copy_mount_string: Limit string length to PATH_MAX
PATCH 1/1 copy_mount_string: Limit string length to PATH_MAX
On ppc64le, When a string with PAGE_SIZE - 1 (i.e. 64k-1) length is passed as a "filesystem type" argument to the mount(2) syscall, copy_mount_string() ends up allocating 64k (the PAGE_SIZE on ppc64le) worth of space for holding the string in kernel's address space.
Later, in set_precision() (invoked by get_fs_type() -> __request_module() -> vsnprintf()), we end up assigning strlen(fs-type-string) i.e. 65535 as the
value to 'struct printf_spec'->precision member. This field has a width of 16 bits and it is a signed data type. Hence an invalid value ends up getting assigned. This causes the "WARN_ONCE(spec->precision != prec, "precision %d too large", prec)" statement inside set_precision() to be executed.
This commit fixes the bug by limiting the length of the string passed by copy_mount_string() to strndup_user() to PATH_MAX.
--- fs/namespace.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/namespace.c +1 -1
@@ -2831,7 +2831,7 @@ void *copy_mount_options(const void __user * data)char *copy_mount_string (const void __user *data) { -return data ?strndup_user (data,PAGE_SIZE ) :NULL ; +return data ?strndup_user (data,PATH_MAX ) :NULL ; }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Quoted 15 lines · Chandan Rajendra
On ppc64le, When a string with
PAGE_SIZE- 1 (i.e. 64k-1) length is passed as a "filesystem type" argument to the mount(2) syscall,copy_mount_string()ends up allocating 64k (thePAGE_SIZEon ppc64le) worth of space for holding the string in kernel's address space.Later, in
set_precision()(invoked byget_fs_type()->__request_module()->vsnprintf()), we end up assigning strlen(fs-type-string) i.e. 65535 as the
value to 'struct printf_spec'->precision member. This field has a width of 16 bits and it is a signed data type. Hence an invalid value ends up getting assigned. This causes the "WARN_ONCE(spec->precision != prec, "precision %d too large", prec)" statement insideset_precision()to be executed.
Quoted 6 lines
This commit fixes the bug by limiting the length of the string passed by
copy_mount_string()tostrndup_user()toPATH_MAX.Signed-off-by Chandan Rajendra <[email protected]>Reported-by Abdul Haleem <[email protected]>Suggested-by Al Viro <[email protected]>
Quoted 20 lines
--- fs/namespace.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/namespace.c +1
-2@@ -2831,7 +2831,7 @@ void *copy_mount_options(const void __user * data)char *copy_mount_string (const void __user *data) { -return data ?strndup_user (data,PAGE_SIZE ) :NULL ; +return data ?strndup_user (data,PATH_MAX ) :NULL ; }/* -- 2.19.1
Quoted 14 lines · Chandan Rajendra
On ppc64le, When a string with
PAGE_SIZE- 1 (i.e. 64k-1) length is passed as a "filesystem type" argument to the mount(2) syscall,copy_mount_string()ends up allocating 64k (thePAGE_SIZEon ppc64le) worth of space for holding the string in kernel's address space.Later, in
set_precision()(invoked byget_fs_type()->__request_module()->vsnprintf()), we end up assigning strlen(fs-type-string) i.e. 65535 as the
value to 'struct printf_spec'->precision member. This field has a width of 16 bits and it is a signed data type. Hence an invalid value ends up getting assigned. This causes the "WARN_ONCE(spec->precision != prec, "precision %d too large", prec)" statement insideset_precision()to be executed.
Quoted 6 lines
This commit fixes the bug by limiting the length of the string passed by
copy_mount_string()tostrndup_user()toPATH_MAX.Signed-off-by Chandan Rajendra <[email protected]>Reported-by Abdul Haleem <[email protected]>Suggested-by Al Viro <[email protected]>
Applied