char/mwave: fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
PATCH 1/1 char/mwave: fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability
ipcnum is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/char/mwave/mwavedd.c:299 mwave_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue 'pDrvData->IPCs' [w] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing ipcnum before using it to index pDrvData->IPCs.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Signed-off-by Gustavo A. R. Silva <[email protected]>
--- drivers/char/mwave/mwavedd.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/char/mwave/mwavedd.c +7 -0
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@#include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/delay.h> #include <linux/serial_8250.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include "smapi.h" #include "mwavedd.h" #include "3780i.h"
@@ -289,6 +290,8 @@ static long mwave_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int iocmd, ipcnum);return -EINVAL ; } + ipcnum =array_index_nospec (ipcnum, +ARRAY_SIZE (pDrvData->IPCs)); PRINTK_3(TRACE_MWAVE, "mwavedd::mwave_ioctl IOCTL_MW_REGISTER_IPC" " ipcnum %x entry usIntCount %x\n",
@@ -317,6 +320,8 @@ static long mwave_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int iocmd, " Invalid ipcnum %x\n", ipcnum);return -EINVAL ; } + ipcnum =array_index_nospec (ipcnum, +ARRAY_SIZE (pDrvData->IPCs)); PRINTK_3(TRACE_MWAVE, "mwavedd::mwave_ioctl IOCTL_MW_GET_IPC" " ipcnum %x, usIntCount %x\n",
@@ -383,6 +388,8 @@ static long mwave_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int iocmd, ipcnum);return -EINVAL ; } + ipcnum =array_index_nospec (ipcnum, +ARRAY_SIZE (pDrvData->IPCs));mutex_lock (&mwave_mutex);if (pDrvData->IPCs[ipcnum].bIsEnabled == true) { pDrvData->IPCs[ipcnum].bIsEnabled = false;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1