mem_access: Fix npfec.kind propagation
RFC PATCH 1/2 mem_access: Fix npfec.kind propagation
The name of the "with_gla" flag is confusing; it has nothing to do with the existence or lack thereof of a faulting GLA, but rather where the fault originated. The npfec.kind value is always valid, and should thus be propagated, regardless of whether gla_valid is set or not.
In particular, gla_valid will never be set on AMD systems; but npfec.kind will still be valid and should still be propagated.
---
CC: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
CC: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
CC: Tim Deegan <[email protected]>
CC: Tamas K Lengyel <[email protected]>
CC: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]>
--- xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c +5 -5
@@ -232,12 +232,12 @@ bool p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, unsigned long gla, { req->u.mem_access.flags |=MEM_ACCESS_GLA_VALID ; req->u.mem_access.gla = gla; - -if ( npfec.kind == npfec_kind_with_gla ) - req->u.mem_access.flags |=MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_WITH_GLA ; -else if ( npfec.kind == npfec_kind_in_gpt ) - req->u.mem_access.flags |=MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_IN_GPT ; } + +if ( npfec.kind == npfec_kind_with_gla ) + req->u.mem_access.flags |=MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_WITH_GLA ; +else if ( npfec.kind == npfec_kind_in_gpt ) + req->u.mem_access.flags |=MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_IN_GPT ; req->u.mem_access.flags |= npfec.read_access ?MEM_ACCESS_R :0 ; req->u.mem_access.flags |= npfec.write_access ?MEM_ACCESS_W :0 ; req->u.mem_access.flags |= npfec.insn_fetch ?MEM_ACCESS_X :0 ;
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RFC PATCH 2/2 x86/mm: Add mem access rights to NPT
From: Isaila Alexandru <[email protected]>
This patch adds access control for NPT mode.
There aren’t enough extra bits to store the access rights in the NPT p2m table, so we add a radix tree to store extra information.
For efficiency:
- Only allocate this radix tree when we first store "non-default" extra information
- Remove entires which match the default extra information rather than continuing to store them
- For superpages, only store an entry for the first gfn in the superpage. Use the order of the p2m entry being read to determine the proper place to look in the radix table.
Modify p2m_type_to_flags() to accept and interpret an access value, parallel to the ept code.
Add a set_default_access() method to the p2m-pt and p2m-ept versions of the p2m rather than setting it directly, to deal with different default permitted access values.
---
NB, this is compile-tested only.
cc'ing Paul because this is functionality he may want at some point in the future.
I'm not sure why we only allow 'int' to be stored in the radix tree, but that throws away 30-some bits we could otherwise use. We might consider revising this if we run out of bits here.
--- xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c | 5 +- xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c | 9 ++ xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c | 173 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c | 6 ++ xen/arch/x86/monitor.c | 1 + xen/include/asm-x86/mem_access.h | 2 +- xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h | 18 ++++ 7 files changed, 192 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c +1 -4
@@ -389,10 +389,7 @@ long p2m_set_mem_access(struct domain *d, gfn_t gfn, uint32_t nr,/* If request to set default access. */ if (gfn_eq (gfn,INVALID_GFN ) ) - { - p2m->default_access = a; -return 0 ; - } +return p2m->set_default_access (p2m, a);p2m_lock (p2m);if ( ap2m )
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c +9 -0
@@ -667,6 +667,14 @@ bool_t ept_handle_misconfig(uint64_t gpa)return spurious ? (rc >=0 ) : (rc >0 ); } +int ept_set_default_access (struct p2m_domain *p2m,p2m_access_t p2ma) +{ +/* All access is permitted */ + p2m->default_access = p2ma; + +return 0 ; +} +/* * ept_set_entry() computes 'need_modify_vtd_table' for itself, * by observing whether any gfn->mfn translations are modified.
@@ -1255,6 +1263,7 @@ int ept_p2m_init(struct p2m_domain *p2m) p2m->change_entry_type_global = ept_change_entry_type_global; p2m->change_entry_type_range = ept_change_entry_type_range; p2m->memory_type_changed = ept_memory_type_changed; + p2m->set_default_access = ept_set_default_access; p2m->audit_p2m =NULL ; p2m->tlb_flush = ept_tlb_flush;
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c +156 -17
302 lines not on this page · raw message
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c +6 -0
@@ -682,6 +682,12 @@ void p2m_teardown(struct p2m_domain *p2m) d = p2m->domain; +if ( p2m->extra ) + { +radix_tree_destroy (p2m->extra,NULL ); +xfree (p2m->extra); + } +p2m_lock (p2m);ASSERT (atomic_read (&d->shr_pages) ==0 ); p2m->phys_table =pagetable_null ();
xen/arch/x86/monitor.c +1 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@*/ #include <asm/monitor.h> +#include <asm/p2m.h> #include <public/vm_event.h> int arch_monitor_init_domain (struct domain *d)
xen/include/asm-x86/mem_access.h +1 -1
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ bool p2m_mem_access_emulate_check(struct vcpu *v,/* Sanity check for mem_access hardware support */ static inline bool p2m_mem_access_sanity_check (struct domain *d) { -return is_hvm_domain (d) && cpu_has_vmx &&hap_enabled (d); +return is_hvm_domain (d) &&hap_enabled (d); }#endif /*__ASM_X86_MEM_ACCESS_H__ */
xen/include/asm-x86/p2m.h +18 -0
@@ -185,6 +185,16 @@ typedef enum { p2m_alternate, } p2m_class_t; +typedef union { +struct { +u32 access :4 ,/* p2m_access_t */ + _available :25 , + _reserved :3 ;/* Upper two bits reserved */ + }; +int extra; +}p2m_extra_t ; + +/* Per-p2m-table state */ struct p2m_domain {/* Lock that protects updates to the p2m */
@@ -270,6 +280,8 @@ struct p2m_domain { unsigned long gfn, l1_pgentry_t *p, l1_pgentry_t new, unsigned int level);long (*audit_p2m)(struct p2m_domain *p2m); +int (*set_default_access)(struct p2m_domain *p2m, +p2m_access_t p2ma);/* * P2M updates may require TLBs to be flushed (invalidated).
@@ -292,6 +304,12 @@ struct p2m_domain {* retyped get this access type. See definition of p2m_access_t. */ p2m_access_t default_access; +/* +* Radix tree to store extra information which doesn't fit in the +* p2m's PTE +*/ +struct radix_tree_root *extra; +/* If true, and an access fault comes in and there is no vm_event listener, * pause domain. Otherwise, remove access restrictions. */ bool_t access_required;
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Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] x86/mm: Add mem access rights to NPT
Quoted 6 lines · George Dunlap
From: Isaila Alexandru <[email protected]>
This patch adds access control for NPT mode.
There aren’t enough extra bits to store the access rights in the NPT p2m table, so we add a radix tree to store extra information.
I'm sorry to re-open this argument, but why?
ISTR there being some argument based on pagetable sharing with the IOMMU, but that doesn't work at the moment and can't reasonably be made to work. For one, attempting to use pt sharing will break as soon as you try and DMA to a mapped grant.
I'm disinclined to let a broken vestigial feature get in the way of real improvements.
Beyond that, an NPT PTE has basically the same number of software available bits as an EPT PTE.
Am I missing anything?
Quoted 24 lines
For efficiency:
- Only allocate this radix tree when we first store "non-default" extra information- Remove entires which match the default extra information rather than continuing to store them
- For superpages, only store an entry for the first gfn in the superpage. Use the order of the p2m entry being read to determine the proper place to look in the radix table.
Modify
p2m_type_to_flags()to accept and interpret an access value, parallel to the ept code.Add a
set_default_access()method to the p2m-pt and p2m-ept versions of the p2m rather than setting it directly, to deal with different default permitted access values.Signed-off-by Alexandru Isaila <[email protected]>Signed-off-by George Dunlap <[email protected]>---
NB, this is compile-tested only.
Quoted 6 lines
cc'ing Paul because this is functionality he may want at some point in the future.
I'm not sure why we only allow 'int' to be stored in the radix tree, but that throws away 30-some bits we could otherwise use. We might consider revising this if we run out of bits here.
Probably because we have a old fork of the Linux radix tree functionality, rather than any specific reason to waste 30-some bits.
~Andrew
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Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] x86/mm: Add mem access rights to NPT
Quoted 15 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 6 lines · George Dunlap
From: Isaila Alexandru <[email protected]>
This patch adds access control for NPT mode.
There aren’t enough extra bits to store the access rights in the NPT p2m table, so we add a radix tree to store extra information.
I'm sorry to re-open this argument, but why?
ISTR there being some argument based on pagetable sharing with the IOMMU, but that doesn't work at the moment and can't reasonably be made to work. For one, attempting to use pt sharing will break as soon as you try and DMA to a mapped grant.
Quoted 7 lines
I'm disinclined to let a broken vestigial feature get in the way of real improvements.
Beyond that, an NPT PTE has basically the same number of software available bits as an EPT PTE.
Am I missing anything?
Wow -- looks like IOMMU/p2m sharing has been disabled unconditionally since 2014. If nobody has complained since then, that seems like a good enough reason to me to rip it out.
Suravee / Brian / Boris -- any opinions?
The main reason to go with the 'extra bits' solution rather than the 'rip out iommu/p2m sharing' solution is because people have been prognosticating for years that we would be running out of bits and need more at some point in the future. I thought Paul, for instance, might have a use for the extra bits. But I'm happy to wait until such time as we need it and then fish this patch out of the mail archives.
-George
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Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] x86/mm: Add mem access rights to NPT
Quoted 42 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: George Dunlap [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 27 September 2018 11:38
To: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>; xen- [email protected]
Cc: Isaila Alexandru <[email protected]>; Jan Beulich <[email protected]>; Tim (Xen.org) <[email protected]>; Tamas K Lengyel <[email protected]>; Paul Durrant <[email protected]>; Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]>; Suravee Suthikulpanit <[email protected]>; Brian Woods <[email protected]>; Boris Ostrovsky <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] x86/mm: Add mem access rights to NPTQuoted 6 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 5 lines · George Dunlap
From: Isaila Alexandru <[email protected]>
This patch adds access control for NPT mode.
There aren’t enough extra bits to store the access rights in the NPT
p2m
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
table, so we add a radix tree to store extra information.
I'm sorry to re-open this argument, but why?
ISTR there being some argument based on pagetable sharing with the IOMMU, but that doesn't work at the moment and can't reasonably be made to work. For one, attempting to use pt sharing will break as soon as you try and DMA to a mapped grant.
Quoted 7 lines
I'm disinclined to let a broken vestigial feature get in the way of real improvements.
Beyond that, an NPT PTE has basically the same number of software available bits as an EPT PTE.
Am I missing anything?
Wow -- looks like IOMMU/p2m sharing has been disabled unconditionally since 2014. If nobody has complained since then, that seems like a good enough reason to me to rip it out.
Quoted 9 lines
Suravee / Brian / Boris -- any opinions?
The main reason to go with the 'extra bits' solution rather than the 'rip out iommu/p2m sharing' solution is because people have been prognosticating for years that we would be running out of bits and need more at some point in the future. I thought Paul, for instance, might have a use for the extra bits. But I'm happy to wait until such time as we need it and then fish this patch out of the mail archives.
The main angle I had was to have a more generic page-to-type mapping such that it would be suitable to allow steering of accesses to certain pages to distinct IOREQ servers.
Paul
Quoted 1 line
-George
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Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] x86/mm: Add mem access rights to NPT
In reply to George DunlapPing
Suravee / Brian / Boris any ideas on this topic are appreciated.
Regards,
Alex
Quoted 30 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 15 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 6 lines · George Dunlap
From: Isaila Alexandru <[email protected]>
This patch adds access control for NPT mode.
There aren’t enough extra bits to store the access rights in the NPT p2m table, so we add a radix tree to store extra information.
I'm sorry to re-open this argument, but why?
ISTR there being some argument based on pagetable sharing with the IOMMU, but that doesn't work at the moment and can't reasonably be made to work. For one, attempting to use pt sharing will break as soon as you try and DMA to a mapped grant.
Quoted 7 lines
I'm disinclined to let a broken vestigial feature get in the way of real improvements.
Beyond that, an NPT PTE has basically the same number of software available bits as an EPT PTE.
Am I missing anything?
Wow -- looks like IOMMU/p2m sharing has been disabled unconditionally since 2014. If nobody has complained since then, that seems like a good enough reason to me to rip it out.
Suravee / Brian / Boris -- any opinions?
Quoted 9 lines
The main reason to go with the 'extra bits' solution rather than the 'rip out iommu/p2m sharing' solution is because people have been prognosticating for years that we would be running out of bits and need more at some point in the future. I thought Paul, for instance, might have a use for the extra bits. But I'm happy to wait until such time as we need it and then fish this patch out of the mail archives.
-George
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Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] x86/mm: Add mem access rights to NPT
In reply to George DunlapQuoted 22 lines · George Dunlap
From: Isaila Alexandru <[email protected]>
This patch adds access control for NPT mode.
There aren’t enough extra bits to store the access rights in the NPT p2m
table, so we add a radix tree to store extra information.For efficiency:
- Only allocate this radix tree when we first store "non-default" extra information- Remove entires which match the default extra information rather than continuing to store them
- For superpages, only store an entry for the first gfn in the superpage. Use the order of the p2m entry being read to determine the proper place to look in the radix table.
Modify
p2m_type_to_flags()to accept and interpret an access value, parallel to the ept code.
Quoted 8 lines
Add a
set_default_access()method to the p2m-pt and p2m-ept versions of the p2m rather than setting it directly, to deal with different default permitted access values.Signed-off-by Alexandru Isaila <[email protected]>Signed-off-by George Dunlap <[email protected]>---
NB, this is compile-tested only.
I've tested this with xen-access and it works as expected
xen/arch/x86/monitor.c line 23
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/monitor.c +1
-0@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@*/ #include <asm/monitor.h> +#include <asm/p2m.h>
Is this intended?
Regards,
Alex
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Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC PATCH 2/2] x86/mm: Add mem access rights to NPT
In reply to George DunlapQuoted 37 lines · George Dunlap
From: Isaila Alexandru <[email protected]>
This patch adds access control for NPT mode.
There aren’t enough extra bits to store the access rights in the NPT p2m table, so we add a radix tree to store extra information.
For efficiency:
- Only allocate this radix tree when we first store "non-default" extra information- Remove entires which match the default extra information rather than continuing to store them
- For superpages, only store an entry for the first gfn in the superpage. Use the order of the p2m entry being read to determine the proper place to look in the radix table.
Modify
p2m_type_to_flags()to accept and interpret an access value, parallel to the ept code.Add a
set_default_access()method to the p2m-pt and p2m-ept versions of the p2m rather than setting it directly, to deal with different default permitted access values.Signed-off-by Alexandru Isaila <[email protected]>Signed-off-by George Dunlap <[email protected]>---
NB, this is compile-tested only.cc'ing Paul because this is functionality he may want at some point in the future.
I'm not sure why we only allow 'int' to be stored in the radix tree, but that throws away 30-some bits we could otherwise use. We might consider revising this if we run out of bits here.
Quoted 6 lines
CC Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>CC Jan Beulich <[email protected]>CC Tim Deegan <[email protected]>CC Tamas K Lengyel <[email protected]>CC Paul Durrant <[email protected]>CC Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]>
Hi all,
I know it's been some time from the start of this patch but can this move forward? Any thoughts or acks are appreciated.
Thanks,
Alex
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Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC PATCH 2/2] x86/mm: Add mem access rights to NPT
Quoted 47 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
Quoted 37 lines · George Dunlap
From: Isaila Alexandru <[email protected]>
This patch adds access control for NPT mode.
There aren’t enough extra bits to store the access rights in the NPT p2m table, so we add a radix tree to store extra information.
For efficiency:
- Only allocate this radix tree when we first store "non-default" extra information- Remove entires which match the default extra information rather than continuing to store them
- For superpages, only store an entry for the first gfn in the superpage. Use the order of the p2m entry being read to determine the proper place to look in the radix table.
Modify
p2m_type_to_flags()to accept and interpret an access value, parallel to the ept code.Add a
set_default_access()method to the p2m-pt and p2m-ept versions of the p2m rather than setting it directly, to deal with different default permitted access values.Signed-off-by Alexandru Isaila <[email protected]>Signed-off-by George Dunlap <[email protected]>---
NB, this is compile-tested only.cc'ing Paul because this is functionality he may want at some point in the future.
I'm not sure why we only allow 'int' to be stored in the radix tree, but that throws away 30-some bits we could otherwise use. We might consider revising this if we run out of bits here.
Quoted 6 lines
CC Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>CC Jan Beulich <[email protected]>CC Tim Deegan <[email protected]>CC Tamas K Lengyel <[email protected]>CC Paul Durrant <[email protected]>CC Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]>
Quoted 4 lines
Hi all,
I know it's been some time from the start of this patch but can this move forward? Any thoughts or acks are appreciated.
Right, well where we left this, the situation was that on AMD hardware with IOMMU / p2m sharing, there aren't enough bits.
The two general fixes we have so far are:
1. Add a parallel tree for extra bits (this patch)
2. Rip out IOMMU / p2m sharing for AMD.
#2 has the advantage that we don't need an entirely separate tree, as well as getting rid of code that has (apparently) been completely dead for 5 years. #1 has the advantage that we're set up for having a much larger number of IOREQ servers in the future.
Nobody objected to #2. Without looking deeply into it, it seems like it might be a good idea, but I can't be sure without seeing what it would actually look like.
The easiest way to press the point then would be to post a patch series ripping it out.
-George
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Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC PATCH 2/2] x86/mm: Add mem access rights to NPT
Quoted 62 lines · George Dunlap
Quoted 45 lines · Alexandru Stefan ISAILA
Quoted 37 lines · George Dunlap
From: Isaila Alexandru <[email protected]>
This patch adds access control for NPT mode.
There aren’t enough extra bits to store the access rights in the NPT p2m table, so we add a radix tree to store extra information.
For efficiency:
- Only allocate this radix tree when we first store "non-default" extra information- Remove entires which match the default extra information rather than continuing to store them
- For superpages, only store an entry for the first gfn in the superpage. Use the order of the p2m entry being read to determine the proper place to look in the radix table.
Modify
p2m_type_to_flags()to accept and interpret an access value, parallel to the ept code.Add a
set_default_access()method to the p2m-pt and p2m-ept versions of the p2m rather than setting it directly, to deal with different default permitted access values.Signed-off-by Alexandru Isaila <[email protected]>Signed-off-by George Dunlap <[email protected]>---
NB, this is compile-tested only.cc'ing Paul because this is functionality he may want at some point in the future.
I'm not sure why we only allow 'int' to be stored in the radix tree, but that throws away 30-some bits we could otherwise use. We might consider revising this if we run out of bits here.
Quoted 6 lines
CC Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>CC Jan Beulich <[email protected]>CC Tim Deegan <[email protected]>CC Tamas K Lengyel <[email protected]>CC Paul Durrant <[email protected]>CC Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]>Quoted 4 lines
Hi all,
I know it's been some time from the start of this patch but can this move forward? Any thoughts or acks are appreciated.
Right, well where we left this, the situation was that on AMD hardware with IOMMU / p2m sharing, there aren't enough bits.
The two general fixes we have so far are:
1. Add a parallel tree for extra bits (this patch)
2. Rip out IOMMU / p2m sharing for AMD.#2 has the advantage that we don't need an entirely separate tree, as well as getting rid of code that has (apparently) been completely dead for 5 years. #1 has the advantage that we're set up for having a much larger number of IOREQ servers in the future.
Quoted 6 lines
Nobody objected to #2. Without looking deeply into it, it seems like it might be a good idea, but I can't be sure without seeing what it would actually look like.
The easiest way to press the point then would be to post a patch series ripping it out.
IOMMU / p2m sharing on AMD doesn't work, and isn't available any more (despite the code looking suspiciously like it is usable).
There was a bugfix to allow DMA mapping of granted pages, which is a prerequisite for PVH support, which requires using a nonzero p2m type, and is therefore incompatible with IOMMU/p2m sharing.
I don't see any feasible way to bring p2m-sharing back into a working state on AMD.
As a result, we'd be much better ripping out the dead code and more formally acknowledging that it is a dead feature, after which the existing p2m type/access infrastructure should work compatibly with the Intel implementation.
~Andrew
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Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC PATCH 2/2] x86/mm: Add mem access rights to NPT
In reply to George DunlapQuoted 22 lines · George Dunlap
From: Isaila Alexandru <[email protected]>
This patch adds access control for NPT mode.
There aren’t enough extra bits to store the access rights in the NPT p2m table, so we add a radix tree to store extra information.
For efficiency:
- Only allocate this radix tree when we first store "non-default" extra information- Remove entires which match the default extra information rather than continuing to store them
- For superpages, only store an entry for the first gfn in the superpage. Use the order of the p2m entry being read to determine the proper place to look in the radix table.
Modify
p2m_type_to_flags()to accept and interpret an access value, parallel to the ept code.
Quoted 6 lines
Add a
set_default_access()method to the p2m-pt and p2m-ept versions of the p2m rather than setting it directly, to deal with different default permitted access values.Signed-off-by Alexandru Isaila <[email protected]>Signed-off-by George Dunlap <[email protected]>
The mem_access/monitor bits are fairly trivial:
Quoted 2 lines
---
NB, this is compile-tested only.
Are you planning to do some actual testing? I would highly recommend that we see real test results before this is merged to verify functionality.
Thanks,
Tamas
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Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC PATCH 2/2] x86/mm: Add mem access rights to NPT
Quoted 32 lines · Tamas Lengyel
Quoted 22 lines · George Dunlap
From: Isaila Alexandru <[email protected]>
This patch adds access control for NPT mode.
There aren’t enough extra bits to store the access rights in the NPT p2m table, so we add a radix tree to store extra information.
For efficiency:
- Only allocate this radix tree when we first store "non-default" extra information- Remove entires which match the default extra information rather than continuing to store them
- For superpages, only store an entry for the first gfn in the superpage. Use the order of the p2m entry being read to determine the proper place to look in the radix table.
Modify
p2m_type_to_flags()to accept and interpret an access value, parallel to the ept code.Quoted 6 lines
Add a
set_default_access()method to the p2m-pt and p2m-ept versions of the p2m rather than setting it directly, to deal with different default permitted access values.Signed-off-by Alexandru Isaila <[email protected]>Signed-off-by George Dunlap <[email protected]>The mem_access/monitor bits are fairly trivial:
Quoted 8 lines
Acked-by Tamas K Lengyel <[email protected]>Quoted 2 lines
---
NB, this is compile-tested only.Are you planning to do some actual testing? I would highly recommend that we see real test results before this is merged to verify functionality.
We did do some testing with xen-access at the time, but limited testing with the actual full-blown introspection agent (because not all the needed pieces align yet).
Things did appear to work as intended.
Thanks,
Razvan
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Quoted 7 lines · George Dunlap
The name of the "
with_gla" flag is confusing; it has nothing to do with the existence or lack thereof of a faulting GLA, but rather where the fault originated. The npfec.kind value is always valid, and should thus be propagated, regardless of whethergla_validis set or not.
Quoted 5 lines
In particular,
gla_validwill never be set on AMD systems; but npfec.kind will still be valid and should still be propagated.Signed-off-by Alexandru Isaila <[email protected]>Signed-off-by George Dunlap <[email protected]>
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Quoted 30 lines · George Dunlap
The name of the "
with_gla" flag is confusing; it has nothing to do with the existence or lack thereof of a faulting GLA, but rather where the fault originated. The npfec.kind value is always valid, and should thus be propagated, regardless of whethergla_validis set or not.In particular,
gla_validwill never be set on AMD systems; but npfec.kind will still be valid and should still be propagated.Signed-off-by Alexandru Isaila <[email protected]>Signed-off-by George Dunlap <[email protected]>---
CC: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
CC: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
CC: Tim Deegan <[email protected]>
CC: Tamas K Lengyel <[email protected]>
CC: Razvan Cojocaru <[email protected]>--- xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c +0
-1@@ -232,12 +232,12 @@ bool p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, unsigned long gla, { req->u.mem_access.flags |=MEM_ACCESS_GLA_VALID ; req->u.mem_access.gla = gla; -
xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c bool p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, unsigned long gla, · line 240
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c +5
-4-if ( npfec.kind == npfec_kind_with_gla ) - req->u.mem_access.flags |=MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_WITH_GLA ; -else if ( npfec.kind == npfec_kind_in_gpt ) - req->u.mem_access.flags |=MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_IN_GPT ; } + +if ( npfec.kind == npfec_kind_with_gla ) + req->u.mem_access.flags |=MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_WITH_GLA ; +else if ( npfec.kind == npfec_kind_in_gpt ) + req->u.mem_access.flags |=MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_IN_GPT ;
Nit. Newline here please, as it is not logically related with the block below.
~Andrew
xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c bool p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, unsigned long gla, · line 243
Quoted 3 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c +0
-0req->u.mem_access.flags |= npfec.read_access ?MEM_ACCESS_R :0 ; req->u.mem_access.flags |= npfec.write_access ?MEM_ACCESS_W :0 ; req->u.mem_access.flags |= npfec.insn_fetch ?MEM_ACCESS_X :0 ;
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Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · On 26.09.18 at 19:00, <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 12 lines · George Dunlap
xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c +0
-5@@ -232,12 +232,12 @@ bool p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, unsigned long gla, { req->u.mem_access.flags |=MEM_ACCESS_GLA_VALID ; req->u.mem_access.gla = gla; - -if ( npfec.kind == npfec_kind_with_gla ) - req->u.mem_access.flags |=MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_WITH_GLA ; -else if ( npfec.kind == npfec_kind_in_gpt ) - req->u.mem_access.flags |=MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_IN_GPT ; }
Quoted 8 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c bool p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, unsigned long gla, · line 240
Quoted 5 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c +5
-0+ +if ( npfec.kind == npfec_kind_with_gla ) + req->u.mem_access.flags |=MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_WITH_GLA ; +else if ( npfec.kind == npfec_kind_in_gpt ) + req->u.mem_access.flags |=MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_IN_GPT ;Nit. Newline here please, as it is not logically related with the block below.
And, despite it being just two comparisons, perhaps better to make it a switch() at the same time?
Jan
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Quoted 23 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · On 26.09.18 at 19:00, <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 12 lines · George Dunlap
xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c +0
-5@@ -232,12 +232,12 @@ bool p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, unsigned long gla, { req->u.mem_access.flags |=MEM_ACCESS_GLA_VALID ; req->u.mem_access.gla = gla; - -if ( npfec.kind == npfec_kind_with_gla ) - req->u.mem_access.flags |=MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_WITH_GLA ; -else if ( npfec.kind == npfec_kind_in_gpt ) - req->u.mem_access.flags |=MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_IN_GPT ; }Quoted 8 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c bool p2m_mem_access_check(paddr_t gpa, unsigned long gla, · line 240
Quoted 5 lines
xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c +5
-0+ +if ( npfec.kind == npfec_kind_with_gla ) + req->u.mem_access.flags |=MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_WITH_GLA ; +else if ( npfec.kind == npfec_kind_in_gpt ) + req->u.mem_access.flags |=MEM_ACCESS_FAULT_IN_GPT ;Nit. Newline here please, as it is not logically related with the block below.
Quoted 2 lines
And, despite it being just two comparisons, perhaps better to make it a
switch()at the same time?
Sure -- this is logically separate from the follow-up patch, so I'll re-send it as a singleton with the comments.
-George
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