sctp: socket.c validate sprstat_policy
Subsystems (3)
PATCH v2 1/1 sctp: socket.c validate sprstat_policy
It is possible to perform out-of-bound reads on sctp_getsockopt_pr_streamstatus() and on sctp_getsockopt_pr_assocstatus() by passing from userspace a sprstat_policy that overflows the abandoned_sent/abandoned_unsent fixed length arrays. The over-read data are directly copied/leaked to userspace.
--- net/sctp/socket.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/sctp/socket.c +6 -2
@@ -7083,7 +7083,9 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_pr_assocstatus(struct sock *sk, int len, } policy = params.sprstat_policy; -if (!policy || (policy & ~(SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK |SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL ))) +if (!policy || (policy & ~(SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK |SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL )) || +__SCTP_PR_INDEX (policy) >SCTP_PR_INDEX (MAX ) || +__SCTP_PR_INDEX (policy) <0 ) goto out; asoc =sctp_id2assoc (sk, params.sprstat_assoc_id);
@@ -7142,7 +7144,9 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_pr_streamstatus(struct sock *sk, int len, } policy = params.sprstat_policy; -if (!policy || (policy & ~(SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK |SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL ))) +if (!policy || (policy & ~(SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK |SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL )) || +__SCTP_PR_INDEX (policy) >SCTP_PR_INDEX (MAX ) || +__SCTP_PR_INDEX (policy) <0 ) goto out; asoc =sctp_id2assoc (sk, params.sprstat_assoc_id);
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
Xin Long
maintainerQuoted 30 lines · Tomas Bortoli
It is possible to perform out-of-bound reads on
sctp_getsockopt_pr_streamstatus()and onsctp_getsockopt_pr_assocstatus()by passing from userspace asprstat_policythat overflows the abandoned_sent/abandoned_unsent fixed length arrays. The over-read data are directly copied/leaked to userspace.Signed-off-by Tomas Bortoli <[email protected]>Reported-by [email protected]--- net/sctp/socket.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)net/sctp/socket.c +3
-1@@ -7083,7 +7083,9 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_pr_assocstatus(struct sock *sk, int len, } policy = params.sprstat_policy; -if (!policy || (policy & ~(SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK |SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL ))) +if (!policy || (policy & ~(SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK |SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL )) || +__SCTP_PR_INDEX (policy) >SCTP_PR_INDEX (MAX ) || +__SCTP_PR_INDEX (policy) <0 ) goto out; asoc =sctp_id2assoc (sk, params.sprstat_assoc_id);
net/sctp/socket.c static int sctp_getsockopt_pr_streamstatus(struct sock *sk, int len, · line 7150
Quoted 8 lines
net/sctp/socket.c +3
-1@@ -7142,7 +7144,9 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_pr_streamstatus(struct sock *sk, int len, } policy = params.sprstat_policy; -if (!policy || (policy & ~(SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK |SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL ))) +if (!policy || (policy & ~(SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK |SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL )) || +__SCTP_PR_INDEX (policy) >SCTP_PR_INDEX (MAX ) || +__SCTP_PR_INDEX (policy) <0 ) goto out;
This is not the correct fix.
See https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/10/27/136
Quoted 33 lines · Xin Long
Quoted 32 lines · Tomas Bortoli
It is possible to perform out-of-bound reads on
sctp_getsockopt_pr_streamstatus()and onsctp_getsockopt_pr_assocstatus()by passing from userspace asprstat_policythat overflows the abandoned_sent/abandoned_unsent fixed length arrays. The over-read data are directly copied/leaked to userspace.Signed-off-by Tomas Bortoli <[email protected]>Reported-by [email protected]--- net/sctp/socket.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)net/sctp/socket.c +3
-1@@ -7083,7 +7083,9 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_pr_assocstatus(struct sock *sk, int len, } policy = params.sprstat_policy; -if (!policy || (policy & ~(SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK |SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL ))) +if (!policy || (policy & ~(SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK |SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL )) || +__SCTP_PR_INDEX (policy) >SCTP_PR_INDEX (MAX ) || +__SCTP_PR_INDEX (policy) <0 ) goto out; asoc =sctp_id2assoc (sk, params.sprstat_assoc_id);@@ -7142,7 +7144,9 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_pr_streamstatus(struct sock *sk, int len, }
Quoted 9 lines
net/sctp/socket.c static int sctp_getsockopt_pr_assocstatus(struct sock *sk, int len, · line 7089
Quoted 6 lines
net/sctp/socket.c +3
-1policy = params.sprstat_policy; -if (!policy || (policy & ~(SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK |SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL ))) +if (!policy || (policy & ~(SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK |SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL )) || +__SCTP_PR_INDEX (policy) >SCTP_PR_INDEX (MAX ) || +__SCTP_PR_INDEX (policy) <0 ) goto out;This is not the correct fix.
See https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/10/27/136
Ack, good to know ty!