4.19.1-stable review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.1 release. There are 24 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun Nov 4 18:28:10 UTC 2018. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.1-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 4.19.1-rc1

Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
net: bridge: remove ipv6 zero address check in mcast queries

David S. Miller <[email protected]>
sparc64: Wire up compat getpeername and getsockname.

David Miller <[email protected]>
sparc64: Make corrupted user stacks more debuggable.

David S. Miller <[email protected]>
sparc64: Export __node_distance.

Xin Long <[email protected]>
sctp: check policy more carefully when getting pr status

Ivan Vecera <[email protected]>
Revert "be2net: remove desc field from be_eq_obj"

Heiner Kallweit <[email protected]>
r8169: fix broken Wake-on-LAN from S5 (poweroff)

David S. Miller <[email protected]>
net: Properly unlink GRO packets on overflow.

Cong Wang <[email protected]>
net: drop skb on failure in ip_check_defrag()

Shalom Toledo <[email protected]>
mlxsw: core: Fix devlink unregister flow

Petr Machata <[email protected]>
mlxsw: spectrum_switchdev: Don't ignore deletions of learned MACs

Karsten Graul <[email protected]>
net/smc: fix smc_buf_unuse to use the lgr pointer

David Ahern <[email protected]>
net/ipv6: Allow onlink routes to have a device mismatch if it is the default route

Jaime Caamaño Ruiz <[email protected]>
openvswitch: Fix push/pop ethernet validation

Tobias Jungel <[email protected]>
bonding: fix length of actor system

Jason Wang <[email protected]>
vhost: Fix Spectre V1 vulnerability

Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
rtnetlink: Disallow FDB configuration for non-Ethernet device

Karsten Graul <[email protected]>
Revert "net: simplify sock_poll_wait"

Sean Tranchetti <[email protected]>
net: udp: fix handling of CHECKSUM_COMPLETE packets

Niklas Cassel <[email protected]>
net: stmmac: Fix stmmac_mdio_reset() when building stmmac as modules

Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
net: sched: gred: pass the right attribute to gred_change_table_def()

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
net/mlx5e: fix csum adjustments caused by RXFCS

Stefano Brivio <[email protected]>
ipv6/ndisc: Preserve IPv6 control buffer if protocol error handlers are called

Hangbin Liu <[email protected]>
bridge: do not add port to router list when receives query with source 0.0.0.0

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                           |  4 +-
 arch/sparc/include/asm/switch_to_64.h              |  3 +-
 arch/sparc/kernel/process_64.c                     | 25 +++++++++---
 arch/sparc/kernel/rtrap_64.S                       |  1 +
 arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c                       | 12 +++++-
 arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c                      |  6 ++-
 arch/sparc/kernel/systbls_64.S                     |  4 +-
 arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c                            |  1 +
 crypto/af_alg.c                                    |  2 +-
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_netlink.c                 |  3 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be.h             |  1 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c        |  6 +--
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rx.c    | 45 +++++-----------------
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c         | 24 ++++++++----
 .../ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_switchdev.c   |  2 -
 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c               |  9 ++++-
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_mdio.c  |  2 +-
 drivers/vhost/vhost.c                              |  2 +
 include/net/sock.h                                 | 12 ++++--
 net/atm/common.c                                   |  2 +-
 net/bridge/br_multicast.c                          |  9 ++++-
 net/caif/caif_socket.c                             |  2 +-
 net/core/datagram.c                                |  7 ++--
 net/core/dev.c                                     |  1 +
 net/core/rtnetlink.c                               | 10 +++++
 net/dccp/proto.c                                   |  2 +-
 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c                             | 12 ++++--
 net/ipv4/tcp.c                                     |  2 +-
 net/ipv4/udp.c                                     | 20 +++++++++-
 net/ipv6/ip6_checksum.c                            | 20 +++++++++-
 net/ipv6/ndisc.c                                   |  3 +-
 net/ipv6/route.c                                   |  2 +
 net/iucv/af_iucv.c                                 |  2 +-
 net/nfc/llcp_sock.c                                |  2 +-
 net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c                     |  4 +-
 net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c                               |  2 +-
 net/sched/sch_gred.c                               |  2 +-
 net/sctp/socket.c                                  |  8 ++--
 net/smc/af_smc.c                                   |  2 +-
 net/smc/smc_core.c                                 | 25 ++++++------
 net/tipc/socket.c                                  |  2 +-
 net/unix/af_unix.c                                 |  4 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/net/fib-onlink-tests.sh    | 14 +++----
 43 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 123 deletions(-)

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5a2de63fd1a59c30c02526d427bc014b98adf508 ]

Based on RFC 4541, 2.1.1. IGMP Forwarding Rules

The switch supporting IGMP snooping must maintain a list of multicast routers and the ports on which they are attached. This list can be constructed in any combination of the following ways:

a) This list should be built by the snooping switch sending Multicast Router Solicitation messages as described in IGMP Multicast Router Discovery [MRDISC]. It may also snoop Multicast Router Advertisement messages sent by and to other nodes.

b) The arrival port for IGMP Queries (sent by multicast routers) where the source address is not 0.0.0.0.

We should not add the port to router list when receives query with source 0.0.0.0.

---
 net/bridge/br_multicast.c |   10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1420,7 +1420,15 @@ static void br_multicast_query_received(
 		return;
 
 	br_multicast_update_query_timer(br, query, max_delay);
-	br_multicast_mark_router(br, port);
+
+	/* Based on RFC4541, section 2.1.1 IGMP Forwarding Rules,
+	 * the arrival port for IGMP Queries where the source address
+	 * is 0.0.0.0 should not be added to router port list.
+	 */
+	if ((saddr->proto == htons(ETH_P_IP) && saddr->u.ip4) ||
+	    (saddr->proto == htons(ETH_P_IPV6) &&
+	     !ipv6_addr_any(&saddr->u.ip6)))
+		br_multicast_mark_router(br, port);
 }
 
 static void br_ip4_multicast_query(struct net_bridge *br,

according to user reports this patch will cause a serious regression. igmp snooping is not working anymore with this patch

Am 02.11.2018 um 19:34 schrieb Greg Kroah-Hartman:

Is this also a problem in 4.20? This patch went into 4.20-rc1, so it has been around for a while with no reported issues that I can find. Any pointers to the reports?

thanks,

greg k-h

Am 17.02.2019 um 17:48 schrieb Greg Kroah-Hartman:

i need to check this. i found this patch in 4.9, 4.14 and 4.4
the rest was picked up from the mailinglist. according to the git sources of 4.20 and 5.0 the same code is in there as well

i just got the report from users today and was able to reproduce it with iptv streams. just by disabling the code it was working again.

Sebastian

*reminder*

Am 18.02.2019 um 11:18 schrieb Sebastian Gottschall:

[snip]

Could you please include more details about the setup that's broken ? Note that we were warned[1] of potential breakage from this change after it went in and regardless of the suggestion from the RFC we'll probably have to revert this patch.

Ying Xu as author of the patch, any thoughts ?

Also adding Linus Lüssing to the CC as he was the one who warned against it. Note that the warning was sent as a reply to my breakage fix, but it was intended for the original patch.

Thanks,
Nik

[1] https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg272944.html

My bad, it's Hangbin Liu's patch. It was reported by Ying Xu.

Sorry I missed Linus's reply after Ying Xu replied. I will read it and disscuss with Ying Xu.

No, we are also waiting for more details from Sebastian.

Thanks
Hangbin

Am 20.02.2019 um 15:46 schrieb Hangbin Liu:

the test scenario is the following. one of my testers of the dd-wrt firmware is using a iptv stream from the france isp "orange".
he just bridged the iptv vlan interface which has no ip (the isp doesnt provide a ip configuration here) to a bridge and played with igmp snooping to avoid flooding of all ports within the same bridge. he found out that this setting simply does not work with the current kernel, but does
if this patch has been removed. we used kernel 4.4 in the test scenario. all latest revision.
i was able to reproduce the same problem on kernel 4.9 and 4.14 on a different device using a german isp based iptv stream. same effect. after reverting the problematic code it worked again.

Sebastian

Reminder of what?

If this is still an issue in 4.20, and 5.0-rc, there's nothing I can do. Please work with the networking developers to resolve the issue and get the fix merged into Linus's tree and then I will be glad to take the fix into the stable trees.

If this is _not_ an issue with 4.20 and 5.0-rc, I need to know that as well.

thanks,

greg k-h

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stefano Brivio <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ee1abcf689353f36d9322231b4320926096bdee0 ]

Commit a61bbcf28a8c ("[NET]: Store skb->timestamp as offset to a base timestamp") introduces a neighbour control buffer and zeroes it out in ndisc_rcv(), as ndisc_recv_ns() uses it.

Commit f2776ff04722 ("[IPV6]: Fix address/interface handling in UDP and DCCP, according to the scoping architecture.") introduces the usage of the IPv6 control buffer in protocol error handlers (e.g. inet6_iif() in present-day __udp6_lib_err()).

Now, with commit b94f1c0904da ("ipv6: Use icmpv6_notify() to propagate redirect, instead of rt6_redirect()."), we call protocol error handlers from ndisc_redirect_rcv(), after the control buffer is already stolen and some parts are already zeroed out. This implies that inet6_iif() on this path will always return zero.

This gives unexpected results on UDP socket lookup in __udp6_lib_err(), as we might actually need to match sockets for a given interface.

Instead of always claiming the control buffer in ndisc_rcv(), do that only when needed.

---
 net/ipv6/ndisc.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1732,10 +1732,9 @@ int ndisc_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	memset(NEIGH_CB(skb), 0, sizeof(struct neighbour_cb));
-
 	switch (msg->icmph.icmp6_type) {
 	case NDISC_NEIGHBOUR_SOLICITATION:
+		memset(NEIGH_CB(skb), 0, sizeof(struct neighbour_cb));
 		ndisc_recv_ns(skb);
 		break;
 

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d48051c5b8376038c2b287c3b1bd55b8d391d567 ]

As shown by Dmitris, we need to use csum_block_add() instead of csum_add() when adding the FCS contribution to skb csum.

Before 4.18 (more exactly commit 88078d98d1bb "net: pskb_trim_rcsum() and CHECKSUM_COMPLETE are friends"), the whole skb csum was thrown away, so RXFCS changes were ignored.

Then before commit d55bef5059dd ("net: fix pskb_trim_rcsum_slow() with odd trim offset") both mlx5 and pskb_trim_rcsum_slow() bugs were canceling each other.

Now we fixed pskb_trim_rcsum_slow() we need to fix mlx5.

Note that this patch also rewrites mlx5e_get_fcs() to :

- Use skb_header_pointer() instead of reinventing it.
- Use __get_unaligned_cpu32() to avoid possible non aligned accesses as Dmitris pointed out.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rx.c |   45 ++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)

@@ -696,43 +696,15 @@ static inline bool is_last_ethertype_ip(
 	return (ethertype == htons(ETH_P_IP) || ethertype == htons(ETH_P_IPV6));
 }
 
-static __be32 mlx5e_get_fcs(struct sk_buff *skb)
+static u32 mlx5e_get_fcs(const struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	int last_frag_sz, bytes_in_prev, nr_frags;
-	u8 *fcs_p1, *fcs_p2;
-	skb_frag_t *last_frag;
-	__be32 fcs_bytes;
-
-	if (!skb_is_nonlinear(skb))
-		return *(__be32 *)(skb->data + skb->len - ETH_FCS_LEN);
-
-	nr_frags = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
-	last_frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[nr_frags - 1];
-	last_frag_sz = skb_frag_size(last_frag);
-
-	/* If all FCS data is in last frag */
-	if (last_frag_sz >= ETH_FCS_LEN)
-		return *(__be32 *)(skb_frag_address(last_frag) +
-				   last_frag_sz - ETH_FCS_LEN);
-
-	fcs_p2 = (u8 *)skb_frag_address(last_frag);
-	bytes_in_prev = ETH_FCS_LEN - last_frag_sz;
-
-	/* Find where the other part of the FCS is - Linear or another frag */
-	if (nr_frags == 1) {
-		fcs_p1 = skb_tail_pointer(skb);
-	} else {
-		skb_frag_t *prev_frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[nr_frags - 2];
+	const void *fcs_bytes;
+	u32 _fcs_bytes;
 
-		fcs_p1 = skb_frag_address(prev_frag) +
-			    skb_frag_size(prev_frag);
-	}
-	fcs_p1 -= bytes_in_prev;
-
-	memcpy(&fcs_bytes, fcs_p1, bytes_in_prev);
-	memcpy(((u8 *)&fcs_bytes) + bytes_in_prev, fcs_p2, last_frag_sz);
+	fcs_bytes = skb_header_pointer(skb, skb->len - ETH_FCS_LEN,
+				       ETH_FCS_LEN, &_fcs_bytes);
 
-	return fcs_bytes;
+	return __get_unaligned_cpu32(fcs_bytes);
 }
 
 static inline void mlx5e_handle_csum(struct net_device *netdev,

@@ -765,8 +737,9 @@ static inline void mlx5e_handle_csum(str
 						 network_depth - ETH_HLEN,
 						 skb->csum);
 		if (unlikely(netdev->features & NETIF_F_RXFCS))
-			skb->csum = csum_add(skb->csum,
-					     (__force __wsum)mlx5e_get_fcs(skb));
+			skb->csum = csum_block_add(skb->csum,
+						   (__force __wsum)mlx5e_get_fcs(skb),
+						   skb->len - ETH_FCS_LEN);
 		stats->csum_complete++;
 		return;
 	}

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 38b4f18d56372e1e21771ab7b0357b853330186c ]

gred_change_table_def() takes a pointer to TCA_GRED_DPS attribute, and expects it will be able to interpret its contents as struct tc_gred_sopt. Pass the correct gred attribute, instead of TCA_OPTIONS.

This bug meant the table definition could never be changed after Qdisc was initialized (unless whatever TCA_OPTIONS contained both passed netlink validation and was a valid struct tc_gred_sopt...).

Old behaviour:

$ ip link add type dummy
$ tc qdisc replace dev dummy0 parent root handle 7: \
     gred setup vqs 4 default 0
$ tc qdisc replace dev dummy0 parent root handle 7: \
     gred setup vqs 4 default 0
RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument

Now:

$ ip link add type dummy
$ tc qdisc replace dev dummy0 parent root handle 7: \
     gred setup vqs 4 default 0
$ tc qdisc replace dev dummy0 parent root handle 7: \
     gred setup vqs 4 default 0
$ tc qdisc replace dev dummy0 parent root handle 7: \
     gred setup vqs 4 default 0

---
 net/sched/sch_gred.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ static int gred_change(struct Qdisc *sch
 	if (tb[TCA_GRED_PARMS] == NULL && tb[TCA_GRED_STAB] == NULL) {
 		if (tb[TCA_GRED_LIMIT] != NULL)
 			sch->limit = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_GRED_LIMIT]);
-		return gred_change_table_def(sch, opt);
+		return gred_change_table_def(sch, tb[TCA_GRED_DPS]);
 	}
 
 	if (tb[TCA_GRED_PARMS] == NULL ||

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Niklas Cassel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 30549aab146ccb1275230c3b4b4bc6b4181fd54e ]

When building stmmac, it is only possible to select CONFIG_DWMAC_GENERIC, or any of the glue drivers, when CONFIG_STMMAC_PLATFORM is set. The only exception is CONFIG_STMMAC_PCI.

When calling of_mdiobus_register(), it will call our ->reset() callback, which is set to stmmac_mdio_reset().

Most of the code in stmmac_mdio_reset() is protected by a "#if defined(CONFIG_STMMAC_PLATFORM)", which will evaluate to false when CONFIG_STMMAC_PLATFORM=m.

Because of this, the phy reset gpio will only be pulled when stmmac is built as built-in, but not when built as modules.

Fix this by using "#if IS_ENABLED()" instead of "#if defined()".

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_mdio.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ static int stmmac_mdio_write(struct mii_
  */
 int stmmac_mdio_reset(struct mii_bus *bus)
 {
-#if defined(CONFIG_STMMAC_PLATFORM)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_STMMAC_PLATFORM)
 	struct net_device *ndev = bus->priv;
 	struct stmmac_priv *priv = netdev_priv(ndev);
 	unsigned int mii_address = priv->hw->mii.addr;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sean Tranchetti <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit db4f1be3ca9b0ef7330763d07bf4ace83ad6f913 ]

Current handling of CHECKSUM_COMPLETE packets by the UDP stack is incorrect for any packet that has an incorrect checksum value.

udp4/6_csum_init() will both make a call to __skb_checksum_validate_complete() to initialize/validate the csum field when receiving a CHECKSUM_COMPLETE packet. When this packet fails validation, skb->csum will be overwritten with the pseudoheader checksum so the packet can be fully validated by software, but the skb->ip_summed value will be left as CHECKSUM_COMPLETE so that way the stack can later warn the user about their hardware spewing bad checksums. Unfortunately, leaving the SKB in this state can cause problems later on in the checksum calculation.

Since the the packet is still marked as CHECKSUM_COMPLETE, udp_csum_pull_header() will SUBTRACT the checksum of the UDP header from skb->csum instead of adding it, leaving us with a garbage value in that field. Once we try to copy the packet to userspace in the udp4/6_recvmsg(), we'll make a call to skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg() to checksum the packet data and add it in the garbage skb->csum value to perform our final validation check.

Since the value we're validating is not the proper checksum, it's possible that the folded value could come out to 0, causing us not to drop the packet. Instead, we believe that the packet was checksummed incorrectly by hardware since skb->ip_summed is still CHECKSUM_COMPLETE, and we attempt to warn the user with netdev_rx_csum_fault(skb->dev);

Unfortunately, since this is the UDP path, skb->dev has been overwritten by skb->dev_scratch and is no longer a valid pointer, so we end up reading invalid memory.

This patch addresses this problem in two ways:
1) Do not use the dev pointer when calling netdev_rx_csum_fault() from skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(). Since this gets called from the UDP path where skb->dev has been overwritten, we have no way of knowing if the pointer is still valid. Also for the sake of consistency with the other uses of netdev_rx_csum_fault(), don't attempt to call it if the packet was checksummed by software.

2) Add better CHECKSUM_COMPLETE handling to udp4/6_csum_init(). If we receive a packet that's CHECKSUM_COMPLETE that fails verification (i.e. skb->csum_valid == 0), check who performed the calculation. It's possible that the checksum was done in software by the network stack earlier (such as Netfilter's CONNTRACK module), and if that says the checksum is bad, we can drop the packet immediately instead of waiting until we try and copy it to userspace. Otherwise, we need to mark the SKB as CHECKSUM_NONE, since the skb->csum field no longer contains the full packet checksum after the call to __skb_checksum_validate_complete().

---
 net/core/datagram.c     |    5 +++--
 net/ipv4/udp.c          |   20 ++++++++++++++++++--
 net/ipv6/ip6_checksum.c |   20 ++++++++++++++++++--
 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -808,8 +808,9 @@ int skb_copy_and_csum_datagram_msg(struc
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 
-		if (unlikely(skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE))
-			netdev_rx_csum_fault(skb->dev);
+		if (unlikely(skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE) &&
+		    !skb->csum_complete_sw)
+			netdev_rx_csum_fault(NULL);
 	}
 	return 0;
 fault:

@@ -2120,8 +2120,24 @@ static inline int udp4_csum_init(struct
 	/* Note, we are only interested in != 0 or == 0, thus the
 	 * force to int.
 	 */
-	return (__force int)skb_checksum_init_zero_check(skb, proto, uh->check,
-							 inet_compute_pseudo);
+	err = (__force int)skb_checksum_init_zero_check(skb, proto, uh->check,
+							inet_compute_pseudo);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE && !skb->csum_valid) {
+		/* If SW calculated the value, we know it's bad */
+		if (skb->csum_complete_sw)
+			return 1;
+
+		/* HW says the value is bad. Let's validate that.
+		 * skb->csum is no longer the full packet checksum,
+		 * so don't treat it as such.
+		 */
+		skb_checksum_complete_unset(skb);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* wrapper for udp_queue_rcv_skb tacking care of csum conversion and

@@ -88,8 +88,24 @@ int udp6_csum_init(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	 * Note, we are only interested in != 0 or == 0, thus the
 	 * force to int.
 	 */
-	return (__force int)skb_checksum_init_zero_check(skb, proto, uh->check,
-							 ip6_compute_pseudo);
+	err = (__force int)skb_checksum_init_zero_check(skb, proto, uh->check,
+							ip6_compute_pseudo);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE && !skb->csum_valid) {
+		/* If SW calculated the value, we know it's bad */
+		if (skb->csum_complete_sw)
+			return 1;
+
+		/* HW says the value is bad. Let's validate that.
+		 * skb->csum is no longer the full packet checksum,
+		 * so don't treat is as such.
+		 */
+		skb_checksum_complete_unset(skb);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(udp6_csum_init);
 

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Karsten Graul <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 89ab066d4229acd32e323f1569833302544a4186 ]

This reverts commit dd979b4df817e9976f18fb6f9d134d6bc4a3c317.

This broke tcp_poll for SMC fallback: An AF_SMC socket establishes an internal TCP socket for the initial handshake with the remote peer. Whenever the SMC connection can not be established this TCP socket is used as a fallback. All socket operations on the SMC socket are then forwarded to the TCP socket. In case of poll, the file->private_data pointer references the SMC socket because the TCP socket has no file assigned. This causes tcp_poll to wait on the wrong socket.

---
 crypto/af_alg.c        |    2 +-
 include/net/sock.h     |   12 +++++++++---
 net/atm/common.c       |    2 +-
 net/caif/caif_socket.c |    2 +-
 net/core/datagram.c    |    2 +-
 net/dccp/proto.c       |    2 +-
 net/ipv4/tcp.c         |    2 +-
 net/iucv/af_iucv.c     |    2 +-
 net/nfc/llcp_sock.c    |    2 +-
 net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c   |    2 +-
 net/smc/af_smc.c       |    2 +-
 net/tipc/socket.c      |    2 +-
 net/unix/af_unix.c     |    4 ++--
 13 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

@@ -1071,7 +1071,7 @@ __poll_t af_alg_poll(struct file *file,
 	struct af_alg_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
 	__poll_t mask;
 
-	sock_poll_wait(file, wait);
+	sock_poll_wait(file, sock, wait);
 	mask = 0;
 
 	if (!ctx->more || ctx->used)

@@ -2057,14 +2057,20 @@ static inline bool skwq_has_sleeper(stru
 /**
  * sock_poll_wait - place memory barrier behind the poll_wait call.
  * @filp:           file
+ * @sock:           socket to wait on
  * @p:              poll_table
  *
  * See the comments in the wq_has_sleeper function.
+ *
+ * Do not derive sock from filp->private_data here. An SMC socket establishes
+ * an internal TCP socket that is used in the fallback case. All socket
+ * operations on the SMC socket are then forwarded to the TCP socket. In case of
+ * poll, the filp->private_data pointer references the SMC socket because the
+ * TCP socket has no file assigned.
  */
-static inline void sock_poll_wait(struct file *filp, poll_table *p)
+static inline void sock_poll_wait(struct file *filp, struct socket *sock,
+				  poll_table *p)
 {
-	struct socket *sock = filp->private_data;
-
 	if (!poll_does_not_wait(p)) {
 		poll_wait(filp, &sock->wq->wait, p);
 		/* We need to be sure we are in sync with the

@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ __poll_t vcc_poll(struct file *file, str
 	struct atm_vcc *vcc;
 	__poll_t mask;
 
-	sock_poll_wait(file, wait);
+	sock_poll_wait(file, sock, wait);
 	mask = 0;
 
 	vcc = ATM_SD(sock);

@@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ static __poll_t caif_poll(struct file *f
 	__poll_t mask;
 	struct caifsock *cf_sk = container_of(sk, struct caifsock, sk);
 
-	sock_poll_wait(file, wait);
+	sock_poll_wait(file, sock, wait);
 	mask = 0;
 
 	/* exceptional events? */

@@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ __poll_t datagram_poll(struct file *file
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	__poll_t mask;
 
-	sock_poll_wait(file, wait);
+	sock_poll_wait(file, sock, wait);
 	mask = 0;
 
 	/* exceptional events? */

@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ __poll_t dccp_poll(struct file *file, st
 	__poll_t mask;
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 
-	sock_poll_wait(file, wait);
+	sock_poll_wait(file, sock, wait);
 	if (sk->sk_state == DCCP_LISTEN)
 		return inet_csk_listen_poll(sk);
 

@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ __poll_t tcp_poll(struct file *file, str
 	const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
 	int state;
 
-	sock_poll_wait(file, wait);
+	sock_poll_wait(file, sock, wait);
 
 	state = inet_sk_state_load(sk);
 	if (state == TCP_LISTEN)

@@ -1505,7 +1505,7 @@ __poll_t iucv_sock_poll(struct file *fil
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	__poll_t mask = 0;
 
-	sock_poll_wait(file, wait);
+	sock_poll_wait(file, sock, wait);
 
 	if (sk->sk_state == IUCV_LISTEN)
 		return iucv_accept_poll(sk);

@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ static __poll_t llcp_sock_poll(struct fi
 
 	pr_debug("%p\n", sk);
 
-	sock_poll_wait(file, wait);
+	sock_poll_wait(file, sock, wait);
 
 	if (sk->sk_state == LLCP_LISTEN)
 		return llcp_accept_poll(sk);

@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ static __poll_t rxrpc_poll(struct file *
 	struct rxrpc_sock *rx = rxrpc_sk(sk);
 	__poll_t mask;
 
-	sock_poll_wait(file, wait);
+	sock_poll_wait(file, sock, wait);
 	mask = 0;
 
 	/* the socket is readable if there are any messages waiting on the Rx

@@ -1543,7 +1543,7 @@ static __poll_t smc_poll(struct file *fi
 			mask |= EPOLLERR;
 	} else {
 		if (sk->sk_state != SMC_CLOSED)
-			sock_poll_wait(file, wait);
+			sock_poll_wait(file, sock, wait);
 		if (sk->sk_err)
 			mask |= EPOLLERR;
 		if ((sk->sk_shutdown == SHUTDOWN_MASK) ||

@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ static __poll_t tipc_poll(struct file *f
 	struct tipc_sock *tsk = tipc_sk(sk);
 	__poll_t revents = 0;
 
-	sock_poll_wait(file, wait);
+	sock_poll_wait(file, sock, wait);
 
 	if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
 		revents |= EPOLLRDHUP | EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;

@@ -2640,7 +2640,7 @@ static __poll_t unix_poll(struct file *f
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	__poll_t mask;
 
-	sock_poll_wait(file, wait);
+	sock_poll_wait(file, sock, wait);
 	mask = 0;
 
 	/* exceptional events? */

@@ -2677,7 +2677,7 @@ static __poll_t unix_dgram_poll(struct f
 	unsigned int writable;
 	__poll_t mask;
 
-	sock_poll_wait(file, wait);
+	sock_poll_wait(file, sock, wait);
 	mask = 0;
 
 	/* exceptional events? */

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit da71577545a52be3e0e9225a946e5fd79cfab015 ]

When an FDB entry is configured, the address is validated to have the length of an Ethernet address, but the device for which the address is configured can be of any type.

The above can result in the use of uninitialized memory when the address is later compared against existing addresses since 'dev->addr_len' is used and it may be greater than ETH_ALEN, as with ip6tnl devices.

Fix this by making sure that FDB entries are only configured for Ethernet devices.

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in memcmp+0x11d/0x180 lib/string.c:863
CPU: 1 PID: 4318 Comm: syz-executor998 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc3+ #49
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
  dump_stack+0x14b/0x190 lib/dump_stack.c:113
  kmsan_report+0x183/0x2b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:956
  __msan_warning+0x70/0xc0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:645
  memcmp+0x11d/0x180 lib/string.c:863
  dev_uc_add_excl+0x165/0x7b0 net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:464
  ndo_dflt_fdb_add net/core/rtnetlink.c:3463 [inline]
  rtnl_fdb_add+0x1081/0x1270 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3558
  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xa0b/0x1530 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4715
  netlink_rcv_skb+0x36e/0x5f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454
  rtnetlink_rcv+0x50/0x60 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4733
  netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline]
  netlink_unicast+0x1638/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343
  netlink_sendmsg+0x1205/0x1290 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908
  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
  sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe70/0x1290 net/socket.c:2114
  __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2152 [inline]
  __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2161 [inline]
  __se_sys_sendmsg+0x2a3/0x3d0 net/socket.c:2159
  __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2159
  do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7
RIP: 0033:0x440ee9
Code: e8 cc ab 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7

48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 bb 0a fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fff6a93b518 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000440ee9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00000000004002c8 R09: 00000000004002c8
R10: 00000000004002c8 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 000000000000b4b0
R13: 0000000000401ec0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Uninit was created at:

  kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:256 [inline]
  kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb8/0x1b0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:181
  kmsan_kmalloc+0x98/0x100 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:91
  kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:100
  slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline]
  slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2718 [inline]
  __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x9e7/0x1160 mm/slub.c:4351
  __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline]
  __alloc_skb+0x2f5/0x9e0 net/core/skbuff.c:206
  alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:996 [inline]
  netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1189 [inline]
  netlink_sendmsg+0xb49/0x1290 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883
  sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
  sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline]
  ___sys_sendmsg+0xe70/0x1290 net/socket.c:2114
  __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2152 [inline]
  __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2161 [inline]
  __se_sys_sendmsg+0x2a3/0x3d0 net/socket.c:2159
  __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2159
  do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7

v2:
* Make error message more specific (David)

---
 net/core/rtnetlink.c |   10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

@@ -3530,6 +3530,11 @@ static int rtnl_fdb_add(struct sk_buff *
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (dev->type != ARPHRD_ETHER) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "FDB delete only supported for Ethernet devices");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	addr = nla_data(tb[NDA_LLADDR]);
 
 	err = fdb_vid_parse(tb[NDA_VLAN], &vid, extack);

@@ -3634,6 +3639,11 @@ static int rtnl_fdb_del(struct sk_buff *
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (dev->type != ARPHRD_ETHER) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "FDB add only supported for Ethernet devices");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	addr = nla_data(tb[NDA_LLADDR]);
 
 	err = fdb_vid_parse(tb[NDA_VLAN], &vid, extack);

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jason Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ff002269a4ee9c769dbf9365acef633ebcbd6cbe ]

The idx in vhost_vring_ioctl() was controlled by userspace, hence a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

Fixing this by sanitizing idx before using it to index d->vqs.

---
 drivers/vhost/vhost.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
 #include <linux/interval_tree_generic.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include "vhost.h"
 

@@ -1397,6 +1398,7 @@ long vhost_vring_ioctl(struct vhost_dev
 	if (idx >= d->nvqs)
 		return -ENOBUFS;
 
+	idx = array_index_nospec(idx, d->nvqs);
 	vq = d->vqs[idx];
 
 	mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tobias Jungel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 414dd6fb9a1a1b59983aea7bf0f79f0085ecc5b8 ]

The attribute IFLA_BOND_AD_ACTOR_SYSTEM is sent to user space having the length of sizeof(bond->params.ad_actor_system) which is 8 byte. This patch aligns the length to ETH_ALEN to have the same MAC address exposed as using sysfs.

---
 drivers/net/bonding/bond_netlink.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -638,8 +638,7 @@ static int bond_fill_info(struct sk_buff
 				goto nla_put_failure;
 
 			if (nla_put(skb, IFLA_BOND_AD_ACTOR_SYSTEM,
-				    sizeof(bond->params.ad_actor_system),
-				    &bond->params.ad_actor_system))
+				    ETH_ALEN, &bond->params.ad_actor_system))
 				goto nla_put_failure;
 		}
 		if (!bond_3ad_get_active_agg_info(bond, &info)) {

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "Jaime Caama�o Ruiz" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 46ebe2834ba5b541f28ee72e556a3fed42c47570 ]

When there are both pop and push ethernet header actions among the actions to be applied to a packet, an unexpected EINVAL (Invalid argument) error is obtained. This is due to mac_proto not being reset correctly when those actions are validated.

Reported-at:
https://mail.openvswitch.org/pipermail/ovs-discuss/2018-October/047554.html

---
 net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -3030,7 +3030,7 @@ static int __ovs_nla_copy_actions(struct
 			 * is already present */
 			if (mac_proto != MAC_PROTO_NONE)
 				return -EINVAL;
-			mac_proto = MAC_PROTO_NONE;
+			mac_proto = MAC_PROTO_ETHERNET;
 			break;
 
 		case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_POP_ETH:

@@ -3038,7 +3038,7 @@ static int __ovs_nla_copy_actions(struct
 				return -EINVAL;
 			if (vlan_tci & htons(VLAN_TAG_PRESENT))
 				return -EINVAL;
-			mac_proto = MAC_PROTO_ETHERNET;
+			mac_proto = MAC_PROTO_NONE;
 			break;
 
 		case OVS_ACTION_ATTR_PUSH_NSH:

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Ahern <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4ed591c8ab44e711e56b8e021ffaf4f407c045f5 ]

The intent of ip6_route_check_nh_onlink is to make sure the gateway given for an onlink route is not actually on a connected route for a different interface (e.g., 2001:db8:1::/64 is on dev eth1 and then an onlink route has a via 2001:db8:1::1 dev eth2). If the gateway lookup hits the default route then it most likely will be a different interface than the onlink route which is ok.

Update ip6_route_check_nh_onlink to disregard the device mismatch if the gateway lookup hits the default route. Turns out the existing onlink tests are passing because there is no default route or it is an unreachable default, so update the onlink tests to have a default route other than unreachable.

---
 net/ipv6/route.c                                |    2 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/net/fib-onlink-tests.sh |   14 +++++++-------
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

@@ -2799,6 +2799,8 @@ static int ip6_route_check_nh_onlink(str
 	grt = ip6_nh_lookup_table(net, cfg, gw_addr, tbid, 0);
 	if (grt) {
 		if (!grt->dst.error &&
+		    /* ignore match if it is the default route */
+		    grt->from && !ipv6_addr_any(&grt->from->fib6_dst.addr) &&
 		    (grt->rt6i_flags & flags || dev != grt->dst.dev)) {
 			NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack,
 				       "Nexthop has invalid gateway or device mismatch");

@@ -167,8 +167,8 @@ setup()
 	# add vrf table
 	ip li add ${VRF} type vrf table ${VRF_TABLE}
 	ip li set ${VRF} up
-	ip ro add table ${VRF_TABLE} unreachable default
-	ip -6 ro add table ${VRF_TABLE} unreachable default
+	ip ro add table ${VRF_TABLE} unreachable default metric 8192
+	ip -6 ro add table ${VRF_TABLE} unreachable default metric 8192
 
 	# create test interfaces
 	ip li add ${NETIFS[p1]} type veth peer name ${NETIFS[p2]}

@@ -185,20 +185,20 @@ setup()
 	for n in 1 3 5 7; do
 		ip li set ${NETIFS[p${n}]} up
 		ip addr add ${V4ADDRS[p${n}]}/24 dev ${NETIFS[p${n}]}
-		ip addr add ${V6ADDRS[p${n}]}/64 dev ${NETIFS[p${n}]}
+		ip addr add ${V6ADDRS[p${n}]}/64 dev ${NETIFS[p${n}]} nodad
 	done
 
 	# move peer interfaces to namespace and add addresses
 	for n in 2 4 6 8; do
 		ip li set ${NETIFS[p${n}]} netns ${PEER_NS} up
 		ip -netns ${PEER_NS} addr add ${V4ADDRS[p${n}]}/24 dev ${NETIFS[p${n}]}
-		ip -netns ${PEER_NS} addr add ${V6ADDRS[p${n}]}/64 dev ${NETIFS[p${n}]}
+		ip -netns ${PEER_NS} addr add ${V6ADDRS[p${n}]}/64 dev ${NETIFS[p${n}]} nodad
 	done
 
-	set +e
+	ip -6 ro add default via ${V6ADDRS[p3]/::[0-9]/::64}
+	ip -6 ro add table ${VRF_TABLE} default via ${V6ADDRS[p7]/::[0-9]/::64}
 
-	# let DAD complete - assume default of 1 probe
-	sleep 1
+	set +e
 }
 
 cleanup()

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Karsten Graul <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fb692ec4117f6fd25044cfb5720d6b79d400dc65 ]

The pointer to the link group is unset in the smc connection structure right before the call to smc_buf_unuse. Provide the lgr pointer to smc_buf_unuse explicitly.
And move the call to smc_lgr_schedule_free_work to the end of smc_conn_free.

---
 net/smc/smc_core.c |   25 ++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

@@ -122,22 +122,17 @@ static void __smc_lgr_unregister_conn(st
 	sock_put(&smc->sk); /* sock_hold in smc_lgr_register_conn() */
 }
 
-/* Unregister connection and trigger lgr freeing if applicable
+/* Unregister connection from lgr
  */
 static void smc_lgr_unregister_conn(struct smc_connection *conn)
 {
 	struct smc_link_group *lgr = conn->lgr;
-	int reduced = 0;
 
 	write_lock_bh(&lgr->conns_lock);
 	if (conn->alert_token_local) {
-		reduced = 1;
 		__smc_lgr_unregister_conn(conn);
 	}
 	write_unlock_bh(&lgr->conns_lock);
-	if (!reduced || lgr->conns_num)
-		return;
-	smc_lgr_schedule_free_work(lgr);
 }
 
 /* Send delete link, either as client to request the initiation

@@ -291,7 +286,8 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static void smc_buf_unuse(struct smc_connection *conn)
+static void smc_buf_unuse(struct smc_connection *conn,
+			  struct smc_link_group *lgr)
 {
 	if (conn->sndbuf_desc)
 		conn->sndbuf_desc->used = 0;

@@ -301,8 +297,6 @@ static void smc_buf_unuse(struct smc_con
 			conn->rmb_desc->used = 0;
 		} else {
 			/* buf registration failed, reuse not possible */
-			struct smc_link_group *lgr = conn->lgr;
-
 			write_lock_bh(&lgr->rmbs_lock);
 			list_del(&conn->rmb_desc->list);
 			write_unlock_bh(&lgr->rmbs_lock);

@@ -315,16 +309,21 @@ static void smc_buf_unuse(struct smc_con
 /* remove a finished connection from its link group */
 void smc_conn_free(struct smc_connection *conn)
 {
-	if (!conn->lgr)
+	struct smc_link_group *lgr = conn->lgr;
+
+	if (!lgr)
 		return;
-	if (conn->lgr->is_smcd) {
+	if (lgr->is_smcd) {
 		smc_ism_unset_conn(conn);
 		tasklet_kill(&conn->rx_tsklet);
 	} else {
 		smc_cdc_tx_dismiss_slots(conn);
 	}
-	smc_lgr_unregister_conn(conn);
-	smc_buf_unuse(conn);
+	smc_lgr_unregister_conn(conn);		/* unsets conn->lgr */
+	smc_buf_unuse(conn, lgr);		/* allow buffer reuse */
+
+	if (!lgr->conns_num)
+		smc_lgr_schedule_free_work(lgr);
 }
 
 static void smc_link_clear(struct smc_link *lnk)

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Petr Machata <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ad0b9d94182be8356978d220c82f9837cffeb7a9 ]

Demands to remove FDB entries should be honored even if the FDB entry in question was originally learned, and not added by the user. Therefore ignore the added_by_user datum for SWITCHDEV_FDB_DEL_TO_DEVICE.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_switchdev.c |    2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

@@ -2317,8 +2317,6 @@ static void mlxsw_sp_switchdev_event_wor
 		break;
 	case SWITCHDEV_FDB_DEL_TO_DEVICE:
 		fdb_info = &switchdev_work->fdb_info;
-		if (!fdb_info->added_by_user)
-			break;
 		mlxsw_sp_port_fdb_set(mlxsw_sp_port, fdb_info, false);
 		break;
 	case SWITCHDEV_FDB_ADD_TO_BRIDGE: /* fall through */

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shalom Toledo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a22712a962912faf257e857ab6857f56a93cfb34 ]

After a failed reload, the driver is still registered to devlink, its devlink instance is still allocated and the 'reload_fail' flag is set. Then, in the next reload try, the driver's allocated devlink instance will be freed without unregistering from devlink and its components (e.g, resources). This scenario can cause a use-after-free if the user tries to execute command via devlink user-space tool.

Fix by not freeing the devlink instance during reload (failed or not).

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/core.c |   24 +++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

@@ -943,8 +943,8 @@ static int mlxsw_devlink_core_bus_device
 					     mlxsw_core->bus,
 					     mlxsw_core->bus_priv, true,
 					     devlink);
-	if (err)
-		mlxsw_core->reload_fail = true;
+	mlxsw_core->reload_fail = !!err;
+
 	return err;
 }
 

@@ -1083,8 +1083,15 @@ void mlxsw_core_bus_device_unregister(st
 {
 	struct devlink *devlink = priv_to_devlink(mlxsw_core);
 
-	if (mlxsw_core->reload_fail)
-		goto reload_fail;
+	if (mlxsw_core->reload_fail) {
+		if (!reload)
+			/* Only the parts that were not de-initialized in the
+			 * failed reload attempt need to be de-initialized.
+			 */
+			goto reload_fail_deinit;
+		else
+			return;
+	}
 
 	if (mlxsw_core->driver->fini)
 		mlxsw_core->driver->fini(mlxsw_core);

@@ -1098,9 +1105,12 @@ void mlxsw_core_bus_device_unregister(st
 	if (!reload)
 		devlink_resources_unregister(devlink, NULL);
 	mlxsw_core->bus->fini(mlxsw_core->bus_priv);
-	if (reload)
-		return;
-reload_fail:
+
+	return;
+
+reload_fail_deinit:
+	devlink_unregister(devlink);
+	devlink_resources_unregister(devlink, NULL);
 	devlink_free(devlink);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(mlxsw_core_bus_device_unregister);

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7de414a9dd91426318df7b63da024b2b07e53df5 ]

Most callers of pskb_trim_rcsum() simply drop the skb when it fails, however, ip_check_defrag() still continues to pass the skb up to stack. This is suspicious.

In ip_check_defrag(), after we learn the skb is an IP fragment, passing the skb to callers makes no sense, because callers expect fragments are defrag'ed on success. So, dropping the skb when we can't defrag it is reasonable.

Note, prior to commit 88078d98d1bb, this is not a big problem as checksum will be fixed up anyway. After it, the checksum is not correct on failure.

Found this during code review.

---
 net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c |   12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -720,10 +720,14 @@ struct sk_buff *ip_check_defrag(struct n
 	if (ip_is_fragment(&iph)) {
 		skb = skb_share_check(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (skb) {
-			if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, netoff + iph.ihl * 4))
-				return skb;
-			if (pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, netoff + len))
-				return skb;
+			if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, netoff + iph.ihl * 4)) {
+				kfree_skb(skb);
+				return NULL;
+			}
+			if (pskb_trim_rcsum(skb, netoff + len)) {
+				kfree_skb(skb);
+				return NULL;
+			}
 			memset(IPCB(skb), 0, sizeof(struct inet_skb_parm));
 			if (ip_defrag(net, skb, user))
 				return NULL;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commti ece23711dd956cd5053c9cb03e9fe0668f9c8894 ]

Just like with normal GRO processing, we have to initialize skb->next to NULL when we unlink overflow packets from the GRO hash lists.

---
 net/core/dev.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -5431,6 +5431,7 @@ static void gro_flush_oldest(struct list
 	 * SKB to the chain.
 	 */
 	list_del(&oldest->list);
+	oldest->next = NULL;
 	napi_gro_complete(oldest);
 }
 

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Heiner Kallweit <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 649f0837a8cc2b39329f2de00fa0d04b029291c5 ]

It was reported that WoL from S5 is broken (WoL from S3 works) and the analysis showed that during system shutdown the network interface was brought down already when the actual kernel shutdown started. Therefore netif_running() returned false and as a consequence the PHY was suspended. Obviously WoL wasn't working then.
To fix this the original patch needs to be effectively reverted. A side effect is that when normally bringing down the interface and WoL is enabled the PHY will remain powered on (like it was before the original patch).

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/realtek/r8169.c |    9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -4175,10 +4175,15 @@ static void rtl_wol_suspend_quirk(struct
 
 static bool rtl_wol_pll_power_down(struct rtl8169_private *tp)
 {
-	if (!netif_running(tp->dev) || !__rtl8169_get_wol(tp))
+	struct phy_device *phydev;
+
+	if (!__rtl8169_get_wol(tp))
 		return false;
 
-	phy_speed_down(tp->dev->phydev, false);
+	/* phydev may not be attached to netdevice */
+	phydev = mdiobus_get_phy(tp->mii_bus, 0);
+
+	phy_speed_down(phydev, false);
 	rtl_wol_suspend_quirk(tp);
 
 	return true;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ivan Vecera <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5ef79151c2fbc401cf38325e9a32e77b9fc593ae ]

The mentioned commit needs to be reverted because we cannot pass string allocated on stack to request_irq(). This function stores uses this pointer for later use (e.g. /proc/interrupts) so we need to keep this string persistently.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be.h      |    1 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/emulex/benet/be_main.c |    6 ++----
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ static inline void queue_tail_inc(struct
 
 struct be_eq_obj {
 	struct be_queue_info q;
+	char desc[32];
 
 	struct be_adapter *adapter;
 	struct napi_struct napi;

@@ -3488,11 +3488,9 @@ static int be_msix_register(struct be_ad
 	int status, i, vec;
 
 	for_all_evt_queues(adapter, eqo, i) {
-		char irq_name[IFNAMSIZ+4];
-
-		snprintf(irq_name, sizeof(irq_name), "%s-q%d", netdev->name, i);
+		sprintf(eqo->desc, "%s-q%d", netdev->name, i);
 		vec = be_msix_vec_get(adapter, eqo);
-		status = request_irq(vec, be_msix, 0, irq_name, eqo);
+		status = request_irq(vec, be_msix, 0, eqo->desc, eqo);
 		if (status)
 			goto err_msix;
 

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 713358369382cebf92f6e98ce2005f94e7344931 ]

When getting pr_assocstatus and pr_streamstatus by sctp_getsockopt, it doesn't correctly process the case when policy is set with SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL | SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK. It even causes a slab-out-of-bounds in sctp_getsockopt_pr_streamstatus().

This patch fixes it by return -EINVAL for this case.

---
 net/sctp/socket.c |    8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -7101,14 +7101,15 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_pr_assocstatu
 	}
 
 	policy = params.sprstat_policy;
-	if (!policy || (policy & ~(SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK | SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL)))
+	if (!policy || (policy & ~(SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK | SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL)) ||
+	    ((policy & SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL) && (policy & SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK)))
 		goto out;
 
 	asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, params.sprstat_assoc_id);
 	if (!asoc)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (policy & SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL) {
+	if (policy == SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL) {
 		params.sprstat_abandoned_unsent = 0;
 		params.sprstat_abandoned_sent = 0;
 		for (policy = 0; policy <= SCTP_PR_INDEX(MAX); policy++) {

@@ -7160,7 +7161,8 @@ static int sctp_getsockopt_pr_streamstat
 	}
 
 	policy = params.sprstat_policy;
-	if (!policy || (policy & ~(SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK | SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL)))
+	if (!policy || (policy & ~(SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK | SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL)) ||
+	    ((policy & SCTP_PR_SCTP_ALL) && (policy & SCTP_PR_SCTP_MASK)))
 		goto out;
 
 	asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, params.sprstat_assoc_id);

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2b4792eaa9f553764047d157365ed8b7787751a3 ]

Some drivers reference it via node_distance(), for example the NVME host driver core.

ERROR: "__node_distance" [drivers/nvme/host/nvme-core.ko] undefined! make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.modpost:92: __modpost] Error 1

---
 arch/sparc/mm/init_64.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -1383,6 +1383,7 @@ int __node_distance(int from, int to)
 	}
 	return numa_latency[from][to];
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__node_distance);
 
 static int __init find_best_numa_node_for_mlgroup(struct mdesc_mlgroup *grp)
 {

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Miller <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5b4fc3882a649c9411dd0dcad2ddb78e911d340e ]

Right now if we get a corrupted user stack frame we do a do_exit(SIGILL) which is not helpful.

If under a debugger, this behavior causes the inferior process to exit. So the register and other state cannot be examined at the time of the event.

Instead, conditionally log a rate limited kernel log message and then force a SIGSEGV.

With bits and ideas borrowed (as usual) from powerpc.

---
 arch/sparc/include/asm/switch_to_64.h |    3 ++-
 arch/sparc/kernel/process_64.c        |   25 +++++++++++++++++++------
 arch/sparc/kernel/rtrap_64.S          |    1 +
 arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c          |   12 ++++++++++--
 arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c         |    6 +++++-
 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ do {	save_and_clear_fpu();						\
 } while(0)
 
 void synchronize_user_stack(void);
-void fault_in_user_windows(void);
+struct pt_regs;
+void fault_in_user_windows(struct pt_regs *);
 
 #endif /* __SPARC64_SWITCH_TO_64_H */

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #include <linux/sysrq.h>
 #include <linux/nmi.h>
 #include <linux/context_tracking.h>
+#include <linux/signal.h>
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/page.h>

@@ -521,7 +522,12 @@ static void stack_unaligned(unsigned lon
 	force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, (void __user *) sp, 0, current);
 }
 
-void fault_in_user_windows(void)
+static const char uwfault32[] = KERN_INFO \
+	"%s[%d]: bad register window fault: SP %08lx (orig_sp %08lx) TPC %08lx O7 %08lx\n";
+static const char uwfault64[] = KERN_INFO \
+	"%s[%d]: bad register window fault: SP %016lx (orig_sp %016lx) TPC %08lx O7 %016lx\n";
+
+void fault_in_user_windows(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	struct thread_info *t = current_thread_info();
 	unsigned long window;

@@ -534,9 +540,9 @@ void fault_in_user_windows(void)
 		do {
 			struct reg_window *rwin = &t->reg_window[window];
 			int winsize = sizeof(struct reg_window);
-			unsigned long sp;
+			unsigned long sp, orig_sp;
 
-			sp = t->rwbuf_stkptrs[window];
+			orig_sp = sp = t->rwbuf_stkptrs[window];
 
 			if (test_thread_64bit_stack(sp))
 				sp += STACK_BIAS;

@@ -547,8 +553,16 @@ void fault_in_user_windows(void)
 				stack_unaligned(sp);
 
 			if (unlikely(copy_to_user((char __user *)sp,
-						  rwin, winsize)))
+						  rwin, winsize))) {
+				if (show_unhandled_signals)
+					printk_ratelimited(is_compat_task() ?
+							   uwfault32 : uwfault64,
+							   current->comm, current->pid,
+							   sp, orig_sp,
+							   regs->tpc,
+							   regs->u_regs[UREG_I7]);
 				goto barf;
+			}
 		} while (window--);
 	}
 	set_thread_wsaved(0);

@@ -556,8 +570,7 @@ void fault_in_user_windows(void)
 
 barf:
 	set_thread_wsaved(window + 1);
-	user_exit();
-	do_exit(SIGILL);
+	force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
 }
 
 asmlinkage long sparc_do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ __handle_preemption:
 		 wrpr			%g0, RTRAP_PSTATE_IRQOFF, %pstate
 
 __handle_user_windows:
+		add			%sp, PTREGS_OFF, %o0
 		call			fault_in_user_windows
 661:		 wrpr			%g0, RTRAP_PSTATE, %pstate
 		/* If userspace is using ADI, it could potentially pass

@@ -371,7 +371,11 @@ static int setup_frame32(struct ksignal
 		get_sigframe(ksig, regs, sigframe_size);
 	
 	if (invalid_frame_pointer(sf, sigframe_size)) {
-		do_exit(SIGILL);
+		if (show_unhandled_signals)
+			pr_info("%s[%d] bad frame in setup_frame32: %08lx TPC %08lx O7 %08lx\n",
+				current->comm, current->pid, (unsigned long)sf,
+				regs->tpc, regs->u_regs[UREG_I7]);
+		force_sigsegv(ksig->sig, current);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 

@@ -501,7 +505,11 @@ static int setup_rt_frame32(struct ksign
 		get_sigframe(ksig, regs, sigframe_size);
 	
 	if (invalid_frame_pointer(sf, sigframe_size)) {
-		do_exit(SIGILL);
+		if (show_unhandled_signals)
+			pr_info("%s[%d] bad frame in setup_rt_frame32: %08lx TPC %08lx O7 %08lx\n",
+				current->comm, current->pid, (unsigned long)sf,
+				regs->tpc, regs->u_regs[UREG_I7]);
+		force_sigsegv(ksig->sig, current);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 

@@ -370,7 +370,11 @@ setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, str
 		get_sigframe(ksig, regs, sf_size);
 
 	if (invalid_frame_pointer (sf)) {
-		do_exit(SIGILL);	/* won't return, actually */
+		if (show_unhandled_signals)
+			pr_info("%s[%d] bad frame in setup_rt_frame: %016lx TPC %016lx O7 %016lx\n",
+				current->comm, current->pid, (unsigned long)sf,
+				regs->tpc, regs->u_regs[UREG_I7]);
+		force_sigsegv(ksig->sig, current);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: "David S. Miller" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1f2b5b8e2df4591fbca430aff9c5a072dcc0f408 ]

---
 arch/sparc/kernel/systbls_64.S |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -47,9 +47,9 @@ sys_call_table32:
 	.word sys_recvfrom, sys_setreuid16, sys_setregid16, sys_rename, compat_sys_truncate
 /*130*/	.word compat_sys_ftruncate, sys_flock, compat_sys_lstat64, sys_sendto, sys_shutdown
 	.word sys_socketpair, sys_mkdir, sys_rmdir, compat_sys_utimes, compat_sys_stat64
-/*140*/	.word sys_sendfile64, sys_nis_syscall, compat_sys_futex, sys_gettid, compat_sys_getrlimit
+/*140*/	.word sys_sendfile64, sys_getpeername, compat_sys_futex, sys_gettid, compat_sys_getrlimit
 	.word compat_sys_setrlimit, sys_pivot_root, sys_prctl, sys_pciconfig_read, sys_pciconfig_write
-/*150*/	.word sys_nis_syscall, sys_inotify_init, sys_inotify_add_watch, sys_poll, sys_getdents64
+/*150*/	.word sys_getsockname, sys_inotify_init, sys_inotify_add_watch, sys_poll, sys_getdents64
 	.word compat_sys_fcntl64, sys_inotify_rm_watch, compat_sys_statfs, compat_sys_fstatfs, sys_oldumount
 /*160*/	.word compat_sys_sched_setaffinity, compat_sys_sched_getaffinity, sys_getdomainname, sys_setdomainname, sys_nis_syscall
 	.word sys_quotactl, sys_set_tid_address, compat_sys_mount, compat_sys_ustat, sys_setxattr

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>

commit 0fe5119e267f3e3d8ac206895f5922195ec55a8a upstream.

Recently a check was added which prevents marking of routers with zero source address, but for IPv6 that cannot happen as the relevant RFCs actually forbid such packets:
RFC 2710 (MLDv1):
"To be valid, the Query message MUST
come from a link-local IPv6 Source Address, be at least 24 octets long, and have a correct MLD checksum."

Same goes for RFC 3810.

And also it can be seen as a requirement in ipv6_mc_check_mld_query() which is used by the bridge to validate the message before processing it. Thus any queries with :: source address won't be processed anyway. So just remove the check for zero IPv6 source address from the query processing function.

---
 net/bridge/br_multicast.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1426,8 +1426,7 @@ static void br_multicast_query_received(
 	 * is 0.0.0.0 should not be added to router port list.
 	 */
 	if ((saddr->proto == htons(ETH_P_IP) && saddr->u.ip4) ||
-	    (saddr->proto == htons(ETH_P_IPV6) &&
-	     !ipv6_addr_any(&saddr->u.ip6)))
+	    saddr->proto == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
 		br_multicast_mark_router(br, port);
 }
 

Build results:

	total: 135 pass: 135 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 316 pass: 316 fail: 0

Details are available at https://kerneltests.org/builders/.

Guenter

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64 and i386.

NOTE: kernel selftest version updated to 4.19

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 4.19.1-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.19.y
git commit: 6eebea1ddae93f3931387c0672ff2d130a4888ce
git describe: v4.19-25-g6eebea1ddae9
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.19-oe/build/v4.19-25-g6eebea1ddae9

No regressions (compared to build v4.19-25-ga3c575473f6c) and mainline.

Thanks for testing all of these and letting me know.

greg k-h