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some little stuff

PATCH In review Russell Coker 3 participants 5 messages Jan 11, 2019 – Jan 16, 2019

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PATCH 1/1 some little stuff

Tiny and I think they are all obvious.

policy/modules/admin/bootloader.te +2 -0
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.te
===================================================================
@@ -147,7 +147,9 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(bootloader_t
 
 mount_rw_runtime_files(bootloader_t)
 
+selinux_getattr_fs(bootloader_t)
 seutil_read_bin_policy(bootloader_t)
+seutil_read_file_contexts(bootloader_t)
 seutil_read_loadpolicy(bootloader_t)
 seutil_dontaudit_search_config(bootloader_t)
 
policy/modules/admin/logrotate.te +2 -1
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/admin/logrotate.te
===================================================================
@@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ role system_r types logrotate_mail_t;
 # Local policy
 #
 
-allow logrotate_t self:capability { chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid sys_nice sys_resource };
+# sys_ptrace is for systemctl
+allow logrotate_t self:capability { chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid sys_ptrace sys_nice sys_resource };
 # systemctl asks for net_admin
 dontaudit logrotate_t self:capability net_admin;
 allow logrotate_t self:process { transition signal_perms getsched setsched getsession getpgid setpgid getcap setcap share getattr setfscreate noatsecure siginh setrlimit rlimitinh dyntransition setkeycreate setsockcreate getrlimit };
policy/modules/services/dhcp.te +1 -0
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/services/dhcp.te
===================================================================
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(dhcpd_t)
 
 logging_send_syslog_msg(dhcpd_t)
 
+miscfiles_read_generic_certs(dhcpd_t)
 miscfiles_read_localization(dhcpd_t)
 
 sysnet_read_dhcp_config(dhcpd_t)
policy/modules/services/ssh.te +1 -0
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
===================================================================
@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ optional_policy(`
 
 optional_policy(`
 	xserver_domtrans_xauth(sshd_t)
+	xserver_link_xdm_keys(sshd_t)
 ')
 
 ########################################
policy/modules/services/xserver.if +18 -0
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
===================================================================
@@ -1634,6 +1634,24 @@ interface(`xserver_rw_xdm_keys',`
 
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
+##	Manage keys for xdm.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`xserver_link_xdm_keys',`
+	gen_require(`
+		type xdm_t;
+	')
+
+	allow $1 xdm_t:key link;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
 ##	Read and write the mesa shader cache.
 ## </summary>
 ## <param name="domain">
policy/modules/services/xserver.te +3 -0
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/services/xserver.te
===================================================================
@@ -708,6 +708,9 @@ allow xserver_t mesa_shader_cache_t:file
 xdg_cache_filetrans(xserver_t, mesa_shader_cache_t, dir, "mesa_shader_cache")
 xdg_generic_user_home_dir_filetrans_cache(xserver_t, dir, ".cache")
 
+# for writing to ~/.local/share/sddm/xorg-session.log
+xdg_manage_data(xauth_t)
+
 domtrans_pattern(xserver_t, xauth_exec_t, xauth_t)
 allow xserver_t xauth_home_t:file read_file_perms;
 
policy/modules/system/systemd.te +7 -1
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
===================================================================
@@ -337,6 +337,10 @@ optional_policy(`
 	networkmanager_dbus_chat(systemd_hostnamed_t)
 ')
 
+optional_policy(`
+	unconfined_dbus_send(systemd_hostnamed_t)
+')
+
 #########################################
 #
 # hw local policy
@@ -431,6 +435,7 @@ dev_rw_input_dev(systemd_logind_t)
 dev_rw_sysfs(systemd_logind_t)
 dev_setattr_dri_dev(systemd_logind_t)
 dev_setattr_generic_usb_dev(systemd_logind_t)
+dev_setattr_input_dev(systemd_logind_t)
 dev_setattr_kvm_dev(systemd_logind_t)
 dev_setattr_sound_dev(systemd_logind_t)
 dev_setattr_video_dev(systemd_logind_t)
@@ -680,10 +685,11 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(systemd_noti
 # Nspawn local policy
 #
 
-allow systemd_nspawn_t self:process { getcap setcap setfscreate setrlimit sigkill };
+allow systemd_nspawn_t self:process { signal getcap setcap setfscreate setrlimit sigkill };
 allow systemd_nspawn_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search fsetid mknod net_admin setgid setuid setpcap sys_admin sys_chroot };
 allow systemd_nspawn_t self:capability2 wake_alarm;
 allow systemd_nspawn_t self:unix_dgram_socket connected_socket_perms;
+allow systemd_nspawn_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
 
 allow systemd_nspawn_t systemd_journal_t:dir search;
 
policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te +8 -0
Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te
===================================================================
@@ -252,6 +252,10 @@ userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(groupadd_t)
 userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(groupadd_t)
 
 optional_policy(`
+	apt_use_fds(groupadd_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
 	dbus_system_bus_client(groupadd_t)
 ')
 
@@ -546,6 +550,10 @@ optional_policy(`
 ')
 
 optional_policy(`
+	apt_use_fds(groupadd_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
 	dbus_system_bus_client(useradd_t)
 ')
 
#1 lore raw
Quoted 21 lines · Russell Coker

Tiny and I think they are all obvious.

Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/admin/bootloader.te +2 -0
@@ -147,7 +147,9 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(bootloader_t
 
  mount_rw_runtime_files(bootloader_t)
 
+selinux_getattr_fs(bootloader_t)
  seutil_read_bin_policy(bootloader_t)
+seutil_read_file_contexts(bootloader_t)
  seutil_read_loadpolicy(bootloader_t)
  seutil_dontaudit_search_config(bootloader_t)
 

Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/admin/logrotate.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/admin/logrotate.te role system_r types logrotate_mail_t; · line 41

Quoted 6 lines
policy/modules/admin/logrotate.te +2 -1
@@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ role system_r types logrotate_mail_t;
  # Local policy
  #
 
-allow logrotate_t self:capability { chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid sys_nice sys_resource };
+# sys_ptrace is for systemctl
+allow logrotate_t self:capability { chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid sys_ptrace sys_nice sys_resource };

I didn't merge this because it seems peculiar. There is no process ptrace permission and also because it doesn't seem like it should be allowed to ptrace anyway.

Quoted 74 lines
policy/modules/admin/logrotate.te +0 -0
  # systemctl asks for net_admin
  dontaudit logrotate_t self:capability net_admin;
  allow logrotate_t self:process { transition signal_perms getsched setsched getsession getpgid setpgid getcap setcap share getattr setfscreate noatsecure siginh setrlimit rlimitinh dyntransition setkeycreate setsockcreate getrlimit };

Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/services/dhcp.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/services/dhcp.te +1 -0
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(dhcpd_t)
 
  logging_send_syslog_msg(dhcpd_t)
 
+miscfiles_read_generic_certs(dhcpd_t)
  miscfiles_read_localization(dhcpd_t)
 
  sysnet_read_dhcp_config(dhcpd_t)

Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/services/ssh.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/services/ssh.te +1 -0
@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ optional_policy(`
 
  optional_policy(`
  	xserver_domtrans_xauth(sshd_t)
+	xserver_link_xdm_keys(sshd_t)
  ')
 
  ########################################

Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/services/xserver.if
===================================================================

policy/modules/services/xserver.if +18 -0
@@ -1634,6 +1634,24 @@ interface(`xserver_rw_xdm_keys',`
 
  ########################################
  ## <summary>
+##	Manage keys for xdm.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`xserver_link_xdm_keys',`
+	gen_require(`
+		type xdm_t;
+	')
+
+	allow $1 xdm_t:key link;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
  ##	Read and write the mesa shader cache.
  ## </summary>
  ## <param name="domain">

Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/services/xserver.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/services/xserver.te +2 -0
@@ -708,6 +708,9 @@ allow xserver_t mesa_shader_cache_t:file
  xdg_cache_filetrans(xserver_t, mesa_shader_cache_t, dir, "mesa_shader_cache")
  xdg_generic_user_home_dir_filetrans_cache(xserver_t, dir, ".cache")
 
+# for writing to ~/.local/share/sddm/xorg-session.log
+xdg_manage_data(xauth_t)
  domtrans_pattern(xserver_t, xauth_exec_t, xauth_t)
  allow xserver_t xauth_home_t:file read_file_perms;
 

Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/system/systemd.te optional_policy(` · line 342

Quoted 6 lines
policy/modules/system/systemd.te +3 -0
@@ -337,6 +337,10 @@ optional_policy(`
  	networkmanager_dbus_chat(systemd_hostnamed_t)
  ')
 
+optional_policy(`
+	unconfined_dbus_send(systemd_hostnamed_t)
+')

This comment:

https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/issues/18#issuecomment-452316615

makes me rethink all dbus sends to unconfined domains, especially unconfined_t. This here isn't all confined domains, but I want more consideration for the perm.

Quoted 51 lines
policy/modules/system/systemd.te +3 -1
  #########################################
  #
  # hw local policy
@@ -431,6 +435,7 @@ dev_rw_input_dev(systemd_logind_t)
  dev_rw_sysfs(systemd_logind_t)
  dev_setattr_dri_dev(systemd_logind_t)
  dev_setattr_generic_usb_dev(systemd_logind_t)
+dev_setattr_input_dev(systemd_logind_t)
  dev_setattr_kvm_dev(systemd_logind_t)
  dev_setattr_sound_dev(systemd_logind_t)
  dev_setattr_video_dev(systemd_logind_t)
@@ -680,10 +685,11 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(systemd_noti
  # Nspawn local policy
  #
 
-allow systemd_nspawn_t self:process { getcap setcap setfscreate setrlimit sigkill };
+allow systemd_nspawn_t self:process { signal getcap setcap setfscreate setrlimit sigkill };
  allow systemd_nspawn_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search fsetid mknod net_admin setgid setuid setpcap sys_admin sys_chroot };
  allow systemd_nspawn_t self:capability2 wake_alarm;
  allow systemd_nspawn_t self:unix_dgram_socket connected_socket_perms;
+allow systemd_nspawn_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
 
  allow systemd_nspawn_t systemd_journal_t:dir search;
 

Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te +8 -0
@@ -252,6 +252,10 @@ userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(groupadd_t)
  userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(groupadd_t)
 
  optional_policy(`
+	apt_use_fds(groupadd_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
  	dbus_system_bus_client(groupadd_t)
  ')
 
@@ -546,6 +550,10 @@ optional_policy(`
  ')
 
  optional_policy(`
+	apt_use_fds(groupadd_t)
+')
+
+optional_policy(`
  	dbus_system_bus_client(useradd_t)
  ')
 
Signature · 1 line
Chris PeBenito
#2 lore raw
Quoted 14 lines · AEDT Chris PeBenito

policy/modules/system/systemd.te optional_policy(` · line 342

Quoted 11 lines

Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/system/systemd.te +3 -0
@@ -337,6 +337,10 @@ optional_policy(`
 networkmanager_dbus_chat(systemd_hostnamed_t)
 ')
 
+optional_policy(`
+       unconfined_dbus_send(systemd_hostnamed_t)
+')

This comment:

Quoted 5 lines

https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/issues/18#issuecomment-452316615

makes me rethink all dbus sends to unconfined domains, especially unconfined_t. This here isn't all confined domains, but I want more consideration for the perm.

That comment is about allowing all domains to send to unconfined_t. Allowing specific domains like systemd_hostnamed_t to send to unconfined_t doesn't seem like a problem. It doesn't seem likely that an attack via dbus would start with a systemd domain, especially not one like systemd_hostnamed_t.

Signature · 2 lines
My Main Blog         http://etbe.coker.com.au/
My Documents Blog    http://doc.coker.com.au/
#3 lore raw
Quoted 17 lines · Russell Coker
Quoted 16 lines · AEDT Chris PeBenito

policy/modules/system/systemd.te optional_policy(` · line 342

Quoted 11 lines

Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/system/systemd.te +3 -0
@@ -337,6 +337,10 @@ optional_policy(`
 networkmanager_dbus_chat(systemd_hostnamed_t)
 ')
 
+optional_policy(`
+       unconfined_dbus_send(systemd_hostnamed_t)
+')

This comment:

https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/issues/18#issuecomment-452316615

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines

makes me rethink all dbus sends to unconfined domains, especially unconfined_t. This here isn't all confined domains, but I want more consideration for the perm.

That comment is about allowing all domains to send to unconfined_t. Allowing specific domains like systemd_hostnamed_t to send to unconfined_t doesn't seem like a problem. It doesn't seem likely that an attack via dbus would start with a systemd domain, especially not one like systemd_hostnamed_t.

Not completely accurate. The comment is not about "all" domains, its about "all" domains that already have access to dbus. However I kind of agree here that it's probably not worth it to go down this rabbit hole.

Even the normal dbus_chat interfaces are too broad (and that is inevitable), and potentially allow for atleast some form of priv escalation more often then not.

It just a dbus design issue IMHO.

This is also why i added that commit in the first place. I knew that it was a (big) compromise but i just chose to add it anyway (without any discussion, which was wrong). I still allow this access in DSSP2, I just made a note about it in the README. There are just weak spots in the policy such as DBUS and unconfined. As long as you are aware of them you can to some extent anticipate that.

Signature · 3 lines
Key fingerprint = 5F4D 3CDB D3F8 3652 FBD8 02D5 3B6C 5F1D 2C7B 6B02
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Dominick Grift
#4 lore raw
In reply to Russell Coker
Quoted 17 lines · Russell Coker
Quoted 16 lines · AEDT Chris PeBenito

policy/modules/system/systemd.te optional_policy(` · line 342

Quoted 11 lines

Index: refpolicy-2.20180701/policy/modules/system/systemd.te
===================================================================

policy/modules/system/systemd.te +3 -0
@@ -337,6 +337,10 @@ optional_policy(`
 networkmanager_dbus_chat(systemd_hostnamed_t)
 ')
 
+optional_policy(`
+       unconfined_dbus_send(systemd_hostnamed_t)
+')

This comment:

https://github.com/SELinuxProject/refpolicy/issues/18#issuecomment-452316615

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines

makes me rethink all dbus sends to unconfined domains, especially unconfined_t. This here isn't all confined domains, but I want more consideration for the perm.

That comment is about allowing all domains to send to unconfined_t. Allowing specific domains like systemd_hostnamed_t to send to unconfined_t doesn't seem like a problem. It doesn't seem likely that an attack via dbus would start with a systemd domain, especially not one like systemd_hostnamed_t.

It's applicable to confined domains sending messages to unconfined domains. What compounds my concern is that there is no similar access for confined users, so where is this coming from? (what's happening?)

Signature · 1 line
Chris PeBenito