4.19.2-stable review

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>

commit e7da89926f6dc6cf855f5ffdf79ef99a1b115ca7 upstream.

When there is no EDID the CEC adapter should be unconfigured as well. So call cec_phys_addr_invalidate() when this happens.

---
 drivers/media/i2c/adv7604.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -2284,8 +2284,10 @@ static int adv76xx_set_edid(struct v4l2_
 		state->aspect_ratio.numerator = 16;
 		state->aspect_ratio.denominator = 9;
 
-		if (!state->edid.present)
+		if (!state->edid.present) {
 			state->edid.blocks = 0;
+			cec_phys_addr_invalidate(state->cec_adap);
+		}
 
 		v4l2_dbg(2, debug, sd, "%s: clear EDID pad %d, edid.present = 0x%x\n",
 				__func__, edid->pad, state->edid.present);

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>

commit ab83203e181015b099720aff43ffabc1812e0fb3 upstream.

When there is no EDID the CEC adapter should be unconfigured as well. So call cec_phys_addr_invalidate() when this happens.

---
 drivers/media/i2c/adv7842.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -786,8 +786,10 @@ static int edid_write_hdmi_segment(struc
 	/* Disable I2C access to internal EDID ram from HDMI DDC ports */
 	rep_write_and_or(sd, 0x77, 0xf3, 0x00);
 
-	if (!state->hdmi_edid.present)
+	if (!state->hdmi_edid.present) {
+		cec_phys_addr_invalidate(state->cec_adap);
 		return 0;
+	}
 
 	pa = cec_get_edid_phys_addr(edid, 256, &spa_loc);
 	err = cec_phys_addr_validate(pa, &pa, NULL);

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit ceff2f4dcd44abf35864d9a99f85ac619e89a01d upstream.

Use the new of_get_compatible_child() helper to lookup the sibling instead of using of_find_compatible_node(), which searches the entire tree from a given start node and thus can return an unrelated (i.e. non-sibling) node.

This also addresses a potential use-after-free (e.g. after probe deferral) as the tree-wide helper drops a reference to its first argument (i.e. the parent device node).

While at it, also fix the related cec-node reference leak.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_hdmi.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1446,8 +1446,7 @@ static int mtk_hdmi_dt_parse_pdata(struc
 	}
 
 	/* The CEC module handles HDMI hotplug detection */
-	cec_np = of_find_compatible_node(np->parent, NULL,
-					 "mediatek,mt8173-cec");
+	cec_np = of_get_compatible_child(np->parent, "mediatek,mt8173-cec");
 	if (!cec_np) {
 		dev_err(dev, "Failed to find CEC node\n");
 		return -EINVAL;

@@ -1457,8 +1456,10 @@ static int mtk_hdmi_dt_parse_pdata(struc
 	if (!cec_pdev) {
 		dev_err(hdmi->dev, "Waiting for CEC device %pOF\n",
 			cec_np);
+		of_node_put(cec_np);
 		return -EPROBE_DEFER;
 	}
+	of_node_put(cec_np);
 	hdmi->cec_dev = &cec_pdev->dev;
 
 	/*

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>

commit a58c37978cf02f6d35d05ee4e9288cb8455f1401 upstream.

Drop all Adobe references and use the official opRGB standard instead.

---
 Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/biblio.rst              |   10 ----------
 Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/colorspaces-defs.rst    |    8 ++++----
 Documentation/media/uapi/v4l/colorspaces-details.rst |   13 ++++++-------
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

@@ -226,16 +226,6 @@ xvYCC
 
 :author:    International Electrotechnical Commission (http://www.iec.ch)
 
-.. _adobergb:
-
-AdobeRGB
-========
-
-
-:title:     Adobe© RGB (1998) Color Image Encoding Version 2005-05
-
-:author:    Adobe Systems Incorporated (http://www.adobe.com)
-
 .. _oprgb:
 
 opRGB

@@ -51,8 +51,8 @@ whole range, 0-255, dividing the angular
       - See :ref:`col-rec709`.
     * - ``V4L2_COLORSPACE_SRGB``
       - See :ref:`col-srgb`.
-    * - ``V4L2_COLORSPACE_ADOBERGB``
-      - See :ref:`col-adobergb`.
+    * - ``V4L2_COLORSPACE_OPRGB``
+      - See :ref:`col-oprgb`.
     * - ``V4L2_COLORSPACE_BT2020``
       - See :ref:`col-bt2020`.
     * - ``V4L2_COLORSPACE_DCI_P3``

@@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ whole range, 0-255, dividing the angular
       - Use the Rec. 709 transfer function.
     * - ``V4L2_XFER_FUNC_SRGB``
       - Use the sRGB transfer function.
-    * - ``V4L2_XFER_FUNC_ADOBERGB``
-      - Use the AdobeRGB transfer function.
+    * - ``V4L2_XFER_FUNC_OPRGB``
+      - Use the opRGB transfer function.
     * - ``V4L2_XFER_FUNC_SMPTE240M``
       - Use the SMPTE 240M transfer function.
     * - ``V4L2_XFER_FUNC_NONE``

@@ -290,15 +290,14 @@ Y' is clamped to the range [0…1] and C
 170M/BT.601. The Y'CbCr quantization is limited range.
 
 
-.. _col-adobergb:
+.. _col-oprgb:
 
-Colorspace Adobe RGB (V4L2_COLORSPACE_ADOBERGB)
+Colorspace opRGB (V4L2_COLORSPACE_OPRGB)
 ===============================================
 
-The :ref:`adobergb` standard defines the colorspace used by computer
-graphics that use the AdobeRGB colorspace. This is also known as the
-:ref:`oprgb` standard. The default transfer function is
-``V4L2_XFER_FUNC_ADOBERGB``. The default Y'CbCr encoding is
+The :ref:`oprgb` standard defines the colorspace used by computer
+graphics that use the opRGB colorspace. The default transfer function is
+``V4L2_XFER_FUNC_OPRGB``. The default Y'CbCr encoding is
 ``V4L2_YCBCR_ENC_601``. The default Y'CbCr quantization is limited
 range.
 

@@ -312,7 +311,7 @@ The chromaticities of the primary colors
 
 .. tabularcolumns:: |p{4.4cm}|p{4.4cm}|p{8.7cm}|
 
-.. flat-table:: Adobe RGB Chromaticities
+.. flat-table:: opRGB Chromaticities
     :header-rows:  1
     :stub-columns: 0
     :widths:       1 1 2

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>

commit db0340182444612bcadb98bdec22f651aa42266c upstream.

The CTA-861 standards have been updated to refer to opRGB instead of AdobeRGB. The official standard is in fact named opRGB, so switch to that.

The two old defines referring to ADOBERGB in the public API are put under #ifndef __KERNEL__ and a comment mentions that they are deprecated.

---
 Documentation/media/videodev2.h.rst.exceptions  |    6 
 drivers/media/common/v4l2-tpg/v4l2-tpg-colors.c |  262 ++++++++++++------------
 drivers/media/i2c/adv7511.c                     |    2 
 drivers/media/i2c/adv7604.c                     |    2 
 drivers/media/i2c/tc358743.c                    |    4 
 drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-core.h       |    2 
 drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-ctrls.c      |    6 
 drivers/media/platform/vivid/vivid-vid-out.c    |    2 
 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-dv-timings.c       |    8 
 include/uapi/linux/videodev2.h                  |   23 +-
 10 files changed, 165 insertions(+), 152 deletions(-)

@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ replace symbol V4L2_MEMORY_USERPTR :c:ty
 # Documented enum v4l2_colorspace
 replace symbol V4L2_COLORSPACE_470_SYSTEM_BG :c:type:`v4l2_colorspace`
 replace symbol V4L2_COLORSPACE_470_SYSTEM_M :c:type:`v4l2_colorspace`
-replace symbol V4L2_COLORSPACE_ADOBERGB :c:type:`v4l2_colorspace`
+replace symbol V4L2_COLORSPACE_OPRGB :c:type:`v4l2_colorspace`
+replace define V4L2_COLORSPACE_ADOBERGB :c:type:`v4l2_colorspace`
 replace symbol V4L2_COLORSPACE_BT2020 :c:type:`v4l2_colorspace`
 replace symbol V4L2_COLORSPACE_DCI_P3 :c:type:`v4l2_colorspace`
 replace symbol V4L2_COLORSPACE_DEFAULT :c:type:`v4l2_colorspace`

@@ -69,7 +70,8 @@ replace symbol V4L2_COLORSPACE_SRGB :c:t
 
 # Documented enum v4l2_xfer_func
 replace symbol V4L2_XFER_FUNC_709 :c:type:`v4l2_xfer_func`
-replace symbol V4L2_XFER_FUNC_ADOBERGB :c:type:`v4l2_xfer_func`
+replace symbol V4L2_XFER_FUNC_OPRGB :c:type:`v4l2_xfer_func`
+replace define V4L2_XFER_FUNC_ADOBERGB :c:type:`v4l2_xfer_func`
 replace symbol V4L2_XFER_FUNC_DCI_P3 :c:type:`v4l2_xfer_func`
 replace symbol V4L2_XFER_FUNC_DEFAULT :c:type:`v4l2_xfer_func`
 replace symbol V4L2_XFER_FUNC_NONE :c:type:`v4l2_xfer_func`

@@ -1355,7 +1355,7 @@ static int adv7511_set_fmt(struct v4l2_s
 	state->xfer_func = format->format.xfer_func;
 
 	switch (format->format.colorspace) {
-	case V4L2_COLORSPACE_ADOBERGB:
+	case V4L2_COLORSPACE_OPRGB:
 		c = HDMI_COLORIMETRY_EXTENDED;
 		ec = y ? HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_ADOBE_YCC_601 :
 			 HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_ADOBE_RGB;

@@ -2476,7 +2476,7 @@ static int adv76xx_log_status(struct v4l
 		"YCbCr Bt.601 (16-235)", "YCbCr Bt.709 (16-235)",
 		"xvYCC Bt.601", "xvYCC Bt.709",
 		"YCbCr Bt.601 (0-255)", "YCbCr Bt.709 (0-255)",
-		"sYCC", "Adobe YCC 601", "AdobeRGB", "invalid", "invalid",
+		"sYCC", "opYCC 601", "opRGB", "invalid", "invalid",
 		"invalid", "invalid", "invalid"
 	};
 	static const char * const rgb_quantization_range_txt[] = {

@@ -1243,9 +1243,9 @@ static int tc358743_log_status(struct v4
 	u8 vi_status3 =  i2c_rd8(sd, VI_STATUS3);
 	const int deep_color_mode[4] = { 8, 10, 12, 16 };
 	static const char * const input_color_space[] = {
-		"RGB", "YCbCr 601", "Adobe RGB", "YCbCr 709", "NA (4)",
+		"RGB", "YCbCr 601", "opRGB", "YCbCr 709", "NA (4)",
 		"xvYCC 601", "NA(6)", "xvYCC 709", "NA(8)", "sYCC601",
-		"NA(10)", "NA(11)", "NA(12)", "Adobe YCC 601"};
+		"NA(10)", "NA(11)", "NA(12)", "opYCC 601"};
 
 	v4l2_info(sd, "-----Chip status-----\n");
 	v4l2_info(sd, "Chip ID: 0x%02x\n",

@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ enum vivid_colorspace {
 	VIVID_CS_170M,
 	VIVID_CS_709,
 	VIVID_CS_SRGB,
-	VIVID_CS_ADOBERGB,
+	VIVID_CS_OPRGB,
 	VIVID_CS_2020,
 	VIVID_CS_DCI_P3,
 	VIVID_CS_240M,

@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ static int vivid_vid_cap_s_ctrl(struct v
 		V4L2_COLORSPACE_SMPTE170M,
 		V4L2_COLORSPACE_REC709,
 		V4L2_COLORSPACE_SRGB,
-		V4L2_COLORSPACE_ADOBERGB,
+		V4L2_COLORSPACE_OPRGB,
 		V4L2_COLORSPACE_BT2020,
 		V4L2_COLORSPACE_DCI_P3,
 		V4L2_COLORSPACE_SMPTE240M,

@@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ static const char * const vivid_ctrl_col
 	"SMPTE 170M",
 	"Rec. 709",
 	"sRGB",
-	"AdobeRGB",
+	"opRGB",
 	"BT.2020",
 	"DCI-P3",
 	"SMPTE 240M",

@@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ static const char * const vivid_ctrl_xfe
 	"Default",
 	"Rec. 709",
 	"sRGB",
-	"AdobeRGB",
+	"opRGB",
 	"SMPTE 240M",
 	"None",
 	"DCI-P3",

@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ int vivid_try_fmt_vid_out(struct file *f
 		mp->colorspace = V4L2_COLORSPACE_SMPTE170M;
 	} else if (mp->colorspace != V4L2_COLORSPACE_SMPTE170M &&
 		   mp->colorspace != V4L2_COLORSPACE_REC709 &&
-		   mp->colorspace != V4L2_COLORSPACE_ADOBERGB &&
+		   mp->colorspace != V4L2_COLORSPACE_OPRGB &&
 		   mp->colorspace != V4L2_COLORSPACE_BT2020 &&
 		   mp->colorspace != V4L2_COLORSPACE_SRGB) {
 		mp->colorspace = V4L2_COLORSPACE_REC709;

@@ -838,8 +838,8 @@ v4l2_hdmi_rx_colorimetry(const struct hd
 		case HDMI_COLORIMETRY_EXTENDED:
 			switch (avi->extended_colorimetry) {
 			case HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_ADOBE_RGB:
-				c.colorspace = V4L2_COLORSPACE_ADOBERGB;
-				c.xfer_func = V4L2_XFER_FUNC_ADOBERGB;
+				c.colorspace = V4L2_COLORSPACE_OPRGB;
+				c.xfer_func = V4L2_XFER_FUNC_OPRGB;
 				break;
 			case HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_BT2020:
 				c.colorspace = V4L2_COLORSPACE_BT2020;

@@ -909,9 +909,9 @@ v4l2_hdmi_rx_colorimetry(const struct hd
 				c.xfer_func = V4L2_XFER_FUNC_SRGB;
 				break;
 			case HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_ADOBE_YCC_601:
-				c.colorspace = V4L2_COLORSPACE_ADOBERGB;
+				c.colorspace = V4L2_COLORSPACE_OPRGB;
 				c.ycbcr_enc = V4L2_YCBCR_ENC_601;
-				c.xfer_func = V4L2_XFER_FUNC_ADOBERGB;
+				c.xfer_func = V4L2_XFER_FUNC_OPRGB;
 				break;
 			case HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_BT2020:
 				c.colorspace = V4L2_COLORSPACE_BT2020;

@@ -225,8 +225,8 @@ enum v4l2_colorspace {
 	/* For RGB colorspaces such as produces by most webcams. */
 	V4L2_COLORSPACE_SRGB          = 8,
 
-	/* AdobeRGB colorspace */
-	V4L2_COLORSPACE_ADOBERGB      = 9,
+	/* opRGB colorspace */
+	V4L2_COLORSPACE_OPRGB         = 9,
 
 	/* BT.2020 colorspace, used for UHDTV. */
 	V4L2_COLORSPACE_BT2020        = 10,

@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ enum v4l2_xfer_func {
 	 *
 	 * V4L2_COLORSPACE_SRGB, V4L2_COLORSPACE_JPEG: V4L2_XFER_FUNC_SRGB
 	 *
-	 * V4L2_COLORSPACE_ADOBERGB: V4L2_XFER_FUNC_ADOBERGB
+	 * V4L2_COLORSPACE_OPRGB: V4L2_XFER_FUNC_OPRGB
 	 *
 	 * V4L2_COLORSPACE_SMPTE240M: V4L2_XFER_FUNC_SMPTE240M
 	 *

@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ enum v4l2_xfer_func {
 	V4L2_XFER_FUNC_DEFAULT     = 0,
 	V4L2_XFER_FUNC_709         = 1,
 	V4L2_XFER_FUNC_SRGB        = 2,
-	V4L2_XFER_FUNC_ADOBERGB    = 3,
+	V4L2_XFER_FUNC_OPRGB       = 3,
 	V4L2_XFER_FUNC_SMPTE240M   = 4,
 	V4L2_XFER_FUNC_NONE        = 5,
 	V4L2_XFER_FUNC_DCI_P3      = 6,

@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ enum v4l2_xfer_func {
  * This depends on the colorspace.
  */
 #define V4L2_MAP_XFER_FUNC_DEFAULT(colsp) \
-	((colsp) == V4L2_COLORSPACE_ADOBERGB ? V4L2_XFER_FUNC_ADOBERGB : \
+	((colsp) == V4L2_COLORSPACE_OPRGB ? V4L2_XFER_FUNC_OPRGB : \
 	 ((colsp) == V4L2_COLORSPACE_SMPTE240M ? V4L2_XFER_FUNC_SMPTE240M : \
 	  ((colsp) == V4L2_COLORSPACE_DCI_P3 ? V4L2_XFER_FUNC_DCI_P3 : \
 	   ((colsp) == V4L2_COLORSPACE_RAW ? V4L2_XFER_FUNC_NONE : \

@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ enum v4l2_ycbcr_encoding {
 	 *
 	 * V4L2_COLORSPACE_SMPTE170M, V4L2_COLORSPACE_470_SYSTEM_M,
 	 * V4L2_COLORSPACE_470_SYSTEM_BG, V4L2_COLORSPACE_SRGB,
-	 * V4L2_COLORSPACE_ADOBERGB and V4L2_COLORSPACE_JPEG: V4L2_YCBCR_ENC_601
+	 * V4L2_COLORSPACE_OPRGB and V4L2_COLORSPACE_JPEG: V4L2_YCBCR_ENC_601
 	 *
 	 * V4L2_COLORSPACE_REC709 and V4L2_COLORSPACE_DCI_P3: V4L2_YCBCR_ENC_709
 	 *

@@ -382,6 +382,17 @@ enum v4l2_quantization {
 	 (((is_rgb_or_hsv) || (colsp) == V4L2_COLORSPACE_JPEG) ? \
 	 V4L2_QUANTIZATION_FULL_RANGE : V4L2_QUANTIZATION_LIM_RANGE))
 
+/*
+ * Deprecated names for opRGB colorspace (IEC 61966-2-5)
+ *
+ * WARNING: Please don't use these deprecated defines in your code, as
+ * there is a chance we have to remove them in the future.
+ */
+#ifndef __KERNEL__
+#define V4L2_COLORSPACE_ADOBERGB V4L2_COLORSPACE_OPRGB
+#define V4L2_XFER_FUNC_ADOBERGB  V4L2_XFER_FUNC_OPRGB
+#endif
+
 enum v4l2_priority {
 	V4L2_PRIORITY_UNSET       = 0,  /* not initialized */
 	V4L2_PRIORITY_BACKGROUND  = 1,

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>

commit 463659a08d7999d5461fa45b35b17686189a70ca upstream.

These names have been renamed in the CTA-861 standard due to trademark issues. Replace them here as well so they are in sync with the standard.

---
 drivers/media/i2c/adv7511.c               |    4 ++--
 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-dv-timings.c |    4 ++--
 drivers/video/hdmi.c                      |    8 ++++----
 include/linux/hdmi.h                      |    4 ++--
 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

@@ -1357,8 +1357,8 @@ static int adv7511_set_fmt(struct v4l2_s
 	switch (format->format.colorspace) {
 	case V4L2_COLORSPACE_OPRGB:
 		c = HDMI_COLORIMETRY_EXTENDED;
-		ec = y ? HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_ADOBE_YCC_601 :
-			 HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_ADOBE_RGB;
+		ec = y ? HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_OPYCC_601 :
+			 HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_OPRGB;
 		break;
 	case V4L2_COLORSPACE_SMPTE170M:
 		c = y ? HDMI_COLORIMETRY_ITU_601 : HDMI_COLORIMETRY_NONE;

@@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ v4l2_hdmi_rx_colorimetry(const struct hd
 		switch (avi->colorimetry) {
 		case HDMI_COLORIMETRY_EXTENDED:
 			switch (avi->extended_colorimetry) {
-			case HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_ADOBE_RGB:
+			case HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_OPRGB:
 				c.colorspace = V4L2_COLORSPACE_OPRGB;
 				c.xfer_func = V4L2_XFER_FUNC_OPRGB;
 				break;

@@ -908,7 +908,7 @@ v4l2_hdmi_rx_colorimetry(const struct hd
 				c.ycbcr_enc = V4L2_YCBCR_ENC_601;
 				c.xfer_func = V4L2_XFER_FUNC_SRGB;
 				break;
-			case HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_ADOBE_YCC_601:
+			case HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_OPYCC_601:
 				c.colorspace = V4L2_COLORSPACE_OPRGB;
 				c.ycbcr_enc = V4L2_YCBCR_ENC_601;
 				c.xfer_func = V4L2_XFER_FUNC_OPRGB;

@@ -592,10 +592,10 @@ hdmi_extended_colorimetry_get_name(enum
 		return "xvYCC 709";
 	case HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_S_YCC_601:
 		return "sYCC 601";
-	case HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_ADOBE_YCC_601:
-		return "Adobe YCC 601";
-	case HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_ADOBE_RGB:
-		return "Adobe RGB";
+	case HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_OPYCC_601:
+		return "opYCC 601";
+	case HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_OPRGB:
+		return "opRGB";
 	case HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_BT2020_CONST_LUM:
 		return "BT.2020 Constant Luminance";
 	case HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_BT2020:

@@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ enum hdmi_extended_colorimetry {
 	HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_XV_YCC_601,
 	HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_XV_YCC_709,
 	HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_S_YCC_601,
-	HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_ADOBE_YCC_601,
-	HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_ADOBE_RGB,
+	HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_OPYCC_601,
+	HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_OPRGB,
 
 	/* The following EC values are only defined in CEA-861-F. */
 	HDMI_EXTENDED_COLORIMETRY_BT2020_CONST_LUM,

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tri Vo <[email protected]>

commit 2a6c7c367de82951c98a290a21156770f6f82c84 upstream.

x0 is not callee-saved in the PCS. So there is no need to specify -fcall-used-x0.

Clang doesn't currently support -fcall-used flags. This patch will help building the kernel with clang.

---
 arch/arm64/lib/Makefile |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ lib-y		:= clear_user.o delay.o copy_from
 # when supported by the CPU. Result and argument registers are handled
 # correctly, based on the function prototype.
 lib-$(CONFIG_ARM64_LSE_ATOMICS) += atomic_ll_sc.o
-CFLAGS_atomic_ll_sc.o	:= -fcall-used-x0 -ffixed-x1 -ffixed-x2		\
+CFLAGS_atomic_ll_sc.o	:= -ffixed-x1 -ffixed-x2        		\
 		   -ffixed-x3 -ffixed-x4 -ffixed-x5 -ffixed-x6		\
 		   -ffixed-x7 -fcall-saved-x8 -fcall-saved-x9		\
 		   -fcall-saved-x10 -fcall-saved-x11 -fcall-saved-x12	\

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Colin Ian King <[email protected]>

commit 940c620d6af8fca7d115de40f19870fba415efac upstream.

Currently a failed allocation of channel->name leads to an immediate return without freeing channel. Fix this by setting ret to -ENOMEM and jumping to an exit path that kfree's channel.

Detected by CoverityScan, CID#1473692 ("Resource Leak")

---
 drivers/rpmsg/qcom_smd.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1122,8 +1122,10 @@ static struct qcom_smd_channel *qcom_smd
 
 	channel->edge = edge;
 	channel->name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!channel->name)
-		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	if (!channel->name) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto free_channel;
+	}
 
 	spin_lock_init(&channel->tx_lock);
 	spin_lock_init(&channel->recv_lock);

@@ -1173,6 +1175,7 @@ static struct qcom_smd_channel *qcom_smd
 
 free_name_and_channel:
 	kfree(channel->name);
+free_channel:
 	kfree(channel);
 
 	return ERR_PTR(ret);

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nicolas Pitre <[email protected]>

commit 672ca9dd13f1aca0c17516f76fc5b0e8344b3e46 upstream.

It is possible for corrupted filesystem images to produce very large block offsets that may wrap when a length is added, and wrongly pass the buffer size test.

---
 fs/cramfs/inode.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -202,7 +202,8 @@ static void *cramfs_blkdev_read(struct s
 			continue;
 		blk_offset = (blocknr - buffer_blocknr[i]) << PAGE_SHIFT;
 		blk_offset += offset;
-		if (blk_offset + len > BUFFER_SIZE)
+		if (blk_offset > BUFFER_SIZE ||
+		    blk_offset + len > BUFFER_SIZE)
 			continue;
 		return read_buffers[i] + blk_offset;
 	}

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thor Thayer <[email protected]>

commit ce3bf934f919a7d675c5b7fa4cc233ded9c6256e upstream.

The address in the SDRAM node was incorrect. Fix this to agree with the correct address and to match the reg definition block.

---
 arch/arm/boot/dts/socfpga_arria10.dtsi |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -613,7 +613,7 @@
 			status = "disabled";
 		};
 
-		sdr: sdr@ffc25000 {
+		sdr: sdr@ffcfb100 {
 			compatible = "altr,sdr-ctl", "syscon";
 			reg = <0xffcfb100 0x80>;
 		};

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thor Thayer <[email protected]>

commit 74121b9aa3cd571ddfff014a9f47db36cae3cda9 upstream.

Correct the register size of the System Manager node.

---
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/altera/socfpga_stratix10.dtsi |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@
 
 		sysmgr: sysmgr@ffd12000 {
 			compatible = "altr,sys-mgr", "syscon";
-			reg = <0xffd12000 0x1000>;
+			reg = <0xffd12000 0x228>;
 		};
 
 		/* Local timer */

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]>

commit 137dc5843faeacabf48fc22a8dc58c4e0b4f0927 upstream.

The scm device must be present in order for the rmtfs driver to configure memory permissions for the rmtfs memory region, so check that it is probed before continuing.

---
 drivers/soc/qcom/rmtfs_mem.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -212,6 +212,11 @@ static int qcom_rmtfs_mem_probe(struct p
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to parse qcom,vmid\n");
 		goto remove_cdev;
 	} else if (!ret) {
+		if (!qcom_scm_is_available()) {
+			ret = -EPROBE_DEFER;
+			goto remove_cdev;
+		}
+
 		perms[0].vmid = QCOM_SCM_VMID_HLOS;
 		perms[0].perm = QCOM_SCM_PERM_RW;
 		perms[1].vmid = vmid;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

commit 1dc6bd5e39a29453bdcc17348dd2a89f1aa4004e upstream.

Fix child-node lookup during probe, which ended up searching the whole device tree depth-first starting at the parent rather than just matching on its children.

To make things worse, the parent pmc node could end up being prematurely freed as of_find_node_by_name() drops a reference to its first argument.

---
 drivers/soc/tegra/pmc.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1288,7 +1288,7 @@ static void tegra_pmc_init_tsense_reset(
 	if (!pmc->soc->has_tsense_reset)
 		return;
 
-	np = of_find_node_by_name(pmc->dev->of_node, "i2c-thermtrip");
+	np = of_get_child_by_name(pmc->dev->of_node, "i2c-thermtrip");
 	if (!np) {
 		dev_warn(dev, "i2c-thermtrip node not found, %s.\n", disabled);
 		return;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>

commit 0d0352d8b3d6d7ca9a710b40e194cbbaeb841c88 upstream.

Fix the synthetic event test case to remove event correctly. If redirecting command to synthetic_event file without append mode, it cleans up all existing events and execute (parse) the command. This means "delete event" always fails to find the target event.

Since previous synthetic event has a bug which doesn't return -ENOENT even if it fails to find the deleting event, this test passed. But fixing that bug, this test fails because this test itself has a bug.

This fixes that bug by trying to delete event right after adding an event, and use append mode redirection ('>>') instead of normal redirection ('>').

---
 tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/test.d/trigger/inter-event/trigger-synthetic-event-createremove.tc |   12 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -35,18 +35,18 @@ fi
 
 reset_trigger
 
-echo "Test create synthetic event with an error"
-echo 'wakeup_latency  u64 lat pid_t pid char' > synthetic_events > /dev/null
+echo "Test remove synthetic event"
+echo '!wakeup_latency  u64 lat pid_t pid char comm[16]' >> synthetic_events
 if [ -d events/synthetic/wakeup_latency ]; then
-    fail "Created wakeup_latency synthetic event with an invalid format"
+    fail "Failed to delete wakeup_latency synthetic event"
 fi
 
 reset_trigger
 
-echo "Test remove synthetic event"
-echo '!wakeup_latency  u64 lat pid_t pid char comm[16]' > synthetic_events
+echo "Test create synthetic event with an error"
+echo 'wakeup_latency  u64 lat pid_t pid char' > synthetic_events > /dev/null
 if [ -d events/synthetic/wakeup_latency ]; then
-    fail "Failed to delete wakeup_latency synthetic event"
+    fail "Created wakeup_latency synthetic event with an invalid format"
 fi
 
 do_reset

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>

commit 48dc0ef19044bfb69193302fbe3a834e3331b7ae upstream.

Test ptrace-tm-spd-gpr fails on current kernel (4.19) due to a segmentation fault that happens on the child process prior to setting cptr[2] = 1. This causes the parent process to wait forever at 'while (!pptr[2])' and the test to be killed by the test harness framework by timeout, thus, failing.

The segmentation fault happens because of a inline assembly being generated as:

	0x10000355c <tm_spd_gpr+492>    lfs    f0, 0(0)

This is reading memory position 0x0 and causing the segmentation fault.

This code is being generated by ASM_LOAD_FPR_SINGLE_PRECISION(flt_4), where flt_4 is passed to the inline assembly block as:

	[flt_4] "r" (&d)

Since the inline assembly 'r' constraint means any GPR, gpr0 is being chosen, thus causing this issue when issuing a Load Floating-Point Single instruction.

This patch simply changes the constraint to 'b', which specify that this register will be used as base, and r0 is not allowed to be used, avoiding this issue.

Other than that, removing flt_2 register from the input operands, since it is not used by the inline assembly code at all.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/ptrace/ptrace-tm-spd-gpr.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -67,8 +67,8 @@ trans:
 		"3: ;"
 		: [res] "=r" (result), [texasr] "=r" (texasr)
 		: [gpr_1]"i"(GPR_1), [gpr_2]"i"(GPR_2), [gpr_4]"i"(GPR_4),
-		[sprn_texasr] "i" (SPRN_TEXASR), [flt_1] "r" (&a),
-		[flt_2] "r" (&b), [flt_4] "r" (&d)
+		[sprn_texasr] "i" (SPRN_TEXASR), [flt_1] "b" (&a),
+		[flt_4] "b" (&d)
 		: "memory", "r5", "r6", "r7",
 		"r8", "r9", "r10", "r11", "r12", "r13", "r14", "r15",
 		"r16", "r17", "r18", "r19", "r20", "r21", "r22", "r23",

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>

commit 18858511fd8a877303cc34c06efa461b26a0e070 upstream.

Return -ENOENT error if there is no target synthetic event. This notices an operation failure to user as below;

  # echo 'wakeup_latency u64 lat; pid_t pid;' > synthetic_events
  # echo '!wakeup' >> synthetic_events
  sh: write error: No such file or directory

---
 kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1063,8 +1063,10 @@ static int create_synth_event(int argc,
 		event = NULL;
 		ret = -EEXIST;
 		goto out;
-	} else if (delete_event)
+	} else if (delete_event) {
+		ret = -ENOENT;
 		goto out;
+	}
 
 	if (argc < 2) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>

commit 3628b4ca64f24a4ec55055597d0cb1c814729f8b upstream.

Some qgroup trace events like btrfs_qgroup_release_data() and btrfs_qgroup_free_delayed_ref() can still be triggered even if qgroup is not enabled.

This is caused by the lack of qgroup status check before calling some qgroup functions. Thankfully the functions can handle quota disabled case well and just do nothing for qgroup disabled case.

This patch will do earlier check before triggering related trace events.

And for enabled <-> disabled race case:

1) For enabled->disabled case
Disable will wipe out all qgroups data including reservation and excl/rfer. Even if we leak some reservation or numbers, it will still be cleared, so nothing will go wrong.

2) For disabled -> enabled case
Current btrfs_qgroup_release_data() will use extent_io tree to ensure we won't underflow reservation. And for delayed_ref we use head->qgroup_reserved to record the reserved space, so in that case head->qgroup_reserved should be 0 and we won't underflow.

---
 fs/btrfs/qgroup.c |    4 ++++
 fs/btrfs/qgroup.h |    2 ++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)

@@ -3106,6 +3106,10 @@ static int __btrfs_qgroup_release_data(s
 	int trace_op = QGROUP_RELEASE;
 	int ret;
 
+	if (!test_bit(BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED,
+		      &BTRFS_I(inode)->root->fs_info->flags))
+		return 0;
+
 	/* In release case, we shouldn't have @reserved */
 	WARN_ON(!free && reserved);
 	if (free && reserved)

@@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ void btrfs_qgroup_free_refroot(struct bt
 static inline void btrfs_qgroup_free_delayed_ref(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
 						 u64 ref_root, u64 num_bytes)
 {
+	if (!test_bit(BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED, &fs_info->flags))
+		return;
 	trace_btrfs_qgroup_free_delayed_ref(fs_info, ref_root, num_bytes);
 	btrfs_qgroup_free_refroot(fs_info, ref_root, num_bytes,
 				  BTRFS_QGROUP_RSV_DATA);

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>

commit 65c6e82becec33731f48786e5a30f98662c86b16 upstream.

[BUG]
When mounting certain crafted image, btrfs will trigger kernel BUG_ON() when trying to recover balance:

kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:8956!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI

  CPU: 1 PID: 662 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1-custom+ #10
  RIP: 0010:walk_up_proc+0x336/0x480 [btrfs]
  RSP: 0018:ffffb53540c9b890 EFLAGS: 00010202
  Call Trace:
   walk_up_tree+0x172/0x1f0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x3a4/0x830 [btrfs]
   merge_reloc_roots+0xe1/0x1d0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_recover_relocation+0x3ea/0x420 [btrfs]
   open_ctree+0x1af3/0x1dd0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_mount_root+0x66b/0x740 [btrfs]
   mount_fs+0x3b/0x16a
   vfs_kern_mount.part.9+0x54/0x140
   btrfs_mount+0x16d/0x890 [btrfs]
   mount_fs+0x3b/0x16a
   vfs_kern_mount.part.9+0x54/0x140
   do_mount+0x1fd/0xda0
   ksys_mount+0xba/0xd0
   __x64_sys_mount+0x21/0x30
   do_syscall_64+0x60/0x210
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

[CAUSE]
Extent tree corruption. In this particular case, reloc tree root's owner is DATA_RELOC_TREE (should be TREE_RELOC), thus its backref is corrupted and we failed the owner check in walk_up_tree().

[FIX]
It's pretty hard to take care of every extent tree corruption, but at least we can remove such BUG_ON() and exit more gracefully.

And since in this particular image, DATA_RELOC_TREE and TREE_RELOC share the same root (which is obviously invalid), we needs to make __del_reloc_root() more robust to detect such invalid sharing to avoid possible NULL dereference as root->node can be NULL in this case.

---
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c |   18 ++++++++++++------
 fs/btrfs/relocation.c  |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

@@ -8763,15 +8763,14 @@ static noinline int walk_up_proc(struct
 	if (eb == root->node) {
 		if (wc->flags[level] & BTRFS_BLOCK_FLAG_FULL_BACKREF)
 			parent = eb->start;
-		else
-			BUG_ON(root->root_key.objectid !=
-			       btrfs_header_owner(eb));
+		else if (root->root_key.objectid != btrfs_header_owner(eb))
+			goto owner_mismatch;
 	} else {
 		if (wc->flags[level + 1] & BTRFS_BLOCK_FLAG_FULL_BACKREF)
 			parent = path->nodes[level + 1]->start;
-		else
-			BUG_ON(root->root_key.objectid !=
-			       btrfs_header_owner(path->nodes[level + 1]));
+		else if (root->root_key.objectid !=
+			 btrfs_header_owner(path->nodes[level + 1]))
+			goto owner_mismatch;
 	}
 
 	btrfs_free_tree_block(trans, root, eb, parent, wc->refs[level] == 1);

@@ -8779,6 +8778,11 @@ out:
 	wc->refs[level] = 0;
 	wc->flags[level] = 0;
 	return 0;
+
+owner_mismatch:
+	btrfs_err_rl(fs_info, "unexpected tree owner, have %llu expect %llu",
+		     btrfs_header_owner(eb), root->root_key.objectid);
+	return -EUCLEAN;
 }
 
 static noinline int walk_down_tree(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,

@@ -8832,6 +8836,8 @@ static noinline int walk_up_tree(struct
 			ret = walk_up_proc(trans, root, path, wc);
 			if (ret > 0)
 				return 0;
+			if (ret < 0)
+				return ret;
 
 			if (path->locks[level]) {
 				btrfs_tree_unlock_rw(path->nodes[level],

@@ -1281,7 +1281,7 @@ static void __del_reloc_root(struct btrf
 	struct mapping_node *node = NULL;
 	struct reloc_control *rc = fs_info->reloc_ctl;
 
-	if (rc) {
+	if (rc && root->node) {
 		spin_lock(&rc->reloc_root_tree.lock);
 		rb_node = tree_search(&rc->reloc_root_tree.rb_root,
 				      root->node->start);

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>

commit b72c3aba09a53fc7c1824250d71180ca154517a7 upstream.

[BUG]
For certain crafted image, whose csum root leaf has missing backref, if we try to trigger write with data csum, it could cause deadlock with the following kernel WARN_ON():

  WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 41 at fs/btrfs/locking.c:230 btrfs_tree_lock+0x3e2/0x400
  CPU: 1 PID: 41 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted 4.18.0-rc1+ #8
  Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_endio_write_helper
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_tree_lock+0x3e2/0x400
  Call Trace:
   btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x39f/0x770
   __btrfs_cow_block+0x285/0x9e0
   btrfs_cow_block+0x191/0x2e0
   btrfs_search_slot+0x492/0x1160
   btrfs_lookup_csum+0xec/0x280
   btrfs_csum_file_blocks+0x2be/0xa60
   add_pending_csums+0xaf/0xf0
   btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x74b/0xc90
   finish_ordered_fn+0x15/0x20
   normal_work_helper+0xf6/0x500
   btrfs_endio_write_helper+0x12/0x20
   process_one_work+0x302/0x770
   worker_thread+0x81/0x6d0
   kthread+0x180/0x1d0
   ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

[CAUSE]
That crafted image has missing backref for csum tree root leaf. And when we try to allocate new tree block, since there is no EXTENT/METADATA_ITEM for csum tree root, btrfs consider it's free slot and use it.

The extent tree of the image looks like:

Normal image | This fuzzed image
----------------------------------+--------------------------------

  BG 29360128                       | BG 29360128
   One empty slot                   |  One empty slot
  29364224: backref to UUID tree    | 29364224: backref to UUID tree
   Two empty slots                  |  Two empty slots
  29376512: backref to CSUM tree    |  One empty slot (bad type) <<<
  29380608: backref to D_RELOC tree | 29380608: backref to D_RELOC tree
  ...                               | ...

Since bytenr 29376512 has no METADATA/EXTENT_ITEM, when btrfs try to alloc tree block, it's an valid slot for btrfs.

And for finish_ordered_write, when we need to insert csum, we try to CoW csum tree root.

By accident, empty slots at bytenr BG_OFFSET, BG_OFFSET + 8K, BG_OFFSET + 12K is already used by tree block COW for other trees, the next empty slot is BG_OFFSET + 16K, which should be the backref for CSUM tree.

But due to the bad type, btrfs can recognize it and still consider it as an empty slot, and will try to use it for csum tree CoW.

Then in the following call trace, we will try to lock the new tree block, which turns out to be the old csum tree root which is already locked:

btrfs_search_slot() called on csum tree root, which is at 29376512 |- btrfs_cow_block()

   |- btrfs_set_lock_block()
   |  |- Now locks tree block 29376512 (old csum tree root)
   |- __btrfs_cow_block()
      |- btrfs_alloc_tree_block()
         |- btrfs_reserve_extent()
            | Now it returns tree block 29376512, which extent tree
            | shows its empty slot, but it's already hold by csum tree
            |- btrfs_init_new_buffer()
               |- btrfs_tree_lock()
                  | Triggers WARN_ON(eb->lock_owner == current->pid)
                  |- wait_event()
                     Wait lock owner to release the lock, but it's
                     locked by ourself, so it will deadlock

[FIX]
This patch will do the lock_owner and current->pid check at btrfs_init_new_buffer().
So above deadlock can be avoided.

Since such problem can only happen in crafted image, we will still trigger kernel warning for later aborted transaction, but with a little more meaningful warning message.

---
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c |   13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

@@ -8119,6 +8119,19 @@ btrfs_init_new_buffer(struct btrfs_trans
 	if (IS_ERR(buf))
 		return buf;
 
+	/*
+	 * Extra safety check in case the extent tree is corrupted and extent
+	 * allocator chooses to use a tree block which is already used and
+	 * locked.
+	 */
+	if (buf->lock_owner == current->pid) {
+		btrfs_err_rl(fs_info,
+"tree block %llu owner %llu already locked by pid=%d, extent tree corruption detected",
+			buf->start, btrfs_header_owner(buf), current->pid);
+		free_extent_buffer(buf);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EUCLEAN);
+	}
+
 	btrfs_set_buffer_lockdep_class(root->root_key.objectid, buf, level);
 	btrfs_tree_lock(buf);
 	clean_tree_block(fs_info, buf);

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>

commit 374b0e2d6ba5da7fd1cadb3247731ff27d011f6f upstream.

When we hit an I/O error in free_log_tree->walk_log_tree during file system shutdown we can crash due to there not being a valid transaction handle.

Use btrfs_handle_fs_error when there's no transaction handle to use.

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000060
  IP: free_log_tree+0xd2/0x140 [btrfs]
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
  Modules linked in: <modules>
  CPU: 2 PID: 23544 Comm: umount Tainted: G        W        4.12.14-kvmsmall #9 SLE15 (unreleased)
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.0.0-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
  task: ffff96bfd3478880 task.stack: ffffa7cf40d78000
  RIP: 0010:free_log_tree+0xd2/0x140 [btrfs]
  RSP: 0018:ffffa7cf40d7bd10 EFLAGS: 00010282
  RAX: 00000000fffffffb RBX: 00000000fffffffb RCX: 0000000000000002
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff96c02f07d4c8 RDI: 0000000000000282
  RBP: ffff96c013cf1000 R08: ffff96c02f07d4c8 R09: ffff96c02f07d4d0
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: ffff96c005e800c0 R14: ffffa7cf40d7bdb8 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  00007f17856bcfc0(0000) GS:ffff96c03f600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 0000000000000060 CR3: 0000000045ed6002 CR4: 00000000003606e0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  Call Trace:
   ? wait_for_writer+0xb0/0xb0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_free_log+0x17/0x30 [btrfs]
   btrfs_drop_and_free_fs_root+0x9a/0xe0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_free_fs_roots+0xc0/0x130 [btrfs]
   ? wait_for_completion+0xf2/0x100
   close_ctree+0xea/0x2e0 [btrfs]
   ? kthread_stop+0x161/0x260
   generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x120
   kill_anon_super+0xe/0x20
   btrfs_kill_super+0x13/0x100 [btrfs]
   deactivate_locked_super+0x3f/0x70
   cleanup_mnt+0x3b/0x70
   task_work_run+0x78/0x90
   exit_to_usermode_loop+0x77/0xa6
   do_syscall_64+0x1c5/0x1e0
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
  RIP: 0033:0x7f1784f90827
  RSP: 002b:00007ffdeeb03118 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000556a60c62970 RCX: 00007f1784f90827
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000556a60c62b50
  RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 00000000ffffffff
  R10: 0000556a60c63900 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000556a60c62b50
  R13: 00007f17854a81c4 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
  RIP: free_log_tree+0xd2/0x140 [btrfs] RSP: ffffa7cf40d7bd10
  CR2: 0000000000000060

---
 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c |    9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -3196,9 +3196,12 @@ static void free_log_tree(struct btrfs_t
 	};
 
 	ret = walk_log_tree(trans, log, &wc);
-	/* I don't think this can happen but just in case */
-	if (ret)
-		btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, ret);
+	if (ret) {
+		if (trans)
+			btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, ret);
+		else
+			btrfs_handle_fs_error(log->fs_info, ret, NULL);
+	}
 
 	while (1) {
 		ret = find_first_extent_bit(&log->dirty_log_pages,

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>

commit 5c06147128fbbdf7a84232c5f0d808f53153defe upstream.

When we fail to start a transaction in btrfs_dev_replace_start, we leave dev_replace->replace_start set to STARTED but clear ->srcdev and ->tgtdev. Later, that can result in an Oops in btrfs_dev_replace_progress when having state set to STARTED or SUSPENDED implies that ->srcdev is valid.

Also fix error handling when the state is already STARTED or SUSPENDED while starting. That, too, will clear ->srcdev and ->tgtdev even though it doesn't own them. This should be an impossible case to hit since we should be protected by the BTRFS_FS_EXCL_OP bit being set. Let's add an ASSERT there while we're at it.

---
 fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -440,6 +440,7 @@ int btrfs_dev_replace_start(struct btrfs
 		break;
 	case BTRFS_IOCTL_DEV_REPLACE_STATE_STARTED:
 	case BTRFS_IOCTL_DEV_REPLACE_STATE_SUSPENDED:
+		ASSERT(0);
 		ret = BTRFS_IOCTL_DEV_REPLACE_RESULT_ALREADY_STARTED;
 		goto leave;
 	}

@@ -482,6 +483,10 @@ int btrfs_dev_replace_start(struct btrfs
 	if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
 		btrfs_dev_replace_write_lock(dev_replace);
+		dev_replace->replace_state =
+			BTRFS_IOCTL_DEV_REPLACE_STATE_NEVER_STARTED;
+		dev_replace->srcdev = NULL;
+		dev_replace->tgtdev = NULL;
 		goto leave;
 	}
 

@@ -503,8 +508,6 @@ int btrfs_dev_replace_start(struct btrfs
 	return ret;
 
 leave:
-	dev_replace->srcdev = NULL;
-	dev_replace->tgtdev = NULL;
 	btrfs_dev_replace_write_unlock(dev_replace);
 	btrfs_destroy_dev_replace_tgtdev(tgt_device);
 	return ret;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>

commit 93bba24d4b5ad1e5cd8b43f64e66ff9d6355dd20 upstream.

Function btrfs_trim_fs() doesn't handle errors in a consistent way. If error happens when trimming existing block groups, it will skip the remaining blocks and continue to trim unallocated space for each device.

The return value will only reflect the final error from device trimming.

This patch will fix such behavior by:

1) Recording the last error from block group or device trimming The return value will also reflect the last error during trimming. Make developer more aware of the problem.

2) Continuing trimming if possible
If we failed to trim one block group or device, we could still try the next block group or device.

3) Report number of failures during block group and device trimming It would be less noisy, but still gives user a brief summary of what's going wrong.

Such behavior can avoid confusion for cases like failure to trim the first block group and then only unallocated space is trimmed.

---
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c |   49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

@@ -10850,6 +10850,15 @@ static int btrfs_trim_free_extents(struc
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Trim the whole filesystem by:
+ * 1) trimming the free space in each block group
+ * 2) trimming the unallocated space on each device
+ *
+ * This will also continue trimming even if a block group or device encounters
+ * an error.  The return value will be the last error, or 0 if nothing bad
+ * happens.
+ */
 int btrfs_trim_fs(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, struct fstrim_range *range)
 {
 	struct btrfs_block_group_cache *cache = NULL;

@@ -10860,6 +10869,10 @@ int btrfs_trim_fs(struct btrfs_fs_info *
 	u64 end;
 	u64 trimmed = 0;
 	u64 total_bytes = btrfs_super_total_bytes(fs_info->super_copy);
+	u64 bg_failed = 0;
+	u64 dev_failed = 0;
+	int bg_ret = 0;
+	int dev_ret = 0;
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	/*

@@ -10870,7 +10883,7 @@ int btrfs_trim_fs(struct btrfs_fs_info *
 	else
 		cache = btrfs_lookup_block_group(fs_info, range->start);
 
-	while (cache) {
+	for (; cache; cache = next_block_group(fs_info, cache)) {
 		if (cache->key.objectid >= (range->start + range->len)) {
 			btrfs_put_block_group(cache);
 			break;

@@ -10884,13 +10897,15 @@ int btrfs_trim_fs(struct btrfs_fs_info *
 			if (!block_group_cache_done(cache)) {
 				ret = cache_block_group(cache, 0);
 				if (ret) {
-					btrfs_put_block_group(cache);
-					break;
+					bg_failed++;
+					bg_ret = ret;
+					continue;
 				}
 				ret = wait_block_group_cache_done(cache);
 				if (ret) {
-					btrfs_put_block_group(cache);
-					break;
+					bg_failed++;
+					bg_ret = ret;
+					continue;
 				}
 			}
 			ret = btrfs_trim_block_group(cache,

@@ -10901,28 +10916,40 @@ int btrfs_trim_fs(struct btrfs_fs_info *
 
 			trimmed += group_trimmed;
 			if (ret) {
-				btrfs_put_block_group(cache);
-				break;
+				bg_failed++;
+				bg_ret = ret;
+				continue;
 			}
 		}
-
-		cache = next_block_group(fs_info, cache);
 	}
 
+	if (bg_failed)
+		btrfs_warn(fs_info,
+			"failed to trim %llu block group(s), last error %d",
+			bg_failed, bg_ret);
 	mutex_lock(&fs_info->fs_devices->device_list_mutex);
 	devices = &fs_info->fs_devices->alloc_list;
 	list_for_each_entry(device, devices, dev_alloc_list) {
 		ret = btrfs_trim_free_extents(device, range->minlen,
 					      &group_trimmed);
-		if (ret)
+		if (ret) {
+			dev_failed++;
+			dev_ret = ret;
 			break;
+		}
 
 		trimmed += group_trimmed;
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&fs_info->fs_devices->device_list_mutex);
 
+	if (dev_failed)
+		btrfs_warn(fs_info,
+			"failed to trim %llu device(s), last error %d",
+			dev_failed, dev_ret);
 	range->len = trimmed;
-	return ret;
+	if (bg_ret)
+		return bg_ret;
+	return dev_ret;
 }
 
 /*

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>

commit 6ba9fc8e628becf0e3ec94083450d089b0dec5f5 upstream.

[BUG]
fstrim on some btrfs only trims the unallocated space, not trimming any space in existing block groups.

[CAUSE]
Before fstrim_range passed to btrfs_trim_fs(), it gets truncated to range [0, super->total_bytes). So later btrfs_trim_fs() will only be able to trim block groups in range [0, super->total_bytes).

While for btrfs, any bytenr aligned to sectorsize is valid, since btrfs uses its logical address space, there is nothing limiting the location where we put block groups.

For filesystem with frequent balance, it's quite easy to relocate all block groups and bytenr of block groups will start beyond super->total_bytes.

In that case, btrfs will not trim existing block groups.

[FIX]
Just remove the truncation in btrfs_ioctl_fitrim(), so btrfs_trim_fs() can get the unmodified range, which is normally set to [0, U64_MAX].

---
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c |   10 +---------
 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c       |   11 +++++++----
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

@@ -10868,21 +10868,13 @@ int btrfs_trim_fs(struct btrfs_fs_info *
 	u64 start;
 	u64 end;
 	u64 trimmed = 0;
-	u64 total_bytes = btrfs_super_total_bytes(fs_info->super_copy);
 	u64 bg_failed = 0;
 	u64 dev_failed = 0;
 	int bg_ret = 0;
 	int dev_ret = 0;
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	/*
-	 * try to trim all FS space, our block group may start from non-zero.
-	 */
-	if (range->len == total_bytes)
-		cache = btrfs_lookup_first_block_group(fs_info, range->start);
-	else
-		cache = btrfs_lookup_block_group(fs_info, range->start);
-
+	cache = btrfs_lookup_first_block_group(fs_info, range->start);
 	for (; cache; cache = next_block_group(fs_info, cache)) {
 		if (cache->key.objectid >= (range->start + range->len)) {
 			btrfs_put_block_group(cache);

@@ -491,7 +491,6 @@ static noinline int btrfs_ioctl_fitrim(s
 	struct fstrim_range range;
 	u64 minlen = ULLONG_MAX;
 	u64 num_devices = 0;
-	u64 total_bytes = btrfs_super_total_bytes(fs_info->super_copy);
 	int ret;
 
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))

@@ -515,11 +514,15 @@ static noinline int btrfs_ioctl_fitrim(s
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	if (copy_from_user(&range, arg, sizeof(range)))
 		return -EFAULT;
-	if (range.start > total_bytes ||
-	    range.len < fs_info->sb->s_blocksize)
+
+	/*
+	 * NOTE: Don't truncate the range using super->total_bytes.  Bytenr of
+	 * block group is in the logical address space, which can be any
+	 * sectorsize aligned bytenr in  the range [0, U64_MAX].
+	 */
+	if (range.len < fs_info->sb->s_blocksize)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	range.len = min(range.len, total_bytes - range.start);
 	range.minlen = max(range.minlen, minlen);
 	ret = btrfs_trim_fs(fs_info, &range);
 	if (ret < 0)

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>

commit d4e329de5e5e21594df2e0dd59da9acee71f133b upstream.

btrfs_trim_fs iterates over the fs_devices->alloc_list while holding the device_list_mutex. The problem is that ->alloc_list is protected by the chunk mutex. We don't want to hold the chunk mutex over the trim of the entire file system. Fortunately, the ->dev_list list is protected by the dev_list mutex and while it will give us all devices, including read-only devices, we already just skip the read-only devices. Then we can continue to take and release the chunk mutex while scanning each device.

---
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -10920,8 +10920,8 @@ int btrfs_trim_fs(struct btrfs_fs_info *
 			"failed to trim %llu block group(s), last error %d",
 			bg_failed, bg_ret);
 	mutex_lock(&fs_info->fs_devices->device_list_mutex);
-	devices = &fs_info->fs_devices->alloc_list;
-	list_for_each_entry(device, devices, dev_alloc_list) {
+	devices = &fs_info->fs_devices->devices;
+	list_for_each_entry(device, devices, dev_list) {
 		ret = btrfs_trim_free_extents(device, range->minlen,
 					      &group_trimmed);
 		if (ret) {

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>

commit 0be88e367fd8fbdb45257615d691f4675dda062f upstream.

We check whether any device the file system is using supports discard in the ioctl call, but then we attempt to trim free extents on every device regardless of whether discard is supported. Due to the way we mask off EOPNOTSUPP, we can end up issuing the trim operations on each free range on devices that don't support it, just wasting time.

---
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

@@ -10789,6 +10789,10 @@ static int btrfs_trim_free_extents(struc
 
 	*trimmed = 0;
 
+	/* Discard not supported = nothing to do. */
+	if (!blk_queue_discard(bdev_get_queue(device->bdev)))
+		return 0;
+
 	/* Not writeable = nothing to do. */
 	if (!test_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_WRITEABLE, &device->dev_state))
 		return 0;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>

commit fee7acc361314df6561208c2d3c0882d663dd537 upstream.

Commit 499f377f49f08 (btrfs: iterate over unused chunk space in FITRIM) fixed free space trimming, but introduced latency when it was running. This is due to it pinning the transaction using both a incremented refcount and holding the commit root sem for the duration of a single trim operation.

This was to ensure safety but it's unnecessary. We already hold the the chunk mutex so we know that the chunk we're using can't be allocated while we're trimming it.

In order to check against chunks allocated already in this transaction, we need to check the pending chunks list. To to that safely without joining the transaction (or attaching than then having to commit it) we need to ensure that the dev root's commit root doesn't change underneath us and the pending chunk lists stays around until we're done with it.

We can ensure the former by holding the commit root sem and the latter by pinning the transaction. We do this now, but the critical section covers the trim operation itself and we don't need to do that.

This patch moves the pinning and unpinning logic into helpers and unpins the transaction after performing the search and check for pending chunks.

Limiting the critical section of the transaction pinning improves the latency substantially on slower storage (e.g. image files over NFS).

---
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c |   25 +++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -10772,14 +10772,16 @@ int btrfs_error_unpin_extent_range(struc
  * We don't want a transaction for this since the discard may take a
  * substantial amount of time.  We don't require that a transaction be
  * running, but we do need to take a running transaction into account
- * to ensure that we're not discarding chunks that were released in
- * the current transaction.
+ * to ensure that we're not discarding chunks that were released or
+ * allocated in the current transaction.
  *
  * Holding the chunks lock will prevent other threads from allocating
  * or releasing chunks, but it won't prevent a running transaction
  * from committing and releasing the memory that the pending chunks
  * list head uses.  For that, we need to take a reference to the
- * transaction.
+ * transaction and hold the commit root sem.  We only need to hold
+ * it while performing the free space search since we have already
+ * held back allocations.
  */
 static int btrfs_trim_free_extents(struct btrfs_device *device,
 				   u64 minlen, u64 *trimmed)

@@ -10810,9 +10812,13 @@ static int btrfs_trim_free_extents(struc
 
 		ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&fs_info->chunk_mutex);
 		if (ret)
-			return ret;
+			break;
 
-		down_read(&fs_info->commit_root_sem);
+		ret = down_read_killable(&fs_info->commit_root_sem);
+		if (ret) {
+			mutex_unlock(&fs_info->chunk_mutex);
+			break;
+		}
 
 		spin_lock(&fs_info->trans_lock);
 		trans = fs_info->running_transaction;

@@ -10820,13 +10826,17 @@ static int btrfs_trim_free_extents(struc
 			refcount_inc(&trans->use_count);
 		spin_unlock(&fs_info->trans_lock);
 
+		if (!trans)
+			up_read(&fs_info->commit_root_sem);
+
 		ret = find_free_dev_extent_start(trans, device, minlen, start,
 						 &start, &len);
-		if (trans)
+		if (trans) {
+			up_read(&fs_info->commit_root_sem);
 			btrfs_put_transaction(trans);
+		}
 
 		if (ret) {
-			up_read(&fs_info->commit_root_sem);
 			mutex_unlock(&fs_info->chunk_mutex);
 			if (ret == -ENOSPC)
 				ret = 0;

@@ -10834,7 +10844,6 @@ static int btrfs_trim_free_extents(struc
 		}
 
 		ret = btrfs_issue_discard(device->bdev, start, len, &bytes);
-		up_read(&fs_info->commit_root_sem);
 		mutex_unlock(&fs_info->chunk_mutex);
 
 		if (ret)

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>

commit 3aa7c7a31c26321696b92841d5103461c6f3f517 upstream.

While testing my backport I noticed there was a panic if I ran generic/416 generic/417 generic/418 all in a row. This just happened to uncover a race where we had outstanding IO after we destroy all of our workqueues, and then we'd go to queue the endio work on those free'd workqueues.

This is because we aren't waiting for the caching threads to be done before freeing everything up, so to fix this make sure we wait on any outstanding caching that's being done before we free up the block group, so we're sure to be done with all IO by the time we get to btrfs_stop_all_workers(). This fixes the panic I was seeing consistently in testing.

------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/volumes.c:6112!
SMP PTI
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 27165 Comm: kworker/u4:7 Not tainted 4.16.0-02155-g3553e54a578d-dirty #875
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
Workqueue: btrfs-cache btrfs_cache_helper
RIP: 0010:btrfs_map_bio+0x346/0x370
RSP: 0000:ffffc900061e79d0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff880071542e00 RCX: 0000000000533000
RDX: ffff88006bb74380 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff880078160000
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffff8800781cd200 R09: 0000000000503000
R10: ffff88006cd21200 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8800781cd200 R15: ffff880071542e00
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88007fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000817ffc4 CR3: 0000000078314000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 btree_submit_bio_hook+0x8a/0xd0
 submit_one_bio+0x5d/0x80
 read_extent_buffer_pages+0x18a/0x320
 btree_read_extent_buffer_pages+0xbc/0x200
 ? alloc_extent_buffer+0x359/0x3e0
 read_tree_block+0x3d/0x60
 read_block_for_search.isra.30+0x1a5/0x360
 btrfs_search_slot+0x41b/0xa10
 btrfs_next_old_leaf+0x212/0x470
 caching_thread+0x323/0x490
 normal_work_helper+0xc5/0x310
 process_one_work+0x141/0x340
 worker_thread+0x44/0x3c0
 kthread+0xf8/0x130
 ? process_one_work+0x340/0x340
 ? kthread_bind+0x10/0x10
 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
RIP: btrfs_map_bio+0x346/0x370 RSP: ffffc900061e79d0
---[ end trace 827eb13e50846033 ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Kernel Offset: disabled
---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

---
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -9632,6 +9632,7 @@ void btrfs_put_block_group_cache(struct
 
 		block_group = btrfs_lookup_first_block_group(info, last);
 		while (block_group) {
+			wait_block_group_cache_done(block_group);
 			spin_lock(&block_group->lock);
 			if (block_group->iref)
 				break;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chris Mason <[email protected]>

commit 7703bdd8d23e6ef057af3253958a793ec6066b28 upstream.

During buffered writes, we follow this basic series of steps:

again:
lock all the pages
wait for writeback on all the pages Take the extent range lock
wait for ordered extents on the whole range clean all the pages

if (copy_from_user_in_atomic() hits a fault) {
drop our locks
goto again;
}

dirty all the pages
release all the locks

The extra waiting, cleaning and locking are there to make sure we don't modify pages in flight to the drive, after they've been crc'd.

If some of the pages in the range were already dirty when the write began, and we need to goto again, we create a window where a dirty page has been cleaned and unlocked. It may be reclaimed before we're able to lock it again, which means we'll read the old contents off the drive and lose any modifications that had been pending writeback.

We don't actually need to clean the pages. All of the other locking in place makes sure we don't start IO on the pages, so we can just leave them dirty for the duration of the write.

---
 fs/btrfs/file.c |   29 +++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -531,6 +531,14 @@ int btrfs_dirty_pages(struct inode *inod
 
 	end_of_last_block = start_pos + num_bytes - 1;
 
+	/*
+	 * The pages may have already been dirty, clear out old accounting so
+	 * we can set things up properly
+	 */
+	clear_extent_bit(&BTRFS_I(inode)->io_tree, start_pos, end_of_last_block,
+			 EXTENT_DIRTY | EXTENT_DELALLOC |
+			 EXTENT_DO_ACCOUNTING | EXTENT_DEFRAG, 0, 0, cached);
+
 	if (!btrfs_is_free_space_inode(BTRFS_I(inode))) {
 		if (start_pos >= isize &&
 		    !(BTRFS_I(inode)->flags & BTRFS_INODE_PREALLOC)) {

@@ -1500,18 +1508,27 @@ lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need(struct b
 		}
 		if (ordered)
 			btrfs_put_ordered_extent(ordered);
-		clear_extent_bit(&inode->io_tree, start_pos, last_pos,
-				 EXTENT_DIRTY | EXTENT_DELALLOC |
-				 EXTENT_DO_ACCOUNTING | EXTENT_DEFRAG,
-				 0, 0, cached_state);
+
 		*lockstart = start_pos;
 		*lockend = last_pos;
 		ret = 1;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * It's possible the pages are dirty right now, but we don't want
+	 * to clean them yet because copy_from_user may catch a page fault
+	 * and we might have to fall back to one page at a time.  If that
+	 * happens, we'll unlock these pages and we'd have a window where
+	 * reclaim could sneak in and drop the once-dirty page on the floor
+	 * without writing it.
+	 *
+	 * We have the pages locked and the extent range locked, so there's
+	 * no way someone can start IO on any dirty pages in this range.
+	 *
+	 * We'll call btrfs_dirty_pages() later on, and that will flip around
+	 * delalloc bits and dirty the pages as required.
+	 */
 	for (i = 0; i < num_pages; i++) {
-		if (clear_page_dirty_for_io(pages[i]))
-			account_page_redirty(pages[i]);
 		set_page_extent_mapped(pages[i]);
 		WARN_ON(!PageLocked(pages[i]));
 	}

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>

commit f45c752b65af46bf42963295c332865d95f97fff upstream.

We want to release the unused reservation we have since it refills the delayed refs reserve, which will make everything go smoother when running the delayed refs if we're short on our reservation.

---
 fs/btrfs/transaction.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -1929,6 +1929,9 @@ int btrfs_commit_transaction(struct btrf
 		return ret;
 	}
 
+	btrfs_trans_release_metadata(trans);
+	trans->block_rsv = NULL;
+
 	/* make a pass through all the delayed refs we have so far
 	 * any runnings procs may add more while we are here
 	 */

@@ -1938,9 +1941,6 @@ int btrfs_commit_transaction(struct btrf
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	btrfs_trans_release_metadata(trans);
-	trans->block_rsv = NULL;
-
 	cur_trans = trans->transaction;
 
 	/*

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>

commit 84de76a2fb217dc1b6bc2965cc397d1648aa1404 upstream.

If we're allocating a new space cache inode it's likely going to be under a transaction handle, so we need to use memalloc_nofs_save() in order to avoid deadlocks, and more importantly lockdep messages that make xfstests fail.

---
 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <linux/math64.h>
 #include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 #include <linux/error-injection.h>
+#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
 #include "ctree.h"
 #include "free-space-cache.h"
 #include "transaction.h"

@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ static struct inode *__lookup_free_space
 	struct btrfs_free_space_header *header;
 	struct extent_buffer *leaf;
 	struct inode *inode = NULL;
+	unsigned nofs_flag;
 	int ret;
 
 	key.objectid = BTRFS_FREE_SPACE_OBJECTID;

@@ -68,7 +70,13 @@ static struct inode *__lookup_free_space
 	btrfs_disk_key_to_cpu(&location, &disk_key);
 	btrfs_release_path(path);
 
+	/*
+	 * We are often under a trans handle at this point, so we need to make
+	 * sure NOFS is set to keep us from deadlocking.
+	 */
+	nofs_flag = memalloc_nofs_save();
 	inode = btrfs_iget(fs_info->sb, &location, root, NULL);
+	memalloc_nofs_restore(nofs_flag);
 	if (IS_ERR(inode))
 		return inode;
 

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>

commit 553cceb49681d60975d00892877d4c871bf220f9 upstream.

We need to clear the max_extent_size when we clear bits from a bitmap since it could have been from the range that contains the max_extent_size.

---
 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -1687,6 +1687,8 @@ static inline void __bitmap_clear_bits(s
 	bitmap_clear(info->bitmap, start, count);
 
 	info->bytes -= bytes;
+	if (info->max_extent_size > ctl->unit)
+		info->max_extent_size = 0;
 }
 
 static void bitmap_clear_bits(struct btrfs_free_space_ctl *ctl,

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>

commit 545e3366db823dc3342ca9d7fea803f829c9062f upstream.

Allocating new chunks modifies both the extent and chunk tree, which can trigger new chunk allocations. So instead of doing list_for_each_safe, just do while (!list_empty()) so we make sure we don't exit with other pending bg's still on our list.

---
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -10094,7 +10094,7 @@ error:
 void btrfs_create_pending_block_groups(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans)
 {
 	struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info = trans->fs_info;
-	struct btrfs_block_group_cache *block_group, *tmp;
+	struct btrfs_block_group_cache *block_group;
 	struct btrfs_root *extent_root = fs_info->extent_root;
 	struct btrfs_block_group_item item;
 	struct btrfs_key key;

@@ -10102,7 +10102,10 @@ void btrfs_create_pending_block_groups(s
 	bool can_flush_pending_bgs = trans->can_flush_pending_bgs;
 
 	trans->can_flush_pending_bgs = false;
-	list_for_each_entry_safe(block_group, tmp, &trans->new_bgs, bg_list) {
+	while (!list_empty(&trans->new_bgs)) {
+		block_group = list_first_entry(&trans->new_bgs,
+					       struct btrfs_block_group_cache,
+					       bg_list);
 		if (ret)
 			goto next;
 

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

commit f2d72f42d5fa3bf33761d9e47201745f624fcff5 upstream.

When replaying a log which contains a tmpfile (which necessarily has a link count of 0) we end up calling inc_nlink(), at fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:replay_one_buffer(), which produces a warning like the following:

  [195191.943673] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6924 at fs/inode.c:342 inc_nlink+0x33/0x40
  [195191.943723] CPU: 0 PID: 6924 Comm: mount Not tainted 4.19.0-rc6-btrfs-next-38 #1
  [195191.943724] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.2-0-gf9626ccb91-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
  [195191.943726] RIP: 0010:inc_nlink+0x33/0x40
  [195191.943728] RSP: 0018:ffffb96e425e3870 EFLAGS: 00010246
  [195191.943730] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8c0d1e6af4f0 RCX: 0000000000000006
  [195191.943731] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8c0d1e6af4f0
  [195191.943731] RBP: 0000000000000097 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
  [195191.943732] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffb96e425e3a60
  [195191.943733] R13: ffff8c0d10cff0c8 R14: ffff8c0d0d515348 R15: ffff8c0d78a1b3f8
  [195191.943735] FS:  00007f570ee24480(0000) GS:ffff8c0dfb200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [195191.943736] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [195191.943737] CR2: 00005593286277c8 CR3: 00000000bb8f2006 CR4: 00000000003606f0
  [195191.943739] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  [195191.943740] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  [195191.943741] Call Trace:
  [195191.943778]  replay_one_buffer+0x797/0x7d0 [btrfs]
  [195191.943802]  walk_up_log_tree+0x1c1/0x250 [btrfs]
  [195191.943809]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
  [195191.943825]  walk_log_tree+0xae/0x1d0 [btrfs]
  [195191.943840]  btrfs_recover_log_trees+0x1d7/0x4d0 [btrfs]
  [195191.943856]  ? replay_dir_deletes+0x280/0x280 [btrfs]
  [195191.943870]  open_ctree+0x1c3b/0x22a0 [btrfs]
  [195191.943887]  btrfs_mount_root+0x6b4/0x800 [btrfs]
  [195191.943894]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
  [195191.943899]  ? pcpu_alloc+0x55b/0x7c0
  [195191.943906]  ? mount_fs+0x3b/0x140
  [195191.943908]  mount_fs+0x3b/0x140
  [195191.943912]  ? __init_waitqueue_head+0x36/0x50
  [195191.943916]  vfs_kern_mount+0x62/0x160
  [195191.943927]  btrfs_mount+0x134/0x890 [btrfs]
  [195191.943936]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
  [195191.943938]  ? pcpu_alloc+0x55b/0x7c0
  [195191.943943]  ? mount_fs+0x3b/0x140
  [195191.943952]  ? btrfs_remount+0x570/0x570 [btrfs]
  [195191.943954]  mount_fs+0x3b/0x140
  [195191.943956]  ? __init_waitqueue_head+0x36/0x50
  [195191.943960]  vfs_kern_mount+0x62/0x160
  [195191.943963]  do_mount+0x1f9/0xd40
  [195191.943967]  ? memdup_user+0x4b/0x70
  [195191.943971]  ksys_mount+0x7e/0xd0
  [195191.943974]  __x64_sys_mount+0x21/0x30
  [195191.943977]  do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1b0
  [195191.943980]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
  [195191.943983] RIP: 0033:0x7f570e4e524a
  [195191.943986] RSP: 002b:00007ffd83589478 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
  [195191.943989] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000563f335b2060 RCX: 00007f570e4e524a
  [195191.943990] RDX: 0000563f335b2240 RSI: 0000563f335b2280 RDI: 0000563f335b2260
  [195191.943992] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000020
  [195191.943993] R10: 00000000c0ed0000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000563f335b2260
  [195191.943994] R13: 0000563f335b2240 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
  [195191.944002] irq event stamp: 8688
  [195191.944010] hardirqs last  enabled at (8687): [<ffffffff9cb004c3>] console_unlock+0x503/0x640
  [195191.944012] hardirqs last disabled at (8688): [<ffffffff9ca037dd>] trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
  [195191.944018] softirqs last  enabled at (8638): [<ffffffff9cc0a5d1>] __set_page_dirty_nobuffers+0x101/0x150
  [195191.944020] softirqs last disabled at (8634): [<ffffffff9cc26bbe>] wb_wakeup_delayed+0x2e/0x60
  [195191.944022] ---[ end trace 5d6e873a9a0b811a ]---

This happens because the inode does not have the flag I_LINKABLE set, which is a runtime only flag, not meant to be persisted, set when the inode is created through open(2) if the flag O_EXCL is not passed to it. Except for the warning, there are no other consequences (like corruptions or metadata inconsistencies).

Since it's pointless to replay a tmpfile as it would be deleted in a later phase of the log replay procedure (it has a link count of 0), fix this by not logging tmpfiles and if a tmpfile is found in a log (created by a kernel without this change), skip the replay of the inode.

A test case for fstests follows soon.

---
 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c |   42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

@@ -258,6 +258,13 @@ struct walk_control {
 	/* what stage of the replay code we're currently in */
 	int stage;
 
+	/*
+	 * Ignore any items from the inode currently being processed. Needs
+	 * to be set every time we find a BTRFS_INODE_ITEM_KEY and we are in
+	 * the LOG_WALK_REPLAY_INODES stage.
+	 */
+	bool ignore_cur_inode;
+
 	/* the root we are currently replaying */
 	struct btrfs_root *replay_dest;
 

@@ -2487,6 +2494,20 @@ static int replay_one_buffer(struct btrf
 
 			inode_item = btrfs_item_ptr(eb, i,
 					    struct btrfs_inode_item);
+			/*
+			 * If we have a tmpfile (O_TMPFILE) that got fsync'ed
+			 * and never got linked before the fsync, skip it, as
+			 * replaying it is pointless since it would be deleted
+			 * later. We skip logging tmpfiles, but it's always
+			 * possible we are replaying a log created with a kernel
+			 * that used to log tmpfiles.
+			 */
+			if (btrfs_inode_nlink(eb, inode_item) == 0) {
+				wc->ignore_cur_inode = true;
+				continue;
+			} else {
+				wc->ignore_cur_inode = false;
+			}
 			ret = replay_xattr_deletes(wc->trans, root, log,
 						   path, key.objectid);
 			if (ret)

@@ -2524,16 +2545,8 @@ static int replay_one_buffer(struct btrf
 					     root->fs_info->sectorsize);
 				ret = btrfs_drop_extents(wc->trans, root, inode,
 							 from, (u64)-1, 1);
-				/*
-				 * If the nlink count is zero here, the iput
-				 * will free the inode.  We bump it to make
-				 * sure it doesn't get freed until the link
-				 * count fixup is done.
-				 */
 				if (!ret) {
-					if (inode->i_nlink == 0)
-						inc_nlink(inode);
-					/* Update link count and nbytes. */
+					/* Update the inode's nbytes. */
 					ret = btrfs_update_inode(wc->trans,
 								 root, inode);
 				}

@@ -2548,6 +2561,9 @@ static int replay_one_buffer(struct btrf
 				break;
 		}
 
+		if (wc->ignore_cur_inode)
+			continue;
+
 		if (key.type == BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY &&
 		    wc->stage == LOG_WALK_REPLAY_DIR_INDEX) {
 			ret = replay_one_dir_item(wc->trans, root, path,

@@ -5643,7 +5659,13 @@ static int btrfs_log_inode_parent(struct
 	if (ret)
 		goto end_no_trans;
 
-	if (btrfs_inode_in_log(inode, trans->transid)) {
+	/*
+	 * Skip already logged inodes or inodes corresponding to tmpfiles
+	 * (since logging them is pointless, a link count of 0 means they
+	 * will never be accessible).
+	 */
+	if (btrfs_inode_in_log(inode, trans->transid) ||
+	    inode->vfs_inode.i_nlink == 0) {
 		ret = BTRFS_NO_LOG_SYNC;
 		goto end_no_trans;
 	}

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

commit 0f375eed92b5a407657532637ed9652611a682f5 upstream.

In a scenario like the following:

  mkdir /mnt/A               # inode 258
  mkdir /mnt/B               # inode 259
  touch /mnt/B/bar           # inode 260

sync

mv /mnt/B/bar /mnt/A/bar
mv -T /mnt/A /mnt/B
fsync /mnt/B/bar

<power fail>

After replaying the log we end up with file bar having 2 hard links, both with the name 'bar' and one in the directory with inode number 258 and the other in the directory with inode number 259. Also, we end up with the directory inode 259 still existing and with the directory inode 258 still named as 'A', instead of 'B'. In this scenario, file 'bar' should only have one hard link, located at directory inode 258, the directory inode 259 should not exist anymore and the name for directory inode 258 should be 'B'.

This incorrect behaviour happens because when attempting to log the old parents of an inode, we skip any parents that no longer exist. Fix this by forcing a full commit if an old parent no longer exists.

A test case for fstests follows soon.

---
 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c |   30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -5583,9 +5583,33 @@ static int btrfs_log_all_parents(struct
 
 			dir_inode = btrfs_iget(fs_info->sb, &inode_key,
 					       root, NULL);
-			/* If parent inode was deleted, skip it. */
-			if (IS_ERR(dir_inode))
-				continue;
+			/*
+			 * If the parent inode was deleted, return an error to
+			 * fallback to a transaction commit. This is to prevent
+			 * getting an inode that was moved from one parent A to
+			 * a parent B, got its former parent A deleted and then
+			 * it got fsync'ed, from existing at both parents after
+			 * a log replay (and the old parent still existing).
+			 * Example:
+			 *
+			 * mkdir /mnt/A
+			 * mkdir /mnt/B
+			 * touch /mnt/B/bar
+			 * sync
+			 * mv /mnt/B/bar /mnt/A/bar
+			 * mv -T /mnt/A /mnt/B
+			 * fsync /mnt/B/bar
+			 * <power fail>
+			 *
+			 * If we ignore the old parent B which got deleted,
+			 * after a log replay we would have file bar linked
+			 * at both parents and the old parent B would still
+			 * exist.
+			 */
+			if (IS_ERR(dir_inode)) {
+				ret = PTR_ERR(dir_inode);
+				goto out;
+			}
 
 			if (ctx)
 				ctx->log_new_dentries = false;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>

commit 9c7b0c2e8dbfbcd80a71e2cbfe02704f26c185c6 upstream.

[BUG]
In the following case, rescan won't zero out the number of qgroup 1/0:

  $ mkfs.btrfs -fq $DEV
  $ mount $DEV /mnt

  $ btrfs quota enable /mnt
  $ btrfs qgroup create 1/0 /mnt
  $ btrfs sub create /mnt/sub
  $ btrfs qgroup assign 0/257 1/0 /mnt

  $ dd if=/dev/urandom of=/mnt/sub/file bs=1k count=1000
  $ btrfs sub snap /mnt/sub /mnt/snap
  $ btrfs quota rescan -w /mnt
  $ btrfs qgroup show -pcre /mnt
  qgroupid         rfer         excl     max_rfer     max_excl parent  child
  --------         ----         ----     --------     -------- ------  -----
  0/5          16.00KiB     16.00KiB         none         none ---     ---
  0/257      1016.00KiB     16.00KiB         none         none 1/0     ---
  0/258      1016.00KiB     16.00KiB         none         none ---     ---
  1/0        1016.00KiB     16.00KiB         none         none ---     0/257

So far so good, but:

  $ btrfs qgroup remove 0/257 1/0 /mnt
  WARNING: quotas may be inconsistent, rescan needed
  $ btrfs quota rescan -w /mnt
  $ btrfs qgroup show -pcre  /mnt
  qgoupid         rfer         excl     max_rfer     max_excl parent  child
  --------         ----         ----     --------     -------- ------  -----
  0/5          16.00KiB     16.00KiB         none         none ---     ---
  0/257      1016.00KiB     16.00KiB         none         none ---     ---
  0/258      1016.00KiB     16.00KiB         none         none ---     ---
  1/0        1016.00KiB     16.00KiB         none         none ---     ---
	     ^^^^^^^^^^     ^^^^^^^^ not cleared

[CAUSE]
Before rescan we call qgroup_rescan_zero_tracking() to zero out all qgroups' accounting numbers.

However we don't mark all qgroups dirty, but rely on rescan to do so.

If we have any high level qgroup without children, it won't be marked dirty during rescan, since we cannot reach that qgroup.

This will cause QGROUP_INFO items of childless qgroups never get updated in the quota tree, thus their numbers will stay the same in "btrfs qgroup show" output.

[FIX]
Just mark all qgroups dirty in qgroup_rescan_zero_tracking(), so even if we have childless qgroups, their QGROUP_INFO items will still get updated during rescan.

---
 fs/btrfs/qgroup.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -2897,6 +2897,7 @@ qgroup_rescan_zero_tracking(struct btrfs
 		qgroup->rfer_cmpr = 0;
 		qgroup->excl = 0;
 		qgroup->excl_cmpr = 0;
+		qgroup_dirty(fs_info, qgroup);
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_lock);
 }

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

commit 3527a018c00e5dbada2f9d7ed5576437b6dd5cfb upstream.

At inode.c:compress_file_range(), under the "free_pages_out" label, we can end up dereferencing the "pages" pointer when it has a NULL value. This case happens when "start" has a value of 0 and we fail to allocate memory for the "pages" pointer. When that happens we jump to the "cont" label and then enter the "if (start == 0)" branch where we immediately call the cow_file_range_inline() function. If that function returns 0 (success creating an inline extent) or an error (like -ENOMEM for example) we jump to the "free_pages_out" label and then access "pages[i]" leading to a NULL pointer dereference, since "nr_pages" has a value greater than zero at that point.

Fix this by setting "nr_pages" to 0 when we fail to allocate memory for the "pages" pointer.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201119

---
 fs/btrfs/inode.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

@@ -503,6 +503,7 @@ again:
 		pages = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_NOFS);
 		if (!pages) {
 			/* just bail out to the uncompressed code */
+			nr_pages = 0;
 			goto cont;
 		}
 

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

commit 7ed586d0a8241e81d58c656c5b315f781fa6fc97 upstream.

When using the NO_HOLES feature and logging a regular file, we were expecting that if we find an inline extent, that either its size in RAM (uncompressed and unenconded) matches the size of the file or if it does not, that it matches the sector size and it represents compressed data. This assertion does not cover a case where the length of the inline extent is smaller than the sector size and also smaller the file's size, such case is possible through fallocate. Example:

  $ mkfs.btrfs -f -O no-holes /dev/sdb
  $ mount /dev/sdb /mnt

  $ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xb60 0 21" /mnt/foobar
  $ xfs_io -c "falloc 40 40" /mnt/foobar
  $ xfs_io -c "fsync" /mnt/foobar

In the above example we trigger the assertion because the inline extent's length is 21 bytes while the file size is 80 bytes. The fallocate() call merely updated the file's size and did not touch the existing inline extent, as expected.

So fix this by adjusting the assertion so that an inline extent length smaller than the file size is valid if the file size is smaller than the filesystem's sector size.

A test case for fstests follows soon.

---
 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -4655,7 +4655,8 @@ static int btrfs_log_trailing_hole(struc
 			ASSERT(len == i_size ||
 			       (len == fs_info->sectorsize &&
 				btrfs_file_extent_compression(leaf, extent) !=
-				BTRFS_COMPRESS_NONE));
+				BTRFS_COMPRESS_NONE) ||
+			       (len < i_size && i_size < fs_info->sectorsize));
 			return 0;
 		}
 

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

commit 5ce555578e0919237fa4bda92b4670e2dd176f85 upstream.

When writing out a block group free space cache we can end deadlocking with ourselves on an extent buffer lock resulting in a warning like the following:

  [245043.379979] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 2608 at fs/btrfs/locking.c:251 btrfs_tree_lock+0x1be/0x1d0 [btrfs]
  [245043.392792] CPU: 4 PID: 2608 Comm: btrfs-transacti Tainted: G
    W I      4.16.8 #1
  [245043.395489] RIP: 0010:btrfs_tree_lock+0x1be/0x1d0 [btrfs]
  [245043.396791] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000424b840 EFLAGS: 00010246
  [245043.398093] RAX: 0000000000000a30 RBX: ffff8807e20a3d20 RCX: 0000000000000001
  [245043.399414] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffff8807e20a3d20
  [245043.400732] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffff88041f39a700 R09: ffff880000000000
  [245043.402021] R10: 0000000000000040 R11: ffff8807e20a3d20 R12: ffff8807cb220630
  [245043.403296] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff8807cb220628 R15: ffff88041fbdf000
  [245043.404780] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88082fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  [245043.406050] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  [245043.407321] CR2: 00007fffdbdb9f10 CR3: 0000000001c09005 CR4: 00000000000206e0
  [245043.408670] Call Trace:
  [245043.409977]  btrfs_search_slot+0x761/0xa60 [btrfs]
  [245043.411278]  btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x62/0xb0 [btrfs]
  [245043.412572]  btrfs_insert_item+0x5b/0xc0 [btrfs]
  [245043.413922]  btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0xfb/0x1e0 [btrfs]
  [245043.415216]  do_chunk_alloc+0x1e5/0x2a0 [btrfs]
  [245043.416487]  find_free_extent+0xcd0/0xf60 [btrfs]
  [245043.417813]  btrfs_reserve_extent+0x96/0x1e0 [btrfs]
  [245043.419105]  btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xfb/0x4a0 [btrfs]
  [245043.420378]  __btrfs_cow_block+0x127/0x550 [btrfs]
  [245043.421652]  btrfs_cow_block+0xee/0x190 [btrfs]
  [245043.422979]  btrfs_search_slot+0x227/0xa60 [btrfs]
  [245043.424279]  ? btrfs_update_inode_item+0x59/0x100 [btrfs]
  [245043.425538]  ? iput+0x72/0x1e0
  [245043.426798]  write_one_cache_group.isra.49+0x20/0x90 [btrfs]
  [245043.428131]  btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x102/0x420 [btrfs]
  [245043.429419]  btrfs_commit_transaction+0x11b/0x880 [btrfs]
  [245043.430712]  ? start_transaction+0x8e/0x410 [btrfs]
  [245043.432006]  transaction_kthread+0x184/0x1a0 [btrfs]
  [245043.433341]  kthread+0xf0/0x130
  [245043.434628]  ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0x4e0/0x4e0 [btrfs]
  [245043.435928]  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x40/0x40
  [245043.437236]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
  [245043.441054] ---[ end trace 15abaa2aaf36827f ]---

This is because at write_one_cache_group() when we are COWing a leaf from the extent tree we end up allocating a new block group (chunk) and, because we have hit a threshold on the number of bytes reserved for system chunks, we attempt to finalize the creation of new block groups from the current transaction, by calling btrfs_create_pending_block_groups(). However here we also need to modify the extent tree in order to insert a block group item, and if the location for this new block group item happens to be in the same leaf that we were COWing earlier, we deadlock since btrfs_search_slot() tries to write lock the extent buffer that we locked before at write_one_cache_group().

We have already hit similar cases in the past and commit d9a0540a79f8 ("Btrfs: fix deadlock when finalizing block group creation") fixed some of those cases by delaying the creation of pending block groups at the known specific spots that could lead to a deadlock. This change reworks that commit to be more generic so that we don't have to add similar logic to every possible path that can lead to a deadlock. This is done by making __btrfs_cow_block() disallowing the creation of new block groups (setting the transaction's can_flush_pending_bgs to false) before it attempts to allocate a new extent buffer for either the extent, chunk or device trees, since those are the trees that pending block creation modifies. Once the new extent buffer is allocated, it allows creation of pending block groups to happen again.

This change depends on a recent patch from Josef which is not yet in Linus' tree, named "btrfs: make sure we create all new block groups" in order to avoid occasional warnings at btrfs_trans_release_chunk_metadata().

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199753

---
 fs/btrfs/ctree.c       |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c |   16 ++++++----------
 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

@@ -1050,9 +1050,26 @@ static noinline int __btrfs_cow_block(st
 	if ((root->root_key.objectid == BTRFS_TREE_RELOC_OBJECTID) && parent)
 		parent_start = parent->start;
 
+	/*
+	 * If we are COWing a node/leaf from the extent, chunk or device trees,
+	 * make sure that we do not finish block group creation of pending block
+	 * groups. We do this to avoid a deadlock.
+	 * COWing can result in allocation of a new chunk, and flushing pending
+	 * block groups (btrfs_create_pending_block_groups()) can be triggered
+	 * when finishing allocation of a new chunk. Creation of a pending block
+	 * group modifies the extent, chunk and device trees, therefore we could
+	 * deadlock with ourselves since we are holding a lock on an extent
+	 * buffer that btrfs_create_pending_block_groups() may try to COW later.
+	 */
+	if (root == fs_info->extent_root ||
+	    root == fs_info->chunk_root ||
+	    root == fs_info->dev_root)
+		trans->can_flush_pending_bgs = false;
+
 	cow = btrfs_alloc_tree_block(trans, root, parent_start,
 			root->root_key.objectid, &disk_key, level,
 			search_start, empty_size);
+	trans->can_flush_pending_bgs = true;
 	if (IS_ERR(cow))
 		return PTR_ERR(cow);
 

@@ -2911,7 +2911,6 @@ int btrfs_run_delayed_refs(struct btrfs_
 	struct btrfs_delayed_ref_head *head;
 	int ret;
 	int run_all = count == (unsigned long)-1;
-	bool can_flush_pending_bgs = trans->can_flush_pending_bgs;
 
 	/* We'll clean this up in btrfs_cleanup_transaction */
 	if (trans->aborted)

@@ -2928,7 +2927,6 @@ again:
 #ifdef SCRAMBLE_DELAYED_REFS
 	delayed_refs->run_delayed_start = find_middle(&delayed_refs->root);
 #endif
-	trans->can_flush_pending_bgs = false;
 	ret = __btrfs_run_delayed_refs(trans, count);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, ret);

@@ -2959,7 +2957,6 @@ again:
 		goto again;
 	}
 out:
-	trans->can_flush_pending_bgs = can_flush_pending_bgs;
 	return 0;
 }
 

@@ -4554,11 +4551,9 @@ out:
 	 * the block groups that were made dirty during the lifetime of the
 	 * transaction.
 	 */
-	if (trans->can_flush_pending_bgs &&
-	    trans->chunk_bytes_reserved >= (u64)SZ_2M) {
+	if (trans->chunk_bytes_reserved >= (u64)SZ_2M)
 		btrfs_create_pending_block_groups(trans);
-		btrfs_trans_release_chunk_metadata(trans);
-	}
+
 	return ret;
 }
 

@@ -10099,9 +10094,10 @@ void btrfs_create_pending_block_groups(s
 	struct btrfs_block_group_item item;
 	struct btrfs_key key;
 	int ret = 0;
-	bool can_flush_pending_bgs = trans->can_flush_pending_bgs;
 
-	trans->can_flush_pending_bgs = false;
+	if (!trans->can_flush_pending_bgs)
+		return;
+
 	while (!list_empty(&trans->new_bgs)) {
 		block_group = list_first_entry(&trans->new_bgs,
 					       struct btrfs_block_group_cache,

@@ -10126,7 +10122,7 @@ void btrfs_create_pending_block_groups(s
 next:
 		list_del_init(&block_group->bg_list);
 	}
-	trans->can_flush_pending_bgs = can_flush_pending_bgs;
+	btrfs_trans_release_chunk_metadata(trans);
 }
 
 int btrfs_make_block_group(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, u64 bytes_used,

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>

commit 21a94f7acf0f748599ea552af5d9ee7d7e41c72f upstream.

If we use up our block group before allocating a new one we'll easily get a max_extent_size that's set really really low, which will result in a lot of fragmentation. We need to make sure we're resetting the max_extent_size when we add a new chunk or add new space.

---
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -4530,6 +4530,7 @@ static int do_chunk_alloc(struct btrfs_t
 			goto out;
 	} else {
 		ret = 1;
+		space_info->max_extent_size = 0;
 	}
 
 	space_info->force_alloc = CHUNK_ALLOC_NO_FORCE;

@@ -6431,6 +6432,7 @@ static int btrfs_free_reserved_bytes(str
 		space_info->bytes_readonly += num_bytes;
 	cache->reserved -= num_bytes;
 	space_info->bytes_reserved -= num_bytes;
+	space_info->max_extent_size = 0;
 
 	if (delalloc)
 		cache->delalloc_bytes -= num_bytes;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>

commit ad22cf6ea47fa20fbe11ac324a0a15c0a9a4a2a9 upstream.

We can't use entry->bytes if our entry is a bitmap entry, we need to use entry->max_extent_size in that case. Fix up all the logic to make this consistent.

---
 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c |   30 ++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

@@ -1772,6 +1772,13 @@ static int search_bitmap(struct btrfs_fr
 	return -1;
 }
 
+static inline u64 get_max_extent_size(struct btrfs_free_space *entry)
+{
+	if (entry->bitmap)
+		return entry->max_extent_size;
+	return entry->bytes;
+}
+
 /* Cache the size of the max extent in bytes */
 static struct btrfs_free_space *
 find_free_space(struct btrfs_free_space_ctl *ctl, u64 *offset, u64 *bytes,

@@ -1793,8 +1800,8 @@ find_free_space(struct btrfs_free_space_
 	for (node = &entry->offset_index; node; node = rb_next(node)) {
 		entry = rb_entry(node, struct btrfs_free_space, offset_index);
 		if (entry->bytes < *bytes) {
-			if (entry->bytes > *max_extent_size)
-				*max_extent_size = entry->bytes;
+			*max_extent_size = max(get_max_extent_size(entry),
+					       *max_extent_size);
 			continue;
 		}
 

@@ -1812,8 +1819,8 @@ find_free_space(struct btrfs_free_space_
 		}
 
 		if (entry->bytes < *bytes + align_off) {
-			if (entry->bytes > *max_extent_size)
-				*max_extent_size = entry->bytes;
+			*max_extent_size = max(get_max_extent_size(entry),
+					       *max_extent_size);
 			continue;
 		}
 

@@ -1825,8 +1832,10 @@ find_free_space(struct btrfs_free_space_
 				*offset = tmp;
 				*bytes = size;
 				return entry;
-			} else if (size > *max_extent_size) {
-				*max_extent_size = size;
+			} else {
+				*max_extent_size =
+					max(get_max_extent_size(entry),
+					    *max_extent_size);
 			}
 			continue;
 		}

@@ -2686,8 +2695,8 @@ static u64 btrfs_alloc_from_bitmap(struc
 
 	err = search_bitmap(ctl, entry, &search_start, &search_bytes, true);
 	if (err) {
-		if (search_bytes > *max_extent_size)
-			*max_extent_size = search_bytes;
+		*max_extent_size = max(get_max_extent_size(entry),
+				       *max_extent_size);
 		return 0;
 	}
 

@@ -2724,8 +2733,9 @@ u64 btrfs_alloc_from_cluster(struct btrf
 
 	entry = rb_entry(node, struct btrfs_free_space, offset_index);
 	while (1) {
-		if (entry->bytes < bytes && entry->bytes > *max_extent_size)
-			*max_extent_size = entry->bytes;
+		if (entry->bytes < bytes)
+			*max_extent_size = max(get_max_extent_size(entry),
+					       *max_extent_size);
 
 		if (entry->bytes < bytes ||
 		    (!entry->bitmap && entry->offset < min_start)) {

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>

commit fb5c39d7a887108087de6ff93d3f326b01b4ef41 upstream.

max_extent_size is supposed to be the largest contiguous range for the space info, and ctl->free_space is the total free space in the block group. We need to keep track of these separately and _only_ use the max_free_space if we don't have a max_extent_size, as that means our original request was too large to search any of the block groups for and therefore wouldn't have a max_extent_size set.

---
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -7230,6 +7230,7 @@ static noinline int find_free_extent(str
 	struct btrfs_block_group_cache *block_group = NULL;
 	u64 search_start = 0;
 	u64 max_extent_size = 0;
+	u64 max_free_space = 0;
 	u64 empty_cluster = 0;
 	struct btrfs_space_info *space_info;
 	int loop = 0;

@@ -7525,8 +7526,8 @@ unclustered_alloc:
 			spin_lock(&ctl->tree_lock);
 			if (ctl->free_space <
 			    num_bytes + empty_cluster + empty_size) {
-				if (ctl->free_space > max_extent_size)
-					max_extent_size = ctl->free_space;
+				max_free_space = max(max_free_space,
+						     ctl->free_space);
 				spin_unlock(&ctl->tree_lock);
 				goto loop;
 			}

@@ -7693,6 +7694,8 @@ loop:
 	}
 out:
 	if (ret == -ENOSPC) {
+		if (!max_extent_size)
+			max_extent_size = max_free_space;
 		spin_lock(&space_info->lock);
 		space_info->max_extent_size = max_extent_size;
 		spin_unlock(&space_info->lock);

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>

commit 49940bdd57779c78462da7aa5a8650b2fea8c2ff upstream.

When we insert the file extent once the ordered extent completes we free the reserved extent reservation as it'll have been migrated to the bytes_used counter. However if we error out after this step we'll still clear the reserved extent reservation, resulting in a negative accounting of the reserved bytes for the block group and space info. Fix this by only doing the free if we didn't successfully insert a file extent for this extent.

---
 fs/btrfs/inode.c |   10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -2945,6 +2945,7 @@ static int btrfs_finish_ordered_io(struc
 	bool truncated = false;
 	bool range_locked = false;
 	bool clear_new_delalloc_bytes = false;
+	bool clear_reserved_extent = true;
 
 	if (!test_bit(BTRFS_ORDERED_NOCOW, &ordered_extent->flags) &&
 	    !test_bit(BTRFS_ORDERED_PREALLOC, &ordered_extent->flags) &&

@@ -3048,10 +3049,12 @@ static int btrfs_finish_ordered_io(struc
 						logical_len, logical_len,
 						compress_type, 0, 0,
 						BTRFS_FILE_EXTENT_REG);
-		if (!ret)
+		if (!ret) {
+			clear_reserved_extent = false;
 			btrfs_release_delalloc_bytes(fs_info,
 						     ordered_extent->start,
 						     ordered_extent->disk_len);
+		}
 	}
 	unpin_extent_cache(&BTRFS_I(inode)->extent_tree,
 			   ordered_extent->file_offset, ordered_extent->len,

@@ -3112,8 +3115,13 @@ out:
 		 * wrong we need to return the space for this ordered extent
 		 * back to the allocator.  We only free the extent in the
 		 * truncated case if we didn't write out the extent at all.
+		 *
+		 * If we made it past insert_reserved_file_extent before we
+		 * errored out then we don't need to do this as the accounting
+		 * has already been done.
 		 */
 		if ((ret || !logical_len) &&
+		    clear_reserved_extent &&
 		    !test_bit(BTRFS_ORDERED_NOCOW, &ordered_extent->flags) &&
 		    !test_bit(BTRFS_ORDERED_PREALLOC, &ordered_extent->flags))
 			btrfs_free_reserved_extent(fs_info,

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>

commit 80ee54bfe8a3850015585ebc84e8d207fcae6831 upstream.

We were not handling the reserved byte accounting properly for data references. Metadata was fine, if it errored out the error paths would free the bytes_reserved count and pin the extent, but it even missed one of the error cases. So instead move this handling up into run_one_delayed_ref so we are sure that both cases are properly cleaned up in case of a transaction abort.

---
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c |   12 ++++--------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -2366,6 +2366,9 @@ static int run_one_delayed_ref(struct bt
 					   insert_reserved);
 	else
 		BUG();
+	if (ret && insert_reserved)
+		btrfs_pin_extent(trans->fs_info, node->bytenr,
+				 node->num_bytes, 1);
 	return ret;
 }
 

@@ -7977,21 +7980,14 @@ static int alloc_reserved_tree_block(str
 	}
 
 	path = btrfs_alloc_path();
-	if (!path) {
-		btrfs_free_and_pin_reserved_extent(fs_info,
-						   extent_key.objectid,
-						   fs_info->nodesize);
+	if (!path)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	}
 
 	path->leave_spinning = 1;
 	ret = btrfs_insert_empty_item(trans, fs_info->extent_root, path,
 				      &extent_key, size);
 	if (ret) {
 		btrfs_free_path(path);
-		btrfs_free_and_pin_reserved_extent(fs_info,
-						   extent_key.objectid,
-						   fs_info->nodesize);
 		return ret;
 	}
 

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>

commit 30928e9baac238a7330085a1c5747f0b5df444b4 upstream.

This could result in a really bad case where we do something like

evict
evict_refill_and_join
btrfs_commit_transaction
btrfs_run_delayed_iputs
evict
evict_refill_and_join
btrfs_commit_transaction
... forever

We have plenty of other places where we run delayed iputs that are much safer, let those do the work.

---
 fs/btrfs/transaction.c |    9 ---------
 1 file changed, 9 deletions(-)

@@ -2280,15 +2280,6 @@ int btrfs_commit_transaction(struct btrf
 
 	kmem_cache_free(btrfs_trans_handle_cachep, trans);
 
-	/*
-	 * If fs has been frozen, we can not handle delayed iputs, otherwise
-	 * it'll result in deadlock about SB_FREEZE_FS.
-	 */
-	if (current != fs_info->transaction_kthread &&
-	    current != fs_info->cleaner_kthread &&
-	    !test_bit(BTRFS_FS_FROZEN, &fs_info->flags))
-		btrfs_run_delayed_iputs(fs_info);
-
 	return ret;
 
 scrub_continue:

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>

commit c495144bc6962186feae31d687596d2472000e45 upstream.

We're getting a lockdep splat because we take the dio_sem under the log_mutex. What we really need is to protect fsync() from logging an extent map for an extent we never waited on higher up, so just guard the whole thing with dio_sem.

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.18.0-rc4-xfstests-00025-g5de5edbaf1d4 #411 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
aio-dio-invalid/30928 is trying to acquire lock:
0000000092621cfd (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: get_user_pages_unlocked+0x5a/0x1e0

but task is already holding lock:
00000000cefe6b35 (&ei->dio_sem){++++}, at: btrfs_direct_IO+0x3be/0x400

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #5 (&ei->dio_sem){++++}:

       lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220
       down_write+0x51/0xb0
       btrfs_log_changed_extents+0x80/0xa40
       btrfs_log_inode+0xbaf/0x1000
       btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x26f/0xa80
       btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x50/0x70
       btrfs_sync_file+0x357/0x540
       do_fsync+0x38/0x60
       __ia32_sys_fdatasync+0x12/0x20
       do_fast_syscall_32+0x9a/0x2f0
       entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x84/0x96

-> #4 (&ei->log_mutex){+.+.}:

       lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220
       __mutex_lock+0x86/0xa10
       btrfs_record_unlink_dir+0x2a/0xa0
       btrfs_unlink+0x5a/0xc0
       vfs_unlink+0xb1/0x1a0
       do_unlinkat+0x264/0x2b0
       do_fast_syscall_32+0x9a/0x2f0
       entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x84/0x96

-> #3 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}:

       lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220
       __sb_start_write+0x14d/0x230
       start_transaction+0x3e6/0x590
       btrfs_evict_inode+0x475/0x640
       evict+0xbf/0x1b0
       btrfs_run_delayed_iputs+0x6c/0x90
       cleaner_kthread+0x124/0x1a0
       kthread+0x106/0x140
       ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

-> #2 (&fs_info->cleaner_delayed_iput_mutex){+.+.}:

       lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220
       __mutex_lock+0x86/0xa10
       btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x197/0x530
       btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x4c/0x90
       btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space+0x20/0x60
       btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x87/0x520
       do_page_mkwrite+0x31/0xa0
       __handle_mm_fault+0x799/0xb00
       handle_mm_fault+0x7c/0xe0
       __do_page_fault+0x1d3/0x4a0
       async_page_fault+0x1e/0x30

-> #1 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}:

       lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220
       __sb_start_write+0x14d/0x230
       btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x6a/0x520
       do_page_mkwrite+0x31/0xa0
       __handle_mm_fault+0x799/0xb00
       handle_mm_fault+0x7c/0xe0
       __do_page_fault+0x1d3/0x4a0
       async_page_fault+0x1e/0x30

-> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}:

       __lock_acquire+0x42e/0x7a0
       lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220
       down_read+0x48/0xb0
       get_user_pages_unlocked+0x5a/0x1e0
       get_user_pages_fast+0xa4/0x150
       iov_iter_get_pages+0xc3/0x340
       do_direct_IO+0xf93/0x1d70
       __blockdev_direct_IO+0x32d/0x1c20
       btrfs_direct_IO+0x227/0x400
       generic_file_direct_write+0xcf/0x180
       btrfs_file_write_iter+0x308/0x58c
       aio_write+0xf8/0x1d0
       io_submit_one+0x3a9/0x620
       __ia32_compat_sys_io_submit+0xb2/0x270
       do_int80_syscall_32+0x5b/0x1a0
       entry_INT80_compat+0x88/0xa0

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  &mm->mmap_sem --> &ei->log_mutex --> &ei->dio_sem

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&ei->dio_sem);
                               lock(&ei->log_mutex);
                               lock(&ei->dio_sem);

lock(&mm->mmap_sem);

*** DEADLOCK ***

1 lock held by aio-dio-invalid/30928:
#0: 00000000cefe6b35 (&ei->dio_sem){++++}, at: btrfs_direct_IO+0x3be/0x400

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 30928 Comm: aio-dio-invalid Not tainted 4.18.0-rc4-xfstests-00025-g5de5edbaf1d4 #411
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0x7c/0xbb
 print_circular_bug.isra.37+0x297/0x2a4
 check_prev_add.constprop.45+0x781/0x7a0
 ? __lock_acquire+0x42e/0x7a0
 validate_chain.isra.41+0x7f0/0xb00
 __lock_acquire+0x42e/0x7a0
 lock_acquire+0xbd/0x220
 ? get_user_pages_unlocked+0x5a/0x1e0
 down_read+0x48/0xb0
 ? get_user_pages_unlocked+0x5a/0x1e0
 get_user_pages_unlocked+0x5a/0x1e0
 get_user_pages_fast+0xa4/0x150
 iov_iter_get_pages+0xc3/0x340
 do_direct_IO+0xf93/0x1d70
 ? __alloc_workqueue_key+0x358/0x490
 ? __blockdev_direct_IO+0x14b/0x1c20
 __blockdev_direct_IO+0x32d/0x1c20
 ? btrfs_run_delalloc_work+0x40/0x40
 ? can_nocow_extent+0x490/0x490
 ? kvm_clock_read+0x1f/0x30
 ? can_nocow_extent+0x490/0x490
 ? btrfs_run_delalloc_work+0x40/0x40
 btrfs_direct_IO+0x227/0x400
 ? btrfs_run_delalloc_work+0x40/0x40
 generic_file_direct_write+0xcf/0x180
 btrfs_file_write_iter+0x308/0x58c
 aio_write+0xf8/0x1d0
 ? kvm_clock_read+0x1f/0x30
 ? __might_fault+0x3e/0x90
 io_submit_one+0x3a9/0x620
 ? io_submit_one+0xe5/0x620
 __ia32_compat_sys_io_submit+0xb2/0x270
 do_int80_syscall_32+0x5b/0x1a0
 entry_INT80_compat+0x88/0xa0

---
 fs/btrfs/file.c     |   12 ++++++++++++
 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c |    2 --
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -2078,6 +2078,14 @@ int btrfs_sync_file(struct file *file, l
 		goto out;
 
 	inode_lock(inode);
+
+	/*
+	 * We take the dio_sem here because the tree log stuff can race with
+	 * lockless dio writes and get an extent map logged for an extent we
+	 * never waited on.  We need it this high up for lockdep reasons.
+	 */
+	down_write(&BTRFS_I(inode)->dio_sem);
+
 	atomic_inc(&root->log_batch);
 
 	/*

@@ -2086,6 +2094,7 @@ int btrfs_sync_file(struct file *file, l
 	 */
 	ret = btrfs_wait_ordered_range(inode, start, len);
 	if (ret) {
+		up_write(&BTRFS_I(inode)->dio_sem);
 		inode_unlock(inode);
 		goto out;
 	}

@@ -2109,6 +2118,7 @@ int btrfs_sync_file(struct file *file, l
 		 * checked called fsync.
 		 */
 		ret = filemap_check_wb_err(inode->i_mapping, file->f_wb_err);
+		up_write(&BTRFS_I(inode)->dio_sem);
 		inode_unlock(inode);
 		goto out;
 	}

@@ -2127,6 +2137,7 @@ int btrfs_sync_file(struct file *file, l
 	trans = btrfs_start_transaction(root, 0);
 	if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
+		up_write(&BTRFS_I(inode)->dio_sem);
 		inode_unlock(inode);
 		goto out;
 	}

@@ -2148,6 +2159,7 @@ int btrfs_sync_file(struct file *file, l
 	 * file again, but that will end up using the synchronization
 	 * inside btrfs_sync_log to keep things safe.
 	 */
+	up_write(&BTRFS_I(inode)->dio_sem);
 	inode_unlock(inode);
 
 	/*

@@ -4393,7 +4393,6 @@ static int btrfs_log_changed_extents(str
 
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&extents);
 
-	down_write(&inode->dio_sem);
 	write_lock(&tree->lock);
 	test_gen = root->fs_info->last_trans_committed;
 	logged_start = start;

@@ -4459,7 +4458,6 @@ process:
 	}
 	WARN_ON(!list_empty(&extents));
 	write_unlock(&tree->lock);
-	up_write(&inode->dio_sem);
 
 	btrfs_release_path(path);
 	if (!ret)

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

commit 421f0922a2cfb0c75acd9746454aaa576c711a65 upstream.

At inode.c:evict_inode_truncate_pages(), when we iterate over the inode's extent states, we access an extent state record's "state" field after we unlocked the inode's io tree lock. This can lead to a use-after-free issue because after we unlock the io tree that extent state record might have been freed due to being merged into another adjacent extent state record (a previous inflight bio for a read operation finished in the meanwhile which unlocked a range in the io tree and cause a merge of extent state records, as explained in the comment before the while loop added in commit 6ca0709756710 ("Btrfs: fix hang during inode eviction due to concurrent readahead")).

Fix this by keeping a copy of the extent state's flags in a local variable and using it after unlocking the io tree.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201189

---
 fs/btrfs/inode.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -5283,11 +5283,13 @@ static void evict_inode_truncate_pages(s
 		struct extent_state *cached_state = NULL;
 		u64 start;
 		u64 end;
+		unsigned state_flags;
 
 		node = rb_first(&io_tree->state);
 		state = rb_entry(node, struct extent_state, rb_node);
 		start = state->start;
 		end = state->end;
+		state_flags = state->state;
 		spin_unlock(&io_tree->lock);
 
 		lock_extent_bits(io_tree, start, end, &cached_state);

@@ -5300,7 +5302,7 @@ static void evict_inode_truncate_pages(s
 		 *
 		 * Note, end is the bytenr of last byte, so we need + 1 here.
 		 */
-		if (state->state & EXTENT_DELALLOC)
+		if (state_flags & EXTENT_DELALLOC)
 			btrfs_qgroup_free_data(inode, NULL, start, end - start + 1);
 
 		clear_extent_bit(io_tree, start, end,

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

commit 9084cb6a24bf5838a665af92ded1af8363f9e563 upstream.

We were iterating a block group's free space cache rbtree without locking first the lock that protects it (the free_space_ctl->free_space_offset rbtree is protected by the free_space_ctl->tree_lock spinlock).

KASAN reported an use-after-free problem when iterating such a rbtree due to a concurrent rbtree delete:

[ 9520.359168] ==================================================================
[ 9520.359656] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rb_next+0x13/0x90
[ 9520.359949] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8800b7ada500 by task btrfs-transacti/1721
[ 9520.360357]
[ 9520.360530] CPU: 4 PID: 1721 Comm: btrfs-transacti Tainted: G             L    4.19.0-rc8-nbor #555
[ 9520.360990] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 9520.362682] Call Trace:
[ 9520.362887]  dump_stack+0xa4/0xf5
[ 9520.363146]  print_address_description+0x78/0x280
[ 9520.363412]  kasan_report+0x263/0x390
[ 9520.363650]  ? rb_next+0x13/0x90
[ 9520.363873]  __asan_load8+0x54/0x90
[ 9520.364102]  rb_next+0x13/0x90
[ 9520.364380]  btrfs_dump_free_space+0x146/0x160 [btrfs]
[ 9520.364697]  dump_space_info+0x2cd/0x310 [btrfs]
[ 9520.364997]  btrfs_reserve_extent+0x1ee/0x1f0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.365310]  __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x1cc/0x620 [btrfs]
[ 9520.365646]  ? btrfs_update_time+0x180/0x180 [btrfs]
[ 9520.365923]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[ 9520.366204]  ? btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x2c0/0x5c0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.366549]  btrfs_prealloc_file_range_trans+0x23/0x30 [btrfs]
[ 9520.366880]  cache_save_setup+0x42e/0x580 [btrfs]
[ 9520.367220]  ? btrfs_check_data_free_space+0xd0/0xd0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.367518]  ? lock_downgrade+0x2f0/0x2f0
[ 9520.367799]  ? btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x11f/0x6e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.368104]  ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 9520.368349]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140
[ 9520.368638]  btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x2af/0x6e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.368978]  ? btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x870/0x870 [btrfs]
[ 9520.369282]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140
[ 9520.369534]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[ 9520.369811]  ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1b8/0x230 [btrfs]
[ 9520.370137]  commit_cowonly_roots+0x4b9/0x610 [btrfs]
[ 9520.370560]  ? commit_fs_roots+0x350/0x350 [btrfs]
[ 9520.370926]  ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1b8/0x230 [btrfs]
[ 9520.371285]  btrfs_commit_transaction+0x5e5/0x10e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.371612]  ? btrfs_apply_pending_changes+0x90/0x90 [btrfs]
[ 9520.371943]  ? start_transaction+0x168/0x6c0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.372257]  transaction_kthread+0x21c/0x240 [btrfs]
[ 9520.372537]  kthread+0x1d2/0x1f0
[ 9520.372793]  ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0xb50/0xb50 [btrfs]
[ 9520.373090]  ? kthread_park+0xb0/0xb0
[ 9520.373329]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[ 9520.373567]
[ 9520.373738] Allocated by task 1804:
[ 9520.373974]  kasan_kmalloc+0xff/0x180
[ 9520.374208]  kasan_slab_alloc+0x11/0x20
[ 9520.374447]  kmem_cache_alloc+0xfc/0x2d0
[ 9520.374731]  __btrfs_add_free_space+0x40/0x580 [btrfs]
[ 9520.375044]  unpin_extent_range+0x4f7/0x7a0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.375383]  btrfs_finish_extent_commit+0x15f/0x4d0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.375707]  btrfs_commit_transaction+0xb06/0x10e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.376027]  btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x237/0x5c0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.376365]  btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x81/0xd0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.376689]  btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space+0x25/0x80 [btrfs]
[ 9520.377018]  btrfs_direct_IO+0x42e/0x6d0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.377284]  generic_file_direct_write+0x11e/0x220
[ 9520.377587]  btrfs_file_write_iter+0x472/0xac0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.377875]  aio_write+0x25c/0x360
[ 9520.378106]  io_submit_one+0xaa0/0xdc0
[ 9520.378343]  __se_sys_io_submit+0xfa/0x2f0
[ 9520.378589]  __x64_sys_io_submit+0x43/0x50
[ 9520.378840]  do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x240
[ 9520.379081]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 9520.379387]
[ 9520.379557] Freed by task 1802:
[ 9520.379782]  __kasan_slab_free+0x173/0x260
[ 9520.380028]  kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10
[ 9520.380262]  kmem_cache_free+0xc1/0x2c0
[ 9520.380544]  btrfs_find_space_for_alloc+0x4cd/0x4e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.380866]  find_free_extent+0xa99/0x17e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.381166]  btrfs_reserve_extent+0xd5/0x1f0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.381474]  btrfs_get_blocks_direct+0x60b/0xbd0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.381761]  __blockdev_direct_IO+0x10ee/0x58a1
[ 9520.382059]  btrfs_direct_IO+0x25a/0x6d0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.382321]  generic_file_direct_write+0x11e/0x220
[ 9520.382623]  btrfs_file_write_iter+0x472/0xac0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.382904]  aio_write+0x25c/0x360
[ 9520.383172]  io_submit_one+0xaa0/0xdc0
[ 9520.383416]  __se_sys_io_submit+0xfa/0x2f0
[ 9520.383678]  __x64_sys_io_submit+0x43/0x50
[ 9520.383927]  do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x240
[ 9520.384165]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 9520.384439]
[ 9520.384610] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8800b7ada500
                which belongs to the cache btrfs_free_space of size 72
[ 9520.385175] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
                72-byte region [ffff8800b7ada500, ffff8800b7ada548)
[ 9520.385691] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 9520.385957] page:ffffea0002deb680 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff880108a1d700 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
[ 9520.388030] flags: 0x8100(slab|head)
[ 9520.388281] raw: 0000000000008100 ffffea0002deb608 ffffea0002728808 ffff880108a1d700
[ 9520.388722] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000130013 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 9520.389169] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 9520.389473]
[ 9520.389658] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 9520.389943]  ffff8800b7ada400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 9520.390368]  ffff8800b7ada480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 9520.390796] >ffff8800b7ada500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 9520.391223]                    ^
[ 9520.391461]  ffff8800b7ada580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 9520.391885]  ffff8800b7ada600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 9520.392313] ==================================================================
[ 9520.392772] BTRFS critical (device vdc): entry offset 2258497536, bytes 131072, bitmap no
[ 9520.393247] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000011
[ 9520.393705] PGD 800000010dbab067 P4D 800000010dbab067 PUD 107551067 PMD 0
[ 9520.394059] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI
[ 9520.394378] CPU: 4 PID: 1721 Comm: btrfs-transacti Tainted: G    B        L    4.19.0-rc8-nbor #555
[ 9520.394858] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[ 9520.395350] RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x3c/0x90
[ 9520.396461] RSP: 0018:ffff8801074ff780 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 9520.396762] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff81b5ac4c
[ 9520.397115] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000011
[ 9520.397468] RBP: ffff8801074ff7a0 R08: ffffed0021d64ccc R09: ffffed0021d64ccc
[ 9520.397821] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0021d64ccb R12: ffff8800b91e0000
[ 9520.398188] R13: ffff8800a3ceba48 R14: ffff8800b627bf80 R15: 0000000000020000
[ 9520.398555] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88010eb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 9520.399007] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 9520.399335] CR2: 0000000000000011 CR3: 0000000106b52000 CR4: 00000000000006a0
[ 9520.399679] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 9520.400023] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 9520.400400] Call Trace:
[ 9520.400648]  btrfs_dump_free_space+0x146/0x160 [btrfs]
[ 9520.400974]  dump_space_info+0x2cd/0x310 [btrfs]
[ 9520.401287]  btrfs_reserve_extent+0x1ee/0x1f0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.401609]  __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x1cc/0x620 [btrfs]
[ 9520.401952]  ? btrfs_update_time+0x180/0x180 [btrfs]
[ 9520.402232]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[ 9520.402522]  ? btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x2c0/0x5c0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.402882]  btrfs_prealloc_file_range_trans+0x23/0x30 [btrfs]
[ 9520.403261]  cache_save_setup+0x42e/0x580 [btrfs]
[ 9520.403570]  ? btrfs_check_data_free_space+0xd0/0xd0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.403871]  ? lock_downgrade+0x2f0/0x2f0
[ 9520.404161]  ? btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x11f/0x6e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.404481]  ? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 9520.404732]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140
[ 9520.405026]  btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x2af/0x6e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.405375]  ? btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x870/0x870 [btrfs]
[ 9520.405694]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140
[ 9520.405958]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x27/0x40
[ 9520.406243]  ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1b8/0x230 [btrfs]
[ 9520.406574]  commit_cowonly_roots+0x4b9/0x610 [btrfs]
[ 9520.406899]  ? commit_fs_roots+0x350/0x350 [btrfs]
[ 9520.407253]  ? btrfs_run_delayed_refs+0x1b8/0x230 [btrfs]
[ 9520.407589]  btrfs_commit_transaction+0x5e5/0x10e0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.407925]  ? btrfs_apply_pending_changes+0x90/0x90 [btrfs]
[ 9520.408262]  ? start_transaction+0x168/0x6c0 [btrfs]
[ 9520.408582]  transaction_kthread+0x21c/0x240 [btrfs]
[ 9520.408870]  kthread+0x1d2/0x1f0
[ 9520.409138]  ? btrfs_cleanup_transaction+0xb50/0xb50 [btrfs]
[ 9520.409440]  ? kthread_park+0xb0/0xb0
[ 9520.409682]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[ 9520.410508] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 9520.410764]    (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 9520.411007] CR2: 0000000000000011
[ 9520.411297] ---[ end trace 01a0863445cf360a ]---
[ 9520.411568] RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x3c/0x90
[ 9520.412644] RSP: 0018:ffff8801074ff780 EFLAGS: 00010292
[ 9520.412932] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: ffffffff81b5ac4c
[ 9520.413274] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000011
[ 9520.413616] RBP: ffff8801074ff7a0 R08: ffffed0021d64ccc R09: ffffed0021d64ccc
[ 9520.414007] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed0021d64ccb R12: ffff8800b91e0000
[ 9520.414349] R13: ffff8800a3ceba48 R14: ffff8800b627bf80 R15: 0000000000020000
[ 9520.416074] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88010eb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 9520.416536] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 9520.416848] CR2: 0000000000000011 CR3: 0000000106b52000 CR4: 00000000000006a0
[ 9520.418477] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 9520.418846] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 9520.419204] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 9520.419666] Dumping ftrace buffer:
[ 9520.419930]    (ftrace buffer empty)
[ 9520.420168] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 9520.420406] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---

Fix this by acquiring the respective lock before iterating the rbtree.

---
 fs/btrfs/free-space-cache.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -2459,6 +2459,7 @@ void btrfs_dump_free_space(struct btrfs_
 	struct rb_node *n;
 	int count = 0;
 
+	spin_lock(&ctl->tree_lock);
 	for (n = rb_first(&ctl->free_space_offset); n; n = rb_next(n)) {
 		info = rb_entry(n, struct btrfs_free_space, offset_index);
 		if (info->bytes >= bytes && !block_group->ro)

@@ -2467,6 +2468,7 @@ void btrfs_dump_free_space(struct btrfs_
 			   info->offset, info->bytes,
 		       (info->bitmap) ? "yes" : "no");
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&ctl->tree_lock);
 	btrfs_info(fs_info, "block group has cluster?: %s",
 	       list_empty(&block_group->cluster_list) ? "no" : "yes");
 	btrfs_info(fs_info,

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Ahern <[email protected]>

commit e72bde6b66299602087c8c2350d36a525e75d06e upstream.

Marco reported an error with hfsc:

root@Calimero:~# tc qdisc add dev eth0 root handle 1:0 hfsc default 1
Error: Attribute failed policy validation.

Apparently a few implementations pass TCA_OPTIONS as a binary instead of nested attribute, so drop TCA_OPTIONS from the policy.

---
 net/sched/sch_api.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1309,7 +1309,6 @@ check_loop_fn(struct Qdisc *q, unsigned
 
 const struct nla_policy rtm_tca_policy[TCA_MAX + 1] = {
 	[TCA_KIND]		= { .type = NLA_STRING },
-	[TCA_OPTIONS]		= { .type = NLA_NESTED },
 	[TCA_RATE]		= { .type = NLA_BINARY,
 				    .len = sizeof(struct tc_estimator) },
 	[TCA_STAB]		= { .type = NLA_NESTED },

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>

commit 943210ba807ec50aafa2fa7b13bd6d36a478969b upstream.

If you run aptitude on framebuffer console, the display is corrupted. The corruption is caused by the commit d8ae7242. The patch adds "offset" to "start" when calling scr_memsetw, but it forgets to do the same addition on a subsequent call to do_update_region.

---
 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1551,7 +1551,7 @@ static void csi_K(struct vc_data *vc, in
 	scr_memsetw(start + offset, vc->vc_video_erase_char, 2 * count);
 	vc->vc_need_wrap = 0;
 	if (con_should_update(vc))
-		do_update_region(vc, (unsigned long) start, count);
+		do_update_region(vc, (unsigned long)(start + offset), count);
 }
 
 static void csi_X(struct vc_data *vc, int vpar) /* erase the following vpar positions */

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>

commit d2f007dbe7e4c9583eea6eb04d60001e85c6f1bd upstream.

The current logic first clones the extent array and sorts both copies, then maps the lower IDs of the forward mapping into the lower namespace, but doesn't map the lower IDs of the reverse mapping.

This means that code in a nested user namespace with >5 extents will see incorrect IDs. It also breaks some access checks, like inode_owner_or_capable() and privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(), so a process can incorrectly appear to be capable relative to an inode.

To fix it, we have to make sure that the "lower_first" members of extents in both arrays are translated; and we have to make sure that the reverse map is sorted *after* the translation (since otherwise the translation can break the sorting).

This is CVE-2018-18955.

---
 kernel/user_namespace.c |   12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -974,10 +974,6 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *fi
 	if (!new_idmap_permitted(file, ns, cap_setid, &new_map))
 		goto out;
 
-	ret = sort_idmaps(&new_map);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out;
-
 	ret = -EPERM;
 	/* Map the lower ids from the parent user namespace to the
 	 * kernel global id space.

@@ -1004,6 +1000,14 @@ static ssize_t map_write(struct file *fi
 		e->lower_first = lower_first;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * If we want to use binary search for lookup, this clones the extent
+	 * array and sorts both copies.
+	 */
+	ret = sort_idmaps(&new_map);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+
 	/* Install the map */
 	if (new_map.nr_extents <= UID_GID_MAP_MAX_BASE_EXTENTS) {
 		memcpy(map->extent, new_map.extent,

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Colascione <[email protected]>

commit 1ae80cf31938c8f77c37a29bbe29e7f1cd492be8 upstream.

The map-in-map frequently serves as a mechanism for atomic snapshotting of state that a BPF program might record. The current implementation is dangerous to use in this way, however, since userspace has no way of knowing when all programs that might have retrieved the "old" value of the map may have completed.

This change ensures that map update operations on map-in-map map types always wait for all references to the old map to drop before returning to userspace.

---
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c |   13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)

@@ -741,6 +741,17 @@ err_put:
 	return err;
 }
 
+static void maybe_wait_bpf_programs(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+	/* Wait for any running BPF programs to complete so that
+	 * userspace, when we return to it, knows that all programs
+	 * that could be running use the new map value.
+	 */
+	if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS ||
+	    map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY_OF_MAPS)
+		synchronize_rcu();
+}
+
 #define BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM_LAST_FIELD flags
 
 static int map_update_elem(union bpf_attr *attr)

@@ -831,6 +842,7 @@ static int map_update_elem(union bpf_att
 	}
 	__this_cpu_dec(bpf_prog_active);
 	preempt_enable();
+	maybe_wait_bpf_programs(map);
 out:
 free_value:
 	kfree(value);

@@ -883,6 +895,7 @@ static int map_delete_elem(union bpf_att
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	__this_cpu_dec(bpf_prog_active);
 	preempt_enable();
+	maybe_wait_bpf_programs(map);
 out:
 	kfree(key);
 err_put:

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

commit fc09ab7a767394f9ecdad84ea6e85d68b83c8e21 upstream.

The commit 37a3a98ef601 ("ALSA: hda - Enable runtime PM only for discrete GPU") added a new ops gpu_bound to be called when GPU gets bound. The patch overlooked, however, that vga_switcheroo_enable() is called only once at GPU is bound. When an audio client is registered after that point, it would miss the gpu_bound call. This leads to the unexpected lack of runtime PM in HD-audio side.

For addressing that regression, just call gpu_bound callback manually at vga_switcheroo_register_audio_client() when the GPU was already bound.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=201615

---
 drivers/gpu/vga/vga_switcheroo.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -380,6 +380,9 @@ int vga_switcheroo_register_audio_client
 			mutex_unlock(&vgasr_mutex);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
+		/* notify if GPU has been already bound */
+		if (ops->gpu_bound)
+			ops->gpu_bound(pdev, id);
 	}
 	mutex_unlock(&vgasr_mutex);
 

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 4.19.2-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.19.y
git commit: 9ac3c2d4889c84e1fa030dc61ca5aeb6951f8776
git describe: v4.19.1-362-g9ac3c2d4889c
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.19-oe/build/v4.19.1-362-g9ac3c2d4889c

No regressions (compared to build v4.19.1)

Ran 19028 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64

Test Suites
-----------
* boot
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none

Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

Thanks for testing 3 of these and letting me know.

greg k-h

Build results:

	total: 135 pass: 135 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 291 pass: 291 fail: 0

Details are available at https://kerneltests.org/builders/.

Guenter

Thanks for testing all of these and letting me know.

greg k-h