bfs: add sanity check at bfs_fill_super()
Subsystems (6)
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 1/11 bfs: add sanity check at bfs_fill_super()
From: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9f2df09a33aa2c76ce6385d382693f98d7f2f07e ]
syzbot is reporting too large memory allocation at bfs_fill_super() [1]. Since file system image is corrupted such that bfs_sb->s_start == 0, bfs_fill_super() is trying to allocate 8MB of continuous memory. Fix this by adding a sanity check on bfs_sb->s_start, __GFP_NOWARN and printf().
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=16a87c236b951351374a84c8a32f40edbc034e96
--- fs/bfs/inode.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/bfs/inode.c +6 -3
@@ -350,7 +350,8 @@ static int bfs_fill_super(struct super_block *s, void *data, int silent) s->s_magic =BFS_MAGIC ; -if (le32_to_cpu (bfs_sb->s_start) >le32_to_cpu (bfs_sb->s_end)) { +if (le32_to_cpu (bfs_sb->s_start) >le32_to_cpu (bfs_sb->s_end) || +le32_to_cpu (bfs_sb->s_start) <BFS_BSIZE ) {printf ("Superblock is corrupted\n" ); goto out1; }
@@ -359,9 +360,11 @@ static int bfs_fill_super(struct super_block *s, void *data, int silent)sizeof (struct bfs_inode ) +BFS_ROOT_INO -1 ; imap_len = (info->si_lasti /8 ) +1 ; - info->si_imap =kzalloc (imap_len,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!info->si_imap) + info->si_imap =kzalloc (imap_len,GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN); +if (!info->si_imap) { +printf ("Cannot allocate %u bytes\n" , imap_len); goto out1; + }for (i =0 ; i <BFS_ROOT_INO ; i++)set_bit (i, info->si_imap);
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 2/11 reiserfs: propagate errors from fill_with_dentries() properly
From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b10298d56c9623f9b173f19959732d3184b35f4f ]
fill_with_dentries() failed to propagate errors up to reiserfs_for_each_xattr() properly. Plumb them through.
Note that reiserfs_for_each_xattr() is only used by reiserfs_delete_xattrs() and reiserfs_chown_xattrs(). The result of reiserfs_delete_xattrs() is discarded anyway, the only difference there is whether a warning is printed to dmesg. The result of reiserfs_chown_xattrs() does matter because it can block chowning of the file to which the xattrs belong; but either way, the resulting state can have misaligned ownership, so my patch doesn't improve things greatly.
Credit for making me look at this code goes to Al Viro, who pointed out that the ->actor calling convention is suboptimal and should be changed.
--- fs/reiserfs/xattr.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
fs/reiserfs/xattr.c +7 -0
@@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ struct reiserfs_dentry_buf {struct dir_context ctx;struct dentry *xadir;int count; +int err;struct dentry *dentries[8 ]; };
@@ -206,6 +207,7 @@ fill_with_dentries(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *name, int namelen, dentry =lookup_one_len (name, dbuf->xadir, namelen);if (IS_ERR (dentry)) { + dbuf->err =PTR_ERR (dentry);return PTR_ERR (dentry); }else if (d_really_is_negative (dentry)) {/* A directory entry exists, but no file? */
@@ -214,6 +216,7 @@ fill_with_dentries(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *name, int namelen,"not found for file %pd.\n" , dentry, dbuf->xadir);dput (dentry); + dbuf->err = -EIO ;return -EIO ; }
@@ -261,6 +264,10 @@ static int reiserfs_for_each_xattr(struct inode *inode, err =reiserfs_readdir_inode (d_inode (dir), &buf.ctx);if (err)break ; +if (buf.err) { + err = buf.err; +break ; + }if (!buf.count)break ;for (i =0 ; !err && i < buf.count && buf.dentries[i]; i++) {
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 3/11 hfs: prevent btree data loss on root split
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Ernesto A. Fernández <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d057c036672f33d43a5f7344acbb08cf3a8a0c09 ]
This bug is triggered whenever hfs_brec_update_parent() needs to split the root node. The height of the btree is not increased, which leaves the new node orphaned and its records lost. It is not possible for this to happen on a valid hfs filesystem because the index nodes have fixed length keys.
For reasons I ignore, the hfs module does have support for a number of hfsplus features. A corrupt btree header may report variable length keys and trigger this bug, so it's better to fix it.
--- fs/hfs/brec.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
fs/hfs/brec.c +4 -0
@@ -424,6 +424,10 @@ static int hfs_brec_update_parent(struct hfs_find_data *fd)if (new_node) {__be32 cnid; +if (!new_node->parent) { +hfs_btree_inc_height (tree); + new_node->parent = tree->root; + } fd->bnode =hfs_bnode_find (tree, new_node->parent);/* create index key and entry */ hfs_bnode_read_key (new_node, fd->search_key,14 );
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 4/11 hfsplus: prevent btree data loss on root split
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Ernesto A. Fernández <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0a3021d4f5295aa073c7bf5c5e4de60a2e292578 ]
Creating, renaming or deleting a file may cause catalog corruption and data loss. This bug is randomly triggered by xfstests generic/027, but here is a faster reproducer:
truncate -s 50M fs.iso
mkfs.hfsplus fs.iso
mount fs.iso /mnt
i=100
while [ $i -le 150 ]; do
touch /mnt/$i &>/dev/null
((++i))
done
i=100
while [ $i -le 150 ]; do
mv /mnt/$i /mnt/$(perl -e "print $i x82") &>/dev/null
((++i))
done
umount /mnt
fsck.hfsplus -n fs.isoThe bug is triggered whenever hfs_brec_update_parent() needs to split the root node. The height of the btree is not increased, which leaves the new node orphaned and its records lost.
--- fs/hfsplus/brec.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
fs/hfsplus/brec.c +4 -0
@@ -427,6 +427,10 @@ static int hfs_brec_update_parent(struct hfs_find_data *fd)if (new_node) {__be32 cnid; +if (!new_node->parent) { +hfs_btree_inc_height (tree); + new_node->parent = tree->root; + } fd->bnode =hfs_bnode_find (tree, new_node->parent);/* create index key and entry */ hfs_bnode_read_key (new_node, fd->search_key,14 );
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 5/11 um: Give start_idle_thread() a return code
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7ff1e34bbdc15acab823b1ee4240e94623d50ee8 ]
Fixes:arch/um/os-Linux/skas/process.c:613:1: warning: control reaches end of non-void function [-Wreturn-type]
longjmp() never returns but gcc still warns that the end of the function can be reached.
Add a return code and debug aid to detect this impossible case.
--- arch/um/os-Linux/skas/process.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
arch/um/os-Linux/skas/process.c +5 -0
@@ -585,6 +585,11 @@ int start_idle_thread(void *stack, jmp_buf *switch_buf)fatal_sigsegv (); }longjmp (*switch_buf,1 ); + +/* unreachable */ +printk (UM_KERN_ERR "impossible long jump!" ); +fatal_sigsegv (); +return 0 ; }void initial_thread_cb_skas (void (*proc)(void *),void *arg)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 6/11 fs/exofs: fix potential memory leak in mount option parsing
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Chengguang Xu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 515f1867addaba49c1c6ac73abfaffbc192c1db4 ]
There are some cases can cause memory leak when parsing option 'osdname'.
--- fs/exofs/super.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/exofs/super.c +4 -1
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ static int parse_options(char *options, struct exofs_mountopt *opts) token =match_token (p, tokens, args);switch (token) {case Opt_name: +kfree (opts->dev_name); opts->dev_name =match_strdup (&args[0 ]);if (unlikely (!opts->dev_name)) {EXOFS_ERR ("Error allocating dev_name" );
@@ -868,8 +869,10 @@ static struct dentry *exofs_mount(struct file_system_type *type,int ret; ret =parse_options (data, &opts); -if (ret) +if (ret) { +kfree (opts.dev_name);return ERR_PTR (ret); + }if (!opts.dev_name) opts.dev_name = dev_name;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 7/11 clk: samsung: exynos5420: Enable PERIS clocks for suspend
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Marek Szyprowski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b33228029d842269e17bba591609e83ed422005d ]
Ensure that clocks for core SoC modules (including TZPC0..9 modules) are enabled for suspend/resume cycle. This fixes suspend/resume support on Exynos5422-based Odroid XU3/XU4 boards.
--- drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos5420.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/clk/samsung/clk-exynos5420.c +1 -0
@@ -273,6 +273,7 @@ static const struct samsung_clk_reg_dump exynos5420_set_clksrc[] = { { .offset = GATE_BUS_TOP, .value = 0xffffffff, }, { .offset = GATE_BUS_DISP1, .value = 0xffffffff, }, { .offset = GATE_IP_PERIC, .value = 0xffffffff, }, + { .offset = GATE_IP_PERIS, .value = 0xffffffff, }, }; static int exynos5420_clk_suspend(void)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 8/11 platform/x86: acerhdf: Add BIOS entry for Gateway LT31 v1.3307
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Paul Gortmaker <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 684238d79ad85c5e19a71bb5818e77e329912fbc ]
To fix:
acerhdf: unknown (unsupported) BIOS version Gateway /LT31 /v1.3307 , please report, aborting!
As can be seen in the context, the BIOS registers haven't changed in the previous versions, so the assumption is they won't have changed in this last update for this somewhat older platform either.
--- drivers/platform/x86/acerhdf.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/platform/x86/acerhdf.c +1 -0
@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ static const struct bios_settings bios_tbl[] = { {"Gateway", "LT31", "v1.3201", 0x55, 0x58, {0x9e, 0x00}, 0}, {"Gateway", "LT31", "v1.3302", 0x55, 0x58, {0x9e, 0x00}, 0}, {"Gateway", "LT31", "v1.3303t", 0x55, 0x58, {0x9e, 0x00}, 0}, + {"Gateway", "LT31", "v1.3307", 0x55, 0x58, {0x9e, 0x00}, 0},/* Packard Bell */ {"Packard Bell", "DOA150", "v0.3104", 0x55, 0x58, {0x21, 0x00}, 0}, {"Packard Bell", "DOA150", "v0.3105", 0x55, 0x58, {0x20, 0x00}, 0},
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 9/11 arm64: percpu: Initialize ret in the default case
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b5bb425871186303e6936fa2581521bdd1964a58 ]
Clang warns that if the default case is taken, ret will be uninitialized.
./arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h:196:2: warning: variable 'ret' is used uninitialized whenever switch default is taken [-Wsometimes-uninitialized]
default:
^~~~~~~
./arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h:200:9: note: uninitialized use occurs
here
return ret;
^~~
./arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h:157:19: note: initialize the variable
'ret' to silence this warning
unsigned long ret, loop;
^
= 0This warning appears several times while building the erofs filesystem. While it's not strictly wrong, the BUILD_BUG will prevent this from becoming a true problem. Initialize ret to 0 in the default case right before the BUILD_BUG to silence all of these warnings.
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/percpu.h +3 -0
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ static inline unsigned long __percpu_##op(void *ptr, \ : [val] "Ir" (val)); \break ; \default : \ + ret =0 ; \BUILD_BUG (); \ } \ \
@@ -113,6 +114,7 @@ static inline unsigned long __percpu_read(void *ptr, int size) ret =ACCESS_ONCE (*(u64 *)ptr);break ;default : + ret =0 ;BUILD_BUG (); }
@@ -182,6 +184,7 @@ static inline unsigned long __percpu_xchg(void *ptr, unsigned long val, : [val] "r" (val));break ;default : + ret =0 ;BUILD_BUG (); }
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 10/11 mm/vmstat.c: assert that vmstat_text is in sync with stat_items_size
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f0ecf25a093fc0589f0a6bc4c1ea068bbb67d220 ]
Having two gigantic arrays that must manually be kept in sync, including ifdefs, isn't exactly robust. To make it easier to catch such issues in the future, add a BUILD_BUG_ON().
--- mm/vmstat.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
mm/vmstat.c +2 -0
@@ -1320,6 +1320,8 @@ static void *vmstat_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) stat_items_size +=sizeof (struct vm_event_state );#endif +BUILD_BUG_ON (stat_items_size != +ARRAY_SIZE (vmstat_text) *sizeof (unsigned long )); v =kmalloc (stat_items_size,GFP_KERNEL ); m->private = v;if (!v)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 11/11 mm: don't warn about large allocations for slab
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 61448479a9f2c954cde0cfe778cb6bec5d0a748d ]
Slub does not call kmalloc_slab() for sizes > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE, instead it falls back to kmalloc_large().
For slab KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE == KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE and it calls kmalloc_slab() for all allocations relying on NULL return value for over-sized allocations.
This inconsistency leads to unwanted warnings from kmalloc_slab() for over-sized allocations for slab. Returning NULL for failed allocations is the expected behavior.
Make slub and slab code consistent by checking size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE in slab before calling kmalloc_slab().
While we are here also fix the check in kmalloc_slab(). We should check against KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE rather than KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE. It all kinda worked because for slab the constants are the same, and slub always checks the size against KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE before kmalloc_slab(). But if we get there with size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE anyhow bad things will happen. For example, in case of a newly introduced bug in slub code.
Also move the check in kmalloc_slab() from function entry to the size > 192 case. This partially compensates for the additional check in slab code and makes slub code a bit faster (at least theoretically).
Also drop __GFP_NOWARN in the warning check. This warning means a bug in slab code itself, user-passed flags have nothing to do with it.
Nothing of this affects slob.
--- mm/slab.c | 4 ++++ mm/slab_common.c | 12 ++++++------ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
mm/slab.c +4 -0
@@ -3488,6 +3488,8 @@ __do_kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node, unsigned long caller) {struct kmem_cache *cachep; +if (unlikely (size >KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE )) +return NULL ; cachep =kmalloc_slab (size, flags);if (unlikely (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR (cachep)))return cachep;
@@ -3520,6 +3522,8 @@ static __always_inline void *__do_kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags,struct kmem_cache *cachep;void *ret; +if (unlikely (size >KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE )) +return NULL ; cachep =kmalloc_slab (size, flags);if (unlikely (ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR (cachep)))return cachep;
mm/slab_common.c +6 -6
@@ -852,18 +852,18 @@ struct kmem_cache *kmalloc_slab(size_t size, gfp_t flags) {int index; -if (unlikely (size >KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE )) { -WARN_ON_ONCE (!(flags & __GFP_NOWARN)); -return NULL ; - } -if (size <=192 ) {if (!size)return ZERO_SIZE_PTR ; index = size_index[size_index_elem (size)]; - }else + }else { +if (unlikely (size >KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE )) { +WARN_ON (1 ); +return NULL ; + } index =fls (size -1 ); + }#ifdef CONFIG_ZONE_DMA if (unlikely ((flags &GFP_DMA )))
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1