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V4.9 backport of 32-bit arm spectre patches

PATCH In review David Long 6 participants 40 messages Nov 8, 2018 – Nov 22, 2018 Stable branch

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover V4.9 backport of 32-bit arm spectre patches

From: "David A. Long" <[email protected]>

V4.9 backport of spectre patches from Russell M. King's spectre branch. Patches not yet in upstream are excluded.

Changes in V2:
1) Fixed bad merge in #11/24 in hyp-entry.S.
2) Incorporated upstream patch to earlier patch where wrong ENDPROC call was done in hypervisor code in proc-v7.S.

Marc Zyngier (2):
ARM: KVM: invalidate BTB on guest exit for Cortex-A12/A17
ARM: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Cortex-A15

Russell King (22):
ARM: add more CPU part numbers for Cortex and Brahma B15 CPUs
ARM: bugs: prepare processor bug infrastructure
ARM: bugs: hook processor bug checking into SMP and suspend paths
ARM: bugs: add support for per-processor bug checking
ARM: spectre: add Kconfig symbol for CPUs vulnerable to Spectre
ARM: spectre-v2: harden branch predictor on context switches
ARM: spectre-v2: add Cortex A8 and A15 validation of the IBE bit
ARM: spectre-v2: harden user aborts in kernel space
ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening
ARM: spectre-v2: warn about incorrect context switching functions
ARM: spectre-v2: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Brahma B15
ARM: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling
ARM: KVM: report support for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
ARM: spectre-v1: add speculation barrier (csdb) macros
ARM: spectre-v1: add array_index_mask_nospec() implementation
ARM: spectre-v1: fix syscall entry
ARM: signal: copy registers using __copy_from_user()
ARM: vfp: use __copy_from_user() when restoring VFP state
ARM: oabi-compat: copy semops using __copy_from_user()
ARM: use __inttype() in get_user()
ARM: spectre-v1: use get_user() for __get_user()
ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesses

 arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h   |  12 ++
 arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h     |  32 ++++++
 arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h        |   6 +-
 arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h        |   3 +
 arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h     |   8 ++
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_asm.h     |   2 -
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |  14 ++-
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h     |  23 +++-
 arch/arm/include/asm/proc-fns.h    |   4 +
 arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h |  15 +++
 arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h |   4 +-
 arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h     |  26 +++--
 arch/arm/kernel/Makefile           |   1 +
 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c             |  18 +++
 arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S     |  18 ++-
 arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S     |  25 +++++
 arch/arm/kernel/signal.c           |  55 ++++-----
 arch/arm/kernel/smp.c              |   4 +
 arch/arm/kernel/suspend.c          |   2 +
 arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c  |   8 +-
 arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S       | 112 ++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S      |   9 ++
 arch/arm/mm/Kconfig                |  23 ++++
 arch/arm/mm/Makefile               |   2 +-
 arch/arm/mm/fault.c                |   3 +
 arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S          |   3 +-
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-2level.S       |   6 -
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c         | 174 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S              | 154 +++++++++++++++++++------
 arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c           |  17 ++-
 30 files changed, 674 insertions(+), 109 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c
 create mode 100644 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
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2.17.1
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#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/24 ARM: add more CPU part numbers for Cortex and Brahma B15 CPUs

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit f5683e76f35b4ec5891031b6a29036efe0a1ff84 upstream.

Add CPU part numbers for Cortex A53, A57, A72, A73, A75 and the Broadcom Brahma B15 CPU.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h +8 -0
index b62eaeb147aa..c55db1e22f0c 100644
@@ -76,8 +76,16 @@
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12		0x4100c0d0
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17		0x4100c0e0
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15		0x4100c0f0
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A53		0x4100d030
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57		0x4100d070
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72		0x4100d080
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73		0x4100d090
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75		0x4100d0a0
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_MASK		0xff00fff0
 
+/* Broadcom cores */
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15		0x420000f0
+
 /* DEC implemented cores */
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_SA1100		0x4400a110
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
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#2 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/24 ARM: bugs: prepare processor bug infrastructure

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit a5b9177f69329314721aa7022b7e69dab23fa1f0 upstream.

Prepare the processor bug infrastructure so that it can be expanded to check for per-processor bugs.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h | 4 ++--
 arch/arm/kernel/Makefile    | 1 +
 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c      | 9 +++++++++
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c
arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h +2 -2
index a97f1ea708d1..ed122d294f3f 100644
@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@
 #ifndef __ASM_BUGS_H
 #define __ASM_BUGS_H
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
 extern void check_writebuffer_bugs(void);
 
-#define check_bugs() check_writebuffer_bugs()
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
+extern void check_bugs(void);
 #else
 #define check_bugs() do { } while (0)
 #endif
arch/arm/kernel/Makefile +1 -0
index ad325a8c7e1e..adb9add28b6f 100644
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ else
 obj-y		+= entry-armv.o
 endif
 
+obj-$(CONFIG_MMU)		+= bugs.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_IDLE)		+= cpuidle.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ISA_DMA_API)	+= dma.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_FIQ)		+= fiq.o fiqasm.o
arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c new file +9 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..88024028bb70
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+// SPDX-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
+#include <asm/proc-fns.h>
+
+void __init check_bugs(void)
+{
+	check_writebuffer_bugs();
+}
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
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#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/24 ARM: bugs: hook processor bug checking into SMP and suspend paths

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit 26602161b5ba795928a5a719fe1d5d9f2ab5c3ef upstream.

Check for CPU bugs when secondary processors are being brought online, and also when CPUs are resuming from a low power mode. This gives an opportunity to check that processor specific bug workarounds are correctly enabled for all paths that a CPU re-enters the kernel.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h | 2 ++
 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c      | 5 +++++
 arch/arm/kernel/smp.c       | 4 ++++
 arch/arm/kernel/suspend.c   | 2 ++
 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h +2 -0
index ed122d294f3f..73a99c72a930 100644
@@ -14,8 +14,10 @@ extern void check_writebuffer_bugs(void);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
 extern void check_bugs(void);
+extern void check_other_bugs(void);
 #else
 #define check_bugs() do { } while (0)
+#define check_other_bugs() do { } while (0)
 #endif
 
 #endif
arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c +5 -0
index 88024028bb70..16e7ba2a9cc4 100644
@@ -3,7 +3,12 @@
 #include <asm/bugs.h>
 #include <asm/proc-fns.h>
 
+void check_other_bugs(void)
+{
+}
+
 void __init check_bugs(void)
 {
 	check_writebuffer_bugs();
+	check_other_bugs();
 }
arch/arm/kernel/smp.c +4 -0
index 7dd14e8395e6..d2ce37da87d8 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <linux/irq_work.h>
 
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
 #include <asm/smp.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
@@ -400,6 +401,9 @@ asmlinkage void secondary_start_kernel(void)
 	 * before we continue - which happens after __cpu_up returns.
 	 */
 	set_cpu_online(cpu, true);
+
+	check_other_bugs();
+
 	complete(&cpu_running);
 
 	local_irq_enable();
arch/arm/kernel/suspend.c +2 -0
index 9a2f882a0a2d..134f0d432610 100644
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/idmap.h>
 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ int cpu_suspend(unsigned long arg, int (*fn)(unsigned long))
 		cpu_switch_mm(mm->pgd, mm);
 		local_flush_bp_all();
 		local_flush_tlb_all();
+		check_other_bugs();
 	}
 
 	return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#4 lore raw

PATCH v2 4/24 ARM: bugs: add support for per-processor bug checking

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit 9d3a04925deeabb97c8e26d940b501a2873e8af3 upstream.

Add support for per-processor bug checking - each processor function descriptor gains a function pointer for this check, which must not be an __init function. If non-NULL, this will be called whenever a CPU enters the kernel via which ever path (boot CPU, secondary CPU startup, CPU resuming, etc.)

This allows processor specific bug checks to validate that workaround bits are properly enabled by firmware via all entry paths to the kernel.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/proc-fns.h | 4 ++++
 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c          | 4 ++++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S       | 3 ++-
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/proc-fns.h +4 -0
index 8877ad5ffe10..f379f5f849a9 100644
@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ extern struct processor {
 	 * Set up any processor specifics
 	 */
 	void (*_proc_init)(void);
+	/*
+	 * Check for processor bugs
+	 */
+	void (*check_bugs)(void);
 	/*
 	 * Disable any processor specifics
 	 */
arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c +4 -0
index 16e7ba2a9cc4..7be511310191 100644
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@
 
 void check_other_bugs(void)
 {
+#ifdef MULTI_CPU
+	if (processor.check_bugs)
+		processor.check_bugs();
+#endif
 }
 
 void __init check_bugs(void)
arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S +2 -1
index 0d40c285bd86..7d9176c4a21d 100644
@@ -274,13 +274,14 @@
 	mcr	p15, 0, ip, c7, c10, 4		@ data write barrier
 	.endm
 
-.macro define_processor_functions name:req, dabort:req, pabort:req, nommu=0, suspend=0
+.macro define_processor_functions name:req, dabort:req, pabort:req, nommu=0, suspend=0, bugs=0
 	.type	\name\()_processor_functions, #object
 	.align 2
 ENTRY(\name\()_processor_functions)
 	.word	\dabort
 	.word	\pabort
 	.word	cpu_\name\()_proc_init
+	.word	\bugs
 	.word	cpu_\name\()_proc_fin
 	.word	cpu_\name\()_reset
 	.word	cpu_\name\()_do_idle
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#5 lore raw

PATCH v2 5/24 ARM: spectre: add Kconfig symbol for CPUs vulnerable to Spectre

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit c58d237d0852a57fde9bc2c310972e8f4e3d155d upstream.

Add a Kconfig symbol for CPUs which are vulnerable to the Spectre attacks.

---
 arch/arm/mm/Kconfig | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/arm/mm/Kconfig +4 -0
index c1799dd1d0d9..d37af5e63411 100644
@@ -396,6 +396,7 @@ config CPU_V7
 	select CPU_CP15_MPU if !MMU
 	select CPU_HAS_ASID if MMU
 	select CPU_PABRT_V7
+	select CPU_SPECTRE if MMU
 	select CPU_TLB_V7 if MMU
 
 # ARMv7M
@@ -800,6 +801,9 @@ config CPU_BPREDICT_DISABLE
 	help
 	  Say Y here to disable branch prediction.  If unsure, say N.
 
+config CPU_SPECTRE
+	bool
+
 config TLS_REG_EMUL
 	bool
 	select NEED_KUSER_HELPERS
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
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#6 lore raw

PATCH v2 6/24 ARM: spectre-v2: harden branch predictor on context switches

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit 06c23f5ffe7ad45b908d0fff604dae08a7e334b9 upstream.

Required manual merge of arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S.

Harden the branch predictor against Spectre v2 attacks on context switches for ARMv7 and later CPUs. We do this by:

Cortex A9, A12, A17, A73, A75: invalidating the BTB. Cortex A15, Brahma B15: invalidating the instruction cache.

Cortex A57 and Cortex A72 are not addressed in this patch.

Cortex R7 and Cortex R8 are also not addressed as we do not enforce memory protection on these cores.

---
 arch/arm/mm/Kconfig          |  19 ++++++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-2level.S |   6 --
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S        | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 3 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
arch/arm/mm/Kconfig +19 -0
index d37af5e63411..7f3760fa9c15 100644
@@ -804,6 +804,25 @@ config CPU_BPREDICT_DISABLE
 config CPU_SPECTRE
 	bool
 
+config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT
+	depends on CPU_SPECTRE
+	default y
+	help
+	   Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely
+	   on being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim
+	   context by executing aliasing branches in the attacker context.
+	   Such attacks can be partially mitigated against by clearing
+	   internal branch predictor state and limiting the prediction
+	   logic in some situations.
+
+	   This config option will take CPU-specific actions to harden
+	   the branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on
+	   specific instruction sequences or control bits being set by
+	   the system firmware.
+
+	   If unsure, say Y.
+
 config TLS_REG_EMUL
 	bool
 	select NEED_KUSER_HELPERS
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-2level.S +0 -6
index c6141a5435c3..f8d45ad2a515 100644
@@ -41,11 +41,6 @@
  *	even on Cortex-A8 revisions not affected by 430973.
  *	If IBE is not set, the flush BTAC/BTB won't do anything.
  */
-ENTRY(cpu_ca8_switch_mm)
-#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
-	mov	r2, #0
-	mcr	p15, 0, r2, c7, c5, 6		@ flush BTAC/BTB
-#endif
 ENTRY(cpu_v7_switch_mm)
 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
 	mmid	r1, r1				@ get mm->context.id
@@ -66,7 +61,6 @@ ENTRY(cpu_v7_switch_mm)
 #endif
 	bx	lr
 ENDPROC(cpu_v7_switch_mm)
-ENDPROC(cpu_ca8_switch_mm)
 
 /*
  *	cpu_v7_set_pte_ext(ptep, pte)
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S +96 -29

173 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
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#7 lore raw

PATCH v2 7/24 ARM: spectre-v2: add Cortex A8 and A15 validation of the IBE bit

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit e388b80288aade31135aca23d32eee93dd106795 upstream.

When the branch predictor hardening is enabled, firmware must have set the IBE bit in the auxiliary control register. If this bit has not been set, the Spectre workarounds will not be functional.

Add validation that this bit is set, and print a warning at alert level if this is not the case.

---
 arch/arm/mm/Makefile       |  2 +-
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S      |  4 ++--
 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
arch/arm/mm/Makefile +1 -1
index e8698241ece9..92d47c8cbbc3 100644
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_MOHAWK)	+= proc-mohawk.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_FEROCEON)	+= proc-feroceon.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V6)		+= proc-v6.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V6K)		+= proc-v6.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V7)		+= proc-v7.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V7)		+= proc-v7.o proc-v7-bugs.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V7M)		+= proc-v7m.o
 
 AFLAGS_proc-v6.o	:=-Wa,-march=armv6
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c new file +36 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e46557db6446
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+
+static __maybe_unused void cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(bool *warned,
+						  u32 mask, const char *msg)
+{
+	u32 aux_cr;
+
+	asm("mrc p15, 0, %0, c1, c0, 1" : "=r" (aux_cr));
+
+	if ((aux_cr & mask) != mask) {
+		if (!*warned)
+			pr_err("CPU%u: %s", smp_processor_id(), msg);
+		*warned = true;
+	}
+}
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, spectre_warned);
+
+static void check_spectre_auxcr(bool *warned, u32 bit)
+{
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) &&
+		cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(warned, bit,
+				       "Spectre v2: firmware did not set auxiliary control register IBE bit, system vulnerable\n");
+}
+
+void cpu_v7_ca8_ibe(void)
+{
+	check_spectre_auxcr(this_cpu_ptr(&spectre_warned), BIT(6));
+}
+
+void cpu_v7_ca15_ibe(void)
+{
+	check_spectre_auxcr(this_cpu_ptr(&spectre_warned), BIT(0));
+}
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S +2 -2
index bf632d76d392..4e4f794f17ce 100644
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ __v7_setup_stack:
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_do_suspend,	cpu_v7_do_suspend
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_do_resume,	cpu_v7_do_resume
 #endif
-	define_processor_functions ca8, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
+	define_processor_functions ca8, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1, bugs=cpu_v7_ca8_ibe
 
 	@ Cortex-A9 - needs more registers preserved across suspend/resume
 	@ and bpiall switch_mm for hardening
@@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ __v7_setup_stack:
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca15_suspend_size,	cpu_v7_suspend_size
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca15_do_suspend,	cpu_v7_do_suspend
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca15_do_resume,	cpu_v7_do_resume
-	define_processor_functions ca15, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
+	define_processor_functions ca15, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1, bugs=cpu_v7_ca15_ibe
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_PJ4B
 	define_processor_functions pj4b, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
 #endif
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
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#8 lore raw

PATCH v2 8/24 ARM: spectre-v2: harden user aborts in kernel space

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit f5fe12b1eaee220ce62ff9afb8b90929c396595f upstream.

In order to prevent aliasing attacks on the branch predictor, invalidate the BTB or instruction cache on CPUs that are known to be affected when taking an abort on a address that is outside of a user task limit:

Cortex A8, A9, A12, A17, A73, A75: flush BTB.
Cortex A15, Brahma B15: invalidate icache.

If the IBE bit is not set, then there is little point to enabling the workaround.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h        |  3 ++
 arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h | 15 ++++++
 arch/arm/mm/fault.c                |  3 ++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c         | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S              |  8 ++--
 5 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h +3 -0
index dbdbce1b3a72..b74b174ac9fc 100644
@@ -64,6 +64,9 @@
 #define __write_sysreg(v, r, w, c, t)	asm volatile(w " " c : : "r" ((t)(v)))
 #define write_sysreg(v, ...)		__write_sysreg(v, __VA_ARGS__)
 
+#define BPIALL				__ACCESS_CP15(c7, 0, c5, 6)
+#define ICIALLU				__ACCESS_CP15(c7, 0, c5, 0)
+
 extern unsigned long cr_alignment;	/* defined in entry-armv.S */
 
 static inline unsigned long get_cr(void)
arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h +15 -0
index a3d61ad984af..1fed41440af9 100644
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <linux/irqflags.h>
 #include <linux/reboot.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
 
 extern void cpu_init(void);
 
@@ -14,6 +15,20 @@ void soft_restart(unsigned long);
 extern void (*arm_pm_restart)(enum reboot_mode reboot_mode, const char *cmd);
 extern void (*arm_pm_idle)(void);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+typedef void (*harden_branch_predictor_fn_t)(void);
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(harden_branch_predictor_fn_t, harden_branch_predictor_fn);
+static inline void harden_branch_predictor(void)
+{
+	harden_branch_predictor_fn_t fn = per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn,
+						  smp_processor_id());
+	if (fn)
+		fn();
+}
+#else
+#define harden_branch_predictor() do { } while (0)
+#endif
+
 #define UDBG_UNDEFINED	(1 << 0)
 #define UDBG_SYSCALL	(1 << 1)
 #define UDBG_BADABORT	(1 << 2)
arch/arm/mm/fault.c +3 -0
index f7861dc83182..5ca207ada852 100644
@@ -163,6 +163,9 @@ __do_user_fault(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr,
 {
 	struct siginfo si;
 
+	if (addr > TASK_SIZE)
+		harden_branch_predictor();
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_USER
 	if (((user_debug & UDBG_SEGV) && (sig == SIGSEGV)) ||
 	    ((user_debug & UDBG_BUS)  && (sig == SIGBUS))) {
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c +68 -5

99 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S +5 -3
index 4e4f794f17ce..2d2e5ae85816 100644
@@ -527,8 +527,10 @@ __v7_setup_stack:
 
 	__INITDATA
 
+	.weak cpu_v7_bugs_init
+
 	@ define struct processor (see <asm/proc-fns.h> and proc-macros.S)
-	define_processor_functions v7, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
+	define_processor_functions v7, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1, bugs=cpu_v7_bugs_init
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 	@ generic v7 bpiall on context switch
@@ -543,7 +545,7 @@ __v7_setup_stack:
 	globl_equ	cpu_v7_bpiall_do_suspend,	cpu_v7_do_suspend
 	globl_equ	cpu_v7_bpiall_do_resume,	cpu_v7_do_resume
 #endif
-	define_processor_functions v7_bpiall, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
+	define_processor_functions v7_bpiall, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1, bugs=cpu_v7_bugs_init
 
 #define HARDENED_BPIALL_PROCESSOR_FUNCTIONS v7_bpiall_processor_functions
 #else
@@ -579,7 +581,7 @@ __v7_setup_stack:
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_switch_mm,	cpu_v7_switch_mm
 #endif
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_set_pte_ext,	cpu_v7_set_pte_ext
-	define_processor_functions ca9mp, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
+	define_processor_functions ca9mp, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1, bugs=cpu_v7_bugs_init
 #endif
 
 	@ Cortex-A15 - needs iciallu switch_mm for hardening
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#9 lore raw

PATCH v2 9/24 ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit 10115105cb3aa17b5da1cb726ae8dd5f6854bd93 upstream. Commit 6282e916f774e37845c65d1eae9f8c649004f033 upstream.

Add firmware based hardening for cores that require more complex handling in firmware.

---
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S      | 21 +++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 81 insertions(+)
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c +60 -0
index 85a2e3d6263c..da25a38e1897 100644
@@ -1,14 +1,20 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/psci.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 
 #include <asm/cp15.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
+#include <asm/proc-fns.h>
 #include <asm/system_misc.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 DEFINE_PER_CPU(harden_branch_predictor_fn_t, harden_branch_predictor_fn);
 
+extern void cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
+extern void cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
+
 static void harden_branch_predictor_bpiall(void)
 {
 	write_sysreg(0, BPIALL);
@@ -19,6 +25,16 @@ static void harden_branch_predictor_iciallu(void)
 	write_sysreg(0, ICIALLU);
 }
 
+static void __maybe_unused call_smc_arch_workaround_1(void)
+{
+	arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
+}
+
+static void __maybe_unused call_hvc_arch_workaround_1(void)
+{
+	arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
+}
+
 static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
 {
 	const char *spectre_v2_method = NULL;
@@ -45,7 +61,51 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
 			harden_branch_predictor_iciallu;
 		spectre_v2_method = "ICIALLU";
 		break;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
+	default:
+		/* Other ARM CPUs require no workaround */
+		if (read_cpuid_implementor() == ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM)
+			break;
+		/* fallthrough */
+		/* Cortex A57/A72 require firmware workaround */
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72: {
+		struct arm_smccc_res res;
+
+		if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0)
+			break;
+
+		switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
+		case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
+			arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
+					  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
+			if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
+				break;
+			per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
+				call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
+			processor.switch_mm = cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm;
+			spectre_v2_method = "hypervisor";
+			break;
+
+		case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC:
+			arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
+					  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
+			if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
+				break;
+			per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
+				call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
+			processor.switch_mm = cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm;
+			spectre_v2_method = "firmware";
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
 	}
+#endif
+	}
+
 	if (spectre_v2_method)
 		pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre v2: using %s workaround\n",
 			smp_processor_id(), spectre_v2_method);
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S +21 -0
index 2d2e5ae85816..850c22bca19c 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
  *
  *  This is the "shell" of the ARMv7 processor support.
  */
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/assembler.h>
@@ -88,6 +89,26 @@ ENTRY(cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area)
 	ret	lr
 ENDPROC(cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area)
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
+	.arch_extension sec
+ENTRY(cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm)
+	stmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
+	movw	r0, #:lower16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	movt	r0, #:upper16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	smc	#0
+	ldmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
+	b	cpu_v7_switch_mm
+ENDPROC(cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm)
+	.arch_extension virt
+ENTRY(cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm)
+	stmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
+	movw	r0, #:lower16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	movt	r0, #:upper16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	hvc	#0
+	ldmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
+	b	cpu_v7_switch_mm
+ENDPROC(cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm)
+#endif
 ENTRY(cpu_v7_iciallu_switch_mm)
 	mov	r3, #0
 	mcr	p15, 0, r3, c7, c5, 0		@ ICIALLU
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

Marc,

Can you please ack this to say that you are now happy with it after your comments on version 1, so we can move forward and have Greg merge it.

Thanks.

Quoted 154 lines · David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit 10115105cb3aa17b5da1cb726ae8dd5f6854bd93 upstream. Commit 6282e916f774e37845c65d1eae9f8c649004f033 upstream.

Add firmware based hardening for cores that require more complex handling in firmware.

---
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S      | 21 +++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 81 insertions(+)
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c +60 -0
index 85a2e3d6263c..da25a38e1897 100644
@@ -1,14 +1,20 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/psci.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 
 #include <asm/cp15.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
+#include <asm/proc-fns.h>
 #include <asm/system_misc.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 DEFINE_PER_CPU(harden_branch_predictor_fn_t, harden_branch_predictor_fn);
 
+extern void cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
+extern void cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
+
 static void harden_branch_predictor_bpiall(void)
 {
 	write_sysreg(0, BPIALL);
@@ -19,6 +25,16 @@ static void harden_branch_predictor_iciallu(void)
 	write_sysreg(0, ICIALLU);
 }
 
+static void __maybe_unused call_smc_arch_workaround_1(void)
+{
+	arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
+}
+
+static void __maybe_unused call_hvc_arch_workaround_1(void)
+{
+	arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
+}
+
 static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
 {
 	const char *spectre_v2_method = NULL;
@@ -45,7 +61,51 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
 			harden_branch_predictor_iciallu;
 		spectre_v2_method = "ICIALLU";
 		break;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
+	default:
+		/* Other ARM CPUs require no workaround */
+		if (read_cpuid_implementor() == ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM)
+			break;
+		/* fallthrough */
+		/* Cortex A57/A72 require firmware workaround */
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72: {
+		struct arm_smccc_res res;
+
+		if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0)
+			break;
+
+		switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
+		case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
+			arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
+					  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
+			if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
+				break;
+			per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
+				call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
+			processor.switch_mm = cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm;
+			spectre_v2_method = "hypervisor";
+			break;
+
+		case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC:
+			arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
+					  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
+			if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
+				break;
+			per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
+				call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
+			processor.switch_mm = cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm;
+			spectre_v2_method = "firmware";
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
 	}
+#endif
+	}
+
 	if (spectre_v2_method)
 		pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre v2: using %s workaround\n",
 			smp_processor_id(), spectre_v2_method);
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S +21 -0
index 2d2e5ae85816..850c22bca19c 100644
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
  *
  *  This is the "shell" of the ARMv7 processor support.
  */
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/assembler.h>
@@ -88,6 +89,26 @@ ENTRY(cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area)
 	ret	lr
 ENDPROC(cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area)
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
+	.arch_extension sec
+ENTRY(cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm)
+	stmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
+	movw	r0, #:lower16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	movt	r0, #:upper16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	smc	#0
+	ldmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
+	b	cpu_v7_switch_mm
+ENDPROC(cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm)
+	.arch_extension virt
+ENTRY(cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm)
+	stmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
+	movw	r0, #:lower16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	movt	r0, #:upper16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	hvc	#0
+	ldmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
+	b	cpu_v7_switch_mm
+ENDPROC(cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm)
+#endif
 ENTRY(cpu_v7_iciallu_switch_mm)
 	mov	r3, #0
 	mcr	p15, 0, r3, c7, c5, 0		@ ICIALLU
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Signature · 3 lines
RMK's Patch system: http://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/
FTTC broadband for 0.8mile line in suburbia: sync at 12.1Mbps down 622kbps up
According to speedtest.net: 11.9Mbps down 500kbps up
Acked-by
#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

Russell,

Quoted 23 lines · Russell King - ARM Linux

Marc,

Can you please ack this to say that you are now happy with it after your comments on version 1, so we can move forward and have Greg merge it.

Thanks.

Quoted 13 lines · David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit 10115105cb3aa17b5da1cb726ae8dd5f6854bd93 upstream. Commit 6282e916f774e37845c65d1eae9f8c649004f033 upstream.

Add firmware based hardening for cores that require more complex handling in firmware.

Sure. Feel free to add my

I assume someone has tested these patches (I haven't, and I'm unlikely to do so in the near future as I'm travelling). I'm not sure Tony's "Boot-tested-by" is still valid, and Florian's earlier set of tests didn't show the issues of the initial backport.

Thanks,

	M.
Signature · 1 line
Jazz is not dead, it just smell funny.
author
#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

Quoted 32 lines · Marc Zyngier

Russell,

Quoted 23 lines · Russell King - ARM Linux

Marc,

Can you please ack this to say that you are now happy with it after your comments on version 1, so we can move forward and have Greg merge it.

Thanks.

Quoted 13 lines · David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit 10115105cb3aa17b5da1cb726ae8dd5f6854bd93 upstream. Commit 6282e916f774e37845c65d1eae9f8c649004f033 upstream.

Add firmware based hardening for cores that require more complex handling in firmware.

Sure. Feel free to add my

Quoted 9 lines

I assume someone has tested these patches (I haven't, and I'm unlikely to do so in the near future as I'm travelling). I'm not sure Tony's "Boot-tested-by" is still valid, and Florian's earlier set of tests didn't show the issues of the initial backport.

Thanks,

	M.

I tested the patch set through kernelci and (belatedly) kvm-unit-tests, the latter of which revealed the problem in V1 #11/24. I have to assume Florian didn't specifically test kvm, something I myself had originally assumed would be covered by kernelci.

I didn't scrub any of the ack/tested/reviewed lines from the original patches. I've always assumed this is the correct way to do this but maybe it's not?

-dl

#13 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

Quoted 44 lines · David Long
Quoted 32 lines · Marc Zyngier

Russell,

Quoted 23 lines · Russell King - ARM Linux

Marc,

Can you please ack this to say that you are now happy with it after your comments on version 1, so we can move forward and have Greg merge it.

Thanks.

Quoted 13 lines · David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit 10115105cb3aa17b5da1cb726ae8dd5f6854bd93 upstream. Commit 6282e916f774e37845c65d1eae9f8c649004f033 upstream.

Add firmware based hardening for cores that require more complex handling in firmware.

Sure. Feel free to add my

Quoted 9 lines

I assume someone has tested these patches (I haven't, and I'm unlikely to do so in the near future as I'm travelling). I'm not sure Tony's "Boot-tested-by" is still valid, and Florian's earlier set of tests didn't show the issues of the initial backport.

Thanks,

	M.
Quoted 8 lines

I tested the patch set through kernelci and (belatedly) kvm-unit-tests, the latter of which revealed the problem in V1 #11/24. I have to assume Florian didn't specifically test kvm, something I myself had originally assumed would be covered by kernelci.

I didn't scrub any of the ack/tested/reviewed lines from the original patches. I've always assumed this is the correct way to do this but maybe it's not?

Leaving the tags is absolutely fine, they indicate that the original patch was actually tested.

I'm more worried of potential regressions: we've already found two problems, and although I cannot spot any other, it is fairly obvious that there has only been a limited amount of testing. It may not be a problem, but I'd rather be cautious.

Thanks,

	M.
Signature · 1 line
Jazz is not dead, it just smell funny.
#14 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

Quoted 55 lines · Marc Zyngier
Quoted 44 lines · David Long
Quoted 32 lines · Marc Zyngier

Russell,

Quoted 23 lines · Russell King - ARM Linux

Marc,

Can you please ack this to say that you are now happy with it after your comments on version 1, so we can move forward and have Greg merge it.

Thanks.

Quoted 13 lines · David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit 10115105cb3aa17b5da1cb726ae8dd5f6854bd93 upstream. Commit 6282e916f774e37845c65d1eae9f8c649004f033 upstream.

Add firmware based hardening for cores that require more complex handling in firmware.

Sure. Feel free to add my

Quoted 9 lines

I assume someone has tested these patches (I haven't, and I'm unlikely to do so in the near future as I'm travelling). I'm not sure Tony's "Boot-tested-by" is still valid, and Florian's earlier set of tests didn't show the issues of the initial backport.

Thanks,

	M.
Quoted 8 lines

I tested the patch set through kernelci and (belatedly) kvm-unit-tests, the latter of which revealed the problem in V1 #11/24. I have to assume Florian didn't specifically test kvm, something I myself had originally assumed would be covered by kernelci.

I didn't scrub any of the ack/tested/reviewed lines from the original patches. I've always assumed this is the correct way to do this but maybe it's not?

Quoted 7 lines

Leaving the tags is absolutely fine, they indicate that the original patch was actually tested.

I'm more worried of potential regressions: we've already found two problems, and although I cannot spot any other, it is fairly obvious that there has only been a limited amount of testing. It may not be a problem, but I'd rather be cautious.

The biggest problem is getting people to actually test the damn patches, and not relying on the autobuilders/autobooters to do the work for you. The autobooters are hopeless when it comes to identifying problems (as I've now said multiple times since the regressions were first spotted.)

I'm of the opinion that the autobooters actually give _misleading_ results, and have been doing every since they were setup.

They claim that a platform which boots to a shell prompt, but which the kernel log contains a stack trace is a "pass" result. When you receive an email that says that nothing failed, you don't bother going to (eg) kernelci to read the boot logs, you assume there's no problem. So the failures (eg, due to WARN_ON() or worse, an oops that doesn't prevent reaching a shell prompt) will go unnoticed.

That's exactly what has happened with the big.Little changes.

The ENDPROC() issue is much harder, none of the autobooters cover the case of running a kernel under KVM afaik. So that path never gets executed - it's worse than that, because even if we _did_ have that, we need to have both an ARM kernel and Thumb2 kernel exercised. We really can't rely on "eyes" spotting it, because as has been shown many times, we have lots of cases where things get missed in review. The claim that "open source is better because you have many eyes looking at the source" seems to be provably false.

The same goes for the mess up in vfp_preserve_user_clear_hwstate(), no one spotted that either, and it was only when some other compiler issued a warning that it was found.

We keep asking people to test, but I don't think it does any good in the long run other than delaying patches. Unfortunately, the point at which people notice problems is only _after_ the patches have been merged into mainline and they are effectively forced via that method to test the merged result. Again, there's plenty of evidence to this.

For example, I've been posting asking people to test the big.Little Spectre patches that caused problems last time around. I get the impression I'm completely wasting my time, because I'm getting zero replies on that, not even from the individual who reported the problem last time around.

I might as well have merged the patches last week and get it over with, rather than delaying them until Friday. At least we'll find any problems quicker that way, because, as I've said above, it _forces_ people to test.

I'm afraid that our "ask people to test" model just doesn't work anymore now that we have autobuilders - I guess people end up thinking that the autobuilders will do the work for them... :(

In summary, what I'm saying is that getting patches tested so we can have confidence that they are correct is damn hard to nigh on impossible.

Signature · 3 lines
RMK's Patch system: http://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/
FTTC broadband for 0.8mile line in suburbia: sync at 12.1Mbps down 622kbps up
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#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

In reply to Marc Zyngier
Quoted 4 lines · Marc Zyngier

I assume someone has tested these patches (I haven't, and I'm unlikely to do so in the near future as I'm travelling). I'm not sure Tony's "Boot-tested-by" is still valid, and Florian's earlier set of tests didn't show the issues of the initial backport.

To make the "Boot-tested-by" tags still valid, I just applied this whole series on v4.19.136 and gave it a quick boot test on my boards between C-A8 to C-A15 and they still boot just fine with this series and show the spectre workaround status on dmesg.

Thanks,

Tony

#16 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

In reply to Marc Zyngier
Quoted 28 lines · Marc Zyngier

Russell,

Quoted 23 lines · Russell King - ARM Linux

Marc,

Can you please ack this to say that you are now happy with it after your comments on version 1, so we can move forward and have Greg merge it.

Thanks.

Quoted 13 lines · David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit 10115105cb3aa17b5da1cb726ae8dd5f6854bd93 upstream. Commit 6282e916f774e37845c65d1eae9f8c649004f033 upstream.

Add firmware based hardening for cores that require more complex handling in firmware.

Quoted 8 lines

Sure. Feel free to add my

I assume someone has tested these patches (I haven't, and I'm unlikely to do so in the near future as I'm travelling). I'm not sure Tony's "Boot-tested-by" is still valid, and Florian's earlier set of tests didn't show the issues of the initial backport.

Correct, I was not testing any KVM path at all, which is why this did not show up as a problem for me, I am not really well equipped to perform KVM testing at the moment.

Signature · 1 line
Florian
#17 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

All,

It is now almost two weeks since David posted the patches, and a week since the last message in this thread.

What is happening with these patches? What about the 4.4-stable backport as well? Does anyone care about these anymore? Do we have any product customers using 32-bit Cortex CPUs anymore?

David - FYI - everything in my Spectre branch is now in mainline as of 4.20-rc3, and I have nothing further planned for core 32-bit ARM Spectre workarounds.

Quoted 43 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 28 lines · Marc Zyngier

Russell,

Quoted 23 lines · Russell King - ARM Linux

Marc,

Can you please ack this to say that you are now happy with it after your comments on version 1, so we can move forward and have Greg merge it.

Thanks.

Quoted 13 lines · David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit 10115105cb3aa17b5da1cb726ae8dd5f6854bd93 upstream. Commit 6282e916f774e37845c65d1eae9f8c649004f033 upstream.

Add firmware based hardening for cores that require more complex handling in firmware.

Quoted 8 lines

Sure. Feel free to add my

I assume someone has tested these patches (I haven't, and I'm unlikely to do so in the near future as I'm travelling). I'm not sure Tony's "Boot-tested-by" is still valid, and Florian's earlier set of tests didn't show the issues of the initial backport.

Correct, I was not testing any KVM path at all, which is why this did not show up as a problem for me, I am not really well equipped to perform KVM testing at the moment.

Signature · 1 line
Florian
Signature · 3 lines
RMK's Patch system: http://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/
FTTC broadband for 0.8mile line in suburbia: sync at 12.1Mbps down 622kbps up
According to speedtest.net: 11.9Mbps down 500kbps up
maintainer
#18 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

Quoted 8 lines · Russell King - ARM Linux

All,

It is now almost two weeks since David posted the patches, and a week since the last message in this thread.

What is happening with these patches? What about the 4.4-stable backport as well? Does anyone care about these anymore? Do we have any product customers using 32-bit Cortex CPUs anymore?

I can queue these 4.9 patches up after this next release, I was waiting to see if anyone else had any comments on them.

thanks,

greg k-h

author
#19 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

Quoted 10 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 8 lines · Russell King - ARM Linux

All,

It is now almost two weeks since David posted the patches, and a week since the last message in this thread.

What is happening with these patches? What about the 4.4-stable backport as well? Does anyone care about these anymore? Do we have any product customers using 32-bit Cortex CPUs anymore?

Quoted 7 lines

I can queue these 4.9 patches up after this next release, I was waiting to see if anyone else had any comments on them.

thanks,

greg k-h

FWIW I have since run kvm-unit-tests again, this time with a thumb-2 host kernel. It looked OK to me.

-dl

#20 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

Quoted 14 lines · David Long
Quoted 13 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 8 lines · Russell King - ARM Linux

All,

It is now almost two weeks since David posted the patches, and a week since the last message in this thread.

What is happening with these patches? What about the 4.4-stable backport as well? Does anyone care about these anymore? Do we have any product customers using 32-bit Cortex CPUs anymore?

I can queue these 4.9 patches up after this next release, I was waiting to see if anyone else had any comments on them.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

thanks,

greg k-h

FWIW I have since run kvm-unit-tests again, this time with a thumb-2 host kernel. It looked OK to me.

The issue previously reported wasn't with a Thumb-2 host, but with a Thumb-2 *guest*. I've since verified that this particular case was correctly working.

	M.
Signature · 1 line
Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny...
author
#21 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

In reply to Russell King - ARM Linux
Quoted 8 lines · Russell King - ARM Linux

All,

It is now almost two weeks since David posted the patches, and a week since the last message in this thread.

What is happening with these patches? What about the 4.4-stable backport as well? Does anyone care about these anymore? Do we have any product customers using 32-bit Cortex CPUs anymore?

Please note that the v4.4 patches I sent out do not include the kvm changes from the original patch set, therefore they were never affected by either of the two issues we've been discussing. The kvm-unit-tests for v4.4 look OK, with or without a thumb-2 host kernel.

Quoted 50 lines

David - FYI - everything in my Spectre branch is now in mainline as of 4.20-rc3, and I have nothing further planned for core 32-bit ARM Spectre workarounds.

Quoted 43 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 28 lines · Marc Zyngier

Russell,

Quoted 23 lines · Russell King - ARM Linux

Marc,

Can you please ack this to say that you are now happy with it after your comments on version 1, so we can move forward and have Greg merge it.

Thanks.

Quoted 13 lines · David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit 10115105cb3aa17b5da1cb726ae8dd5f6854bd93 upstream. Commit 6282e916f774e37845c65d1eae9f8c649004f033 upstream.

Add firmware based hardening for cores that require more complex handling in firmware.

Quoted 8 lines

Sure. Feel free to add my

I assume someone has tested these patches (I haven't, and I'm unlikely to do so in the near future as I'm travelling). I'm not sure Tony's "Boot-tested-by" is still valid, and Florian's earlier set of tests didn't show the issues of the initial backport.

Correct, I was not testing any KVM path at all, which is why this did not show up as a problem for me, I am not really well equipped to perform KVM testing at the moment.

Signature · 1 line
Florian

-dl

author
#22 lore raw

PATCH v2 10/24 ARM: spectre-v2: warn about incorrect context switching functions

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit c44f366ea7c85e1be27d08f2f0880f4120698125 upstream.

Warn at error level if the context switching function is not what we are expecting. This can happen with big.Little systems, which we currently do not support.

---
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c +15 -0
index da25a38e1897..5544b82a2e7a 100644
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 DEFINE_PER_CPU(harden_branch_predictor_fn_t, harden_branch_predictor_fn);
 
+extern void cpu_v7_iciallu_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
+extern void cpu_v7_bpiall_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
 extern void cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
 extern void cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
 
@@ -50,6 +52,8 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17:
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73:
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75:
+		if (processor.switch_mm != cpu_v7_bpiall_switch_mm)
+			goto bl_error;
 		per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
 			harden_branch_predictor_bpiall;
 		spectre_v2_method = "BPIALL";
@@ -57,6 +61,8 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
 
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15:
+		if (processor.switch_mm != cpu_v7_iciallu_switch_mm)
+			goto bl_error;
 		per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
 			harden_branch_predictor_iciallu;
 		spectre_v2_method = "ICIALLU";
@@ -82,6 +88,8 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
 					  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
 			if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
 				break;
+			if (processor.switch_mm != cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm && cpu)
+				goto bl_error;
 			per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
 				call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
 			processor.switch_mm = cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm;
@@ -93,6 +101,8 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
 					  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
 			if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
 				break;
+			if (processor.switch_mm != cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm && cpu)
+				goto bl_error;
 			per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
 				call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
 			processor.switch_mm = cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm;
@@ -109,6 +119,11 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
 	if (spectre_v2_method)
 		pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre v2: using %s workaround\n",
 			smp_processor_id(), spectre_v2_method);
+	return;
+
+bl_error:
+	pr_err("CPU%u: Spectre v2: incorrect context switching function, system vulnerable\n",
+		cpu);
 }
 #else
 static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#23 lore raw

PATCH v2 11/24 ARM: KVM: invalidate BTB on guest exit for Cortex-A12/A17

In reply to David Long

From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>

Commit 3f7e8e2e1ebda787f156ce46e3f0a9ce2833fa4f upstream.

In order to avoid aliasing attacks against the branch predictor, let's invalidate the BTB on guest exit. This is made complicated by the fact that we cannot take a branch before invalidating the BTB.

We only apply this to A12 and A17, which are the only two ARM cores on which this useful.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_asm.h |  2 -
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 17 +++++++-
 arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S   | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_asm.h +0 -2
index 8ef05381984b..24f3ec7c9fbe 100644
@@ -61,8 +61,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu;
 extern char __kvm_hyp_init[];
 extern char __kvm_hyp_init_end[];
 
-extern char __kvm_hyp_vector[];
-
 extern void __kvm_flush_vm_context(void);
 extern void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_ipa(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t ipa);
 extern void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid(struct kvm *kvm);
arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h +16 -1
index e2f05cedaf97..625edef2a54f 100644
@@ -248,7 +248,22 @@ static inline int kvm_read_guest_lock(struct kvm *kvm,
 
 static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
 {
-	return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector);
+	switch(read_cpuid_part()) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17:
+	{
+		extern char __kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv[];
+		return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv);
+	}
+
+#endif
+	default:
+	{
+		extern char __kvm_hyp_vector[];
+		return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector);
+	}
+	}
 }
 
 static inline int kvm_map_vectors(void)
arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +69 -2

89 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#24 lore raw

PATCH v2 12/24 ARM: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Cortex-A15

In reply to David Long

From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>

Commit 0c47ac8cd157727e7a532d665d6fb1b5fd333977 upstream.

In order to avoid aliasing attacks against the branch predictor on Cortex-A15, let's invalidate the BTB on guest exit, which can only be done by invalidating the icache (with ACTLR[0] being set).

We use the same hack as for A12/A17 to perform the vector decoding.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h |  5 +++++
 arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S   | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h +5 -0
index 625edef2a54f..3ad2c44f4137 100644
@@ -257,6 +257,11 @@ static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
 		return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv);
 	}
 
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
+	{
+		extern char __kvm_hyp_vector_ic_inv[];
+		return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector_ic_inv);
+	}
 #endif
 	default:
 	{
arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +24 -0
index 58ec002721a1..1bdd03014138 100644
@@ -72,6 +72,28 @@ __kvm_hyp_vector:
 	W(b)	hyp_fiq
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	.align 5
+__kvm_hyp_vector_ic_inv:
+	.global __kvm_hyp_vector_ic_inv
+
+	/*
+	 * We encode the exception entry in the bottom 3 bits of
+	 * SP, and we have to guarantee to be 8 bytes aligned.
+	 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Reset 	  7 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Undef	  6 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Syscall	  5 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Prefetch abort 4 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Data abort	  3 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* HVC		  2 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* IRQ		  1 */
+	W(nop)			/* FIQ		  0 */
+
+	mcr	p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 0	/* ICIALLU */
+	isb
+
+	b	decode_vectors
+
 	.align 5
 __kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv:
 	.global __kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv
@@ -92,6 +114,8 @@ __kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv:
 	mcr	p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 6	/* BPIALL */
 	isb
 
+decode_vectors:
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL
 	/*
 	 * Yet another silly hack: Use VPIDR as a temp register.
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#25 lore raw

PATCH v2 13/24 ARM: spectre-v2: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Brahma B15

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit 3c908e16396d130608e831b7fac4b167a2ede6ba upstream.

Include Brahma B15 in the Spectre v2 KVM workarounds.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h +1 -0
index 3ad2c44f4137..d26395754b56 100644
@@ -257,6 +257,7 @@ static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
 		return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv);
 	}
 
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15:
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
 	{
 		extern char __kvm_hyp_vector_ic_inv[];
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#26 lore raw

PATCH v2 14/24 ARM: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit b800acfc70d9fb81fbd6df70f2cf5e20f70023d0 upstream.

We want SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 to be fast. As fast as possible. So let's intercept it as early as we can by testing for the function call number as soon as we've identified a HVC call coming from the guest.

---
 arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +16 -1
index 1bdd03014138..64d4a39f4b4b 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
  * Foundation, 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA  02110-1301, USA.
  */
 
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_arm.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
@@ -202,7 +203,7 @@ hyp_hvc:
 	lsr     r2, r2, #16
 	and     r2, r2, #0xff
 	cmp     r2, #0
-	bne	guest_trap		@ Guest called HVC
+	bne	guest_hvc_trap		@ Guest called HVC
 
 	/*
 	 * Getting here means host called HVC, we shift parameters and branch
@@ -235,6 +236,20 @@ THUMB(	orr	lr, #1)
 	pop	{r2, lr}
 1:	eret
 
+guest_hvc_trap:
+	movw	r2, #:lower16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	movt	r2, #:upper16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	ldr	r0, [sp]		@ Guest's r0
+	teq	r0, r2
+	bne	guest_trap
+	add	sp, sp, #12
+	@ Returns:
+	@ r0 = 0
+	@ r1 = HSR value (perfectly predictable)
+	@ r2 = ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	mov	r0, #0
+	eret
+
 guest_trap:
 	load_vcpu r0			@ Load VCPU pointer to r0
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#27 lore raw

PATCH v2 15/24 ARM: KVM: report support for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit add5609877c6785cc002c6ed7e008b1d61064439 upstream.

Report support for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 to KVM guests for affected CPUs.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h +12 -2
index 0833d8a1dbbb..2fda7e905754 100644
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/kvm_types.h>
+#include <asm/cputype.h>
 #include <asm/kvm.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_mmio.h>
@@ -323,8 +324,17 @@ static inline int kvm_arm_vcpu_arch_has_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 
 static inline bool kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor(void)
 {
-	/* No way to detect it yet, pretend it is not there. */
-	return false;
+	switch(read_cpuid_part()) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17:
+		return true;
+#endif
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
 }
 
 #define KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN		-1
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#28 lore raw

PATCH v2 16/24 ARM: spectre-v1: add speculation barrier (csdb) macros

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit a78d156587931a2c3b354534aa772febf6c9e855 upstream.

Add assembly and C macros for the new CSDB instruction.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h |  8 ++++++++
 arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h   | 13 +++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h +8 -0
index 3aed4492c9a7..189f3b42baea 100644
@@ -445,6 +445,14 @@ THUMB(	orr	\reg , \reg , #PSR_T_BIT	)
 	.size \name , . - \name
 	.endm
 
+	.macro	csdb
+#ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL
+	.inst.w	0xf3af8014
+#else
+	.inst	0xe320f014
+#endif
+	.endm
+
 	.macro check_uaccess, addr:req, size:req, limit:req, tmp:req, bad:req
 #ifndef CONFIG_CPU_USE_DOMAINS
 	adds	\tmp, \addr, #\size - 1
arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h +13 -0
index f5d698182d50..6f00dac6ad8e 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,12 @@
 #define isb(option) __asm__ __volatile__ ("isb " #option : : : "memory")
 #define dsb(option) __asm__ __volatile__ ("dsb " #option : : : "memory")
 #define dmb(option) __asm__ __volatile__ ("dmb " #option : : : "memory")
+#ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL
+#define CSDB	".inst.w 0xf3af8014"
+#else
+#define CSDB	".inst	0xe320f014"
+#endif
+#define csdb() __asm__ __volatile__(CSDB : : : "memory")
 #elif defined(CONFIG_CPU_XSC3) || __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ == 6
 #define isb(x) __asm__ __volatile__ ("mcr p15, 0, %0, c7, c5, 4" \
 				    : : "r" (0) : "memory")
@@ -36,6 +42,13 @@
 #define dmb(x) __asm__ __volatile__ ("" : : : "memory")
 #endif
 
+#ifndef CSDB
+#define CSDB
+#endif
+#ifndef csdb
+#define csdb()
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_HEAVY_MB
 extern void (*soc_mb)(void);
 extern void arm_heavy_mb(void);
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#29 lore raw

PATCH v2 17/24 ARM: spectre-v1: add array_index_mask_nospec() implementation

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit 1d4238c56f9816ce0f9c8dbe42d7f2ad81cb6613 upstream.

Add an implementation of the array_index_mask_nospec() function for mitigating Spectre variant 1 throughout the kernel.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h +19 -0
index 6f00dac6ad8e..513e03d138ea 100644
@@ -75,6 +75,25 @@ extern void arm_heavy_mb(void);
 #define __smp_rmb()	__smp_mb()
 #define __smp_wmb()	dmb(ishst)
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long idx,
+						    unsigned long sz)
+{
+	unsigned long mask;
+
+	asm volatile(
+		"cmp	%1, %2\n"
+	"	sbc	%0, %1, %1\n"
+	CSDB
+	: "=r" (mask)
+	: "r" (idx), "Ir" (sz)
+	: "cc");
+
+	return mask;
+}
+#define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec
+#endif
+
 #include <asm-generic/barrier.h>
 
 #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#30 lore raw

PATCH v2 18/24 ARM: spectre-v1: fix syscall entry

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit 10573ae547c85b2c61417ff1a106cffbfceada35 upstream.

Prevent speculation at the syscall table decoding by clamping the index used to zero on invalid system call numbers, and using the csdb speculative barrier.

---
 arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S | 18 +++++++-----------
 arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S +7 -11
index 10c3283d6c19..56be67ecf0fa 100644
@@ -223,9 +223,7 @@ local_restart:
 	tst	r10, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK		@ are we tracing syscalls?
 	bne	__sys_trace
 
-	cmp	scno, #NR_syscalls		@ check upper syscall limit
-	badr	lr, ret_fast_syscall		@ return address
-	ldrcc	pc, [tbl, scno, lsl #2]		@ call sys_* routine
+	invoke_syscall tbl, scno, r10, ret_fast_syscall
 
 	add	r1, sp, #S_OFF
 2:	cmp	scno, #(__ARM_NR_BASE - __NR_SYSCALL_BASE)
@@ -258,14 +256,8 @@ __sys_trace:
 	mov	r1, scno
 	add	r0, sp, #S_OFF
 	bl	syscall_trace_enter
-
-	badr	lr, __sys_trace_return		@ return address
-	mov	scno, r0			@ syscall number (possibly new)
-	add	r1, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF		@ pointer to regs
-	cmp	scno, #NR_syscalls		@ check upper syscall limit
-	ldmccia	r1, {r0 - r6}			@ have to reload r0 - r6
-	stmccia	sp, {r4, r5}			@ and update the stack args
-	ldrcc	pc, [tbl, scno, lsl #2]		@ call sys_* routine
+	mov	scno, r0
+	invoke_syscall tbl, scno, r10, __sys_trace_return, reload=1
 	cmp	scno, #-1			@ skip the syscall?
 	bne	2b
 	add	sp, sp, #S_OFF			@ restore stack
@@ -317,6 +309,10 @@ sys_syscall:
 		bic	scno, r0, #__NR_OABI_SYSCALL_BASE
 		cmp	scno, #__NR_syscall - __NR_SYSCALL_BASE
 		cmpne	scno, #NR_syscalls	@ check range
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+		movhs	scno, #0
+		csdb
+#endif
 		stmloia	sp, {r5, r6}		@ shuffle args
 		movlo	r0, r1
 		movlo	r1, r2
arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S +25 -0
index e056c9a9aa9d..fa7c6e5c17e7 100644
@@ -377,6 +377,31 @@
 #endif
 	.endm
 
+	.macro	invoke_syscall, table, nr, tmp, ret, reload=0
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+	mov	\tmp, \nr
+	cmp	\tmp, #NR_syscalls		@ check upper syscall limit
+	movcs	\tmp, #0
+	csdb
+	badr	lr, \ret			@ return address
+	.if	\reload
+	add	r1, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF		@ pointer to regs
+	ldmccia	r1, {r0 - r6}			@ reload r0-r6
+	stmccia	sp, {r4, r5}			@ update stack arguments
+	.endif
+	ldrcc	pc, [\table, \tmp, lsl #2]	@ call sys_* routine
+#else
+	cmp	\nr, #NR_syscalls		@ check upper syscall limit
+	badr	lr, \ret			@ return address
+	.if	\reload
+	add	r1, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF		@ pointer to regs
+	ldmccia	r1, {r0 - r6}			@ reload r0-r6
+	stmccia	sp, {r4, r5}			@ update stack arguments
+	.endif
+	ldrcc	pc, [\table, \nr, lsl #2]	@ call sys_* routine
+#endif
+	.endm
+
 /*
  * These are the registers used in the syscall handler, and allow us to
  * have in theory up to 7 arguments to a function - r0 to r6.
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#31 lore raw

PATCH v2 19/24 ARM: signal: copy registers using __copy_from_user()

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit c32cd419d6650e42b9cdebb83c672ec945e6bd7e upstream.

__get_user_error() is used as a fast accessor to make copying structure members in the signal handling path as efficient as possible. However, with software PAN and the recent Spectre variant 1, the efficiency is reduced as these are no longer fast accessors.

In the case of software PAN, it has to switch the domain register around each access, and with Spectre variant 1, it would have to repeat the access_ok() check for each access.

It becomes much more efficient to use __copy_from_user() instead, so let's use this for the ARM integer registers.

---
 arch/arm/kernel/signal.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/arm/kernel/signal.c +21 -17
index 7b8f2141427b..a592bc0287f8 100644
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ struct rt_sigframe {
 
 static int restore_sigframe(struct pt_regs *regs, struct sigframe __user *sf)
 {
+	struct sigcontext context;
 	struct aux_sigframe __user *aux;
 	sigset_t set;
 	int err;
@@ -149,23 +150,26 @@ static int restore_sigframe(struct pt_regs *regs, struct sigframe __user *sf)
 	if (err == 0)
 		set_current_blocked(&set);
 
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r0, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r0, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r1, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r1, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r2, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r2, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r3, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r3, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r4, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r4, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r5, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r5, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r6, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r6, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r7, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r7, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r8, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r8, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r9, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r9, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r10, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r10, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_fp, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_fp, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_ip, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_ip, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_sp, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_sp, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_lr, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_lr, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_pc, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_pc, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_cpsr, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_cpsr, err);
+	err |= __copy_from_user(&context, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext, sizeof(context));
+	if (err == 0) {
+		regs->ARM_r0 = context.arm_r0;
+		regs->ARM_r1 = context.arm_r1;
+		regs->ARM_r2 = context.arm_r2;
+		regs->ARM_r3 = context.arm_r3;
+		regs->ARM_r4 = context.arm_r4;
+		regs->ARM_r5 = context.arm_r5;
+		regs->ARM_r6 = context.arm_r6;
+		regs->ARM_r7 = context.arm_r7;
+		regs->ARM_r8 = context.arm_r8;
+		regs->ARM_r9 = context.arm_r9;
+		regs->ARM_r10 = context.arm_r10;
+		regs->ARM_fp = context.arm_fp;
+		regs->ARM_ip = context.arm_ip;
+		regs->ARM_sp = context.arm_sp;
+		regs->ARM_lr = context.arm_lr;
+		regs->ARM_pc = context.arm_pc;
+		regs->ARM_cpsr = context.arm_cpsr;
+	}
 
 	err |= !valid_user_regs(regs);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#32 lore raw

PATCH v2 20/24 ARM: vfp: use __copy_from_user() when restoring VFP state

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit 42019fc50dfadb219f9e6ddf4c354f3837057d80 upstream.

__get_user_error() is used as a fast accessor to make copying structure members in the signal handling path as efficient as possible. However, with software PAN and the recent Spectre variant 1, the efficiency is reduced as these are no longer fast accessors.

In the case of software PAN, it has to switch the domain register around each access, and with Spectre variant 1, it would have to repeat the access_ok() check for each access.

Use __copy_from_user() rather than __get_user_err() for individual members when restoring VFP state.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h |  4 ++--
 arch/arm/kernel/signal.c           | 17 ++++++++---------
 arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c           | 17 +++++++----------
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h +2 -2
index 776757d1604a..57d2ad9c75ca 100644
@@ -126,8 +126,8 @@ struct user_vfp_exc;
 
 extern int vfp_preserve_user_clear_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *,
 					   struct user_vfp_exc __user *);
-extern int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *,
-				    struct user_vfp_exc __user *);
+extern int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp *,
+				    struct user_vfp_exc *);
 #endif
 
 /*
arch/arm/kernel/signal.c +8 -9
index a592bc0287f8..6bee5c9b1133 100644
@@ -107,21 +107,20 @@ static int preserve_vfp_context(struct vfp_sigframe __user *frame)
 	return vfp_preserve_user_clear_hwstate(&frame->ufp, &frame->ufp_exc);
 }
 
-static int restore_vfp_context(struct vfp_sigframe __user *frame)
+static int restore_vfp_context(struct vfp_sigframe __user *auxp)
 {
-	unsigned long magic;
-	unsigned long size;
-	int err = 0;
+	struct vfp_sigframe frame;
+	int err;
 
-	__get_user_error(magic, &frame->magic, err);
-	__get_user_error(size, &frame->size, err);
+	err = __copy_from_user(&frame, (char __user *) auxp, sizeof(frame));
 
 	if (err)
-		return -EFAULT;
-	if (magic != VFP_MAGIC || size != VFP_STORAGE_SIZE)
+		return err;
+
+	if (frame.magic != VFP_MAGIC || frame.size != VFP_STORAGE_SIZE)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	return vfp_restore_user_hwstate(&frame->ufp, &frame->ufp_exc);
+	return vfp_restore_user_hwstate(&frame.ufp, &frame.ufp_exc);
 }
 
 #endif
arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c +7 -10
index 5629d7580973..8e5e97989fda 100644
@@ -597,13 +597,11 @@ int vfp_preserve_user_clear_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *ufp,
 }
 
 /* Sanitise and restore the current VFP state from the provided structures. */
-int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *ufp,
-			     struct user_vfp_exc __user *ufp_exc)
+int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp *ufp, struct user_vfp_exc *ufp_exc)
 {
 	struct thread_info *thread = current_thread_info();
 	struct vfp_hard_struct *hwstate = &thread->vfpstate.hard;
 	unsigned long fpexc;
-	int err = 0;
 
 	/* Disable VFP to avoid corrupting the new thread state. */
 	vfp_flush_hwstate(thread);
@@ -612,17 +610,16 @@ int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *ufp,
 	 * Copy the floating point registers. There can be unused
 	 * registers see asm/hwcap.h for details.
 	 */
-	err |= __copy_from_user(&hwstate->fpregs, &ufp->fpregs,
-				sizeof(hwstate->fpregs));
+	memcpy(&hwstate->fpregs, &ufp->fpregs, sizeof(hwstate->fpregs));
 	/*
 	 * Copy the status and control register.
 	 */
-	__get_user_error(hwstate->fpscr, &ufp->fpscr, err);
+	hwstate->fpscr = ufp->fpscr;
 
 	/*
 	 * Sanitise and restore the exception registers.
 	 */
-	__get_user_error(fpexc, &ufp_exc->fpexc, err);
+	fpexc = ufp_exc->fpexc;
 
 	/* Ensure the VFP is enabled. */
 	fpexc |= FPEXC_EN;
@@ -631,10 +628,10 @@ int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *ufp,
 	fpexc &= ~(FPEXC_EX | FPEXC_FP2V);
 	hwstate->fpexc = fpexc;
 
-	__get_user_error(hwstate->fpinst, &ufp_exc->fpinst, err);
-	__get_user_error(hwstate->fpinst2, &ufp_exc->fpinst2, err);
+	hwstate->fpinst = ufp_exc->fpinst;
+	hwstate->fpinst2 = ufp_exc->fpinst2;
 
-	return err ? -EFAULT : 0;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#33 lore raw

PATCH v2 21/24 ARM: oabi-compat: copy semops using __copy_from_user()

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit 8c8484a1c18e3231648f5ba7cc5ffb7fd70b3ca4 upstream.

__get_user_error() is used as a fast accessor to make copying structure members as efficient as possible. However, with software PAN and the recent Spectre variant 1, the efficiency is reduced as these are no longer fast accessors.

In the case of software PAN, it has to switch the domain register around each access, and with Spectre variant 1, it would have to repeat the access_ok() check for each access.

Rather than using __get_user_error() to copy each semops element member, copy each semops element in full using __copy_from_user().

---
 arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c +5 -3
index 5f221acd21ae..640748e27035 100644
@@ -328,9 +328,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_oabi_semtimedop(int semid,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	err = 0;
 	for (i = 0; i < nsops; i++) {
-		__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_num, &tsops->sem_num, err);
-		__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_op,  &tsops->sem_op,  err);
-		__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_flg, &tsops->sem_flg, err);
+		struct oabi_sembuf osb;
+		err |= __copy_from_user(&osb, tsops, sizeof(osb));
+		sops[i].sem_num = osb.sem_num;
+		sops[i].sem_op = osb.sem_op;
+		sops[i].sem_flg = osb.sem_flg;
 		tsops++;
 	}
 	if (timeout) {
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#34 lore raw

PATCH v2 22/24 ARM: use __inttype() in get_user()

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit d09fbb327d670737ab40fd8bbb0765ae06b8b739 upstream.

Borrow the x86 implementation of __inttype() to use in get_user() to select an integer type suitable to temporarily hold the result value. This is necessary to avoid propagating the volatile nature of the result argument, which can cause the following warning:

lib/iov_iter.c:413:5: warning: optimization may eliminate reads and/or writes to register variables [-Wvolatile-register-var]

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h +8 -1
index b7e0125c0bbf..4a61f36c7397 100644
@@ -114,6 +114,13 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
 		: "cc"); \
 	flag; })
 
+/*
+ * This is a type: either unsigned long, if the argument fits into
+ * that type, or otherwise unsigned long long.
+ */
+#define __inttype(x) \
+	__typeof__(__builtin_choose_expr(sizeof(x) > sizeof(0UL), 0ULL, 0UL))
+
 /*
  * Single-value transfer routines.  They automatically use the right
  * size if we just have the right pointer type.  Note that the functions
@@ -183,7 +190,7 @@ extern int __get_user_64t_4(void *);
 	({								\
 		unsigned long __limit = current_thread_info()->addr_limit - 1; \
 		register const typeof(*(p)) __user *__p asm("r0") = (p);\
-		register typeof(x) __r2 asm("r2");			\
+		register __inttype(x) __r2 asm("r2");			\
 		register unsigned long __l asm("r1") = __limit;		\
 		register int __e asm("r0");				\
 		unsigned int __ua_flags = uaccess_save_and_enable();	\
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#35 lore raw

PATCH v2 23/24 ARM: spectre-v1: use get_user() for __get_user()

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit b1cd0a14806321721aae45f5446ed83a3647c914 upstream.

Fixing __get_user() for spectre variant 1 is not sane: we would have to add address space bounds checking in order to validate that the location should be accessed, and then zero the address if found to be invalid.

Since __get_user() is supposed to avoid the bounds check, and this is exactly what get_user() does, there's no point having two different implementations that are doing the same thing. So, when the Spectre workarounds are required, make __get_user() an alias of get_user().

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 17 +++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h +11 -6
index 4a61f36c7397..7b17460127fd 100644
@@ -280,6 +280,16 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
 #define user_addr_max() \
 	(segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS) ? ~0UL : get_fs())
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+/*
+ * When mitigating Spectre variant 1, it is not worth fixing the non-
+ * verifying accessors, because we need to add verification of the
+ * address space there.  Force these to use the standard get_user()
+ * version instead.
+ */
+#define __get_user(x, ptr) get_user(x, ptr)
+#else
+
 /*
  * The "__xxx" versions of the user access functions do not verify the
  * address space - it must have been done previously with a separate
@@ -296,12 +306,6 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
 	__gu_err;							\
 })
 
-#define __get_user_error(x, ptr, err)					\
-({									\
-	__get_user_err((x), (ptr), err);				\
-	(void) 0;							\
-})
-
 #define __get_user_err(x, ptr, err)					\
 do {									\
 	unsigned long __gu_addr = (unsigned long)(ptr);			\
@@ -361,6 +365,7 @@ do {									\
 
 #define __get_user_asm_word(x, addr, err)			\
 	__get_user_asm(x, addr, err, ldr)
+#endif
 
 
 #define __put_user_switch(x, ptr, __err, __fn)				\
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
author
#36 lore raw

PATCH v2 24/24 ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesses

In reply to David Long

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

Commit a3c0f84765bb429ba0fd23de1c57b5e1591c9389 upstream.

Spectre variant 1 attacks are about this sequence of pseudo-code:

	index = load(user-manipulated pointer);
	access(base + index * stride);

In order for the cache side-channel to work, the access() must me made to memory which userspace can detect whether cache lines have been loaded. On 32-bit ARM, this must be either user accessible memory, or a kernel mapping of that same user accessible memory.

The problem occurs when the load() speculatively loads privileged data, and the subsequent access() is made to user accessible memory.

Any load() which makes use of a user-maniplated pointer is a potential problem if the data it has loaded is used in a subsequent access. This also applies for the access() if the data loaded by that access is used by a subsequent access.

Harden the get_user() accessors against Spectre attacks by forcing out of bounds addresses to a NULL pointer. This prevents get_user() being used as the load() step above. As a side effect, put_user() will also be affected even though it isn't implicated.

Also harden copy_from_user() by redoing the bounds check within the arm_copy_from_user() code, and NULLing the pointer if out of bounds.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h | 4 ++++
 arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S    | 9 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h +4 -0
index 189f3b42baea..e616f61f859d 100644
@@ -458,6 +458,10 @@ THUMB(	orr	\reg , \reg , #PSR_T_BIT	)
 	adds	\tmp, \addr, #\size - 1
 	sbcccs	\tmp, \tmp, \limit
 	bcs	\bad
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+	movcs	\addr, #0
+	csdb
+#endif
 #endif
 	.endm
 
arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S +9 -0
index 7a4b06049001..a826df3d3814 100644
@@ -90,6 +90,15 @@
 	.text
 
 ENTRY(arm_copy_from_user)
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+	get_thread_info r3
+	ldr	r3, [r3, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT]
+	adds	ip, r1, r2	@ ip=addr+size
+	sub	r3, r3, #1	@ addr_limit - 1
+	cmpcc	ip, r3		@ if (addr+size > addr_limit - 1)
+	movcs	r1, #0		@ addr = NULL
+	csdb
+#endif
 
 #include "copy_template.S"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#37 lore raw
In reply to David Long

I wonder whether those who spotted the errors last time around are going to make any comments on this revised series, or whether we're going to just sit around looking at each other in silence expecting each other to do something.

If I go through them again, I'm pretty sure I'll find nothing.

Quoted 75 lines · David Long

From: "David A. Long" <[email protected]>

V4.9 backport of spectre patches from Russell M. King's spectre branch. Patches not yet in upstream are excluded.

Changes in V2:
1) Fixed bad merge in #11/24 in hyp-entry.S.
2) Incorporated upstream patch to earlier patch where wrong ENDPROC call was done in hypervisor code in proc-v7.S.

Marc Zyngier (2):
ARM: KVM: invalidate BTB on guest exit for Cortex-A12/A17
ARM: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Cortex-A15

Russell King (22):
ARM: add more CPU part numbers for Cortex and Brahma B15 CPUs
ARM: bugs: prepare processor bug infrastructure
ARM: bugs: hook processor bug checking into SMP and suspend paths
ARM: bugs: add support for per-processor bug checking
ARM: spectre: add Kconfig symbol for CPUs vulnerable to Spectre
ARM: spectre-v2: harden branch predictor on context switches
ARM: spectre-v2: add Cortex A8 and A15 validation of the IBE bit
ARM: spectre-v2: harden user aborts in kernel space
ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening
ARM: spectre-v2: warn about incorrect context switching functions
ARM: spectre-v2: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Brahma B15
ARM: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling
ARM: KVM: report support for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
ARM: spectre-v1: add speculation barrier (csdb) macros
ARM: spectre-v1: add array_index_mask_nospec() implementation
ARM: spectre-v1: fix syscall entry
ARM: signal: copy registers using __copy_from_user()
ARM: vfp: use __copy_from_user() when restoring VFP state
ARM: oabi-compat: copy semops using __copy_from_user()
ARM: use __inttype() in get_user()
ARM: spectre-v1: use get_user() for __get_user()
ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesses

 arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h   |  12 ++
 arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h     |  32 ++++++
 arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h        |   6 +-
 arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h        |   3 +
 arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h     |   8 ++
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_asm.h     |   2 -
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |  14 ++-
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h     |  23 +++-
 arch/arm/include/asm/proc-fns.h    |   4 +
 arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h |  15 +++
 arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h |   4 +-
 arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h     |  26 +++--
 arch/arm/kernel/Makefile           |   1 +
 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c             |  18 +++
 arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S     |  18 ++-
 arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S     |  25 +++++
 arch/arm/kernel/signal.c           |  55 ++++-----
 arch/arm/kernel/smp.c              |   4 +
 arch/arm/kernel/suspend.c          |   2 +
 arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c  |   8 +-
 arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S       | 112 ++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S      |   9 ++
 arch/arm/mm/Kconfig                |  23 ++++
 arch/arm/mm/Makefile               |   2 +-
 arch/arm/mm/fault.c                |   3 +
 arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S          |   3 +-
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-2level.S       |   6 -
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c         | 174 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S              | 154 +++++++++++++++++++------
 arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c           |  17 ++-
 30 files changed, 674 insertions(+), 109 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c
 create mode 100644 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Signature · 3 lines
RMK's Patch system: http://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/
FTTC broadband for 0.8mile line in suburbia: sync at 12.1Mbps down 622kbps up
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maintainer
#38 lore raw
In reply to David Long
Quoted 4 lines · David Long

From: "David A. Long" <[email protected]>

V4.9 backport of spectre patches from Russell M. King's spectre branch. Patches not yet in upstream are excluded.

All now queued up, thanks!

Note, the emails went out with a bit of a mess in the patch headers, I've fixed them up by hand in the patch queue, so don't worry, the correct authorship will be attributed properly.

thanks,

greg k-h

author
#39 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 4 lines · David Long

From: "David A. Long" <[email protected]>

V4.9 backport of spectre patches from Russell M. King's spectre branch. Patches not yet in upstream are excluded.

All now queued up, thanks!

Thanks much.

Quoted 8 lines

Note, the emails went out with a bit of a mess in the patch headers, I've fixed them up by hand in the patch queue, so don't worry, the correct authorship will be attributed properly.

thanks,

greg k-h

-dl