+	 * there's some unexpected mismatch it's more helpful to report an
+	 * error immediately than trying to guess what was the intention
+	 * and possibly just delay an eventual error which will be harder
+	 * to track down.
+	 */
+
+	if (reqlen % sizeof(struct s_rpmb) || rsplen % sizeof(struct s_rpmb))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return rpmb_route_frames(mmc, req, reqlen / sizeof(struct s_rpmb),
+				 rsp, rsplen / sizeof(struct s_rpmb));
+}
include/mmc.h +19 -0
index df4255b828a7..aa2499020cab 100644
@@ -748,6 +748,25 @@ int mmc_rpmb_read(struct mmc *mmc, void *addr, unsigned short blk,
 		  unsigned short cnt, unsigned char *key);
 int mmc_rpmb_write(struct mmc *mmc, void *addr, unsigned short blk,
 		   unsigned short cnt, unsigned char *key);
+
+/**
+ * mmc_rpmb_route_frames() - route RPMB data frames
+ * @mmc		Pointer to a MMC device struct
+ * @req		Request data frames
+ * @reqlen	Length of data frames in bytes
+ * @rsp		Supplied buffer for response data frames
+ * @rsplen	Length of supplied buffer for response data frames
+ *
+ * The RPMB data frames are routed to/from some external entity, for
+ * example a Trusted Exectuion Environment in an arm TrustZone protected
+ * secure world. It's expected that it's the external entity who is in
+ * control of the RPMB key.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, < 0 on error.
+ */
+int mmc_rpmb_route_frames(struct mmc *mmc, void *req, unsigned long reqlen,
+			  void *rsp, unsigned long rsplen);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_CMD_BKOPS_ENABLE
 int mmc_set_bkops_enable(struct mmc *mmc);
 #endif
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#9 lore raw

PATCH v4 4/19 mmc: rpmb: add mmc_rpmb_route_frames()

In reply to Jens Wiklander
Quoted 6 lines · Jens Wiklander

Adds mmc_rpmb_route_frames() to route RPMB data frames from/to an external entity.

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#10 lore raw

PATCH v4 5/19 Add UCLASS_TEE for Trusted Execution Environment

In reply to Jens Wiklander

Adds a uclass to interface with a TEE (Trusted Execution Environment).

A TEE driver is a driver that interfaces with a trusted OS running in some secure environment, for example, TrustZone on ARM cpus, or a separate secure co-processor etc.

The TEE subsystem can serve a TEE driver for a Global Platform compliant TEE, but it's not limited to only Global Platform TEEs.

The over all design is based on the TEE subsystem in the Linux kernel, tailored for U-Boot.

---
 MAINTAINERS              |   6 +
 drivers/Kconfig          |   2 +
 drivers/Makefile         |   1 +
 drivers/tee/Kconfig      |  11 ++
 drivers/tee/Makefile     |   3 +
 drivers/tee/tee-uclass.c | 209 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/dm/uclass-id.h   |   1 +
 include/tee.h            | 336 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 8 files changed, 569 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/Makefile
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/tee-uclass.c
 create mode 100644 include/tee.h
MAINTAINERS +6 -0
index 8f237128b241..5b085ad3acd6 100644
@@ -585,6 +585,12 @@ TQ GROUP
 S:	Orphaned (Since 2016-02)
 T:	git git://git.denx.de/u-boot-tq-group.git
 
+TEE
+M:	Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
+S:	Maintained
+F:	drivers/tee/
+F:	include/tee.h
+
 UBI
 M:	Kyungmin Park <[email protected]>
 M:	Heiko Schocher <[email protected]>
drivers/Kconfig +2 -0
index 56536c4b1915..1e44acb4835f 100644
@@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ source "drivers/spmi/Kconfig"
 
 source "drivers/sysreset/Kconfig"
 
+source "drivers/tee/Kconfig"
+
 source "drivers/thermal/Kconfig"
 
 source "drivers/timer/Kconfig"
drivers/Makefile +1 -0
index d296354b3c01..17d6c0947a2f 100644
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ obj-y += smem/
 obj-y += soc/
 obj-$(CONFIG_REMOTEPROC) += remoteproc/
 obj-y += thermal/
+obj-$(CONFIG_TEE) += tee/
 obj-y += axi/
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_MACH_PIC32) += ddr/microchip/
drivers/tee/Kconfig new file +11 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f3fc3c2ca790
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# Generic Trusted Execution Environment Configuration
+config TEE
+	bool "Trusted Execution Environment support"
+	depends on ARM && (ARM64 || CPU_V7A)
+	select ARM_SMCCC
+	help
+	  This implements a generic interface towards a Trusted Execution
+	  Environment (TEE). A TEE is a trusted OS running in some secure
+	  environment, for example, TrustZone on ARM cpus, or a separate
+	  secure co-processor etc. See also:
+	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_execution_environment
drivers/tee/Makefile new file +3 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b6d8e16e6211
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+
+obj-y += tee-uclass.o
drivers/tee/tee-uclass.c new file +209 -0

209 lines not on this page · raw message

include/dm/uclass-id.h +1 -0
index 7027ea076dbf..ccfab99439ff 100644
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ enum uclass_id {
 	UCLASS_SPI_GENERIC,	/* Generic SPI flash target */
 	UCLASS_SYSCON,		/* System configuration device */
 	UCLASS_SYSRESET,	/* System reset device */
+	UCLASS_TEE,		/* Trusted Execution Environment device */
 	UCLASS_THERMAL,		/* Thermal sensor */
 	UCLASS_TIMER,		/* Timer device */
 	UCLASS_TPM,		/* Trusted Platform Module TIS interface */
include/tee.h new file +336 -0

336 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#11 lore raw

PATCH v4 5/19 Add UCLASS_TEE for Trusted Execution Environment

Quoted 9 lines · Jens Wiklander

Adds a uclass to interface with a TEE (Trusted Execution Environment).

A TEE driver is a driver that interfaces with a trusted OS running in some secure environment, for example, TrustZone on ARM cpus, or a separate secure co-processor etc.

The TEE subsystem can serve a TEE driver for a Global Platform compliant TEE, but it's not limited to only Global Platform TEEs.

Quoted 6 lines

The over all design is based on the TEE subsystem in the Linux kernel, tailored for U-Boot.

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#12 lore raw

PATCH v4 6/19 dt/bindings: add bindings for optee

In reply to Jens Wiklander

Sync with c8bfafb15944 ("dt/bindings: add bindings for optee") from Linux kernel.

Introduces linaro prefix and adds bindings for ARM TrustZone based OP-TEE implementation.

---
 .../firmware/linaro,optee-tz.txt              | 31 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 doc/device-tree-bindings/firmware/linaro,optee-tz.txt
doc/device-tree-bindings/firmware/linaro,optee-tz.txt new file +31 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d38834c67dff
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+OP-TEE Device Tree Bindings
+
+OP-TEE is a piece of software using hardware features to provide a Trusted
+Execution Environment. The security can be provided with ARM TrustZone, but
+also by virtualization or a separate chip.
+
+We're using "linaro" as the first part of the compatible property for
+the reference implementation maintained by Linaro.
+
+* OP-TEE based on ARM TrustZone required properties:
+
+- compatible     : should contain "linaro,optee-tz"
+
+- method         : The method of calling the OP-TEE Trusted OS. Permitted
+                   values are:
+
+                   "smc" : SMC #0, with the register assignments specified
+		           in drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h
+
+                   "hvc" : HVC #0, with the register assignments specified
+		           in drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h
+
+
+
+Example:
+	firmware {
+		optee {
+			compatible = "linaro,optee-tz";
+			method = "smc";
+		};
+	};
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#13 lore raw

PATCH v4 6/19 dt/bindings: add bindings for optee

Quoted 8 lines · Jens Wiklander

Sync with c8bfafb15944 ("dt/bindings: add bindings for optee") from Linux kernel.

Introduces linaro prefix and adds bindings for ARM TrustZone based OP-TEE implementation.

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#14 lore raw

PATCH v4 7/19 tee: add OP-TEE driver

In reply to Jens Wiklander

Adds a OP-TEE driver.

* Targets ARM and ARM64
* Supports using any U-Boot memory as shared memory
* Probes OP-TEE version using SMCs
* Uses OPTEE message protocol version 2 to communicate with secure world

---
 drivers/tee/Kconfig                      |  10 +
 drivers/tee/Makefile                     |   1 +
 drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig                |  11 +
 drivers/tee/optee/Makefile               |   4 +
 drivers/tee/optee/core.c                 | 654 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h            | 425 +++++++++++++++
 drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg_supplicant.h | 240 +++++++++
 drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h        |  12 +
 drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h            | 450 ++++++++++++++++
 drivers/tee/optee/supplicant.c           |  93 ++++
 10 files changed, 1900 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/Makefile
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/core.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg_supplicant.h
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/supplicant.c
drivers/tee/Kconfig +10 -0
index f3fc3c2ca790..835c256e9239 100644
@@ -9,3 +9,13 @@ config TEE
 	  environment, for example, TrustZone on ARM cpus, or a separate
 	  secure co-processor etc. See also:
 	  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_execution_environment
+
+if TEE
+
+menu "TEE drivers"
+
+source "drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig"
+
+endmenu
+
+endif
drivers/tee/Makefile +1 -0
index b6d8e16e6211..19633b60f235 100644
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
 
 obj-y += tee-uclass.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_OPTEE) += optee/
drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig new file +11 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7484e6fea114
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# OP-TEE Trusted Execution Environment Configuration
+config OPTEE
+	bool "OP-TEE"
+	depends on ARM_SMCCC
+	help
+	  This implements the OP-TEE Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
+	  driver. OP-TEE is a Trusted OS designed primarily to rely on the
+	  ARM TrustZone(R) technology as the underlying hardware isolation
+	  mechanism. This driver can request services from OP-TEE, but also
+	  handle Remote Procedure Calls (RPC) from OP-TEE needed to
+	  execute a service. For more information see: https://www.op-tee.org
drivers/tee/optee/Makefile new file +4 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6148feb474a5
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+
+obj-y += core.o
+obj-y += supplicant.o
drivers/tee/optee/core.c new file +654 -0

654 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h new file +425 -0

425 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg_supplicant.h new file +240 -0

240 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h new file +12 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..35adb83afcc7
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Linaro Limited
+ */
+
+#ifndef __OPTEE_PRIVATE_H
+#define __OPTEE_PRIVATE_H
+
+void *optee_alloc_and_init_page_list(void *buf, ulong len, u64 *phys_buf_ptr);
+void optee_suppl_cmd(struct udevice *dev, void *shm, void **page_list);
+
+#endif /* __OPTEE_PRIVATE_H */
drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h new file +450 -0

450 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/tee/optee/supplicant.c new file +93 -0

93 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#15 lore raw

PATCH v4 7/19 tee: add OP-TEE driver

Quoted 10 lines · Jens Wiklander

Adds a OP-TEE driver.

* Targets ARM and ARM64
* Supports using any U-Boot memory as shared memory
* Probes OP-TEE version using SMCs
* Uses OPTEE message protocol version 2 to communicate with secure world

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#16 lore raw

PATCH v4 8/19 Documentation: tee uclass and op-tee driver

In reply to Jens Wiklander
---
 doc/README.tee | 112 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 112 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 doc/README.tee
doc/README.tee new file +112 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..79e7996a6f5f
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+=============
+TEE uclass
+=============
+
+This document describes the TEE uclass in U-Boot
+
+A TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) is a trusted OS running in some
+secure environment, for example, TrustZone on ARM CPUs, or a separate
+secure co-processor etc. A TEE driver handles the details needed to
+communicate with the TEE.
+
+This uclass deals with:
+
+- Registration of TEE drivers
+
+- Managing shared memory between U-Boot and the TEE
+
+- Providing a generic API to the TEE
+
+The TEE interface
+=================
+
+include/tee.h defines the generic interface to a TEE.
+
+A client finds the TEE device via tee_find_device(). Other important functions
+when interfacing with a TEE are:
+
+- tee_shm_alloc(), tee_shm_register() and tee_shm_free() to manage shared
+  memory objects often needed when communicating with the TEE.
+
+- tee_get_version() lets the client know which the capabilities of the TEE
+  device.
+
+- tee_open_session() opens a session to a Trusted Application
+
+- tee_invoke_func() invokes a function in a Trusted Application
+
+- tee_close_session() closes a session to a Trusted Application
+
+Much of the communication between clients and the TEE is opaque to the
+driver. The main job for the driver is to receive requests from the
+clients, forward them to the TEE and send back the results.
+
+OP-TEE driver
+=============
+
+The OP-TEE driver handles OP-TEE [1] based TEEs. Currently it is only the ARM
+TrustZone based OP-TEE solution that is supported.
+
+Lowest level of communication with OP-TEE builds on ARM SMC Calling
+Convention (SMCCC) [2], which is the foundation for OP-TEE's SMC interface
+[3] used internally by the driver. Stacked on top of that is OP-TEE Message
+Protocol [4].
+
+OP-TEE SMC interface provides the basic functions required by SMCCC and some
+additional functions specific for OP-TEE. The most interesting functions are:
+
+- OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_CALLS_UID (part of SMCCC) returns the version information
+  which is then returned by TEE_IOC_VERSION
+
+- OPTEE_SMC_CALL_GET_OS_UUID returns the particular OP-TEE implementation, used
+  to tell, for instance, a TrustZone OP-TEE apart from an OP-TEE running on a
+  separate secure co-processor.
+
+- OPTEE_SMC_CALL_WITH_ARG drives the OP-TEE message protocol
+
+- OPTEE_SMC_GET_SHM_CONFIG lets the driver and OP-TEE agree on which memory
+  range to used for shared memory between Linux and OP-TEE.
+
+The GlobalPlatform TEE Client API [5] is implemented on top of the generic
+TEE API.
+
+Picture of the relationship between the different components in the
+OP-TEE architecture:
+
+                   U-Boot                  Secure world
+                   ~~~~~~                  ~~~~~~~~~~~~
+                 +------------+           +-------------+
+                 | Client     |           | Trusted     |
+                 |            |           | Application |
+                 +------------+           +-------------+
+                       /\                       /\
+                       ||                       ||
+                       \/                       \/
+                 +------------+           +-------------+
+                 | TEE        |           | TEE Internal|
+                 | uclass     |           | API         |
+                 +------------+           +-------------+
+                 | OP-TEE     |           | OP-TEE      |
+                 | driver     |           | Trusted OS  |
+                 +------------+-----------+-------------+
+                 |             OP-TEE MSG               |
+                 |      SMCCC (OPTEE_SMC_CALL_*)        |
+                 +--------------------------------------+
+
+RPC (Remote Procedure Call) are requests from secure world to the driver.
+An RPC is identified by a special range of SMCCC return values from
+OPTEE_SMC_CALL_WITH_ARG.
+
+References
+==========
+
+[1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os
+
+[2] http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0028a/index.html
+
+[3] drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h
+
+[4] drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h
+
+[5] http://www.globalplatform.org/specificationsdevice.asp look for
+    "TEE Client API Specification v1.0" and click download.
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#17 lore raw

PATCH v4 8/19 Documentation: tee uclass and op-tee driver

Quoted 2 lines · Jens Wiklander

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#18 lore raw

PATCH v4 9/19 arm: dt: hikey: Add optee node

In reply to Jens Wiklander

Sync with 14e21cb8f811 ("arm64: dt: hikey: Add optee node" from Linux kernel.

---
 arch/arm/dts/hi6220-hikey.dts | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
arch/arm/dts/hi6220-hikey.dts +7 -0
index 818525197508..24f09257af00 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,13 @@
 		device_type = "memory";
 		reg = <0x0 0x0 0x0 0x40000000>;
 	};
+
+	firmware {
+		optee {
+			compatible = "linaro,optee-tz";
+			method = "smc";
+		};
+	};
 };
 
 &uart2 {
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#19 lore raw

PATCH v4 9/19 arm: dt: hikey: Add optee node

Quoted 5 lines · Jens Wiklander

Sync with 14e21cb8f811 ("arm64: dt: hikey: Add optee node" from Linux kernel.

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#20 lore raw

PATCH v4 10/19 optee: support routing of rpmb data frames to mmc

In reply to Jens Wiklander

Adds support in optee supplicant to route signed (MACed) RPMB frames from OP-TEE Secure OS to MMC and vice versa to manipulate the RPMB partition.

---
 drivers/tee/optee/Makefile        |   1 +
 drivers/tee/optee/core.c          |   8 ++
 drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h |  55 ++++++++-
 drivers/tee/optee/rpmb.c          | 181 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/tee/optee/supplicant.c    |   3 +
 5 files changed, 247 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/rpmb.c
drivers/tee/optee/Makefile +1 -0
index 6148feb474a5..928d3f80027f 100644
@@ -2,3 +2,4 @@
 
 obj-y += core.o
 obj-y += supplicant.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SUPPORT_EMMC_RPMB) += rpmb.o
drivers/tee/optee/core.c +8 -0
index 726382da9bb8..7f870f2f735d 100644
@@ -315,6 +315,13 @@ static u32 do_call_with_arg(struct udevice *dev, struct optee_msg_arg *arg)
 			param.a3 = res.a3;
 			handle_rpc(dev, &param, &page_list);
 		} else {
+			/*
+			 * In case we've accessed RPMB to serve an RPC
+			 * request we need to restore the previously
+			 * selected partition as the caller may expect it
+			 * to remain unchanged.
+			 */
+			optee_suppl_rpmb_release(dev);
 			return call_err_to_res(res.a0);
 		}
 	}
@@ -651,4 +658,5 @@ U_BOOT_DRIVER(optee) = {
 	.probe = optee_probe,
 	.ops = &optee_ops,
 	.platdata_auto_alloc_size = sizeof(struct optee_pdata),
+	.priv_auto_alloc_size = sizeof(struct optee_private),
 };
drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h +54 -1

61 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/tee/optee/rpmb.c new file +181 -0

181 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/tee/optee/supplicant.c +3 -0
index 2239b1bf7b37..b1ea65bdb2e3 100644
@@ -85,6 +85,9 @@ void optee_suppl_cmd(struct udevice *dev, struct tee_shm *shm_arg,
 		debug("OPTEE_MSG_RPC_CMD_FS not implemented\n");
 		arg->ret = TEE_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
 		break;
+	case OPTEE_MSG_RPC_CMD_RPMB:
+		optee_suppl_cmd_rpmb(dev, arg);
+		break;
 	default:
 		arg->ret = TEE_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#21 lore raw

PATCH v4 10/19 optee: support routing of rpmb data frames to mmc

Quoted 6 lines · Jens Wiklander

Adds support in optee supplicant to route signed (MACed) RPMB frames from OP-TEE Secure OS to MMC and vice versa to manipulate the RPMB partition.

Quoted 8 lines
---
 drivers/tee/optee/Makefile        |   1 +
 drivers/tee/optee/core.c          |   8 ++
 drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h |  55 ++++++++-
 drivers/tee/optee/rpmb.c          | 181 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/tee/optee/supplicant.c    |   3 +
 5 files changed, 247 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/rpmb.c
#22 lore raw

PATCH v4 10/19 optee: support routing of rpmb data frames to mmc

In reply to Jens Wiklander
Quoted 7 lines · Jens Wiklander

Adds support in optee supplicant to route signed (MACed) RPMB frames from OP-TEE Secure OS to MMC and vice versa to manipulate the RPMB partition.

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#23 lore raw

PATCH v4 11/19 tee: optee: support AVB trusted application

In reply to Jens Wiklander

Adds configuration option OPTEE_TA_AVB and a header file describing the interface to the Android Verified Boot 2.0 (AVB) trusted application provided by OP-TEE.

---
 MAINTAINERS                |  1 +
 drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig  | 16 +++++++++++++
 drivers/tee/tee-uclass.c   | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/tee.h              | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/tee/optee_ta_avb.h | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 127 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 include/tee/optee_ta_avb.h
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
index 5b085ad3acd6..1c96ece8cc9e 100644
@@ -590,6 +590,7 @@ M:	Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
 S:	Maintained
 F:	drivers/tee/
 F:	include/tee.h
+F:	include/tee/
 
 UBI
 M:	Kyungmin Park <[email protected]>
drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig +16 -0
index 7484e6fea114..dbfa7846a30f 100644
@@ -9,3 +9,19 @@ config OPTEE
 	  mechanism. This driver can request services from OP-TEE, but also
 	  handle Remote Procedure Calls (RPC) from OP-TEE needed to
 	  execute a service. For more information see: https://www.op-tee.org
+
+if OPTEE
+
+menu "OP-TEE options"
+
+config OPTEE_TA_AVB
+	bool "Support AVB TA"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enables support for the AVB Trusted Application (TA) in OP-TEE.
+	  The TA can support the "avb" subcommands "read_rb", "write"rb"
+	  and "is_unlocked".
+
+endmenu
+
+endif
drivers/tee/tee-uclass.c +24 -0
index 1bee54ebf4af..abb88c0fee53 100644
@@ -207,3 +207,27 @@ UCLASS_DRIVER(tee) = {
 	.pre_probe = tee_pre_probe,
 	.pre_remove = tee_pre_remove,
 };
+
+void tee_optee_ta_uuid_from_octets(struct tee_optee_ta_uuid *d,
+				   const u8 s[TEE_UUID_LEN])
+{
+	d->time_low = ((u32)s[0] << 24) | ((u32)s[1] << 16) |
+		      ((u32)s[2] << 8) | s[3],
+	d->time_mid = ((u32)s[4] << 8) | s[5];
+	d->time_hi_and_version = ((u32)s[6] << 8) | s[7];
+	memcpy(d->clock_seq_and_node, s + 8, sizeof(d->clock_seq_and_node));
+}
+
+void tee_optee_ta_uuid_to_octets(u8 d[TEE_UUID_LEN],
+				 const struct tee_optee_ta_uuid *s)
+{
+	d[0] = s->time_low >> 24;
+	d[1] = s->time_low >> 16;
+	d[2] = s->time_low >> 8;
+	d[3] = s->time_low;
+	d[4] = s->time_mid >> 8;
+	d[5] = s->time_mid;
+	d[6] = s->time_hi_and_version >> 8;
+	d[7] = s->time_hi_and_version;
+	memcpy(d + 8, s->clock_seq_and_node, sizeof(s->clock_seq_and_node));
+}
include/tee.h +38 -0
index b86dbec257b4..98b1c9cc693a 100644
@@ -49,6 +49,22 @@
 #define TEE_ORIGIN_TRUSTED_APP		0x00000004
 
 struct udevice;
+
+/**
+ * struct tee_optee_ta_uuid - OP-TEE Trusted Application (TA) UUID format
+ *
+ * Used to identify an OP-TEE TA and define suitable to initialize structs
+ * of this format is distributed with the interface of the TA. The
+ * individual fields of this struct doesn't have any special meaning in
+ * OP-TEE. See RFC4122 for details on the format.
+ */
+struct tee_optee_ta_uuid {
+	u32 time_low;
+	u16 time_mid;
+	u16 time_hi_and_version;
+	u8 clock_seq_and_node[8];
+};
+
 /**
  * struct tee_shm - memory shared with the TEE
  * @dev:	The TEE device
@@ -333,4 +349,26 @@ int tee_close_session(struct udevice *dev, u32 session);
 int tee_invoke_func(struct udevice *dev, struct tee_invoke_arg *arg,
 		    uint num_param, struct tee_param *param);
 
+/**
+ * tee_optee_ta_uuid_from_octets() - Converts to struct tee_optee_ta_uuid
+ * @d:	Destination struct
+ * @s:	Source UUID octets
+ *
+ * Conversion to a struct tee_optee_ta_uuid represantion from binary octet
+ * representation.
+ */
+void tee_optee_ta_uuid_from_octets(struct tee_optee_ta_uuid *d,
+				   const u8 s[TEE_UUID_LEN]);
+
+/**
+ * tee_optee_ta_uuid_to_octets() - Converts from struct tee_optee_ta_uuid
+ * @d:	Destination UUID octets
+ * @s:	Source struct
+ *
+ * Conversion from a struct tee_optee_ta_uuid represantion to binary octet
+ * representation.
+ */
+void tee_optee_ta_uuid_to_octets(u8 d[TEE_UUID_LEN],
+				 const struct tee_optee_ta_uuid *s);
+
 #endif /* __TEE_H */
include/tee/optee_ta_avb.h new file +48 -0

48 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#24 lore raw

PATCH v4 11/19 tee: optee: support AVB trusted application

Quoted 7 lines · Jens Wiklander

Adds configuration option OPTEE_TA_AVB and a header file describing the interface to the Android Verified Boot 2.0 (AVB) trusted application provided by OP-TEE.

Quoted 8 lines
---
 MAINTAINERS                |  1 +
 drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig  | 16 +++++++++++++
 drivers/tee/tee-uclass.c   | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/tee.h              | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/tee/optee_ta_avb.h | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 127 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 include/tee/optee_ta_avb.h
#25 lore raw

PATCH v4 11/19 tee: optee: support AVB trusted application

In reply to Jens Wiklander
Quoted 8 lines · Jens Wiklander

Adds configuration option OPTEE_TA_AVB and a header file describing the interface to the Android Verified Boot 2.0 (AVB) trusted application provided by OP-TEE.

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#26 lore raw

PATCH v4 12/19 sandbox: dt: add sandbox_tee node

In reply to Jens Wiklander

Adds a sandbox_tee node to enable the sandbox tee driver in all the sandbox dts files.

---
 arch/sandbox/dts/sandbox.dts   | 4 ++++
 arch/sandbox/dts/sandbox64.dts | 4 ++++
 arch/sandbox/dts/test.dts      | 4 ++++
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
arch/sandbox/dts/sandbox.dts +4 -0
index 6ac37f1ed7be..af7f12aa5889 100644
@@ -322,6 +322,10 @@
 			reg = <0x0 0x400>;
 		};
 	};
+
+	sandbox_tee {
+		compatible = "sandbox,tee";
+	};
 };
 
 #include "cros-ec-keyboard.dtsi"
arch/sandbox/dts/sandbox64.dts +4 -0
index 9e65d2fda3d3..0e32fdad9d81 100644
@@ -311,6 +311,10 @@
 			};
 		};
 	};
+
+	sandbox_tee {
+		compatible = "sandbox,tee";
+	};
 };
 
 #include "cros-ec-keyboard.dtsi"
arch/sandbox/dts/test.dts +4 -0
index 366826333181..997f8f996f23 100644
@@ -630,6 +630,10 @@
 			};
 		};
 	};
+
+	sandbox_tee {
+		compatible = "sandbox,tee";
+	};
 };
 
 #include "sandbox_pmic.dtsi"
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#27 lore raw

PATCH v4 12/19 sandbox: dt: add sandbox_tee node

Quoted 5 lines · Jens Wiklander

Adds a sandbox_tee node to enable the sandbox tee driver in all the sandbox dts files.

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
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#29 lore raw

PATCH v4 13/19 sandbox: imply CONFIG_TEE (TEE uclass)

Quoted 2 lines · Jens Wiklander

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

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#30 lore raw

PATCH v4 14/19 tee: add sandbox driver

In reply to Jens Wiklander

Adds a sandbox tee driver which emulates a generic TEE with the OP-TEE AVB TA.

---
 drivers/tee/Kconfig       |  18 ++-
 drivers/tee/Makefile      |   1 +
 drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig |   2 +-
 drivers/tee/sandbox.c     | 308 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/sandboxtee.h      |  21 +++
 5 files changed, 347 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/sandbox.c
 create mode 100644 include/sandboxtee.h
drivers/tee/Kconfig +16 -2
index 835c256e9239..5c0c89043fac 100644
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 # Generic Trusted Execution Environment Configuration
 config TEE
 	bool "Trusted Execution Environment support"
-	depends on ARM && (ARM64 || CPU_V7A)
-	select ARM_SMCCC
+	depends on (ARM && (ARM64 || CPU_V7A)) || SANDBOX
+	select ARM_SMCCC if ARM
 	help
 	  This implements a generic interface towards a Trusted Execution
 	  Environment (TEE). A TEE is a trusted OS running in some secure
@@ -14,6 +14,20 @@ if TEE
 
 menu "TEE drivers"
 
+config SANDBOX_TEE
+	bool "Sandbox TEE emulator"
+	depends on SANDBOX
+	default y
+	help
+	  This emulates a generic TEE needed for testing including the AVB
+	  TA. The emulation provides all callbacks of a regular TEE and
+	  supports session and shared memory management. The AVB TA is
+	  emulated with rollback indexes and device lock-state, the state
+	  of the TA is only kept in RAM and will be reset on each boot.
+	  The emulation only supports one open session at a time.
+	  Interaction from the U-Boot command line in possible via the
+	  "avb" commands.
+
 source "drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig"
 
 endmenu
drivers/tee/Makefile +1 -0
index 19633b60f235..f72c68c09f33 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
 
 obj-y += tee-uclass.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SANDBOX) += sandbox.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_OPTEE) += optee/
drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig +1 -1
index dbfa7846a30f..d489834df926 100644
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ config OPTEE
 	  handle Remote Procedure Calls (RPC) from OP-TEE needed to
 	  execute a service. For more information see: https://www.op-tee.org
 
-if OPTEE
+if OPTEE || SANDBOX
 
 menu "OP-TEE options"
 
drivers/tee/sandbox.c new file +308 -0

308 lines not on this page · raw message

include/sandboxtee.h new file +21 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..44f653d9cf3b
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Linaro Limited
+ */
+
+#ifndef __SANDBOXTEE_H
+#define __SANDBOXTEE_H
+
+/**
+ * struct sandbox_tee_state - internal state of the sandbox TEE
+ * @session:	current open session
+ * @num_shms:	number of registered shared memory objects
+ * @ta:		Trusted Application of current session
+ */
+struct sandbox_tee_state {
+	u32 session;
+	int num_shms;
+	void *ta;
+};
+
+#endif /*__SANDBOXTEE_H*/
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#31 lore raw

PATCH v4 14/19 tee: add sandbox driver

Quoted 5 lines · Jens Wiklander

Adds a sandbox tee driver which emulates a generic TEE with the OP-TEE AVB TA.

Quoted 9 lines
---
 drivers/tee/Kconfig       |  18 ++-
 drivers/tee/Makefile      |   1 +
 drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig |   2 +-
 drivers/tee/sandbox.c     | 308 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/sandboxtee.h      |  21 +++
 5 files changed, 347 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/tee/sandbox.c
 create mode 100644 include/sandboxtee.h
#32 lore raw

PATCH v4 14/19 tee: add sandbox driver

In reply to Jens Wiklander
Quoted 6 lines · Jens Wiklander

Adds a sandbox tee driver which emulates a generic TEE with the OP-TEE AVB TA.

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#33 lore raw

PATCH v4 15/19 test: tee: test TEE uclass

In reply to Jens Wiklander

Tests the TEE uclass with a sandbox tee driver.

---
 test/dm/Makefile |  1 +
 test/dm/tee.c    | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 99 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 test/dm/tee.c
test/dm/Makefile +1 -0
index 67c1fe6d0142..b1eedf4a6ee2 100644
@@ -46,4 +46,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SPMI) += spmi.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_WDT) += wdt.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_AXI) += axi.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_MISC) += misc.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_TEE) += tee.o
 endif
test/dm/tee.c new file +98 -0

98 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#34 lore raw

PATCH v4 15/19 test: tee: test TEE uclass

Quoted 4 lines · Jens Wiklander

Tests the TEE uclass with a sandbox tee driver.

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
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#35 lore raw

PATCH v4 16/19 avb_verify: support using OP-TEE TA AVB

In reply to Jens Wiklander

With CONFIG_OPTEE_TA_AVB use the trusted application AVB provided by OP-TEE to manage rollback indexes and device-lock status.

---
 common/avb_verify.c  | 118 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 doc/README.avb2      |  13 +++++
 include/avb_verify.h |   4 ++
 3 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
common/avb_verify.c +117 -1
index f8c6ae5566ae..a8c5a3e7db36 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
 #include <image.h>
 #include <malloc.h>
 #include <part.h>
+#include <tee.h>
+#include <tee/optee_ta_avb.h>
 
 static const unsigned char avb_root_pub[1032] = {
 	0x0, 0x0, 0x10, 0x0, 0x55, 0xd9, 0x4, 0xad, 0xd8, 0x4,
@@ -600,6 +602,65 @@ static AvbIOResult validate_vbmeta_public_key(AvbOps *ops,
 	return AVB_IO_RESULT_OK;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_TA_AVB
+static int get_open_session(struct AvbOpsData *ops_data)
+{
+	struct udevice *tee = NULL;
+
+	while (!ops_data->tee) {
+		const struct tee_optee_ta_uuid uuid = TA_AVB_UUID;
+		struct tee_open_session_arg arg;
+		int rc;
+
+		tee = tee_find_device(tee, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+		if (!tee)
+			return -ENODEV;
+
+		memset(&arg, 0, sizeof(arg));
+		tee_optee_ta_uuid_to_octets(arg.uuid, &uuid);
+		rc = tee_open_session(tee, &arg, 0, NULL);
+		if (!rc) {
+			ops_data->tee = tee;
+			ops_data->session = arg.session;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static AvbIOResult invoke_func(struct AvbOpsData *ops_data, u32 func,
+			       ulong num_param, struct tee_param *param)
+{
+	struct tee_invoke_arg arg;
+
+	if (get_open_session(ops_data))
+		return AVB_IO_RESULT_ERROR_IO;
+
+	memset(&arg, 0, sizeof(arg));
+	arg.func = func;
+	arg.session = ops_data->session;
+
+	if (tee_invoke_func(ops_data->tee, &arg, num_param, param))
+		return AVB_IO_RESULT_ERROR_IO;
+	switch (arg.ret) {
+	case TEE_SUCCESS:
+		return AVB_IO_RESULT_OK;
+	case TEE_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY:
+		return AVB_IO_RESULT_ERROR_OOM;
+	case TEE_ERROR_TARGET_DEAD:
+		/*
+		 * The TA has paniced, close the session to reload the TA
+		 * for the next request.
+		 */
+		tee_close_session(ops_data->tee, ops_data->session);
+		ops_data->tee = NULL;
+		return AVB_IO_RESULT_ERROR_IO;
+	default:
+		return AVB_IO_RESULT_ERROR_IO;
+	}
+}
+#endif
+
 /**
  * read_rollback_index() - gets the rollback index corresponding to the
  * location of given by @out_rollback_index.
@@ -615,6 +676,7 @@ static AvbIOResult read_rollback_index(AvbOps *ops,
 				       size_t rollback_index_slot,
 				       u64 *out_rollback_index)
 {
+#ifndef CONFIG_OPTEE_TA_AVB
 	/* For now we always return 0 as the stored rollback index. */
 	printf("%s not supported yet\n", __func__);
 
@@ -622,6 +684,27 @@ static AvbIOResult read_rollback_index(AvbOps *ops,
 		*out_rollback_index = 0;
 
 	return AVB_IO_RESULT_OK;
+#else
+	AvbIOResult rc;
+	struct tee_param param[2];
+
+	if (rollback_index_slot >= TA_AVB_MAX_ROLLBACK_LOCATIONS)
+		return AVB_IO_RESULT_ERROR_NO_SUCH_VALUE;
+
+	memset(param, 0, sizeof(param));
+	param[0].attr = TEE_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_VALUE_INPUT;
+	param[0].u.value.a = rollback_index_slot;
+	param[1].attr = TEE_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_VALUE_OUTPUT;
+
+	rc = invoke_func(ops->user_data, TA_AVB_CMD_READ_ROLLBACK_INDEX,
+			 ARRAY_SIZE(param), param);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+
+	*out_rollback_index = (u64)param[1].u.value.a << 32 |
+			      (u32)param[1].u.value.b;
+	return AVB_IO_RESULT_OK;
+#endif
 }
 
 /**
@@ -639,10 +722,27 @@ static AvbIOResult write_rollback_index(AvbOps *ops,
 					size_t rollback_index_slot,
 					u64 rollback_index)
 {
+#ifndef CONFIG_OPTEE_TA_AVB
 	/* For now this is a no-op. */
 	printf("%s not supported yet\n", __func__);
 
 	return AVB_IO_RESULT_OK;
+#else
+	struct tee_param param[2];
+
+	if (rollback_index_slot >= TA_AVB_MAX_ROLLBACK_LOCATIONS)
+		return AVB_IO_RESULT_ERROR_NO_SUCH_VALUE;
+
+	memset(param, 0, sizeof(param));
+	param[0].attr = TEE_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_VALUE_INPUT;
+	param[0].u.value.a = rollback_index_slot;
+	param[1].attr = TEE_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_VALUE_INPUT;
+	param[1].u.value.a = (u32)(rollback_index >> 32);
+	param[1].u.value.b = (u32)rollback_index;
+
+	return invoke_func(ops->user_data, TA_AVB_CMD_WRITE_ROLLBACK_INDEX,
+			   ARRAY_SIZE(param), param);
+#endif
 }
 
 /**
@@ -658,6 +758,7 @@ static AvbIOResult write_rollback_index(AvbOps *ops,
  */
 static AvbIOResult read_is_device_unlocked(AvbOps *ops, bool *out_is_unlocked)
 {
+#ifndef CONFIG_OPTEE_TA_AVB
 	/* For now we always return that the device is unlocked. */
 
 	printf("%s not supported yet\n", __func__);
@@ -665,6 +766,16 @@ static AvbIOResult read_is_device_unlocked(AvbOps *ops, bool *out_is_unlocked)
 	*out_is_unlocked = true;
 
 	return AVB_IO_RESULT_OK;
+#else
+	AvbIOResult rc;
+	struct tee_param param = { .attr = TEE_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_VALUE_OUTPUT };
+
+	rc = invoke_func(ops->user_data, TA_AVB_CMD_READ_LOCK_STATE, 1, &param);
+	if (rc)
+		return rc;
+	*out_is_unlocked = !param.u.value.a;
+	return AVB_IO_RESULT_OK;
+#endif
 }
 
 /**
@@ -774,6 +885,11 @@ void avb_ops_free(AvbOps *ops)
 
 	ops_data = ops->user_data;
 
-	if (ops_data)
+	if (ops_data) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_TA_AVB
+		if (ops_data->tee)
+			tee_close_session(ops_data->tee, ops_data->session);
+#endif
 		avb_free(ops_data);
+	}
 }
doc/README.avb2 +13 -0
index 120279fedbe2..a29cee1b6f50 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,13 @@ Integrity of the bootloader (U-boot BLOB and environment) is out of scope.
 For additional details check:
 https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/+/master/README.md
 
+1.1. AVB using OP-TEE (optional)
+---------------------------------
+If AVB is configured to use OP-TEE (see 4. below) rollback indexes and
+device lock state are stored in RPMB. The RPMB partition is managed by
+OP-TEE (https://www.op-tee.org/) which is a secure OS leveraging ARM
+TrustZone.
+
 
 2. AVB 2.0 U-BOOT SHELL COMMANDS
 -----------------------------------
@@ -61,6 +68,12 @@ CONFIG_LIBAVB=y
 CONFIG_AVB_VERIFY=y
 CONFIG_CMD_AVB=y
 
+In addtion optionally if storing rollback indexes in RPMB with help of
+OP-TEE:
+CONFIG_TEE=y
+CONFIG_OPTEE=y
+CONFIG_OPTEE_TA_AVB=y
+CONFIG_SUPPORT_EMMC_RPMB=y
 
 Then add `avb verify` invocation to your android boot sequence of commands,
 e.g.:
include/avb_verify.h +4 -0
index eaa60f5393ef..a532a2331aea 100644
@@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ struct AvbOpsData {
 	struct AvbOps ops;
 	int mmc_dev;
 	enum avb_boot_state boot_state;
+#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_TA_AVB
+	struct udevice *tee;
+	u32 session;
+#endif
 };
 
 struct mmc_part {
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#36 lore raw

PATCH v4 16/19 avb_verify: support using OP-TEE TA AVB

Quoted 5 lines · Jens Wiklander

With CONFIG_OPTEE_TA_AVB use the trusted application AVB provided by OP-TEE to manage rollback indexes and device-lock status.

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#37 lore raw

PATCH v4 17/19 test_avb: Update pymark.buildconfigspec information for the AVB tests

In reply to Jens Wiklander

Update the pymark.buildconfigspec to depend on 'cmd_mmc' in addition to 'cmd_avb' for those tests that needs more a more complete MMC implementation or the "mmc" command.

---
 test/py/tests/test_avb.py | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
test/py/tests/test_avb.py +5 -3
index 7996e4845db3..9683fd80d074 100644
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ mmc_dev = 1
 temp_addr = 0x90000000
 temp_addr2 = 0x90002000
 
- at pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_avb')
+ at pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_avb', 'cmd_mmc')
 def test_avb_verify(u_boot_console):
     """Run AVB 2.0 boot verification chain with avb subset of commands
     """
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ def test_avb_verify(u_boot_console):
     assert response.find(success_str)
 
 
- at pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_avb')
+ at pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_avb', 'cmd_mmc')
 def test_avb_mmc_uuid(u_boot_console):
     """Check if 'avb get_uuid' works, compare results with
     'part list mmc 1' output
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ def test_avb_read_rb(u_boot_console):
     assert response == ''
 
     response = u_boot_console.run_command('avb read_rb 1')
+    assert response == 'Rollback index: 0'
 
 
 @pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_avb')
@@ -89,9 +90,10 @@ def test_avb_is_unlocked(u_boot_console):
     assert response == ''
 
     response = u_boot_console.run_command('avb is_unlocked')
+    assert response == 'Unlocked = 1'
 
 
- at pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_avb')
+ at pytest.mark.buildconfigspec('cmd_avb', 'cmd_mmc')
 def test_avb_mmc_read(u_boot_console):
     """Test mmc read operation
     """
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#38 lore raw

PATCH v4 17/19 test_avb: Update pymark.buildconfigspec information for the AVB tests

Quoted 6 lines · Jens Wiklander

Update the pymark.buildconfigspec to depend on 'cmd_mmc' in addition to 'cmd_avb' for those tests that needs more a more complete MMC implementation or the "mmc" command.

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#39 lore raw

PATCH v4 18/19 avb_verify: support sandbox configuration

In reply to Jens Wiklander

Change get_sector_buf() to use map_sysmem() to get a pointer to the CONFIG_FASTBOOT_BUF_ADDR in memory.

---
 include/avb_verify.h | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/avb_verify.h +2 -1
index a532a2331aea..18278f829e41 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 #define _AVB_VERIFY_H
 
 #include <../lib/libavb/libavb.h>
+#include <mapmem.h>
 #include <mmc.h>
 
 #define AVB_MAX_ARGS			1024
@@ -76,7 +77,7 @@ static inline size_t get_sector_buf_size(void)
 
 static inline void *get_sector_buf(void)
 {
-	return (void *)CONFIG_FASTBOOT_BUF_ADDR;
+	return map_sysmem(CONFIG_FASTBOOT_BUF_ADDR, CONFIG_FASTBOOT_BUF_SIZE);
 }
 
 static inline bool is_buf_unaligned(void *buffer)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#41 lore raw

PATCH v4 18/19 avb_verify: support sandbox configuration

In reply to Jens Wiklander
Quoted 5 lines · Jens Wiklander

Change get_sector_buf() to use map_sysmem() to get a pointer to the CONFIG_FASTBOOT_BUF_ADDR in memory.

Applied to u-boot/master, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#42 lore raw

PATCH v4 19/19 Kconfig: sandbox: enable cmd_avb and dependencies

In reply to Jens Wiklander

Enables cmd_avb and its dependencies need to run the AVB tests.

---
 arch/Kconfig             | 4 ++++
 drivers/fastboot/Kconfig | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/Kconfig +4 -0
index 8f10f3fc06e8..543362578f50 100644
@@ -92,6 +92,10 @@ config SANDBOX
 	imply LZMA
 	imply SCSI
 	imply TEE
+	imply AVB_VERIFY
+	imply LIBAVB
+	imply CMD_AVB
+	imply UDP_FUNCTION_FASTBOOT
 
 config SH
 	bool "SuperH architecture"
drivers/fastboot/Kconfig +2 -0
index bc25ea1d9c7a..d63ecdd27e4b 100644
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ config FASTBOOT_BUF_ADDR
 				ROCKCHIP_RK3399
 	default 0x280000 if ROCKCHIP_RK3368
 	default 0x100000 if ARCH_ZYNQMP
+	default 0 if SANDBOX
 	help
 	  The fastboot protocol requires a large memory buffer for
 	  downloads. Define this to the starting RAM address to use for
@@ -45,6 +46,7 @@ config FASTBOOT_BUF_SIZE
 	default 0x8000000 if ARCH_ROCKCHIP
 	default 0x6000000 if ARCH_ZYNQMP
 	default 0x2000000 if ARCH_SUNXI
+	default 0x8192 if SANDBOX
 	default 0x7000000
 	help
 	  The fastboot protocol requires a large memory buffer for
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#43 lore raw

PATCH v4 19/19 Kconfig: sandbox: enable cmd_avb and dependencies

Quoted 4 lines · Jens Wiklander

Enables cmd_avb and its dependencies need to run the AVB tests.

Applied to u-boot/master.

But please note, some of the AVB Kconfig dependencies need to be tightened up as this was attempting to build on sandbox_noblk and failing on lack of MMC stuff (due to no CONFIG_BLK). I worked around it for the moment to move this forward by updating sandbox_noblk_defconfig to disable AVB but we should correct this in Kconfig dependency expressions, thanks!

Signature · 8 lines
Tom
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#44 lore raw

v4 cover AVB using OP-TEE

In reply to Jens Wiklander

Hi Jen,

Quoted 46 lines · Jens Wiklander

Hi,

This adds support for storing AVB rollback indexes in the RPMB partition. The RPMB partition (content and key) is managed by OP-TEE
(https://www.op-tee.org/) which is a secure OS leveraging ARM TrustZone.

The Linux kernel can already support OP-TEE with reading and updating rollback indexes in the RPMB partition, the catch is that this is needed before the kernel has booted.

The design here is the same as what is in the Linux kernel, with the exception that the user space daemon tee-supplicant is integrated in the OP-TEE driver here (drivers/tee/optee/supplicant.c) instead. A new uclass (UCLASS_TEE) is introduced to provide an abstraction for interfacing with a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). There's also the OP-TEE driver using UCLASS_TEE for registration.

A Trusted Application (TA) interface is added to be used by the AVB verify functions which are updated accordingly. The TA is managed by OP-TEE and is executed in a secure TrustZone protected environment.

The header files drivers/tee/optee/optee_{msg,msg_supplicant,smc}.h and include/tee/optee_ta_avb.h are copied from
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/tree/master more or less unmodified. They may need to be updated from time to time in order to support new features.

In MMC there's a new function, mmc_rpmb_route_frames(), which as the name suggests is used to route RPMB frames to/from the MMC. This saves OP-TEE from implementing an MMC driver which would need to share resources with its counterpart here in U-Boot.

This was tested on a Hikey (Kirin 620) board.

I've added myself as maintainer of the TEE stuff.

changes in v4:
* Addressed review comments from Simon Glass
* Rebased on v2018.09
* "avb_verify: bugfix avb_ops_free() skipping free" removed due to the rebase
* Commits "dt/bindings: add bindings for optee",
"sandbox: imply CONFIG_TEE (TEE uclass)",
"tee: add sandbox driver",
"avb_verify: support using OP-TEE TA AVB",
"test_avb: Update pymark.buildconfigspec information for the AVB tests", "Kconfig: sandbox: enable cmd_avb and dependencies",

Quoted 4 lines

* Added descriptions of additional structs and functions
* In commit "avb_verify: support sandbox configuration" avoid the #ifdef CONFIG_SANDBOX in get_sector_buf() as suggested by Simon.

You might consider using patman, where you add the change log for each patch individually, and it produces the change log for the series automatically.

I find it harder to review patches which don't have their own individual change log.

Regards,
Simon

#45 lore raw

v4 cover AVB using OP-TEE

Hi Simon,

Quoted 54 lines · Simon Glass

Hi Jen,

Quoted 46 lines · Jens Wiklander

Hi,

This adds support for storing AVB rollback indexes in the RPMB partition. The RPMB partition (content and key) is managed by OP-TEE
(https://www.op-tee.org/) which is a secure OS leveraging ARM TrustZone.

The Linux kernel can already support OP-TEE with reading and updating rollback indexes in the RPMB partition, the catch is that this is needed before the kernel has booted.

The design here is the same as what is in the Linux kernel, with the exception that the user space daemon tee-supplicant is integrated in the OP-TEE driver here (drivers/tee/optee/supplicant.c) instead. A new uclass (UCLASS_TEE) is introduced to provide an abstraction for interfacing with a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). There's also the OP-TEE driver using UCLASS_TEE for registration.

A Trusted Application (TA) interface is added to be used by the AVB verify functions which are updated accordingly. The TA is managed by OP-TEE and is executed in a secure TrustZone protected environment.

The header files drivers/tee/optee/optee_{msg,msg_supplicant,smc}.h and include/tee/optee_ta_avb.h are copied from
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/tree/master more or less unmodified. They may need to be updated from time to time in order to support new features.

In MMC there's a new function, mmc_rpmb_route_frames(), which as the name suggests is used to route RPMB frames to/from the MMC. This saves OP-TEE from implementing an MMC driver which would need to share resources with its counterpart here in U-Boot.

This was tested on a Hikey (Kirin 620) board.

I've added myself as maintainer of the TEE stuff.

changes in v4:
* Addressed review comments from Simon Glass
* Rebased on v2018.09
* "avb_verify: bugfix avb_ops_free() skipping free" removed due to the rebase
* Commits "dt/bindings: add bindings for optee",
"sandbox: imply CONFIG_TEE (TEE uclass)",
"tee: add sandbox driver",
"avb_verify: support using OP-TEE TA AVB",
"test_avb: Update patiensepymark.buildconfigspec information for the AVB tests", "Kconfig: sandbox: enable cmd_avb and dependencies",

Quoted 4 lines

* Added descriptions of additional structs and functions
* In commit "avb_verify: support sandbox configuration" avoid the #ifdef CONFIG_SANDBOX in get_sector_buf() as suggested by Simon.

Quoted 6 lines

You might consider using patman, where you add the change log for each patch individually, and it produces the change log for the series automatically.

I find it harder to review patches which don't have their own individual change log.

I'll try patman next time. A big thank you for reviewing this patch series.

--
Jens

#46 lore raw

v4 cover AVB using OP-TEE

Hi Jens,

Quoted 57 lines · Jens Wiklander

Hi Simon,

Quoted 54 lines · Simon Glass

Hi Jen,

Quoted 50 lines · Jens Wiklander

Hi,

This adds support for storing AVB rollback indexes in the RPMB partition. The RPMB partition (content and key) is managed by OP-TEE
(https://www.op-tee.org/) which is a secure OS leveraging ARM TrustZone.

The Linux kernel can already support OP-TEE with reading and updating rollback indexes in the RPMB partition, the catch is that this is needed before the kernel has booted.

The design here is the same as what is in the Linux kernel, with the exception that the user space daemon tee-supplicant is integrated in the OP-TEE driver here (drivers/tee/optee/supplicant.c) instead. A new uclass (UCLASS_TEE) is introduced to provide an abstraction for interfacing with a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). There's also the OP-TEE driver using UCLASS_TEE for registration.

A Trusted Application (TA) interface is added to be used by the AVB verify functions which are updated accordingly. The TA is managed by OP-TEE and is executed in a secure TrustZone protected environment.

The header files drivers/tee/optee/optee_{msg,msg_supplicant,smc}.h and include/tee/optee_ta_avb.h are copied from
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/tree/master more or less unmodified. They may need to be updated from time to time in order to support new features.

In MMC there's a new function, mmc_rpmb_route_frames(), which as the name suggests is used to route RPMB frames to/from the MMC. This saves OP-TEE from implementing an MMC driver which would need to share resources with its counterpart here in U-Boot.

This was tested on a Hikey (Kirin 620) board.

I've added myself as maintainer of the TEE stuff.

changes in v4:
* Addressed review comments from Simon Glass
* Rebased on v2018.09
* "avb_verify: bugfix avb_ops_free() skipping free" removed due to the rebase
* Commits "dt/bindings: add bindings for optee",
"sandbox: imply CONFIG_TEE (TEE uclass)",
"tee: add sandbox driver",
"avb_verify: support using OP-TEE TA AVB",
"test_avb: Update patiensepymark.buildconfigspec information for the AVB tests", "Kconfig: sandbox: enable cmd_avb and dependencies",

* Added descriptions of additional structs and functions
* In commit "avb_verify: support sandbox configuration" avoid the #ifdef CONFIG_SANDBOX in get_sector_buf() as suggested by Simon.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

You might consider using patman, where you add the change log for each patch individually, and it produces the change log for the series automatically.

I find it harder to review patches which don't have their own individual change log.

I'll try patman next time. A big thank you for reviewing this patch series.

You made it pretty easy :-) Thanks.

- Simon