akcipher: new verify API for public key algorithms
Subsystems (7)
RFC PATCH v4 1/1 akcipher: new verify API for public key algorithms
API is reworked following suggestions of Herbert Xu.
Previous akcipher .verify() just `decrypts' (using RSA encrypt which is using public key) signature to uncover message hash, which was then compared in upper level public_key_verify_signature() with the expected hash value, which itself was never passed into verify().
This approach was incompatible with EC-DSA family of algorithms, because, to verify a signature EC-DSA algorithm also needs a hash value as input; then it's used (together with a signature divided into halves r||s') to produce a witness value, which is then compared with r' to determine if the signature is correct. Thus, for EC-DSA, nor requirements of .verify() itself, nor its output expectations in public_key_verify_signature() wasn't sufficient.
Make improved .verify() call which gets a signature together with a hash value as input and produce complete signature check without any output besides status.
RSA backends should not have sign/verify callbacks defined (nor they should be used directly). PKCS1 driver knows to call appropriate RSA encrypt/decrypt callbacks to implement sign/verify.
Now for the top level verification only crypto_akcipher_verify() needs to be called.
Tested on x86_64.
---
This should be applied over cryptodev tree.
Changes since v3:
- remove verify_rsa API from RSA backends.
- digest is appended to akcipher_request->src SG.
- pkcs1pad calls encrypt/decrypt for its backends instead of sign/verify.
- pkcs1pad now conform to the new verify API.
- make crypto_akcipher_{maxsize,sign,verify} more robust allowing appropriate akcipher clllbacks to be undefined.
Changes since v2:
- output is factored out from public_key_verify_signature() into crypto_akcipher_verify().
- in crypto_akcipher_verify_rsa() -ENOSYS error is added for robustness (if, in the future, some RSA driver will not implement this api).
- api descriptions are updated to be more clear.
Changes since v1:
- complete rework to the different approach and should be treated as a new patch.
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 32 ++------ crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 33 ++------ crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c | 31 +++++--- crypto/rsa.c | 109 -------------------------- crypto/testmgr.c | 47 ++++++----- drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c | 2 - drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-rsa.c | 2 - drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c | 2 - include/crypto/akcipher.h | 53 +++++++++---- 9 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 217 deletions(-)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c +6 -26
@@ -744,11 +744,10 @@ static int tpm_key_verify_signature(const struct key *key,struct crypto_wait cwait;struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;struct akcipher_request *req; -struct scatterlist sig_sg, digest_sg; +struct scatterlist src_sg[2 ];char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ];uint8_t der_pub_key[PUB_KEY_BUF_SIZE ];uint32_t der_pub_key_len; -void *output;unsigned int outlen;int ret;
@@ -781,36 +780,17 @@ static int tpm_key_verify_signature(const struct key *key,if (!req) goto error_free_tfm; - ret = -ENOMEM ; - outlen =crypto_akcipher_maxsize (tfm); - output =kmalloc (outlen,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!output) - goto error_free_req; - -sg_init_one (&sig_sg, sig->s, sig->s_size); -sg_init_one (&digest_sg, output, outlen); -akcipher_request_set_crypt (req, &sig_sg, &digest_sg, sig->s_size, - outlen); +sg_init_table (&src_sg,2 ); +sg_set_buf (&src_sg[0 ], sig->s, sig->s_size); +sg_set_buf (&src_sg[1 ], sig->digest, sig->digest_size); +akcipher_request_set_crypt (req, &src_sg,NULL , sig->s_size, + sig->digest_size);crypto_init_wait (&cwait);akcipher_request_set_callback (req,CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP , crypto_req_done, &cwait); - -/* Perform the verification calculation. This doesn't actually do the -* verification, but rather calculates the hash expected by the -* signature and returns that to us. -*/ ret =crypto_wait_req (crypto_akcipher_verify (req), &cwait); -if (ret) - goto out_free_output; - -/* Do the actual verification step. */ -if (req->dst_len != sig->digest_size || -memcmp (sig->digest, output, sig->digest_size) !=0 ) - ret = -EKEYREJECTED ; -out_free_output: -kfree (output); error_free_req:akcipher_request_free (req); error_free_tfm:
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c +6 -27
@@ -227,10 +227,8 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,struct crypto_wait cwait;struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;struct akcipher_request *req; -struct scatterlist sig_sg, digest_sg; +struct scatterlist src_sg[2 ];char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ]; -void *output; -unsigned int outlen;int ret;pr_devel ("=>%s()\n" , __func__);
@@ -263,36 +261,17 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,if (ret) goto error_free_req; - ret = -ENOMEM ; - outlen =crypto_akcipher_maxsize (tfm); - output =kmalloc (outlen,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!output) - goto error_free_req; - -sg_init_one (&sig_sg, sig->s, sig->s_size); -sg_init_one (&digest_sg, output, outlen); -akcipher_request_set_crypt (req, &sig_sg, &digest_sg, sig->s_size, - outlen); +sg_init_table (src_sg,2 ); +sg_set_buf (&src_sg[0 ], sig->s, sig->s_size); +sg_set_buf (&src_sg[1 ], sig->digest, sig->digest_size); +akcipher_request_set_crypt (req, src_sg,NULL , sig->s_size, + sig->digest_size);crypto_init_wait (&cwait);akcipher_request_set_callback (req,CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP , crypto_req_done, &cwait); - -/* Perform the verification calculation. This doesn't actually do the -* verification, but rather calculates the hash expected by the -* signature and returns that to us. -*/ ret =crypto_wait_req (crypto_akcipher_verify (req), &cwait); -if (ret) - goto out_free_output; - -/* Do the actual verification step. */ -if (req->dst_len != sig->digest_size || -memcmp (sig->digest, output, sig->digest_size) !=0 ) - ret = -EKEYREJECTED ; -out_free_output: -kfree (output); error_free_req:akcipher_request_free (req); error_free_tfm:
crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +19 -12
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_sign(struct akcipher_request *req)akcipher_request_set_crypt (&req_ctx->child_req, req_ctx->in_sg, req->dst, ctx->key_size -1 , req->dst_len); - err =crypto_akcipher_sign (&req_ctx->child_req); + err =crypto_akcipher_decrypt (&req_ctx->child_req);if (err != -EINPROGRESS && err != -EBUSY )return pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete (req, err);
@@ -488,14 +488,20 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err) err =0 ; -if (req->dst_len < dst_len - pos) - err = -EOVERFLOW ; - req->dst_len = dst_len - pos; - -if (!err) -sg_copy_from_buffer (req->dst, -sg_nents_for_len (req->dst, req->dst_len), - out_buf + pos, req->dst_len); +if (req->dst_len != dst_len - pos) { + err = -EKEYREJECTED ; + req->dst_len = dst_len - pos; + goto done; + } +/* Extract appended digest. */ +sg_pcopy_to_buffer (req->src, +sg_nents_for_len (req->src, + req->src_len + req->dst_len), + req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size, + req->dst_len, ctx->key_size); +/* Do the actual verification step. */ +if (memcmp (req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size, out_buf + pos, req->dst_len)) + err = -EKEYREJECTED ; done:kzfree (req_ctx->out_buf);
@@ -532,10 +538,11 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify(struct akcipher_request *req)struct pkcs1pad_request *req_ctx =akcipher_request_ctx (req);int err; -if (!ctx->key_size || req->src_len < ctx->key_size) +if (req->dst || !req->dst_len || + !ctx->key_size || req->src_len < ctx->key_size)return -EINVAL ; - req_ctx->out_buf =kmalloc (ctx->key_size,GFP_KERNEL ); + req_ctx->out_buf =kmalloc (ctx->key_size + req->dst_len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!req_ctx->out_buf)return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -551,7 +558,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify(struct akcipher_request *req) req_ctx->out_sg, req->src_len, ctx->key_size); - err =crypto_akcipher_verify (&req_ctx->child_req); + err =crypto_akcipher_encrypt (&req_ctx->child_req);if (err != -EINPROGRESS && err != -EBUSY )return pkcs1pad_verify_complete (req, err);
crypto/rsa.c +0 -109
127 lines not on this page · raw message
crypto/testmgr.c +27 -20
77 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/crypto/caam/caampkc.c +0 -2
@@ -994,8 +994,6 @@ static void caam_rsa_exit_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)static struct akcipher_alg caam_rsa = { .encrypt = caam_rsa_enc, .decrypt = caam_rsa_dec, - .sign = caam_rsa_dec, - .verify = caam_rsa_enc, .set_pub_key = caam_rsa_set_pub_key, .set_priv_key = caam_rsa_set_priv_key, .max_size = caam_rsa_max_size,
drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-rsa.c +0 -2
@@ -214,8 +214,6 @@ static void ccp_rsa_exit_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)static struct akcipher_alg ccp_rsa_defaults = { .encrypt = ccp_rsa_encrypt, .decrypt = ccp_rsa_decrypt, - .sign = ccp_rsa_decrypt, - .verify = ccp_rsa_encrypt, .set_pub_key = ccp_rsa_setpubkey, .set_priv_key = ccp_rsa_setprivkey, .max_size = ccp_rsa_maxsize,
drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_asym_algs.c +0 -2
@@ -1300,8 +1300,6 @@ static void qat_rsa_exit_tfm(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm)static struct akcipher_alg rsa = { .encrypt = qat_rsa_enc, .decrypt = qat_rsa_dec, - .sign = qat_rsa_dec, - .verify = qat_rsa_enc, .set_pub_key = qat_rsa_setpubkey, .set_priv_key = qat_rsa_setprivkey, .max_size = qat_rsa_max_size,
include/crypto/akcipher.h +36 -17
106 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
Herbert Xu
maintainerQuoted 10 lines · Vitaly Chikunov
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c +0
-5@@ -781,36 +780,17 @@ static int tpm_key_verify_signature(const struct key *key,if (!req) goto error_free_tfm; - ret = -ENOMEM ; - outlen =crypto_akcipher_maxsize (tfm); - output =kmalloc (outlen,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!output) - goto error_free_req;
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c static int tpm_key_verify_signature(const struct key *key, · line 787
Quoted 10 lines
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c +5
-5- -sg_init_one (&sig_sg, sig->s, sig->s_size); -sg_init_one (&digest_sg, output, outlen); -akcipher_request_set_crypt (req, &sig_sg, &digest_sg, sig->s_size, - outlen); +sg_init_table (&src_sg,2 ); +sg_set_buf (&src_sg[0 ], sig->s, sig->s_size); +sg_set_buf (&src_sg[1 ], sig->digest, sig->digest_size); +akcipher_request_set_crypt (req, &src_sg,NULL , sig->s_size, + sig->digest_size);
It's not clear that sig->digest is guaranteed to be kmalloc memory. In any case, it's best not to mix unrelated changes in a single patch. So please keep the kmalloc on output and then copy sig->digest into it and put output into the SG list.
Thanks,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
Herbert,
Quoted 18 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 17 lines · Vitaly Chikunov
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c +2
-10@@ -781,36 +780,17 @@ static int tpm_key_verify_signature(const struct key *key,if (!req) goto error_free_tfm; - ret = -ENOMEM ; - outlen =crypto_akcipher_maxsize (tfm); - output =kmalloc (outlen,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!output) - goto error_free_req; - -sg_init_one (&sig_sg, sig->s, sig->s_size); -sg_init_one (&digest_sg, output, outlen); -akcipher_request_set_crypt (req, &sig_sg, &digest_sg, sig->s_size, - outlen); +sg_init_table (&src_sg,2 ); +sg_set_buf (&src_sg[0 ], sig->s, sig->s_size);
Quoted 8 lines
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c static int tpm_key_verify_signature(const struct key *key, · line 787
Quoted 3 lines
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c +3
-0+sg_set_buf (&src_sg[1 ], sig->digest, sig->digest_size); +akcipher_request_set_crypt (req, &src_sg,NULL , sig->s_size, + sig->digest_size);It's not clear that
sig->digestis guaranteed to be kmalloc memory. In any case, it's best not to mix unrelated changes in a single patch. So please keep the kmalloc on output and then copysig->digestinto it and put output into the SG list.
It is not guaranteed that sig->s will be kmalloc memory either. (Except we know it for sure like we know the same about sig->digest).
You can see in public_key_signature_free() that both fields are kfree'd together.
So, I don't understand why we should treat sig->digest differently than sig->s.
I was just removing kmalloc'ed output as crypto_akcipher_verify() does not need any output anymore. So, it's not some sort of mixing unrelated changes, from my point of view.
Thanks,
Quoted 6 lines
Thanks,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
Herbert,
Quoted 19 lines · Vitaly Chikunov
Quoted 18 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 17 lines · Vitaly Chikunov
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c +2
-10@@ -781,36 +780,17 @@ static int tpm_key_verify_signature(const struct key *key,if (!req) goto error_free_tfm; - ret = -ENOMEM ; - outlen =crypto_akcipher_maxsize (tfm); - output =kmalloc (outlen,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!output) - goto error_free_req; - -sg_init_one (&sig_sg, sig->s, sig->s_size); -sg_init_one (&digest_sg, output, outlen); -akcipher_request_set_crypt (req, &sig_sg, &digest_sg, sig->s_size, - outlen); +sg_init_table (&src_sg,2 ); +sg_set_buf (&src_sg[0 ], sig->s, sig->s_size);
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c static int tpm_key_verify_signature(const struct key *key, · line 787
Quoted 3 lines
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c +3
-0+sg_set_buf (&src_sg[1 ], sig->digest, sig->digest_size); +akcipher_request_set_crypt (req, &src_sg,NULL , sig->s_size, + sig->digest_size);It's not clear that
sig->digestis guaranteed to be kmalloc memory. In any case, it's best not to mix unrelated changes in a single patch. So please keep the kmalloc on output and then copysig->digestinto it and put output into the SG list.
I will do that.
Thanks,
Quoted 21 lines
It is not guaranteed that
sig->swill be kmalloc memory either. (Except we know it for sure like we know the same aboutsig->digest).You can see in
public_key_signature_free()that both fields are kfree'd together.So, I don't understand why we should treat
sig->digestdifferently thansig->s.I was just removing kmalloc'ed output as
crypto_akcipher_verify()does not need any output anymore. So, it's not some sort of mixing unrelated changes, from my point of view.Thanks,
Quoted 6 lines
Thanks,
Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt