4.9.157-stable review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.157 release. There are 24 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Fri Feb 15 18:36:26 UTC 2019. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.157-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 4.9.157-rc1

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Force mac header to start of data on xmit

Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>
batman-adv: Avoid WARN on net_device without parent in netns

Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
xfrm: refine validation of template and selector families

Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
libceph: avoid KEEPALIVE_PENDING races in ceph_con_keepalive()

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Revert "cifs: In Kconfig CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX needs depends on legacy (insecure cifs)"

Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>
HID: debug: fix the ring buffer implementation

J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
nfsd4: catch some false session retries

J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
nfsd4: fix cached replies to solo SEQUENCE compounds

Thomas Hellstrom <[email protected]>
drm/vmwgfx: Return error code from vmw_execbuf_copy_fence_user

Thomas Hellstrom <[email protected]>
drm/vmwgfx: Fix setting of dma masks

Tina Zhang <[email protected]>
drm/modes: Prevent division by zero htotal

Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>
mac80211: ensure that mgmt tx skbs have tailroom for encryption

Marc Gonzalez <[email protected]>
ARM: tango: Improve ARCH_MULTIPLATFORM compatibility

Russell King <[email protected]>
ARM: iop32x/n2100: fix PCI IRQ mapping

Paul Burton <[email protected]>

    MIPS: VDSO: Include $(ccflags-vdso) in o32,n32 .lds builds

Aaro Koskinen <[email protected]>
MIPS: OCTEON: don't set octeon_dma_bar_type if PCI is disabled

Vladimir Kondratiev <[email protected]>
mips: cm: reprime error cause

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
debugfs: fix debugfs_rename parameter checking

Tomas Winkler <[email protected]>
samples: mei: use /dev/mei0 instead of /dev/mei

Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
misc: vexpress: Off by one in vexpress_syscfg_exec()

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
signal: Better detection of synchronous signals

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
signal: Always notice exiting tasks

Matt Ranostay <[email protected]>
iio: chemical: atlas-ph-sensor: correct IIO_TEMP values to millicelsius

Martin Kepplinger <[email protected]>
mtd: rawnand: gpmi: fix MX28 bus master lockup problem

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                |   4 +-
 arch/arm/mach-iop32x/n2100.c            |   3 +-
 arch/arm/mach-tango/pm.c                |   6 +-
 arch/arm/mach-tango/pm.h                |   7 ++
 arch/arm/mach-tango/setup.c             |   2 +
 arch/mips/kernel/mips-cm.c              |   2 +-
 arch/mips/pci/pci-octeon.c              |  10 +--
 arch/mips/vdso/Makefile                 |   4 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c             |   2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c     |   9 ++-
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c |   2 +-
 drivers/hid/hid-debug.c                 | 122 +++++++++++++-------------------
 drivers/iio/chemical/atlas-ph-sensor.c  |   7 +-
 drivers/misc/vexpress-syscfg.c          |   2 +-
 drivers/mtd/nand/gpmi-nand/gpmi-lib.c   |  15 ++--
 fs/cifs/Kconfig                         |   2 +-
 fs/debugfs/inode.c                      |   7 ++
 fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c                     |  57 +++++++++++++--
 fs/nfsd/state.h                         |   2 +
 fs/nfsd/xdr4.h                          |  13 +++-
 include/linux/hid-debug.h               |   9 ++-
 kernel/signal.c                         |  58 ++++++++++++++-
 net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c         |   5 +-
 net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c         |   2 +
 net/ceph/messenger.c                    |   5 +-
 net/mac80211/tx.c                       |  12 +++-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c                    |  13 ++--
 samples/mei/mei-amt-version.c           |   2 +-
 28 files changed, 249 insertions(+), 135 deletions(-)

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Martin Kepplinger <[email protected]>

commit d5d27fd9826b59979b184ec288e4812abac0e988 upstream.

Disable BCH soft reset according to MX23 erratum #2847 ("BCH soft reset may cause bus master lock up") for MX28 too. It has the same problem.

Observed problem: once per 100,000+ MX28 reboots NAND read failed on DMA timeout errors:

[    1.770823] UBI: attaching mtd3 to ubi0
[    2.768088] gpmi_nand: DMA timeout, last DMA :1
[    3.958087] gpmi_nand: BCH timeout, last DMA :1
[    4.156033] gpmi_nand: Error in ECC-based read: -110
[    4.161136] UBI warning: ubi_io_read: error -110 while reading 64
bytes from PEB 0:0, read only 0 bytes, retry
[    4.171283] step 1 error
[    4.173846] gpmi_nand: Chip: 0, Error -1

Without BCH soft reset we successfully executed 1,000,000 MX28 reboots.

I have a quote from NXP regarding this problem, from July 18th 2016:

"As the i.MX23 and i.MX28 are of the same generation, they share many characteristics. Unfortunately, also the erratas may be shared. In case of the documented erratas and the workarounds, you can also apply the workaround solution of one device on the other one. This have been reported, but I’m afraid that there are not an estimated date for updating the Errata documents.
Please accept our apologies for any inconveniences this may cause."

---
 drivers/mtd/nand/gpmi-nand/gpmi-lib.c |   15 +++++++--------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -168,9 +168,10 @@ int gpmi_init(struct gpmi_nand_data *thi
 
 	/*
 	 * Reset BCH here, too. We got failures otherwise :(
-	 * See later BCH reset for explanation of MX23 handling
+	 * See later BCH reset for explanation of MX23 and MX28 handling
 	 */
-	ret = gpmi_reset_block(r->bch_regs, GPMI_IS_MX23(this));
+	ret = gpmi_reset_block(r->bch_regs,
+			       GPMI_IS_MX23(this) || GPMI_IS_MX28(this));
 	if (ret)
 		goto err_out;
 

@@ -275,13 +276,11 @@ int bch_set_geometry(struct gpmi_nand_da
 
 	/*
 	* Due to erratum #2847 of the MX23, the BCH cannot be soft reset on this
-	* chip, otherwise it will lock up. So we skip resetting BCH on the MX23.
-	* On the other hand, the MX28 needs the reset, because one case has been
-	* seen where the BCH produced ECC errors constantly after 10000
-	* consecutive reboots. The latter case has not been seen on the MX23
-	* yet, still we don't know if it could happen there as well.
+	* chip, otherwise it will lock up. So we skip resetting BCH on the MX23
+	* and MX28.
 	*/
-	ret = gpmi_reset_block(r->bch_regs, GPMI_IS_MX23(this));
+	ret = gpmi_reset_block(r->bch_regs,
+			       GPMI_IS_MX23(this) || GPMI_IS_MX28(this));
 	if (ret)
 		goto err_out;
 

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Matt Ranostay <[email protected]>

commit 0808831dc62e90023ad14ff8da4804c7846e904b upstream.

IIO_TEMP scale value for temperature was incorrect and not in millicelsius as required by the ABI documentation.

---
 drivers/iio/chemical/atlas-ph-sensor.c |    7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -453,9 +453,8 @@ static int atlas_read_raw(struct iio_dev
 	case IIO_CHAN_INFO_SCALE:
 		switch (chan->type) {
 		case IIO_TEMP:
-			*val = 1; /* 0.01 */
-			*val2 = 100;
-			break;
+			*val = 10;
+			return IIO_VAL_INT;
 		case IIO_PH:
 			*val = 1; /* 0.001 */
 			*val2 = 1000;

@@ -486,7 +485,7 @@ static int atlas_write_raw(struct iio_de
 			   int val, int val2, long mask)
 {
 	struct atlas_data *data = iio_priv(indio_dev);
-	__be32 reg = cpu_to_be32(val);
+	__be32 reg = cpu_to_be32(val / 10);
 
 	if (val2 != 0 || val < 0 || val > 20000)
 		return -EINVAL;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>

commit 35634ffa1751b6efd8cf75010b509dcb0263e29b upstream.

Recently syzkaller was able to create unkillablle processes by creating a timer that is delivered as a thread local signal on SIGHUP, and receiving SIGHUP SA_NODEFERER. Ultimately causing a loop failing to deliver SIGHUP but always trying.

Upon examination it turns out part of the problem is actually most of the solution. Since 2.5 signal delivery has found all fatal signals, marked the signal group for death, and queued SIGKILL in every threads thread queue relying on signal->group_exit_code to preserve the information of which was the actual fatal signal.

The conversion of all fatal signals to SIGKILL results in the synchronous signal heuristic in next_signal kicking in and preferring SIGHUP to SIGKILL. Which is especially problematic as all fatal signals have already been transformed into SIGKILL.

Instead of dequeueing signals and depending upon SIGKILL to be the first signal dequeued, first test if the signal group has already been marked for death. This guarantees that nothing in the signal queue can prevent a process that needs to exit from exiting.

Ref: ebf5ebe31d2c ("[PATCH] signal-fixes-2.5.59-A4")
History Tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git

---
 kernel/signal.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

@@ -2198,6 +2198,11 @@ relock:
 		goto relock;
 	}
 
+	/* Has this task already been marked for death? */
+	ksig->info.si_signo = signr = SIGKILL;
+	if (signal_group_exit(signal))
+		goto fatal;
+
 	for (;;) {
 		struct k_sigaction *ka;
 

@@ -2293,6 +2298,7 @@ relock:
 			continue;
 		}
 
+	fatal:
 		spin_unlock_irq(&sighand->siglock);
 
 		/*

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>

commit 7146db3317c67b517258cb5e1b08af387da0618b upstream.

Recently syzkaller was able to create unkillablle processes by creating a timer that is delivered as a thread local signal on SIGHUP, and receiving SIGHUP SA_NODEFERER. Ultimately causing a loop failing to deliver SIGHUP but always trying.

When the stack overflows delivery of SIGHUP fails and force_sigsegv is called. Unfortunately because SIGSEGV is numerically higher than SIGHUP next_signal tries again to deliver a SIGHUP.

timer SIGHUP signal is wrong. We should attempt to deliver the synchronous SIGSEGV signal we just forced.

We can make that happening in a fairly straight forward manner by instead of just looking at the signal number we also look at the si_code. In particular for exceptions (aka synchronous signals) the si_code is always greater than 0.

That still has the potential to pick up a number of asynchronous signals as in a few cases the same si_codes that are used for synchronous signals are also used for asynchronous signals, and SI_KERNEL is also included in the list of possible si_codes.

Still the heuristic is much better and timer signals are definitely excluded. Which is enough to prevent all known ways for someone sending a process signals fast enough to cause unexpected and arguably incorrect behavior.

---
 kernel/signal.c |   52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -696,6 +696,48 @@ static inline bool si_fromuser(const str
 		(!is_si_special(info) && SI_FROMUSER(info));
 }
 
+static int dequeue_synchronous_signal(siginfo_t *info)
+{
+	struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+	struct sigpending *pending = &tsk->pending;
+	struct sigqueue *q, *sync = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Might a synchronous signal be in the queue?
+	 */
+	if (!((pending->signal.sig[0] & ~tsk->blocked.sig[0]) & SYNCHRONOUS_MASK))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Return the first synchronous signal in the queue.
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry(q, &pending->list, list) {
+		/* Synchronous signals have a postive si_code */
+		if ((q->info.si_code > SI_USER) &&
+		    (sigmask(q->info.si_signo) & SYNCHRONOUS_MASK)) {
+			sync = q;
+			goto next;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+next:
+	/*
+	 * Check if there is another siginfo for the same signal.
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry_continue(q, &pending->list, list) {
+		if (q->info.si_signo == sync->info.si_signo)
+			goto still_pending;
+	}
+
+	sigdelset(&pending->signal, sync->info.si_signo);
+	recalc_sigpending();
+still_pending:
+	list_del_init(&sync->list);
+	copy_siginfo(info, &sync->info);
+	__sigqueue_free(sync);
+	return info->si_signo;
+}
+
 /*
  * called with RCU read lock from check_kill_permission()
  */

@@ -2216,7 +2258,15 @@ relock:
 			goto relock;
 		}
 
-		signr = dequeue_signal(current, &current->blocked, &ksig->info);
+		/*
+		 * Signals generated by the execution of an instruction
+		 * need to be delivered before any other pending signals
+		 * so that the instruction pointer in the signal stack
+		 * frame points to the faulting instruction.
+		 */
+		signr = dequeue_synchronous_signal(&ksig->info);
+		if (!signr)
+			signr = dequeue_signal(current, &current->blocked, &ksig->info);
 
 		if (!signr)
 			break; /* will return 0 */

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>

commit f8a70d8b889f180e6860cb1f85fed43d37844c5a upstream.

The > comparison should be >= to prevent reading beyond the end of the func->template[] array.

(The func->template array is allocated in vexpress_syscfg_regmap_init() and it has func->num_templates elements.)

---
 drivers/misc/vexpress-syscfg.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ static int vexpress_syscfg_exec(struct v
 	int tries;
 	long timeout;
 
-	if (WARN_ON(index > func->num_templates))
+	if (WARN_ON(index >= func->num_templates))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	command = readl(syscfg->base + SYS_CFGCTRL);

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tomas Winkler <[email protected]>

commit c4a46acf1db3ce547d290c29e55b3476c78dd76c upstream.

The device was moved from misc device to character devices to support multiple mei devices.

---
 samples/mei/mei-amt-version.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static bool mei_init(struct mei *me, con
 
 	me->verbose = verbose;
 
-	me->fd = open("/dev/mei", O_RDWR);
+	me->fd = open("/dev/mei0", O_RDWR);
 	if (me->fd == -1) {
 		mei_err(me, "Cannot establish a handle to the Intel MEI driver\n");
 		goto err;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

commit d88c93f090f708c18195553b352b9f205e65418f upstream.

debugfs_rename() needs to check that the dentries passed into it really are valid, as sometimes they are not (i.e. if the return value of another debugfs call is passed into this one.) So fix this up by properly checking if the two parent directories are errors (they are allowed to be NULL), and if the dentry to rename is not NULL or an error.

---
 fs/debugfs/inode.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

@@ -732,6 +732,13 @@ struct dentry *debugfs_rename(struct den
 	struct dentry *dentry = NULL, *trap;
 	struct name_snapshot old_name;
 
+	if (IS_ERR(old_dir))
+		return old_dir;
+	if (IS_ERR(new_dir))
+		return new_dir;
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(old_dentry))
+		return old_dentry;
+
 	trap = lock_rename(new_dir, old_dir);
 	/* Source or destination directories don't exist? */
 	if (d_really_is_negative(old_dir) || d_really_is_negative(new_dir))

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vladimir Kondratiev <[email protected]>

commit 05dc6001af0630e200ad5ea08707187fe5537e6d upstream.

Accordingly to the documentation
---cut---
The GCR_ERROR_CAUSE.ERR_TYPE field and the GCR_ERROR_MULT.ERR_TYPE fields can be cleared by either a reset or by writing the current value of GCR_ERROR_CAUSE.ERR_TYPE to the GCR_ERROR_CAUSE.ERR_TYPE register.
---cut---
Do exactly this. Original value of cm_error may be safely written back; it clears error cause and keeps other bits untouched.

---
 arch/mips/kernel/mips-cm.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -424,5 +424,5 @@ void mips_cm_error_report(void)
 	}
 
 	/* reprime cause register */
-	write_gcr_error_cause(0);
+	write_gcr_error_cause(cm_error);
 }

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Aaro Koskinen <[email protected]>

commit dcf300a69ac307053dfb35c2e33972e754a98bce upstream.

Don't set octeon_dma_bar_type if PCI is disabled. This avoids creation of the MSI irqchip later on, and saves a bit of memory.

---
 arch/mips/pci/pci-octeon.c |   10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -573,6 +573,11 @@ static int __init octeon_pci_setup(void)
 	if (octeon_has_feature(OCTEON_FEATURE_PCIE))
 		return 0;
 
+	if (!octeon_is_pci_host()) {
+		pr_notice("Not in host mode, PCI Controller not initialized\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	/* Point pcibios_map_irq() to the PCI version of it */
 	octeon_pcibios_map_irq = octeon_pci_pcibios_map_irq;
 

@@ -584,11 +589,6 @@ static int __init octeon_pci_setup(void)
 	else
 		octeon_dma_bar_type = OCTEON_DMA_BAR_TYPE_BIG;
 
-	if (!octeon_is_pci_host()) {
-		pr_notice("Not in host mode, PCI Controller not initialized\n");
-		return 0;
-	}
-
 	/* PCI I/O and PCI MEM values */
 	set_io_port_base(OCTEON_PCI_IOSPACE_BASE);
 	ioport_resource.start = 0;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul Burton <[email protected]>

commit 67fc5dc8a541e8f458d7f08bf88ff55933bf9f9d upstream.

When generating vdso-o32.lds & vdso-n32.lds for use with programs running as compat ABIs under 64b kernels, we previously haven't included the compiler flags that are supposedly common to all ABIs - ie. those in the ccflags-vdso variable.

This is problematic in cases where we need to provide the -m%-float flag in order to ensure that we don't attempt to use a floating point ABI that's incompatible with the target CPU & ABI. For example a toolchain using current gcc trunk configured --with-fp-32=xx fails to build a 64r6el_defconfig kernel with the following error:

cc1: error: '-march=mips1' requires '-mfp32'
make[2]: *** [arch/mips/vdso/Makefile:135: arch/mips/vdso/vdso-o32.lds] Error 1

Include $(ccflags-vdso) for the compat VDSO .lds builds, just as it is included for the native VDSO .lds & when compiling objects for the compat VDSOs. This ensures we consistently provide the -msoft-float flag amongst others, avoiding the problem by ensuring we're agnostic to the toolchain defaults.

---
 arch/mips/vdso/Makefile |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ $(obj)/%-o32.o: $(src)/%.c FORCE
 	$(call cmd,force_checksrc)
 	$(call if_changed_rule,cc_o_c)
 
-$(obj)/vdso-o32.lds: KBUILD_CPPFLAGS := -mabi=32
+$(obj)/vdso-o32.lds: KBUILD_CPPFLAGS := $(ccflags-vdso) -mabi=32
 $(obj)/vdso-o32.lds: $(src)/vdso.lds.S FORCE
 	$(call if_changed_dep,cpp_lds_S)
 

@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ $(obj)/%-n32.o: $(src)/%.c FORCE
 	$(call cmd,force_checksrc)
 	$(call if_changed_rule,cc_o_c)
 
-$(obj)/vdso-n32.lds: KBUILD_CPPFLAGS := -mabi=n32
+$(obj)/vdso-n32.lds: KBUILD_CPPFLAGS := $(ccflags-vdso) -mabi=n32
 $(obj)/vdso-n32.lds: $(src)/vdso.lds.S FORCE
 	$(call if_changed_dep,cpp_lds_S)
 

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

commit db4090920ba2d61a5827a23e441447926a02ffee upstream.

Booting 4.20 on a TheCUS N2100 results in a kernel oops while probing PCI, due to n2100_pci_map_irq() having been discarded during boot.

---
 arch/arm/mach-iop32x/n2100.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -75,8 +75,7 @@ void __init n2100_map_io(void)
 /*
  * N2100 PCI.
  */
-static int __init
-n2100_pci_map_irq(const struct pci_dev *dev, u8 slot, u8 pin)
+static int n2100_pci_map_irq(const struct pci_dev *dev, u8 slot, u8 pin)
 {
 	int irq;
 

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marc Gonzalez <[email protected]>

commit d0f9f16788e15d9eb40f68b047732d49658c5a3a upstream.

Calling platform-specific code unconditionally blows up when running an ARCH_MULTIPLATFORM kernel on a different platform. Don't do it.

---
 arch/arm/mach-tango/pm.c    |    6 ++----
 arch/arm/mach-tango/pm.h    |    7 +++++++
 arch/arm/mach-tango/setup.c |    2 ++
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #include <linux/suspend.h>
 #include <asm/suspend.h>
 #include "smc.h"
+#include "pm.h"
 
 static int tango_pm_powerdown(unsigned long arg)
 {

@@ -23,10 +24,7 @@ static const struct platform_suspend_ops
 	.valid = suspend_valid_only_mem,
 };
 
-static int __init tango_pm_init(void)
+void __init tango_pm_init(void)
 {
 	suspend_set_ops(&tango_pm_ops);
-	return 0;
 }
-
-late_initcall(tango_pm_init);

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SUSPEND
+void __init tango_pm_init(void);
+#else
+#define tango_pm_init NULL
+#endif

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 #include <asm/mach/arch.h>
 #include <asm/hardware/cache-l2x0.h>
 #include "smc.h"
+#include "pm.h"
 
 static void tango_l2c_write(unsigned long val, unsigned int reg)
 {

@@ -14,4 +15,5 @@ DT_MACHINE_START(TANGO_DT, "Sigma Tango
 	.dt_compat	= tango_dt_compat,
 	.l2c_aux_mask	= ~0,
 	.l2c_write_sec	= tango_l2c_write,
+	.init_late	= tango_pm_init,
 MACHINE_END

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>

commit 9d0f50b80222dc273e67e4e14410fcfa4130a90c upstream.

Some drivers use IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_SW_MGMT_TX to indicate that management frames need to be software encrypted. Since normal data packets are still encrypted by the hardware, crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt gets decremented after key upload to hw. This can lead to passing skbs to ccmp_encrypt_skb, which don't have the necessary tailroom for software encryption.

Change the code to add tailroom for encrypted management packets, even if crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt is 0.

---
 net/mac80211/tx.c |   12 +++++++++---
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -1852,9 +1852,16 @@ static int ieee80211_skb_resize(struct i
 				int head_need, bool may_encrypt)
 {
 	struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local;
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
+	bool enc_tailroom;
 	int tail_need = 0;
 
-	if (may_encrypt && sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt) {
+	hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
+	enc_tailroom = may_encrypt &&
+		       (sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt ||
+			ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control));
+
+	if (enc_tailroom) {
 		tail_need = IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_TAILROOM;
 		tail_need -= skb_tailroom(skb);
 		tail_need = max_t(int, tail_need, 0);

@@ -1862,8 +1869,7 @@ static int ieee80211_skb_resize(struct i
 
 	if (skb_cloned(skb) &&
 	    (!ieee80211_hw_check(&local->hw, SUPPORTS_CLONED_SKBS) ||
-	     !skb_clone_writable(skb, ETH_HLEN) ||
-	     (may_encrypt && sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt)))
+	     !skb_clone_writable(skb, ETH_HLEN) || enc_tailroom))
 		I802_DEBUG_INC(local->tx_expand_skb_head_cloned);
 	else if (head_need || tail_need)
 		I802_DEBUG_INC(local->tx_expand_skb_head);

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tina Zhang <[email protected]>

commit a2fcd5c84f7a7825e028381b10182439067aa90d upstream.

This patch prevents division by zero htotal.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modes.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -753,7 +753,7 @@ int drm_mode_hsync(const struct drm_disp
 	if (mode->hsync)
 		return mode->hsync;
 
-	if (mode->htotal < 0)
+	if (mode->htotal <= 0)
 		return 0;
 
 	calc_val = (mode->clock * 1000) / mode->htotal; /* hsync in Hz */

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Hellstrom <[email protected]>

commit 4cbfa1e6c09e98450aab3240e5119b0ab2c9795b upstream.

Previously we set only the dma mask and not the coherent mask. Fix that. Also, for clarity, make sure both are initially set to 64 bits.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_drv.c |    9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -605,13 +605,16 @@ out_fixup:
 static int vmw_dma_masks(struct vmw_private *dev_priv)
 {
 	struct drm_device *dev = dev_priv->dev;
+	int ret = 0;
 
-	if (intel_iommu_enabled &&
+	ret = dma_set_mask_and_coherent(dev->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(64));
+	if (dev_priv->map_mode != vmw_dma_phys &&
 	    (sizeof(unsigned long) == 4 || vmw_restrict_dma_mask)) {
 		DRM_INFO("Restricting DMA addresses to 44 bits.\n");
-		return dma_set_mask(dev->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(44));
+		return dma_set_mask_and_coherent(dev->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(44));
 	}
-	return 0;
+
+	return ret;
 }
 #else
 static int vmw_dma_masks(struct vmw_private *dev_priv)

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Hellstrom <[email protected]>

commit 728354c005c36eaf44b6e5552372b67e60d17f56 upstream.

The function was unconditionally returning 0, and a caller would have to rely on the returned fence pointer being NULL to detect errors. However, the function vmw_execbuf_copy_fence_user() would expect a non-zero error code in that case and would BUG otherwise.

So make sure we return a proper non-zero error code if the fence pointer returned is NULL.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -3769,7 +3769,7 @@ int vmw_execbuf_fence_commands(struct dr
 		*p_fence = NULL;
 	}
 
-	return 0;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /**

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>

commit 085def3ade52f2ffe3e31f42e98c27dcc222dd37 upstream.

Currently our handling of 4.1+ requests without "cachethis" set is confusing and not quite correct.

Suppose a client sends a compound consisting of only a single SEQUENCE op, and it matches the seqid in a session slot (so it's a retry), but the previous request with that seqid did not have "cachethis" set.

The obvious thing to do might be to return NFS4ERR_RETRY_UNCACHED_REP, but the protocol only allows that to be returned on the op following the SEQUENCE, and there is no such op in this case.

The protocol permits us to cache replies even if the client didn't ask us to. And it's easy to do so in the case of solo SEQUENCE compounds.

So, when we get a solo SEQUENCE, we can either return the previously cached reply or NFSERR_SEQ_FALSE_RETRY if we notice it differs in some way from the original call.

Currently, we're returning a corrupt reply in the case a solo SEQUENCE matches a previous compound with more ops. This actually matters because the Linux client recently started doing this as a way to recover from lost replies to idempotent operations in the case the process doing the original reply was killed: in that case it's difficult to keep the original arguments around to do a real retry, and the client no longer cares what the result is anyway, but it would like to make sure that the slot's sequence id has been incremented, and the solo SEQUENCE assures
that: if the server never got the original reply, it will increment the sequence id. If it did get the original reply, it won't increment, and nothing else that about the reply really matters much. But we can at least attempt to return valid xdr!

---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c |   20 +++++++++++++++-----
 fs/nfsd/state.h     |    1 +
 fs/nfsd/xdr4.h      |   13 +++++++++++--
 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

@@ -2344,14 +2344,16 @@ nfsd4_store_cache_entry(struct nfsd4_com
 
 	dprintk("--> %s slot %p\n", __func__, slot);
 
+	slot->sl_flags |= NFSD4_SLOT_INITIALIZED;
 	slot->sl_opcnt = resp->opcnt;
 	slot->sl_status = resp->cstate.status;
 
-	slot->sl_flags |= NFSD4_SLOT_INITIALIZED;
-	if (nfsd4_not_cached(resp)) {
-		slot->sl_datalen = 0;
+	if (!nfsd4_cache_this(resp)) {
+		slot->sl_flags &= ~NFSD4_SLOT_CACHED;
 		return;
 	}
+	slot->sl_flags |= NFSD4_SLOT_CACHED;
+
 	base = resp->cstate.data_offset;
 	slot->sl_datalen = buf->len - base;
 	if (read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, base, slot->sl_data, slot->sl_datalen))

@@ -2378,8 +2380,16 @@ nfsd4_enc_sequence_replay(struct nfsd4_c
 	op = &args->ops[resp->opcnt - 1];
 	nfsd4_encode_operation(resp, op);
 
-	/* Return nfserr_retry_uncached_rep in next operation. */
-	if (args->opcnt > 1 && !(slot->sl_flags & NFSD4_SLOT_CACHETHIS)) {
+	if (slot->sl_flags & NFSD4_SLOT_CACHED)
+		return op->status;
+	if (args->opcnt == 1) {
+		/*
+		 * The original operation wasn't a solo sequence--we
+		 * always cache those--so this retry must not match the
+		 * original:
+		 */
+		op->status = nfserr_seq_false_retry;
+	} else {
 		op = &args->ops[resp->opcnt++];
 		op->status = nfserr_retry_uncached_rep;
 		nfsd4_encode_operation(resp, op);

@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ struct nfsd4_slot {
 #define NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE	(1 << 0)
 #define NFSD4_SLOT_CACHETHIS	(1 << 1)
 #define NFSD4_SLOT_INITIALIZED	(1 << 2)
+#define NFSD4_SLOT_CACHED	(1 << 3)
 	u8	sl_flags;
 	char	sl_data[];
 };

@@ -645,9 +645,18 @@ static inline bool nfsd4_is_solo_sequenc
 	return resp->opcnt == 1 && args->ops[0].opnum == OP_SEQUENCE;
 }
 
-static inline bool nfsd4_not_cached(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp)
+/*
+ * The session reply cache only needs to cache replies that the client
+ * actually asked us to.  But it's almost free for us to cache compounds
+ * consisting of only a SEQUENCE op, so we may as well cache those too.
+ * Also, the protocol doesn't give us a convenient response in the case
+ * of a replay of a solo SEQUENCE op that wasn't cached
+ * (RETRY_UNCACHED_REP can only be returned in the second op of a
+ * compound).
+ */
+static inline bool nfsd4_cache_this(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp)
 {
-	return !(resp->cstate.slot->sl_flags & NFSD4_SLOT_CACHETHIS)
+	return (resp->cstate.slot->sl_flags & NFSD4_SLOT_CACHETHIS)
 		|| nfsd4_is_solo_sequence(resp);
 }
 

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>

commit 53da6a53e1d414e05759fa59b7032ee08f4e22d7 upstream.

The spec allows us to return NFS4ERR_SEQ_FALSE_RETRY if we notice that the client is making a call that matches a previous (slot, seqid) pair but that *isn't* actually a replay, because some detail of the call doesn't actually match the previous one.

Catching every such case is difficult, but we may as well catch a few easy ones. This also handles the case described in the previous patch, in a different way.

The spec does however require us to catch the case where the difference is in the rpc credentials. This prevents somebody from snooping another user's replies by fabricating retries.

(But the practical value of the attack is limited by the fact that the replies with the most sensitive data are READ replies, which are not normally cached.)

---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c |   37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 fs/nfsd/state.h     |    1 +
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1472,8 +1472,10 @@ free_session_slots(struct nfsd4_session
 {
 	int i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < ses->se_fchannel.maxreqs; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < ses->se_fchannel.maxreqs; i++) {
+		free_svc_cred(&ses->se_slots[i]->sl_cred);
 		kfree(ses->se_slots[i]);
+	}
 }
 
 /*

@@ -2347,6 +2349,8 @@ nfsd4_store_cache_entry(struct nfsd4_com
 	slot->sl_flags |= NFSD4_SLOT_INITIALIZED;
 	slot->sl_opcnt = resp->opcnt;
 	slot->sl_status = resp->cstate.status;
+	free_svc_cred(&slot->sl_cred);
+	copy_cred(&slot->sl_cred, &resp->rqstp->rq_cred);
 
 	if (!nfsd4_cache_this(resp)) {
 		slot->sl_flags &= ~NFSD4_SLOT_CACHED;

@@ -3049,6 +3053,34 @@ static bool nfsd4_request_too_big(struct
 	return xb->len > session->se_fchannel.maxreq_sz;
 }
 
+static bool replay_matches_cache(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
+		 struct nfsd4_sequence *seq, struct nfsd4_slot *slot)
+{
+	struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp = rqstp->rq_argp;
+
+	if ((bool)(slot->sl_flags & NFSD4_SLOT_CACHETHIS) !=
+	    (bool)seq->cachethis)
+		return false;
+	/*
+	 * If there's an error than the reply can have fewer ops than
+	 * the call.  But if we cached a reply with *more* ops than the
+	 * call you're sending us now, then this new call is clearly not
+	 * really a replay of the old one:
+	 */
+	if (slot->sl_opcnt < argp->opcnt)
+		return false;
+	/* This is the only check explicitly called by spec: */
+	if (!same_creds(&rqstp->rq_cred, &slot->sl_cred))
+		return false;
+	/*
+	 * There may be more comparisons we could actually do, but the
+	 * spec doesn't require us to catch every case where the calls
+	 * don't match (that would require caching the call as well as
+	 * the reply), so we don't bother.
+	 */
+	return true;
+}
+
 __be32
 nfsd4_sequence(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
 	       struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate,

@@ -3108,6 +3140,9 @@ nfsd4_sequence(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
 		status = nfserr_seq_misordered;
 		if (!(slot->sl_flags & NFSD4_SLOT_INITIALIZED))
 			goto out_put_session;
+		status = nfserr_seq_false_retry;
+		if (!replay_matches_cache(rqstp, seq, slot))
+			goto out_put_session;
 		cstate->slot = slot;
 		cstate->session = session;
 		cstate->clp = clp;

@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ static inline struct nfs4_delegation *de
 struct nfsd4_slot {
 	u32	sl_seqid;
 	__be32	sl_status;
+	struct svc_cred sl_cred;
 	u32	sl_datalen;
 	u16	sl_opcnt;
 #define NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE	(1 << 0)

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vladis Dronov <[email protected]>

commit 13054abbaa4f1fd4e6f3b4b63439ec033b4c8035 upstream.

Ring buffer implementation in hid_debug_event() and hid_debug_events_read() is strange allowing lost or corrupted data. After commit 717adfdaf147 ("HID: debug: check length before copy_to_user()") it is possible to enter an infinite loop in hid_debug_events_read() by providing 0 as count, this locks up a system. Fix this by rewriting the ring buffer implementation with kfifo and simplify the code.

This fixes CVE-2019-3819.

v2: fix an execution logic and add a comment
v3: use __set_current_state() instead of set_current_state()

Backport to v4.9: some tree-wide patches are missing in v4.9 so cherry-pick relevant pieces from:
* 6396bb22151 ("treewide: kzalloc() -> kcalloc()")
* a9a08845e9ac ("vfs: do bulk POLL* -> EPOLL* replacement")
* 174cd4b1e5fb ("sched/headers: Prepare to move signal wakeup & sigpending methods from <linux/sched.h> into <linux/sched/signal.h>")

---
 drivers/hid/hid-debug.c   |  122 ++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
 include/linux/hid-debug.h |    9 +--
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/kfifo.h>
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>

@@ -455,7 +456,7 @@ static char *resolv_usage_page(unsigned
 	char *buf = NULL;
 
 	if (!f) {
-		buf = kzalloc(sizeof(char) * HID_DEBUG_BUFSIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		buf = kzalloc(HID_DEBUG_BUFSIZE, GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (!buf)
 			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	}

@@ -659,17 +660,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hid_dump_device);
 /* enqueue string to 'events' ring buffer */
 void hid_debug_event(struct hid_device *hdev, char *buf)
 {
-	unsigned i;
 	struct hid_debug_list *list;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&hdev->debug_list_lock, flags);
-	list_for_each_entry(list, &hdev->debug_list, node) {
-		for (i = 0; buf[i]; i++)
-			list->hid_debug_buf[(list->tail + i) % HID_DEBUG_BUFSIZE] =
-				buf[i];
-		list->tail = (list->tail + i) % HID_DEBUG_BUFSIZE;
-        }
+	list_for_each_entry(list, &hdev->debug_list, node)
+		kfifo_in(&list->hid_debug_fifo, buf, strlen(buf));
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hdev->debug_list_lock, flags);
 
 	wake_up_interruptible(&hdev->debug_wait);

@@ -720,8 +716,7 @@ void hid_dump_input(struct hid_device *h
 	hid_debug_event(hdev, buf);
 
 	kfree(buf);
-        wake_up_interruptible(&hdev->debug_wait);
-
+	wake_up_interruptible(&hdev->debug_wait);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hid_dump_input);
 

@@ -1086,8 +1081,8 @@ static int hid_debug_events_open(struct
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	if (!(list->hid_debug_buf = kzalloc(sizeof(char) * HID_DEBUG_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL))) {
-		err = -ENOMEM;
+	err = kfifo_alloc(&list->hid_debug_fifo, HID_DEBUG_FIFOSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (err) {
 		kfree(list);
 		goto out;
 	}

@@ -1107,77 +1102,57 @@ static ssize_t hid_debug_events_read(str
 		size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	struct hid_debug_list *list = file->private_data;
-	int ret = 0, len;
+	int ret = 0, copied;
 	DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
 
 	mutex_lock(&list->read_mutex);
-	while (ret == 0) {
-		if (list->head == list->tail) {
-			add_wait_queue(&list->hdev->debug_wait, &wait);
-			set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
-
-			while (list->head == list->tail) {
-				if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
-					ret = -EAGAIN;
-					break;
-				}
-				if (signal_pending(current)) {
-					ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
-					break;
-				}
-
-				if (!list->hdev || !list->hdev->debug) {
-					ret = -EIO;
-					set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
-					goto out;
-				}
-
-				/* allow O_NONBLOCK from other threads */
-				mutex_unlock(&list->read_mutex);
-				schedule();
-				mutex_lock(&list->read_mutex);
-				set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
+	if (kfifo_is_empty(&list->hid_debug_fifo)) {
+		add_wait_queue(&list->hdev->debug_wait, &wait);
+		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
+
+		while (kfifo_is_empty(&list->hid_debug_fifo)) {
+			if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
+				ret = -EAGAIN;
+				break;
 			}
 
-			set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
-			remove_wait_queue(&list->hdev->debug_wait, &wait);
-		}
-
-		if (ret)
-			goto out;
-
-		/* pass the ringbuffer contents to userspace */
-copy_rest:
-		if (list->tail == list->head)
-			goto out;
-		if (list->tail > list->head) {
-			len = list->tail - list->head;
-			if (len > count)
-				len = count;
-
-			if (copy_to_user(buffer + ret, &list->hid_debug_buf[list->head], len)) {
-				ret = -EFAULT;
-				goto out;
+			if (signal_pending(current)) {
+				ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+				break;
 			}
-			ret += len;
-			list->head += len;
-		} else {
-			len = HID_DEBUG_BUFSIZE - list->head;
-			if (len > count)
-				len = count;
 
-			if (copy_to_user(buffer, &list->hid_debug_buf[list->head], len)) {
-				ret = -EFAULT;
+			/* if list->hdev is NULL we cannot remove_wait_queue().
+			 * if list->hdev->debug is 0 then hid_debug_unregister()
+			 * was already called and list->hdev is being destroyed.
+			 * if we add remove_wait_queue() here we can hit a race.
+			 */
+			if (!list->hdev || !list->hdev->debug) {
+				ret = -EIO;
+				set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
 				goto out;
 			}
-			list->head = 0;
-			ret += len;
-			count -= len;
-			if (count > 0)
-				goto copy_rest;
+
+			/* allow O_NONBLOCK from other threads */
+			mutex_unlock(&list->read_mutex);
+			schedule();
+			mutex_lock(&list->read_mutex);
+			set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
 		}
 
+		__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
+		remove_wait_queue(&list->hdev->debug_wait, &wait);
+
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
 	}
+
+	/* pass the fifo content to userspace, locking is not needed with only
+	 * one concurrent reader and one concurrent writer
+	 */
+	ret = kfifo_to_user(&list->hid_debug_fifo, buffer, count, &copied);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+	ret = copied;
 out:
 	mutex_unlock(&list->read_mutex);
 	return ret;

@@ -1188,7 +1163,7 @@ static unsigned int hid_debug_events_pol
 	struct hid_debug_list *list = file->private_data;
 
 	poll_wait(file, &list->hdev->debug_wait, wait);
-	if (list->head != list->tail)
+	if (!kfifo_is_empty(&list->hid_debug_fifo))
 		return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
 	if (!list->hdev->debug)
 		return POLLERR | POLLHUP;

@@ -1203,7 +1178,7 @@ static int hid_debug_events_release(stru
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&list->hdev->debug_list_lock, flags);
 	list_del(&list->node);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&list->hdev->debug_list_lock, flags);
-	kfree(list->hid_debug_buf);
+	kfifo_free(&list->hid_debug_fifo);
 	kfree(list);
 
 	return 0;

@@ -1254,4 +1229,3 @@ void hid_debug_exit(void)
 {
 	debugfs_remove_recursive(hid_debug_root);
 }
-

@@ -24,7 +24,10 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
 
+#include <linux/kfifo.h>
+
 #define HID_DEBUG_BUFSIZE 512
+#define HID_DEBUG_FIFOSIZE 512
 
 void hid_dump_input(struct hid_device *, struct hid_usage *, __s32);
 void hid_dump_report(struct hid_device *, int , u8 *, int);

@@ -37,11 +40,8 @@ void hid_debug_init(void);
 void hid_debug_exit(void);
 void hid_debug_event(struct hid_device *, char *);
 
-
 struct hid_debug_list {
-	char *hid_debug_buf;
-	int head;
-	int tail;
+	DECLARE_KFIFO_PTR(hid_debug_fifo, char);
 	struct fasync_struct *fasync;
 	struct hid_device *hdev;
 	struct list_head node;

@@ -64,4 +64,3 @@ struct hid_debug_list {
 #endif
 
 #endif
-

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

This reverts commit 4cd376638c893cf5bf1072eeaac884f62b7ac71e which is commit 6e785302dad32228819d8066e5376acd15d0e6ba upstream.

Yi writes:
I notice that 4.4.169 merged 60da90b224ba7 ("cifs: In Kconfig CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX needs depends on legacy (insecure cifs)") add a Kconfig dependency CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY, which was not defined in 4.4 stable, so after this patch we are not able to enable CIFS_POSIX anymore. Linux 4.4 stable didn't merge the legacy dialects codes, so do we really need this patch for 4.4?

So revert this patch in 4.9 as well.

---
 fs/cifs/Kconfig |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ config CIFS_XATTR
 
 config CIFS_POSIX
         bool "CIFS POSIX Extensions"
-        depends on CIFS && CIFS_ALLOW_INSECURE_LEGACY && CIFS_XATTR
+        depends on CIFS_XATTR
         help
           Enabling this option will cause the cifs client to attempt to
 	  negotiate a newer dialect with servers, such as Samba 3.0.5

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>

commit 4aac9228d16458cedcfd90c7fb37211cf3653ac3 upstream.

con_fault() can transition the connection into STANDBY right after ceph_con_keepalive() clears STANDBY in clear_standby():

libceph user thread ceph-msgr worker

ceph_con_keepalive()
mutex_lock(&con->mutex)
clear_standby(con)
mutex_unlock(&con->mutex)

                                mutex_lock(&con->mutex)
                                con_fault()
                                  ...
                                  if KEEPALIVE_PENDING isn't set
                                    set state to STANDBY
                                  ...
                                mutex_unlock(&con->mutex)

set KEEPALIVE_PENDING
set WRITE_PENDING

This triggers warnings in clear_standby() when either ceph_con_send() or ceph_con_keepalive() get to clearing STANDBY next time.

I don't see a reason to condition queue_con() call on the previous value of KEEPALIVE_PENDING, so move the setting of KEEPALIVE_PENDING into the critical section -- unlike WRITE_PENDING, KEEPALIVE_PENDING could have been a non-atomic flag.

---
 net/ceph/messenger.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -3186,9 +3186,10 @@ void ceph_con_keepalive(struct ceph_conn
 	dout("con_keepalive %p\n", con);
 	mutex_lock(&con->mutex);
 	clear_standby(con);
+	con_flag_set(con, CON_FLAG_KEEPALIVE_PENDING);
 	mutex_unlock(&con->mutex);
-	if (con_flag_test_and_set(con, CON_FLAG_KEEPALIVE_PENDING) == 0 &&
-	    con_flag_test_and_set(con, CON_FLAG_WRITE_PENDING) == 0)
+
+	if (con_flag_test_and_set(con, CON_FLAG_WRITE_PENDING) == 0)
 		queue_con(con);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_con_keepalive);

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

commit 35e6103861a3a970de6c84688c6e7a1f65b164ca upstream.

The check assumes that in transport mode, the first templates family must match the address family of the policy selector.

Syzkaller managed to build a template using MODE_ROUTEOPTIMIZATION, with ipv4-in-ipv6 chain, leading to following splat:

BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in xfrm_state_find+0x1db/0x1854
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888063e57aa0 by task a.out/2050
 xfrm_state_find+0x1db/0x1854
 xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0x100/0x1d0
 xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x108/0x1000 [..]

Problem is that addresses point into flowi4 struct, but xfrm_state_find treats them as being ipv6 because it uses templ->encap_family is used (AF_INET6 in case of reproducer) rather than family (AF_INET).

This patch inverts the logic: Enforce 'template family must match selector' EXCEPT for tunnel and BEET mode.

In BEET and Tunnel mode, xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one will have remote/local address pointers changed to point at the addresses found in the template, rather than the flowi ones, so no oob read will occur.

---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c |   13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -1408,10 +1408,15 @@ static int validate_tmpl(int nr, struct
 		if (!ut[i].family)
 			ut[i].family = family;
 
-		if ((ut[i].mode == XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT) &&
-		    (ut[i].family != prev_family))
-			return -EINVAL;
-
+		switch (ut[i].mode) {
+		case XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL:
+		case XFRM_MODE_BEET:
+			break;
+		default:
+			if (ut[i].family != prev_family)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
 		if (ut[i].mode >= XFRM_MODE_MAX)
 			return -EINVAL;
 

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit 955d3411a17f590364238bd0d3329b61f20c1cd2 upstream.

It is not allowed to use WARN* helpers on potential incorrect input from the user or transient problems because systems configured as panic_on_warn will reboot due to such a problem.

A NULL return value of __dev_get_by_index can be caused by various problems which can either be related to the system configuration or problems (incorrectly returned network namespaces) in other (virtual) net_device drivers. batman-adv should not cause a (harmful) WARN in this situation and instead only report it via a simple message.

---
 net/batman-adv/hard-interface.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
 #include "main.h"
 
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
-#include <linux/bug.h>
 #include <linux/byteorder/generic.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>

@@ -172,8 +171,10 @@ static bool batadv_is_on_batman_iface(co
 	parent_dev = __dev_get_by_index((struct net *)parent_net,
 					dev_get_iflink(net_dev));
 	/* if we got a NULL parent_dev there is something broken.. */
-	if (WARN(!parent_dev, "Cannot find parent device"))
+	if (!parent_dev) {
+		pr_err("Cannot find parent device\n");
 		return false;
+	}
 
 	if (batadv_mutual_parents(net_dev, net, parent_dev, parent_net))
 		return false;

4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <[email protected]>

commit 9114daa825fc3f335f9bea3313ce667090187280 upstream.

The caller of ndo_start_xmit may not already have called skb_reset_mac_header. The returned value of skb_mac_header/eth_hdr therefore can be in the wrong position and even outside the current skbuff. This for example happens when the user binds to the device using a PF_PACKET-SOCK_RAW with enabled qdisc-bypass:

  int opt = 4;
  setsockopt(sock, SOL_PACKET, PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS, &opt, sizeof(opt));

Since eth_hdr is used all over the codebase, the batadv_interface_tx function must always take care of resetting it.

---
 net/batman-adv/soft-interface.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -211,6 +211,8 @@ static int batadv_interface_tx(struct sk
 
 	netif_trans_update(soft_iface);
 	vid = batadv_get_vid(skb, 0);
+
+	skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
 	ethhdr = eth_hdr(skb);
 
 	switch (ntohs(ethhdr->h_proto)) {

All tests are passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v4.9:

    8 builds:	8 pass, 0 fail
    16 boots:	16 pass, 0 fail
    14 tests:	14 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 4.9.157-rc1-ge9f66e4
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana,

                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04

Cheers
Jon

nvpublic

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 4.9.157-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.9.y
git commit: faa3b6b1ed9c5a1671bf42cf23aff7c202b7d360
git describe: v4.9.156-25-gfaa3b6b1ed9c
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.9-oe/build/v4.9.156-25-gfaa3b6b1ed9c

No regressions (compared to build v4.9.156)

No Fixes (compared to build v4.9.156)

Ran 22192 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64

Test Suites
-----------
* boot
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none

Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

Build results:

	total: 172 pass: 172 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 315 pass: 315 fail: 0

Guenter

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah