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x86/boot: Fix kexec booting failure after SEV early boot support

PATCH In review Kairui Song 4 participants 9 messages Sep 25, 2018 – Sep 26, 2018

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 x86/boot: Fix kexec booting failure after SEV early boot support

Commit 1958b5fc4010 ("x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active") is causing kexec becomes sometimes unstable, kexec reboot won't start a second kernel bypassing BIOS boot process, instead, the system got reset.

That's because, in get_sev_encryption_bit function, we are using 32-bit RIP-relative addressing to read the value of enc_bit, but kexec may alloc the early boot up code to a higher location, which is beyond 32-bit addressing limit. Some garbage will be read and get_sev_encryption_bit will return the wrong value, which lead to wrong memory page flag.

This patch adds a get_sev_encryption_bit_64 function to avoid this problem. 64-bit early boot code will use this function instead, it uses native RIP addressing to read the enc_bit which have no problem with any location.

Fixes 1958b5fc4010 ("x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active")
---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S | 64 ++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S +45 -19
index eaa843a52907..41933550449a 100644
@@ -18,27 +18,13 @@
 
 	.text
 	.code32
-ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
+do_get_sev_encryption_bit:
 	xor	%eax, %eax
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	push	%ebx
 	push	%ecx
 	push	%edx
-	push	%edi
-
-	/*
-	 * RIP-relative addressing is needed to access the encryption bit
-	 * variable. Since we are running in 32-bit mode we need this call/pop
-	 * sequence to get the proper relative addressing.
-	 */
-	call	1f
-1:	popl	%edi
-	subl	$1b, %edi
-
-	movl	enc_bit(%edi), %eax
-	cmpl	$0, %eax
-	jge	.Lsev_exit
 
 	/* Check if running under a hypervisor */
 	movl	$1, %eax
@@ -69,25 +55,65 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
 
 	movl	%ebx, %eax
 	andl	$0x3f, %eax		/* Return the encryption bit location */
-	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%edi)
 	jmp	.Lsev_exit
 
 .Lno_sev:
 	xor	%eax, %eax
-	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%edi)
 
 .Lsev_exit:
-	pop	%edi
 	pop	%edx
 	pop	%ecx
 	pop	%ebx
 
+#endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
+
+	ret
+
+ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
+	xor	%eax, %eax
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+	push	%edi
+
+	/*
+	 * RIP-relative addressing is needed to access the encryption bit
+	 * variable. Since we are running in 32-bit mode we need this call/pop
+	 * sequence to get the proper relative addressing.
+	 */
+	call	1f
+1:	popl	%edi
+	subl	$1b, %edi
+
+	movl	enc_bit(%edi), %eax
+	cmpl	$0, %eax
+	jge 2f
+
+	call    do_get_sev_encryption_bit
+	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%edi)
+2:
+	pop	%edi
 #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
 	ret
 ENDPROC(get_sev_encryption_bit)
 
 	.code64
+ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit_64)
+	xor	%rax, %rax
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+	movl	enc_bit(%rip), %eax
+	cmpl	$0, %eax
+	jge 1f
+
+	call    do_get_sev_encryption_bit
+	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%rip)
+1:
+#endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
+
+	ret
+ENDPROC(get_sev_encryption_bit_64)
+
 ENTRY(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	push	%rbp
@@ -95,7 +121,7 @@ ENTRY(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 
 	movq	%rsp, %rbp		/* Save current stack pointer */
 
-	call	get_sev_encryption_bit	/* Get the encryption bit position */
+	call	get_sev_encryption_bit_64	/* Get the encryption bit position */
 	testl	%eax, %eax
 	jz	.Lno_sev_mask
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 12 lines · Kairui Song

Commit 1958b5fc4010 ("x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active") is causing kexec becomes sometimes unstable, kexec reboot won't start a second kernel bypassing BIOS boot process, instead, the system got reset.

That's because, in get_sev_encryption_bit function, we are using 32-bit RIP-relative addressing to read the value of enc_bit, but kexec may alloc the early boot up code to a higher location, which is beyond 32-bit addressing limit. Some garbage will be read and get_sev_encryption_bit will return the wrong value, which lead to wrong memory page flag.

Quoted 7 lines

This patch adds a get_sev_encryption_bit_64 function to avoid this problem. 64-bit early boot code will use this function instead, it uses native RIP addressing to read the enc_bit which have no problem with any location.

Fixes 1958b5fc4010 ("x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active")
Quoted 116 lines
---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S | 64 ++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S +45 -19
index eaa843a52907..41933550449a 100644
@@ -18,27 +18,13 @@
 
 	.text
 	.code32
-ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
+do_get_sev_encryption_bit:
 	xor	%eax, %eax
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	push	%ebx
 	push	%ecx
 	push	%edx
-	push	%edi
-
-	/*
-	 * RIP-relative addressing is needed to access the encryption bit
-	 * variable. Since we are running in 32-bit mode we need this call/pop
-	 * sequence to get the proper relative addressing.
-	 */
-	call	1f
-1:	popl	%edi
-	subl	$1b, %edi
-
-	movl	enc_bit(%edi), %eax
-	cmpl	$0, %eax
-	jge	.Lsev_exit
 
 	/* Check if running under a hypervisor */
 	movl	$1, %eax
@@ -69,25 +55,65 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
 
 	movl	%ebx, %eax
 	andl	$0x3f, %eax		/* Return the encryption bit location */
-	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%edi)
 	jmp	.Lsev_exit
 
 .Lno_sev:
 	xor	%eax, %eax
-	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%edi)
 
 .Lsev_exit:
-	pop	%edi
 	pop	%edx
 	pop	%ecx
 	pop	%ebx
 
+#endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
+
+	ret
+
+ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
+	xor	%eax, %eax
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+	push	%edi
+
+	/*
+	 * RIP-relative addressing is needed to access the encryption bit
+	 * variable. Since we are running in 32-bit mode we need this call/pop
+	 * sequence to get the proper relative addressing.
+	 */
+	call	1f
+1:	popl	%edi
+	subl	$1b, %edi
+
+	movl	enc_bit(%edi), %eax
+	cmpl	$0, %eax
+	jge 2f
+
+	call    do_get_sev_encryption_bit
+	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%edi)
+2:
+	pop	%edi
 #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
 	ret
 ENDPROC(get_sev_encryption_bit)
 
 	.code64
+ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit_64)
+	xor	%rax, %rax
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+	movl	enc_bit(%rip), %eax
+	cmpl	$0, %eax
+	jge 1f
+
+	call    do_get_sev_encryption_bit
+	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%rip)
+1:
+#endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
+
+	ret
+ENDPROC(get_sev_encryption_bit_64)
+
 ENTRY(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	push	%rbp
@@ -95,7 +121,7 @@ ENTRY(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 
 	movq	%rsp, %rbp		/* Save current stack pointer */
 
-	call	get_sev_encryption_bit	/* Get the encryption bit position */
+	call	get_sev_encryption_bit_64	/* Get the encryption bit position */
 	testl	%eax, %eax
 	jz	.Lno_sev_mask
 
#2 lore raw
Quoted 58 lines · Thomas
Quoted 12 lines · Kairui Song

Commit 1958b5fc4010 ("x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active") is causing kexec becomes sometimes unstable, kexec reboot won't start a second kernel bypassing BIOS boot process, instead, the system got reset.

That's because, in get_sev_encryption_bit function, we are using 32-bit RIP-relative addressing to read the value of enc_bit, but kexec may alloc the early boot up code to a higher location, which is beyond 32-bit addressing limit. Some garbage will be read and get_sev_encryption_bit will return the wrong value, which lead to wrong memory page flag.

Quoted 7 lines

This patch adds a get_sev_encryption_bit_64 function to avoid this problem. 64-bit early boot code will use this function instead, it uses native RIP addressing to read the enc_bit which have no problem with any location.

Fixes 1958b5fc4010 ("x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active")
Quoted 35 lines
---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S | 64 ++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S +1 -15
index eaa843a52907..41933550449a 100644
@@ -18,27 +18,13 @@
 
 	.text
 	.code32
-ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
+do_get_sev_encryption_bit:
 	xor	%eax, %eax
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	push	%ebx
 	push	%ecx
 	push	%edx
-	push	%edi
-
-	/*
-	 * RIP-relative addressing is needed to access the encryption bit
-	 * variable. Since we are running in 32-bit mode we need this call/pop
-	 * sequence to get the proper relative addressing.
-	 */
-	call	1f
-1:	popl	%edi
-	subl	$1b, %edi
-
-	movl	enc_bit(%edi), %eax
-	cmpl	$0, %eax
-	jge	.Lsev_exit
 
Quoted 7 lines

arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit) · line 72

Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S +0 -1
 	/* Check if running under a hypervisor */
 	movl	$1, %eax
@@ -69,25 +55,65 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
 
 	movl	%ebx, %eax
 	andl	$0x3f, %eax		/* Return the encryption bit location */
-	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%edi)

IINM, the problem can be addressed in a simpler way by getting rid of enc_bit and thus getting rid of the need to do relative addressing of anything and simply doing the whole dance of figuring out the C-bit each time. It probably wouldn't be even measurable...

Signature · 5 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
-- 
#3 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Borislav Petkov

IINM, the problem can be addressed in a simpler way by getting rid of enc_bit and thus getting rid of the need to do relative addressing of anything and simply doing the whole dance of figuring out the C-bit each time. It probably wouldn't be even measurable...

Couldn't agree more.

Obviously enc_bit is redundent here. We only check eax each time, removing it can fix the RIP-relative addressing issue in kexec.

arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S +0 -18
index eaa843a52907..0b60eb867d25 100644
@@ -27,19 +27,6 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
 	push	%edx
 	push	%edi
 
-	/*
-	 * RIP-relative addressing is needed to access the encryption bit
-	 * variable. Since we are running in 32-bit mode we need this call/pop
-	 * sequence to get the proper relative addressing.
-	 */
-	call	1f
-1:	popl	%edi
-	subl	$1b, %edi
-
-	movl	enc_bit(%edi), %eax
-	cmpl	$0, %eax
-	jge	.Lsev_exit
-
 	/* Check if running under a hypervisor */
 	movl	$1, %eax
 	cpuid
@@ -69,12 +56,10 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
 
 	movl	%ebx, %eax
 	andl	$0x3f, %eax		/* Return the encryption bit location */
-	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%edi)
 	jmp	.Lsev_exit
 
 .Lno_sev:
 	xor	%eax, %eax
-	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%edi)
 
 .Lsev_exit:
 	pop	%edi
@@ -113,9 +98,6 @@ ENTRY(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 ENDPROC(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 
 	.data
-enc_bit:
-	.int	0xffffffff
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	.balign	8
 GLOBAL(sme_me_mask)
#4 lore raw
Quoted 50 lines · Baoquan He
Quoted 4 lines · Borislav Petkov

IINM, the problem can be addressed in a simpler way by getting rid of enc_bit and thus getting rid of the need to do relative addressing of anything and simply doing the whole dance of figuring out the C-bit each time. It probably wouldn't be even measurable...

Couldn't agree more.

Obviously enc_bit is redundent here. We only check eax each time, removing it can fix the RIP-relative addressing issue in kexec.

arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S +0 -15
index eaa843a52907..0b60eb867d25 100644
@@ -27,19 +27,6 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
        push    %edx
        push    %edi
 
-       /*
-        * RIP-relative addressing is needed to access the encryption bit
-        * variable. Since we are running in 32-bit mode we need this call/pop
-        * sequence to get the proper relative addressing.
-        */
-       call    1f
-1:     popl    %edi
-       subl    $1b, %edi
-
-       movl    enc_bit(%edi), %eax
-       cmpl    $0, %eax
-       jge     .Lsev_exit
-
        /* Check if running under a hypervisor */
        movl    $1, %eax
        cpuid
@@ -69,12 +56,10 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
 
        movl    %ebx, %eax
        andl    $0x3f, %eax             /* Return the encryption bit location */
-       movl    %eax, enc_bit(%edi)
        jmp     .Lsev_exit
 
 .Lno_sev:
        xor     %eax, %eax
-       movl    %eax, enc_bit(%edi)
 
 .Lsev_exit:
        pop     %edi

arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S ENTRY(set_sev_encryption_mask) · line 103

Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S +0 -3
@@ -113,9 +98,6 @@ ENTRY(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 ENDPROC(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 
        .data
-enc_bit:
-       .int    0xffffffff
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
        .balign 8
 GLOBAL(sme_me_mask)

That is much cleaner indeed, I'm not sure if enc_bit have any other usage, if not we can just drop it for sure.

Hi Thomas, can you help confirm if enc_bit is only a cache to avoid doing the cpuid stuff?

Signature · 2 lines
Best Regards,
Kairui Song
#5 lore raw
In reply to Baoquan He
Quoted 10 lines · Baoquan He
Quoted 4 lines · Borislav Petkov

IINM, the problem can be addressed in a simpler way by getting rid of enc_bit and thus getting rid of the need to do relative addressing of anything and simply doing the whole dance of figuring out the C-bit each time. It probably wouldn't be even measurable...

Couldn't agree more.

Obviously enc_bit is redundent here. We only check eax each time, removing it can fix the RIP-relative addressing issue in kexec.

OK, in distros CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y is set by default usually. enc_bit can save once in normal boot, then fetch and skip the cpuid detection in initialize_identity_maps(). However this only speeds up in amd system with SME, on intel cpu and amd cpu w/o sme, it still needs to do cpuid twice. Removing it should be not measurable as Boris said. Not sure if Tom has other concern.

Thanks
Baoquan

Quoted 48 lines
arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S +0 -18
index eaa843a52907..0b60eb867d25 100644
@@ -27,19 +27,6 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
 	push	%edx
 	push	%edi
 
-	/*
-	 * RIP-relative addressing is needed to access the encryption bit
-	 * variable. Since we are running in 32-bit mode we need this call/pop
-	 * sequence to get the proper relative addressing.
-	 */
-	call	1f
-1:	popl	%edi
-	subl	$1b, %edi
-
-	movl	enc_bit(%edi), %eax
-	cmpl	$0, %eax
-	jge	.Lsev_exit
-
 	/* Check if running under a hypervisor */
 	movl	$1, %eax
 	cpuid
@@ -69,12 +56,10 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
 
 	movl	%ebx, %eax
 	andl	$0x3f, %eax		/* Return the encryption bit location */
-	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%edi)
 	jmp	.Lsev_exit
 
 .Lno_sev:
 	xor	%eax, %eax
-	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%edi)
 
 .Lsev_exit:
 	pop	%edi
@@ -113,9 +98,6 @@ ENTRY(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 ENDPROC(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 
 	.data
-enc_bit:
-	.int	0xffffffff
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	.balign	8
 GLOBAL(sme_me_mask)
#6 lore raw
Quoted 12 lines · Baoquan He
Quoted 10 lines · Baoquan He
Quoted 4 lines · Borislav Petkov

IINM, the problem can be addressed in a simpler way by getting rid of enc_bit and thus getting rid of the need to do relative addressing of anything and simply doing the whole dance of figuring out the C-bit each time. It probably wouldn't be even measurable...

Couldn't agree more.

Obviously enc_bit is redundent here. We only check eax each time, removing it can fix the RIP-relative addressing issue in kexec.

Quoted 6 lines

OK, in distros CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y is set by default usually. enc_bit can save once in normal boot, then fetch and skip the cpuid detection in initialize_identity_maps(). However this only speeds up in amd system with SME, on intel cpu and amd cpu w/o sme, it still needs to do cpuid twice. Removing it should be not measurable as Boris said. Not sure if Tom has other concern.

No concern from me. The original version of the patch did not cache the value, that was added based on the patch series feedback. So, if there is no concern about executing some extra CPUID/RDMSR instructions, then it would certainly simplify the code quite a bit.

Thanks,
Tom

Quoted 52 lines

Thanks
Baoquan

Quoted 48 lines
arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S +0 -18
index eaa843a52907..0b60eb867d25 100644
@@ -27,19 +27,6 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
 	push	%edx
 	push	%edi
 
-	/*
-	 * RIP-relative addressing is needed to access the encryption bit
-	 * variable. Since we are running in 32-bit mode we need this call/pop
-	 * sequence to get the proper relative addressing.
-	 */
-	call	1f
-1:	popl	%edi
-	subl	$1b, %edi
-
-	movl	enc_bit(%edi), %eax
-	cmpl	$0, %eax
-	jge	.Lsev_exit
-
 	/* Check if running under a hypervisor */
 	movl	$1, %eax
 	cpuid
@@ -69,12 +56,10 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
 
 	movl	%ebx, %eax
 	andl	$0x3f, %eax		/* Return the encryption bit location */
-	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%edi)
 	jmp	.Lsev_exit
 
 .Lno_sev:
 	xor	%eax, %eax
-	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%edi)
 
 .Lsev_exit:
 	pop	%edi
@@ -113,9 +98,6 @@ ENTRY(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 ENDPROC(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 
 	.data
-enc_bit:
-	.int	0xffffffff
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	.balign	8
 GLOBAL(sme_me_mask)
#7 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Thomas

No concern from me. The original version of the patch did not cache the value, that was added based on the patch series feedback. So, if there is no concern about executing some extra CPUID/RDMSR instructions, then it would certainly simplify the code quite a bit.

Yeah, I think it was me who suggested to cache it but having simpler code greatly outweighs the minute caching win.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
#8 lore raw
In reply to Lendacky, Thomas
Quoted 20 lines · Thomas
Quoted 12 lines · Baoquan He
Quoted 10 lines · Baoquan He
Quoted 4 lines · Borislav Petkov

IINM, the problem can be addressed in a simpler way by getting rid of enc_bit and thus getting rid of the need to do relative addressing of anything and simply doing the whole dance of figuring out the C-bit each time. It probably wouldn't be even measurable...

Couldn't agree more.

Obviously enc_bit is redundent here. We only check eax each time, removing it can fix the RIP-relative addressing issue in kexec.

Quoted 6 lines

OK, in distros CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y is set by default usually. enc_bit can save once in normal boot, then fetch and skip the cpuid detection in initialize_identity_maps(). However this only speeds up in amd system with SME, on intel cpu and amd cpu w/o sme, it still needs to do cpuid twice. Removing it should be not measurable as Boris said. Not sure if Tom has other concern.

Quoted 4 lines

No concern from me. The original version of the patch did not cache the value, that was added based on the patch series feedback. So, if there is no concern about executing some extra CPUID/RDMSR instructions, then it would certainly simplify the code quite a bit.

OK, thanks for confirming this, Tom.

Then, maybe Kairui can repost below code with formal patch log after testing. I have tested on a intel machine with 48G memory, and CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y, it works well. Maybe add Boris's Suggested-By, and CC me.

Thanks
Baoquan

Quoted 48 lines
Quoted 48 lines
Quoted 48 lines
arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S +0 -18
index eaa843a52907..0b60eb867d25 100644
@@ -27,19 +27,6 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
 	push	%edx
 	push	%edi
 
-	/*
-	 * RIP-relative addressing is needed to access the encryption bit
-	 * variable. Since we are running in 32-bit mode we need this call/pop
-	 * sequence to get the proper relative addressing.
-	 */
-	call	1f
-1:	popl	%edi
-	subl	$1b, %edi
-
-	movl	enc_bit(%edi), %eax
-	cmpl	$0, %eax
-	jge	.Lsev_exit
-
 	/* Check if running under a hypervisor */
 	movl	$1, %eax
 	cpuid
@@ -69,12 +56,10 @@ ENTRY(get_sev_encryption_bit)
 
 	movl	%ebx, %eax
 	andl	$0x3f, %eax		/* Return the encryption bit location */
-	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%edi)
 	jmp	.Lsev_exit
 
 .Lno_sev:
 	xor	%eax, %eax
-	movl	%eax, enc_bit(%edi)
 
 .Lsev_exit:
 	pop	%edi
@@ -113,9 +98,6 @@ ENTRY(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 ENDPROC(set_sev_encryption_mask)
 
 	.data
-enc_bit:
-	.int	0xffffffff
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	.balign	8
 GLOBAL(sme_me_mask)