Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent
Subsystems (4)
v6 cover Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent
Changes in v6:
- remove copy-pasted duplicate macro definition
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/[email protected]/T/
Changes in v5:
- fix misplaced semicolon detected by 0day robot
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/[email protected]/T/
Changes in v4:
- reorder and rename hook arguments
- avoid allocating kernfs_iattrs unless needed
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/[email protected]/T/
Changes in v3:
- rename the hook to "kernfs_init_security"
- change the hook interface to simply pass pointers to struct iattr and struct simple_xattrs of both the new node and its parent
- add full security xattr support to kernfs (and fixup SELinux behavior to handle it properly)
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/[email protected]/T/
Changes in v2:
- add docstring for the new hook in union security_list_options
- initialize *ctx to NULL and *ctxlen to 0 in case the hook is not implemented
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/[email protected]/T/
TL;DR:
This series adds a new security hook that allows to initialize the security context of kernfs properly, taking into account the parent context (and possibly other attributes). Kernfs nodes require special handling here, since they are not bound to specific inodes/superblocks, but instead represent the backing tree structure that is used to build the VFS tree when the kernfs tree is mounted.
The kernfs nodes initially do not store any security context and rely on the LSM to assign some default context to inodes created over them. Kernfs inodes, however, allow setting an explicit context via the *setxattr(2) syscalls, in which case the context is stored inside the kernfs node's internal structure.
SELinux (and possibly other LSMs) initialize the context of newly created FS objects based on the parent object's context (usually the child inherits the parent's context, unless the policy dictates otherwise). This is done by hooking the creation of the new inode corresponding to the newly created file/directory via security_inode_init_security() (most filesystems always create a fresh inode when a new FS object is created). However, kernfs nodes can be created "behind the scenes" while the filesystem is not mounted anywhere and thus no inodes can exist for them yet.
Therefore, to allow maintaining similar behavior for kernfs nodes, a new LSM hook is needed, which will allow initializing the kernfs node's security context based on its own attributes and those of the parent's node.
The main motivation for this change is that the userspace users of cgroupfs (which is built on kernfs) expect the usual security context inheritance to work under SELinux (see [1] and [2]). This functionality is required for better confinement of containers under SELinux.
Patch 1/5 changes SELinux to fetch security context from extended attributes on kernfs filesystems, falling back to genfs-defined context if that fails. Without this patch the 2/5 would be a regression for SELinux (due to the removal of ...notifysecctx() call.
Patch 2/5 implements full security xattr support in kernfs using simple_xattrs; patch 3/5 adds the new LSM hook; patch 4/5 implements the new hook in SELinux; and patch 5/5 modifies kernfs to call the new hook on new node creation.
Testing:
- passed the reproducer from the commit message of the last patch
- passed SELinux testsuite on Fedora 29 (x86_64) when applied on top of current Rawhide kernel (5.0.0-0.rc5.git0.1) [3]
- including the new proposed selinux-testsuite subtest [4] (adapted from the reproducer)
[1] https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/39
[2] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1553803
[3] https://copr.fedorainfracloud.org/coprs/omos/kernel-testing/build/854148/
[4] https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite/pull/48
Ondrej Mosnacek (5):
selinux: try security xattr after genfs for kernfs filesystems
kernfs: use simple_xattrs for security attributes
LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initialization
selinux: implement the kernfs_init_security hook
kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes
fs/kernfs/dir.c | 64 +++++++- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 125 +++++++--------- fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 7 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 22 +++ include/linux/security.h | 14 ++ include/linux/xattr.h | 15 ++ security/security.c | 10 ++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 222 +++++++++++++++++++--------- security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 + 9 files changed, 328 insertions(+), 152 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v6 1/5 selinux: try security xattr after genfs for kernfs filesystems
Since kernfs supports the security xattr handlers, we can simply use these to determine the inode's context, dropping the need to update it from kernfs explicitly using a security_inode_notifysecctx() call.
We achieve this by setting a new sbsec flag SE_SBGENFS_XATTR to all mounts that are known to use kernfs under the hood and then fetching the xattrs after determining the fallback genfs sid in inode_doinit_with_dentry() when this flag is set.
This will allow implementing full security xattr support in kernfs and removing the ...notifysecctx() call in a subsequent patch.
--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 160 +++++++++++++++------------- security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +87 -73
@@ -793,11 +793,13 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,if (!strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"debugfs" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"tracefs" ) || - !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"sysfs" ) || - !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"pstore" ) || + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"pstore" )) + sbsec->flags |=SE_SBGENFS ; + +if (!strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"sysfs" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup2" )) - sbsec->flags |=SE_SBGENFS ; + sbsec->flags |=SE_SBGENFS |SE_SBGENFS_XATTR ;if (!sbsec->behavior) {/*
@@ -1392,6 +1394,71 @@ static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,return rc; } +static int inode_doinit_use_xattr (struct inode *inode,struct dentry *dentry, +u32 def_sid,u32 *sid) +{ +#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 +char *context =NULL ; +unsigned int len =0 ; +int rc; + + *sid = def_sid; + +if (!(inode->i_opflags &IOP_XATTR )) +return 0 ; + + len =INITCONTEXTLEN ; + context =kmalloc (len +1 ,GFP_NOFS ); +if (!context) +return -ENOMEM ; + + context[len] ='\0' ; + rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , context, len); +if (rc == -ERANGE ) { +kfree (context); + +/* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ + rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX ,NULL ,0 ); +if (rc <0 ) +return rc; + + len = rc; + context =kmalloc (len +1 ,GFP_NOFS ); +if (!context) +return -ENOMEM ; + + context[len] ='\0' ; + rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , + context, len); + } +if (rc <0 ) { +kfree (context); +if (rc != -ENODATA ) { +pr_warn ("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n" , + __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); +return rc; + } +return 0 ; + } + + rc =security_context_to_sid_default (&selinux_state, context, rc, sid, + def_sid,GFP_NOFS ); +if (rc) { +char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; +unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino; + +if (rc == -EINVAL ) { +pr_notice_ratelimited ("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n" , + ino, dev, context); + }else { +pr_warn ("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n" , + __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); + } + } +kfree (context); +return 0 ; +} +/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry (struct inode *inode,struct dentry *opt_dentry) {
@@ -1400,9 +1467,6 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentu32 task_sid, sid =0 ;u16 sclass;struct dentry *dentry; -#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 -char *context =NULL ; -unsigned len =0 ;int rc =0 ;if (isec->initialized ==LABEL_INITIALIZED )
@@ -1470,72 +1534,11 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent goto out; } - len =INITCONTEXTLEN ; - context =kmalloc (len+1 ,GFP_NOFS ); -if (!context) { - rc = -ENOMEM ; -dput (dentry); - goto out; - } - context[len] ='\0' ; - rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , context, len); -if (rc == -ERANGE ) { -kfree (context); - -/* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ - rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX ,NULL ,0 ); -if (rc <0 ) { -dput (dentry); - goto out; - } - len = rc; - context =kmalloc (len+1 ,GFP_NOFS ); -if (!context) { - rc = -ENOMEM ; -dput (dentry); - goto out; - } - context[len] ='\0' ; - rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , context, len); - } + rc =inode_doinit_use_xattr (inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid, + &sid);dput (dentry); -if (rc <0 ) { -if (rc != -ENODATA ) { -pr_warn ("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned " -"%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n" , __func__, - -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); -kfree (context); - goto out; - } -/* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */ - sid = sbsec->def_sid; - rc =0 ; - }else { - rc =security_context_to_sid_default (&selinux_state, - context, rc, &sid, - sbsec->def_sid, -GFP_NOFS ); -if (rc) { -char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; -unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino; - -if (rc == -EINVAL ) { -if (printk_ratelimit ()) -pr_notice ("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid " -"context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the " -"filesystem in question.\n" , ino, dev, context); - }else { -pr_warn ("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) " -"returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n" , - __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); - } -kfree (context); -/* Leave with the unlabeled SID */ - rc =0 ; -break ; - } - } -kfree (context); +if (rc) + goto out;break ;case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK : sid = task_sid;
@@ -1586,9 +1589,20 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent goto out; rc =selinux_genfs_get_sid (dentry, sclass, sbsec->flags, &sid); -dput (dentry); -if (rc) +if (rc) { +dput (dentry); goto out; + } + +if (sbsec->flags &SE_SBGENFS_XATTR ) { + rc =inode_doinit_use_xattr (inode, dentry, + sid, &sid); +if (rc) { +dput (dentry); + goto out; + } + } +dput (dentry); }break ; }
security/selinux/include/security.h +1 -0
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@#define SE_SBINITIALIZED 0x0100#define SE_SBPROC 0x0200#define SE_SBGENFS 0x0400 +#define SE_SBGENFS_XATTR 0x0800#define CONTEXT_STR "context="#define FSCONTEXT_STR "fscontext="
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Re: [PATCH v6 1/5] selinux: try security xattr after genfs for kernfs filesystems
Quoted 40 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Since kernfs supports the security xattr handlers, we can simply use these to determine the inode's context, dropping the need to update it from kernfs explicitly using a
security_inode_notifysecctx()call.We achieve this by setting a new sbsec flag
SE_SBGENFS_XATTRto all mounts that are known to use kernfs under the hood and then fetching the xattrs after determining the fallback genfs sid ininode_doinit_with_dentry()when this flag is set.This will allow implementing full security xattr support in kernfs and removing the ...notifysecctx() call in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 160 +++++++++++++++------------- security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)security/selinux/hooks.c +5
-3@@ -793,11 +793,13 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,if (!strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"debugfs" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"tracefs" ) || - !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"sysfs" ) || - !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"pstore" ) || + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"pstore" )) + sbsec->flags |=SE_SBGENFS ; + +if (!strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"sysfs" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup2" )) - sbsec->flags |=SE_SBGENFS ; + sbsec->flags |=SE_SBGENFS |SE_SBGENFS_XATTR ;if (!sbsec->behavior) {/*
security/selinux/hooks.c static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, · line 1402
Quoted 9 lines
security/selinux/hooks.c +6
-0@@ -1392,6 +1394,71 @@ static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,return rc; } +static int inode_doinit_use_xattr (struct inode *inode,struct dentry *dentry, +u32 def_sid,u32 *sid) +{ +#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 +char *context =NULL ; +unsigned int len =0 ;
No need to initialize here since no uses or gotos prior to first assignment?
security/selinux/hooks.c static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, · line 1408
Quoted 6 lines
security/selinux/hooks.c +6
-0+int rc; + + *sid = def_sid; + +if (!(inode->i_opflags &IOP_XATTR )) +return 0 ;
Is this a change in behavior from before the patch? Would we have previously called __vfs_getxattr -> xattr_resolve_name and returned either -EIO (is_bad_inode) or -EOPNOTSUPP to the caller? Perhaps it is fine to return 0 with the default SID here, but wanted to check.
Quoted 179 lines
security/selinux/hooks.c +70
-70+ + len =INITCONTEXTLEN ; + context =kmalloc (len +1 ,GFP_NOFS ); +if (!context) +return -ENOMEM ; + + context[len] ='\0' ; + rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , context, len); +if (rc == -ERANGE ) { +kfree (context); + +/* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ + rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX ,NULL ,0 ); +if (rc <0 ) +return rc; + + len = rc; + context =kmalloc (len +1 ,GFP_NOFS ); +if (!context) +return -ENOMEM ; + + context[len] ='\0' ; + rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , + context, len); + } +if (rc <0 ) { +kfree (context); +if (rc != -ENODATA ) { +pr_warn ("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n" , + __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); +return rc; + } +return 0 ; + } + + rc =security_context_to_sid_default (&selinux_state, context, rc, sid, + def_sid,GFP_NOFS ); +if (rc) { +char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; +unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino; + +if (rc == -EINVAL ) { +pr_notice_ratelimited ("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n" , + ino, dev, context); + }else { +pr_warn ("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n" , + __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); + } + } +kfree (context); +return 0 ; +} +/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry (struct inode *inode,struct dentry *opt_dentry) {@@ -1400,9 +1467,6 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentu32 task_sid, sid =0 ;u16 sclass;struct dentry *dentry; -#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 -char *context =NULL ; -unsigned len =0 ;int rc =0 ;if (isec->initialized ==LABEL_INITIALIZED )@@ -1470,72 +1534,11 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent goto out; } - len =INITCONTEXTLEN ; - context =kmalloc (len+1 ,GFP_NOFS ); -if (!context) { - rc = -ENOMEM ; -dput (dentry); - goto out; - } - context[len] ='\0' ; - rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , context, len); -if (rc == -ERANGE ) { -kfree (context); - -/* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ - rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX ,NULL ,0 ); -if (rc <0 ) { -dput (dentry); - goto out; - } - len = rc; - context =kmalloc (len+1 ,GFP_NOFS ); -if (!context) { - rc = -ENOMEM ; -dput (dentry); - goto out; - } - context[len] ='\0' ; - rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , context, len); - } + rc =inode_doinit_use_xattr (inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid, + &sid);dput (dentry); -if (rc <0 ) { -if (rc != -ENODATA ) { -pr_warn ("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned " -"%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n" , __func__, - -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); -kfree (context); - goto out; - } -/* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */ - sid = sbsec->def_sid; - rc =0 ; - }else { - rc =security_context_to_sid_default (&selinux_state, - context, rc, &sid, - sbsec->def_sid, -GFP_NOFS ); -if (rc) { -char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; -unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino; - -if (rc == -EINVAL ) { -if (printk_ratelimit ()) -pr_notice ("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid " -"context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the " -"filesystem in question.\n" , ino, dev, context); - }else { -pr_warn ("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) " -"returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n" , - __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); - } -kfree (context); -/* Leave with the unlabeled SID */ - rc =0 ; -break ; - } - } -kfree (context); +if (rc) + goto out;break ;case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK : sid = task_sid;@@ -1586,9 +1589,20 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent goto out; rc =selinux_genfs_get_sid (dentry, sclass, sbsec->flags, &sid); -dput (dentry); -if (rc) +if (rc) { +dput (dentry); goto out; + } + +if (sbsec->flags &SE_SBGENFS_XATTR ) { + rc =inode_doinit_use_xattr (inode, dentry, + sid, &sid); +if (rc) { +dput (dentry); + goto out; + } + } +dput (dentry); }break ; }security/selinux/include/security.h +1
-0@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@#define SE_SBINITIALIZED 0x0100#define SE_SBPROC 0x0200#define SE_SBGENFS 0x0400 +#define SE_SBGENFS_XATTR 0x0800#define CONTEXT_STR "context="#define FSCONTEXT_STR "fscontext="
Re: [PATCH v6 1/5] selinux: try security xattr after genfs for kernfs filesystems
Quoted 44 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 43 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Since kernfs supports the security xattr handlers, we can simply use these to determine the inode's context, dropping the need to update it from kernfs explicitly using a
security_inode_notifysecctx()call.We achieve this by setting a new sbsec flag
SE_SBGENFS_XATTRto all mounts that are known to use kernfs under the hood and then fetching the xattrs after determining the fallback genfs sid ininode_doinit_with_dentry()when this flag is set.This will allow implementing full security xattr support in kernfs and removing the ...notifysecctx() call in a subsequent patch.
Signed-off-by Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 160 +++++++++++++++------------- security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-)security/selinux/hooks.c +5
-3@@ -793,11 +793,13 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,if (!strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"debugfs" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"tracefs" ) || - !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"sysfs" ) || - !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"pstore" ) || + !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"pstore" )) + sbsec->flags |=SE_SBGENFS ; + +if (!strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"sysfs" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup" ) || !strcmp (sb->s_type->name,"cgroup2" )) - sbsec->flags |=SE_SBGENFS ; + sbsec->flags |=SE_SBGENFS |SE_SBGENFS_XATTR ;if (!sbsec->behavior) {/* @@ -1392,6 +1394,71 @@ static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,return rc; }
Quoted 8 lines
security/selinux/hooks.c static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, · line 1402
Quoted 6 lines
security/selinux/hooks.c +6
-0+static int inode_doinit_use_xattr (struct inode *inode,struct dentry *dentry, +u32 def_sid,u32 *sid) +{ +#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 +char *context =NULL ; +unsigned int len =0 ;No need to initialize here since no uses or gotos prior to first assignment?
Yes, fixed locally.
Quoted 12 lines
security/selinux/hooks.c static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, · line 1408
Quoted 7 lines
security/selinux/hooks.c +6
-0+int rc; + + *sid = def_sid; + +if (!(inode->i_opflags &IOP_XATTR )) +return 0 ;Is this a change in behavior from before the patch? Would we have previously called
__vfs_getxattr->xattr_resolve_nameand returned either-EIO(is_bad_inode) or-EOPNOTSUPPto the caller? Perhaps it is fine to return 0 with the default SID here, but wanted to check.
In the 'case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR' block (where this code was originally), there is the same check actually duplicated at the beginning (it is not visible in the diff context), for that code path this check is a no-op. Since moving the check into the function would possibly change the behavior there, I chose to duplicate the check inside the new function (and in the new call site we want to leave the default (genfs sid) and return 0).
I realized now that checking for IOP_XATTR along with SE_SBGENFS_XATTR and removing the check from inode_doinit_use_xattr() actually makes more sense. Will do that in the next respin.
Quoted 177 lines
Quoted 177 lines
security/selinux/hooks.c +70
-70+ + len =INITCONTEXTLEN ; + context =kmalloc (len +1 ,GFP_NOFS ); +if (!context) +return -ENOMEM ; + + context[len] ='\0' ; + rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , context, len); +if (rc == -ERANGE ) { +kfree (context); + +/* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ + rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX ,NULL ,0 ); +if (rc <0 ) +return rc; + + len = rc; + context =kmalloc (len +1 ,GFP_NOFS ); +if (!context) +return -ENOMEM ; + + context[len] ='\0' ; + rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , + context, len); + } +if (rc <0 ) { +kfree (context); +if (rc != -ENODATA ) { +pr_warn ("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n" , + __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); +return rc; + } +return 0 ; + } + + rc =security_context_to_sid_default (&selinux_state, context, rc, sid, + def_sid,GFP_NOFS ); +if (rc) { +char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; +unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino; + +if (rc == -EINVAL ) { +pr_notice_ratelimited ("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n" , + ino, dev, context); + }else { +pr_warn ("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n" , + __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); + } + } +kfree (context); +return 0 ; +} +/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry (struct inode *inode,struct dentry *opt_dentry) {@@ -1400,9 +1467,6 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentu32 task_sid, sid =0 ;u16 sclass;struct dentry *dentry; -#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 -char *context =NULL ; -unsigned len =0 ;int rc =0 ;if (isec->initialized ==LABEL_INITIALIZED )@@ -1470,72 +1534,11 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent goto out; } - len =INITCONTEXTLEN ; - context =kmalloc (len+1 ,GFP_NOFS ); -if (!context) { - rc = -ENOMEM ; -dput (dentry); - goto out; - } - context[len] ='\0' ; - rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , context, len); -if (rc == -ERANGE ) { -kfree (context); - -/* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ - rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX ,NULL ,0 ); -if (rc <0 ) { -dput (dentry); - goto out; - } - len = rc; - context =kmalloc (len+1 ,GFP_NOFS ); -if (!context) { - rc = -ENOMEM ; -dput (dentry); - goto out; - } - context[len] ='\0' ; - rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , context, len); - } + rc =inode_doinit_use_xattr (inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid, + &sid);dput (dentry); -if (rc <0 ) { -if (rc != -ENODATA ) { -pr_warn ("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned " -"%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n" , __func__, - -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); -kfree (context); - goto out; - } -/* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */ - sid = sbsec->def_sid; - rc =0 ; - }else { - rc =security_context_to_sid_default (&selinux_state, - context, rc, &sid, - sbsec->def_sid, -GFP_NOFS ); -if (rc) { -char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; -unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino; - -if (rc == -EINVAL ) { -if (printk_ratelimit ()) -pr_notice ("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid " -"context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the " -"filesystem in question.\n" , ino, dev, context); - }else { -pr_warn ("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) " -"returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n" , - __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); - } -kfree (context); -/* Leave with the unlabeled SID */ - rc =0 ; -break ; - } - } -kfree (context); +if (rc) + goto out;break ;case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK : sid = task_sid;@@ -1586,9 +1589,20 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent goto out; rc =selinux_genfs_get_sid (dentry, sclass, sbsec->flags, &sid); -dput (dentry); -if (rc) +if (rc) { +dput (dentry); goto out; + } + +if (sbsec->flags &SE_SBGENFS_XATTR ) { + rc =inode_doinit_use_xattr (inode, dentry, + sid, &sid); +if (rc) { +dput (dentry); + goto out; + } + } +dput (dentry); }break ; }security/selinux/include/security.h +1
-0@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@#define SE_SBINITIALIZED 0x0100#define SE_SBPROC 0x0200#define SE_SBGENFS 0x0400 +#define SE_SBGENFS_XATTR 0x0800
Quoted 4 lines
security/selinux/include/security.h line 64
Quoted 3 lines
security/selinux/include/security.h +0
-0#define CONTEXT_STR "context="#define FSCONTEXT_STR "fscontext="
--
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com> Associate Software Engineer, Security Technologies Red Hat, Inc.
PATCH v6 2/5 kernfs: use simple_xattrs for security attributes
In reply to Ondrej MosnacekReplace the special handling of security xattrs with simple_xattrs, as is already done for the trusted xattrs. This simplifies the code and allows LSMs to use more than just a single xattr to do their business.
--- fs/kernfs/dir.c | 7 ++- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 100 +++++++++++++++--------------------- fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 5 +- 3 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-)
fs/kernfs/dir.c +3 -4
@@ -532,11 +532,10 @@ void kernfs_put(struct kernfs_node *kn)kfree_const (kn->name);if (kn->iattr) { -if (kn->iattr->ia_secdata) -security_release_secctx (kn->iattr->ia_secdata, - kn->iattr->ia_secdata_len); -simple_xattrs_free (&kn->iattr->xattrs); +simple_xattrs_free (&kn->iattr->xattrs_trusted); +simple_xattrs_free (&kn->iattr->xattrs_security); } +kfree (kn->iattr);spin_lock (&kernfs_idr_lock);idr_remove (&root->ino_idr, kn->id.ino);
fs/kernfs/inode.c +41 -59
171 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h +2 -3
@@ -20,10 +20,9 @@struct kernfs_iattrs {struct iattr ia_iattr; -void *ia_secdata; -u32 ia_secdata_len; -struct simple_xattrs xattrs; +struct simple_xattrs xattrs_trusted; +struct simple_xattrs xattrs_security; };/* +1 to avoid triggering overflow warning when negating it */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v6 3/5 LSM: add new hook for kernfs node initialization
In reply to Ondrej MosnacekThis patch introduces a new security hook that is intended for initializing the security data for newly created kernfs nodes, which provide a way of storing a non-default security context, but need to operate independently from mounts (and therefore may not have an associated inode at the moment of creation).
The main motivation is to allow kernfs nodes to inherit the context of the parent under SELinux, similar to the behavior of security_inode_init_security(). Other LSMs may implement their own logic for handling the creation of new nodes.
The interface of the new hook provides the following to the LSM:
* a qstr containing the name of the new node
* inode attributes of the parent node (directory)
* initial inode attributes (struct iattr + simple_xattrs) of the new node
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/security.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 10 ++++++++++ 3 files changed, 46 insertions(+)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +22 -0
@@ -429,6 +429,21 @@* to abort the copy up. Note that the caller is responsible for reading * and writing the xattrs as this hook is merely a filter. * +* Security hooks for kernfs node operations +* +* @kernfs_init_security +* Initialize the security context of a newlycreated kernfs node based +* on its own and its parent's attributes. The security context (or other +* LSM metadata) should be stored in @secattr as extended attributes. +* The hook MAY NOT add/modify attributes in @dir_secattr; it should be +* treated as a read-only list of attributes. +* +* @qstr contains the last path component of the new node. +* @dir_iattr contains the inode attributes of the parent node. +* @dir_secattr is the list of security xattrs of the parent node. +* @iattr contains the inode attributes of the new node. +* @secattr is the list of security xattrs of the new node. +* * Security hooks for file operations * * @file_permission:
@@ -1558,6 +1573,12 @@ union security_list_options {int (*inode_copy_up)(struct dentry *src,struct cred **new);int (*inode_copy_up_xattr)(const char *name); +int (*kernfs_init_security)(const struct qstr *qstr, +const struct iattr *dir_iattr, +struct simple_xattrs *dir_secattr, +const struct iattr *iattr, +struct simple_xattrs *secattr); +int (*file_permission)(struct file *file,int mask);int (*file_alloc_security)(struct file *file);void (*file_free_security)(struct file *file);
@@ -1858,6 +1879,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {struct hlist_head inode_getsecid;struct hlist_head inode_copy_up;struct hlist_head inode_copy_up_xattr; +struct hlist_head kernfs_init_security;struct hlist_head file_permission;struct hlist_head file_alloc_security;struct hlist_head file_free_security;
include/linux/security.h +14 -0
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ struct fown_struct;struct file_operations ;struct msg_msg ;struct xattr ; +struct simple_xattrs ;struct xfrm_sec_ctx ;struct mm_struct ;
@@ -291,6 +292,11 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffervoid security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid);int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new);int security_inode_copy_up_xattr (const char *name); +int security_kernfs_init_security (const struct qstr *qstr, +const struct iattr *dir_iattr, +struct simple_xattrs *dir_secattr, +const struct iattr *iattr, +struct simple_xattrs *secattr);int security_file_permission (struct file *file,int mask);int security_file_alloc (struct file *file);void security_file_free (struct file *file);
@@ -783,6 +789,14 @@ static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)return 0 ; } +static inline int security_kernfs_init_security ( +const struct qstr *qstr,const struct iattr *dir_iattr, +struct simple_xattrs *dir_secattr,const struct iattr *iattr, +struct simple_xattrs *secattr) +{ +return 0 ; +} +static inline int security_inode_copy_up_xattr (const char *name) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
security/security.c +10 -0
@@ -892,6 +892,16 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_copy_up_xattr); +int security_kernfs_init_security (const struct qstr *qstr, +const struct iattr *dir_iattr, +struct simple_xattrs *dir_secattr, +const struct iattr *iattr, +struct simple_xattrs *secattr) +{ +return call_int_hook (kernfs_init_security,0 , qstr, dir_iattr, + dir_secattr, iattr, secattr); +} +int security_file_permission (struct file *file,int mask) {int ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v6 4/5 selinux: implement the kernfs_init_security hook
In reply to Ondrej MosnacekThe hook applies the same logic as selinux_determine_inode_label(), with the exception of the super_block handling, which will be enforced on the actual inodes later by other hooks.
--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+)
security/selinux/hooks.c +62 -0
@@ -3353,6 +3353,66 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } +/* kernfs node operations */ + +int selinux_kernfs_init_security (const struct qstr *qstr, +const struct iattr *dir_iattr, +struct simple_xattrs *dir_secattr, +const struct iattr *iattr, +struct simple_xattrs *secattr) +{ +const struct task_security_struct *tsec =current_security (); +u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen; +int rc; +char *context; + + rc =simple_xattr_get (dir_secattr,XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX ,NULL ,0 ); +if (rc == -ENODATA ) +return 0 ; +else if (rc <0 ) +return rc; + + clen = (u32 )rc; + context =kmalloc (clen,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!context) +return -ENOMEM ; + + rc =simple_xattr_get (dir_secattr,XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX , context, clen); +if (rc <0 ) { +kfree (context); +return rc; + } + + rc =security_context_to_sid (&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid, +GFP_KERNEL ); +kfree (context); +if (rc) +return rc; + +if (tsec->create_sid) { + newsid = tsec->create_sid; + }else { +u16 secclass =inode_mode_to_security_class (iattr->ia_mode); + + rc =security_transition_sid (&selinux_state, tsec->sid, + parent_sid, secclass, qstr, + &newsid); +if (rc) +return rc; + } + + rc =security_sid_to_context_force (&selinux_state, newsid, + &context, &clen); +if (rc) +return rc; + + rc =simple_xattr_set (secattr,XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX , context, clen, +XATTR_CREATE ); +kfree (context); +return rc; +} + +/* file security operations */ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission (struct file *file,int mask)
@@ -6799,6 +6859,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),LSM_HOOK_INIT (inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr), +LSM_HOOK_INIT (kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security), +LSM_HOOK_INIT (file_permission, selinux_file_permission),LSM_HOOK_INIT (file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security),
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
PATCH v6 5/5 kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes
In reply to Ondrej MosnacekUse the new security_kernfs_init_security() hook to allow LSMs to possibly assign a non-default security context to a newly created kernfs node based on the attributes of the new node and also its parent node.
This fixes an issue with cgroupfs under SELinux, where newly created cgroup subdirectories/files would not inherit its parent's context if it had been set explicitly to a non-default value (other than the genfs context specified by the policy). This can be reproduced as follows (on Fedora/RHEL):
# mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test
# # Need permissive to change the label under Fedora policy:
# setenforce 0
# chcon -t container_file_t /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test
# ls -lZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified
total 0
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.controllers
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.max.depth
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.max.descendants
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.procs
-r--r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.stat
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.subtree_control
-rw-r--r--. 1 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 cgroup.threads
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 init.scope
drwxr-xr-x. 26 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:21 system.slice
drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root system_u:object_r:container_file_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:15 test
drwxr-xr-x. 3 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:06 user.slice
# mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test/subdirActual result:
# ls -ldZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test/subdir
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root system_u:object_r:cgroup_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:15 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test/subdirExpected result:
# ls -ldZ /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test/subdir
drwxr-xr-x. 2 root root unconfined_u:object_r:container_file_t:s0 0 Jan 29 03:15 /sys/fs/cgroup/unified/test/subdir--- fs/kernfs/dir.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 25 +++++++++------- fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h | 2 ++ include/linux/xattr.h | 15 ++++++++++ 4 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
fs/kernfs/dir.c +55 -2
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@#include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/hash.h> +#include <linux/stringhash.h> #include "kernfs-internal.h"
@@ -616,7 +617,53 @@ struct kernfs_node *kernfs_node_from_dentry(struct dentry *dentry)return NULL ; } +static int kernfs_node_init_security (struct kernfs_node *parent, +struct kernfs_node *kn) +{ +struct simple_xattrs xattr_child, xattr_parent, *pxattr_parent; +struct iattr iattr_child, iattr_parent, *piattr_parent; +struct qstr q; +int ret; + +if (!parent->iattr) { +kernfs_iattr_init (&iattr_parent, parent); +simple_xattrs_init (&xattr_parent); + piattr_parent = &iattr_parent; + pxattr_parent = &xattr_parent; + }else { + piattr_parent = &parent->iattr->ia_iattr; + pxattr_parent = &parent->iattr->xattrs_security; + } + +kernfs_iattr_init (&iattr_child, kn); +simple_xattrs_init (&xattr_child); + + q.name = kn->name; + q.hash_len =hashlen_string (parent, kn->name); + + ret =security_kernfs_init_security (&q, piattr_parent, pxattr_parent, + &iattr_child, &xattr_child); +if (pxattr_parent == &xattr_parent) +simple_xattrs_free (&xattr_parent); +if (!ret && !simple_xattrs_empty (&xattr_child)) { +/* +* Child has new security xattrs, allocate its kernfs_iattrs +* and put our local xattrs in there. +*/ +struct kernfs_iattrs *attrs =kernfs_iattrs (kn); + +if (!attrs) { +simple_xattrs_free (&xattr_child); +return -ENOMEM ; + } +simple_xattrs_move (&attrs->xattrs_security, &xattr_child); + } +simple_xattrs_free (&xattr_child); +return ret; +} +static struct kernfs_node *__kernfs_new_node (struct kernfs_root *root, +struct kernfs_node *parent,const char *name,umode_t mode,kuid_t uid,kgid_t gid,unsigned flags)
@@ -673,6 +720,12 @@ static struct kernfs_node *__kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_root *root, goto err_out3; } +if (parent) { + ret =kernfs_node_init_security (parent, kn); +if (ret) + goto err_out3; + } +return kn; err_out3:
@@ -691,7 +744,7 @@ struct kernfs_node *kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_node *parent, {struct kernfs_node *kn; - kn =__kernfs_new_node (kernfs_root (parent), + kn =__kernfs_new_node (kernfs_root (parent), parent, name, mode, uid, gid, flags);if (kn) {kernfs_get (parent);
@@ -961,7 +1014,7 @@ struct kernfs_root *kernfs_create_root(struct kernfs_syscall_ops *scops,INIT_LIST_HEAD (&root->supers); root->next_generation =1 ; - kn =__kernfs_new_node (root,"" ,S_IFDIR |S_IRUGO |S_IXUGO , + kn =__kernfs_new_node (root,NULL ,"" ,S_IFDIR |S_IRUGO |S_IXUGO ,GLOBAL_ROOT_UID ,GLOBAL_ROOT_GID ,KERNFS_DIR );if (!kn) {
fs/kernfs/inode.c +14 -11
@@ -31,11 +31,22 @@ static const struct inode_operations kernfs_iops = { .listxattr = kernfs_iop_listxattr, }; -static struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs (struct kernfs_node *kn) +void kernfs_iattr_init (struct iattr *iattrs,struct kernfs_node *kn) +{ +/* assign default attributes */ + iattrs->ia_mode = kn->mode; + iattrs->ia_uid =GLOBAL_ROOT_UID ; + iattrs->ia_gid =GLOBAL_ROOT_GID ; + +ktime_get_real_ts64 (&iattrs->ia_atime); + iattrs->ia_mtime = iattrs->ia_atime; + iattrs->ia_ctime = iattrs->ia_atime; +} + +struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs (struct kernfs_node *kn) {static DEFINE_MUTEX (iattr_mutex);struct kernfs_iattrs *ret; -struct iattr *iattrs;mutex_lock (&iattr_mutex);
@@ -45,16 +56,8 @@ static struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs(struct kernfs_node *kn) kn->iattr =kzalloc (sizeof (struct kernfs_iattrs ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!kn->iattr) goto out_unlock; - iattrs = &kn->iattr->ia_iattr; - -/* assign default attributes */ - iattrs->ia_mode = kn->mode; - iattrs->ia_uid =GLOBAL_ROOT_UID ; - iattrs->ia_gid =GLOBAL_ROOT_GID ; -ktime_get_real_ts64 (&iattrs->ia_atime); - iattrs->ia_mtime = iattrs->ia_atime; - iattrs->ia_ctime = iattrs->ia_atime; +kernfs_iattr_init (&kn->iattr->ia_iattr, kn);simple_xattrs_init (&kn->iattr->xattrs_trusted);simple_xattrs_init (&kn->iattr->xattrs_security);
fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h +2 -0
@@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ int kernfs_iop_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags);ssize_t kernfs_iop_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry,char *buf,size_t size);int __kernfs_setattr (struct kernfs_node *kn,const struct iattr *iattr); +void kernfs_iattr_init (struct iattr *iattrs,struct kernfs_node *kn); +struct kernfs_iattrs *kernfs_iattrs (struct kernfs_node *kn);/* * dir.c
include/linux/xattr.h +15 -0
@@ -108,4 +108,19 @@ ssize_t simple_xattr_list(struct inode *inode, struct simple_xattrs *xattrs, chavoid simple_xattr_list_add (struct simple_xattrs *xattrs,struct simple_xattr *new_xattr); +static inline int simple_xattrs_empty (struct simple_xattrs *xattrs) +{ +return list_empty (&xattrs->head); +} + +/** +* Move the xattr list from @src to @dst, leaving @src empty. +*/ +static inline void simple_xattrs_move (struct simple_xattrs *dst, +struct simple_xattrs *src) +{ +simple_xattrs_free (dst); +list_replace_init (&src->head, &dst->head); +} +#endif /* _LINUX_XATTR_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Tejun Heo
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 5/5] kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes
fs/kernfs/dir.c struct kernfs_node *kernfs_node_from_dentry(struct dentry *dentry) · line 621
Quoted 2 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
fs/kernfs/dir.c +2
-0+static int kernfs_node_init_security (struct kernfs_node *parent, +struct kernfs_node *kn)
Can we skip the whole thing if security is not enabled?
Thanks.
Signature · 1 line
tejun
Re: [PATCH v6 5/5] kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes
Quoted 5 lines · Tejun Heo
fs/kernfs/dir.c struct kernfs_node *kernfs_node_from_dentry(struct dentry *dentry) · line 621
Quoted 2 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
fs/kernfs/dir.c +2
-0+static int kernfs_node_init_security (struct kernfs_node *parent, +struct kernfs_node *kn)Can we skip the whole thing if security is not enabled?
Do you mean just skipping the whole part when CONFIG_SECURITY=n? That is easy to do and I can add it in the next respin (although the compiler should be able to optimize most of it out in that case).
If you mean dynamically checking if calling the hook would actually do anything (i.e. if any LSM actually registered that particular hook), then that should also be possible (just check if security_hook_heads.kernfs_init_security is a non-empty list), but I'm not sure if that wouldn't be too hacky...
--
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com> Associate Software Engineer, Security Technologies Red Hat, Inc.
Tejun Heo
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 5/5] kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes
Quoted 10 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Quoted 5 lines · Tejun Heo
fs/kernfs/dir.c struct kernfs_node *kernfs_node_from_dentry(struct dentry *dentry) · line 621
Quoted 2 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
fs/kernfs/dir.c +2
-0+static int kernfs_node_init_security (struct kernfs_node *parent, +struct kernfs_node *kn)Can we skip the whole thing if security is not enabled?
Do you mean just skipping the whole part when
CONFIG_SECURITY=n? That is easy to do and I can add it in the next respin (although the compiler should be able to optimize most of it out in that case).
So the goal is allowing folks who don't use this to not pay. It'd be better the evaulation can be as late as possible but obviously there's a point where that'd be too complicated. Maybe "ever enabled in this boot" is a good and simple enough at the same time?
Thanks.
Signature · 1 line
tejun
Re: [PATCH v6 5/5] kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes
Quoted 8 lines · Tejun Heo
Quoted 7 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Quoted 5 lines · Tejun Heo
Review
Quoted 2 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
(quoted diff) +2
-0+static int kernfs_node_init_security(struct kernfs_node *parent, + struct kernfs_node *kn)Can we skip the whole thing if security is not enabled?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Do you mean just skipping the whole part when
CONFIG_SECURITY=n? That is easy to do and I can add it in the next respin (although the compiler should be able to optimize most of it out in that case).So the goal is allowing folks who don't use this to not pay. It'd be better the evaulation can be as late as possible but obviously there's a point where that'd be too complicated. Maybe "ever enabled in this boot" is a good and simple enough at the same time?
I don't think there is a way currently to check whether some LSM has been enabled at boot or not. I suppose we could add such function for this kind of heuristics, but I'm not sure how it would interplay with the plans to allow multiple LSM to be enabled simultaneously... Perhaps it would be better/easier to just add a security_kernfs_needs_init() function, which would simply check if the list of registered kernfs_init_security hooks is empty.
I propose something like the patch below (the whitespace is mangled - intended just for visual review). I plan to fold it into the next respin if there are no objections to this approach.
fs/kernfs/dir.c +0 -0
@@ -625,6 +625,9 @@ static int kernfs_node_init_security(struct
kernfs_node *parent,
struct qstr q;
int ret;+ if (!security_kernfs_needs_init() || !parent)
+ return 0;
+
if (!parent->iattr) {
kernfs_iattr_init(&iattr_parent, parent);
simple_xattrs_init(&xattr_parent);
@@ -720,11 +723,9 @@ static struct kernfs_node
*__kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_root *root,
goto err_out3;
}- if (parent) {
- ret = kernfs_node_init_security(parent, kn);
- if (ret)
- goto err_out3;
- } + ret = kernfs_node_init_security(parent, kn); + if (ret)
+ goto err_out3;
return kn;
include/linux/security.h +0 -0
@@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode
*inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer
void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid); int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new); int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
+int security_kernfs_needs_init(void);
int security_kernfs_init_security(const struct qstr *qstr,
const struct iattr *dir_iattr, struct simple_xattrs *dir_secattr,
@@ -789,6 +790,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_kernfs_needs_init(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_kernfs_init_security(
const struct qstr *qstr, const struct iattr *dir_iattr, struct simple_xattrs *dir_secattr, const struct iattr *iattr,
security/security.c +5 -0
@@ -892,6 +892,11 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_copy_up_xattr); +int security_kernfs_needs_init (void ) +{ +return !hlist_empty (&security_hook_heads.kernfs_init_security); +} + int security_kernfs_init_security(const struct qstr *qstr, const struct iattr *dir_iattr, struct simple_xattrs *dir_secattr,
--
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com> Associate Software Engineer, Security Technologies Red Hat, Inc.
Tejun Heo
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 5/5] kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes
Hello,
Quoted 11 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
I don't think there is a way currently to check whether some LSM has been enabled at boot or not. I suppose we could add such function for this kind of heuristics, but I'm not sure how it would interplay with the plans to allow multiple LSM to be enabled simultaneously... Perhaps it would be better/easier to just add a
security_kernfs_needs_init()function, which would simply check if the list of registeredkernfs_init_securityhooks is empty.I propose something like the patch below (the whitespace is mangled - intended just for visual review). I plan to fold it into the next respin if there are no objections to this approach.
Sounds good to me.
Thanks.
Signature · 1 line
tejun
Re: [PATCH v6 5/5] kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes
In reply to Ondrej MosnacekQuoted 88 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Quoted 5 lines · Tejun Heo
Quoted 4 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Quoted 3 lines · Tejun Heo
Quoted 2 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
(quoted diff) +2
-0+static int kernfs_node_init_security(struct kernfs_node *parent, + struct kernfs_node *kn)Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Can we skip the whole thing if security is not enabled?
Do you mean just skipping the whole part when
CONFIG_SECURITY=n? That is easy to do and I can add it in the next respin (although the compiler should be able to optimize most of it out in that case).So the goal is allowing folks who don't use this to not pay. It'd be better the evaulation can be as late as possible but obviously there's a point where that'd be too complicated. Maybe "ever enabled in this boot" is a good and simple enough at the same time?
I don't think there is a way currently to check whether some LSM has been enabled at boot or not. I suppose we could add such function for this kind of heuristics, but I'm not sure how it would interplay with the plans to allow multiple LSM to be enabled simultaneously... Perhaps it would be better/easier to just add a
security_kernfs_needs_init()function, which would simply check if the list of registeredkernfs_init_securityhooks is empty.I propose something like the patch below (the whitespace is mangled - intended just for visual review). I plan to fold it into the next respin if there are no objections to this approach.
fs/kernfs/dir.c +3
-0@@ -625,6 +625,9 @@ static int kernfs_node_init_security(structkernfs_node *parent, struct qstr q;int ret; +if (!security_kernfs_needs_init () || !parent) +return 0 ; +if (!parent->iattr) {kernfs_iattr_init (&iattr_parent, parent);simple_xattrs_init(&xattr_parent);fs/kernfs/dir.c +3
-5@@ -720,11 +723,9 @@ static struct kernfs_node *__kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_root *root, goto err_out3; } - if (parent) { - ret = kernfs_node_init_security(parent, kn); - if (ret) - goto err_out3; - } + ret = kernfs_node_init_security(parent, kn); +if (ret) + goto err_out3;return kn;include/linux/security.h +1
-0@@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffervoid security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid);int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new);int security_inode_copy_up_xattr (const char *name); +int security_kernfs_needs_init (void ); int security_kernfs_init_security(const struct qstr *qstr, const struct iattr *dir_iattr,struct
simple_xattrs*dir_secattr,include/linux/security.h +5
-0@@ -789,6 +790,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) return 0; } +static inline int security_kernfs_needs_init (void ) +{ +return 0 ; +} + static inline int security_kernfs_init_security( const struct qstr *qstr, const struct iattr *dir_iattr,struct
simple_xattrs*dir_secattr, const struct iattr *iattr,security/security.c +0
-0
security/security.c int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) · line 899
Quoted 8 lines
security/security.c +5
-0@@ -892,6 +892,11 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_copy_up_xattr); +int security_kernfs_needs_init (void ) +{ +return !hlist_empty (&security_hook_heads.kernfs_init_security); +} +
Yuck. That's an awful lot of infrastructure just to track that state. May I suggest that instead you have the security_kernfs_init_security() hook return -EOPNOTSUPP in the no-LSM case (2nd argument to call_in_hook). You could then have a state flag in kernfs that you can set to indicate you don't need to call security_kernfs_init_security() again.
Quoted 8 lines
security/security.c +0
-1int security_kernfs_init_security(const struct qstr *qstr, const struct iattr *dir_iattr, struct simple_xattrs *dir_secattr, --Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com> Associate Software Engineer, Security Technologies Red Hat, Inc.
Re: [PATCH v6 5/5] kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes
Quoted 92 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 91 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Quoted 5 lines · Tejun Heo
Quoted 4 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Quoted 3 lines · Tejun Heo
Quoted 2 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
(quoted diff) +2
-0+static int kernfs_node_init_security(struct kernfs_node *parent, + struct kernfs_node *kn)Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Can we skip the whole thing if security is not enabled?
Do you mean just skipping the whole part when
CONFIG_SECURITY=n? That is easy to do and I can add it in the next respin (although the compiler should be able to optimize most of it out in that case).So the goal is allowing folks who don't use this to not pay. It'd be better the evaulation can be as late as possible but obviously there's a point where that'd be too complicated. Maybe "ever enabled in this boot" is a good and simple enough at the same time?
I don't think there is a way currently to check whether some LSM has been enabled at boot or not. I suppose we could add such function for this kind of heuristics, but I'm not sure how it would interplay with the plans to allow multiple LSM to be enabled simultaneously... Perhaps it would be better/easier to just add a
security_kernfs_needs_init()function, which would simply check if the list of registeredkernfs_init_securityhooks is empty.I propose something like the patch below (the whitespace is mangled - intended just for visual review). I plan to fold it into the next respin if there are no objections to this approach.
fs/kernfs/dir.c +3
-0@@ -625,6 +625,9 @@ static int kernfs_node_init_security(structkernfs_node *parent, struct qstr q;int ret; +if (!security_kernfs_needs_init () || !parent) +return 0 ; +if (!parent->iattr) {kernfs_iattr_init (&iattr_parent, parent);simple_xattrs_init(&xattr_parent);fs/kernfs/dir.c +3
-5@@ -720,11 +723,9 @@ static struct kernfs_node *__kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_root *root, goto err_out3; } - if (parent) { - ret = kernfs_node_init_security(parent, kn); - if (ret) - goto err_out3; - } + ret = kernfs_node_init_security(parent, kn); +if (ret) + goto err_out3;return kn;include/linux/security.h +1
-0@@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffervoid security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid);int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new);int security_inode_copy_up_xattr (const char *name); +int security_kernfs_needs_init (void ); int security_kernfs_init_security(const struct qstr *qstr, const struct iattr *dir_iattr,struct
simple_xattrs*dir_secattr,include/linux/security.h +5
-0@@ -789,6 +790,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) return 0; } +static inline int security_kernfs_needs_init (void ) +{ +return 0 ; +} + static inline int security_kernfs_init_security( const struct qstr *qstr, const struct iattr *dir_iattr,struct
simple_xattrs*dir_secattr, const struct iattr *iattr,security/security.c +0
-0@@ -892,6 +892,11 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
Quoted 12 lines
security/security.c int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) · line 899
Quoted 5 lines
security/security.c +5
-0+int security_kernfs_needs_init (void ) +{ +return !hlist_empty (&security_hook_heads.kernfs_init_security); +} +Yuck. That's an awful lot of infrastructure just to track that state. May I suggest that instead you have the
security_kernfs_init_security()hook return-EOPNOTSUPPin the no-LSM case (2nd argument tocall_in_hook). You could then have a state flag in kernfs that you can set to indicate you don't need to callsecurity_kernfs_init_security()again.
Well, maintaining a global variable sounds even more yucky to me... And I don't understand why you'd consider a simple one-line function to be "an awful lot of infrastructure" :) But at the end of the day it is up to the maintainers - Greg/Tejun and James/Serge (who I forgot to Cc on these patches, sorry) - what works better for them.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
security/security.c +0
-1int security_kernfs_init_security(const struct qstr *qstr, const struct iattr *dir_iattr, struct simple_xattrs *dir_secattr, --Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com> Associate Software Engineer, Security Technologies Red Hat, Inc.
--
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com> Associate Software Engineer, Security Technologies Red Hat, Inc.
Tejun Heo
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 5/5] kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes
Hello,
Quoted 5 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Well, maintaining a global variable sounds even more yucky to me... And I don't understand why you'd consider a simple one-line function to be "an awful lot of infrastructure" :) But at the end of the day it is up to the maintainers - Greg/Tejun and James/Serge (who I forgot to Cc on these patches, sorry) - what works better for them.
As long as the cost can be avoided for folks who don't use the relevant features, I don't have a strong opinion on how that's done.
Thanks.
Signature · 1 line
tejun
Re: [PATCH v6 5/5] kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes
In reply to Ondrej MosnacekQuoted 104 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Quoted 92 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 91 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Quoted 5 lines · Tejun Heo
Quoted 4 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Quoted 3 lines · Tejun Heo
Quoted 2 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
(quoted diff) +2
-0+static int kernfs_node_init_security(struct kernfs_node *parent, + struct kernfs_node *kn)Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Can we skip the whole thing if security is not enabled?
Do you mean just skipping the whole part when
CONFIG_SECURITY=n? That is easy to do and I can add it in the next respin (although the compiler should be able to optimize most of it out in that case).So the goal is allowing folks who don't use this to not pay. It'd be better the evaulation can be as late as possible but obviously there's a point where that'd be too complicated. Maybe "ever enabled in this boot" is a good and simple enough at the same time?
I don't think there is a way currently to check whether some LSM has been enabled at boot or not. I suppose we could add such function for this kind of heuristics, but I'm not sure how it would interplay with the plans to allow multiple LSM to be enabled simultaneously... Perhaps it would be better/easier to just add a
security_kernfs_needs_init()function, which would simply check if the list of registeredkernfs_init_securityhooks is empty.I propose something like the patch below (the whitespace is mangled - intended just for visual review). I plan to fold it into the next respin if there are no objections to this approach.
fs/kernfs/dir.c +3
-0@@ -625,6 +625,9 @@ static int kernfs_node_init_security(structkernfs_node *parent, struct qstr q;int ret; +if (!security_kernfs_needs_init () || !parent) +return 0 ; +if (!parent->iattr) {kernfs_iattr_init (&iattr_parent, parent);simple_xattrs_init(&xattr_parent);fs/kernfs/dir.c +3
-5@@ -720,11 +723,9 @@ static struct kernfs_node *__kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_root *root, goto err_out3; } - if (parent) { - ret = kernfs_node_init_security(parent, kn); - if (ret) - goto err_out3; - } + ret = kernfs_node_init_security(parent, kn); +if (ret) + goto err_out3;return kn;include/linux/security.h +1
-0@@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffervoid security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid);int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new);int security_inode_copy_up_xattr (const char *name); +int security_kernfs_needs_init (void ); int security_kernfs_init_security(const struct qstr *qstr, const struct iattr *dir_iattr,struct
simple_xattrs*dir_secattr,include/linux/security.h +5
-0@@ -789,6 +790,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) return 0; } +static inline int security_kernfs_needs_init (void ) +{ +return 0 ; +} + static inline int security_kernfs_init_security( const struct qstr *qstr, const struct iattr *dir_iattr,struct
simple_xattrs*dir_secattr, const struct iattr *iattr,security/security.c +0
-0@@ -892,6 +892,11 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_copy_up_xattr);Quoted 11 lines
security/security.c int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) · line 899
Quoted 5 lines
security/security.c +5
-0+int security_kernfs_needs_init (void ) +{ +return !hlist_empty (&security_hook_heads.kernfs_init_security); +} +Yuck. That's an awful lot of infrastructure just to track that state. May I suggest that instead you have the
security_kernfs_init_security()hook return-EOPNOTSUPPin the no-LSM case (2nd argument tocall_in_hook). You could then have a state flag in kernfs that you can set to indicate you don't need to callsecurity_kernfs_init_security()again.
Quoted 1 line
Well, maintaining a global variable sounds even more yucky to me...
The state you're maintaining is kernfs state, not LSM infrastructure state. The state should be maintained in kernfs, not in the LSM infrastructure.
Quoted 2 lines
And I don't understand why you'd consider a simple one-line function to be "an awful lot of infrastructure" :)
That is because you haven't been working with the LSM infrastructure very long. If you'll recall, I have already objected to kernfs specific LSM hooks. Now, when you find that your approach for using a hook has issues, you want to add another function that does nothing but tell you that there's nothing to do. You can get that by calling the security_kernfs_init_security() hook. The LSM infrastructure is set up to be as painless as possible when you don't want to use it.
Quoted 3 lines
But at the end of the day it
is up to the maintainers - Greg/Tejun and James/Serge (who I forgot to Cc on these patches, sorry)
Yes, James and Serge are the maintainers for the security sub-system, but I have done the transition from hook vector to hook lists and am currently doing the transition from module to infrastructure blob management. I know it better, and have more invested in it, than anyone else just now.
Quoted 1 line
- what works better for them.
Kernfs is an important component of the kernel. So is the security infrastructure. I would hope you don't want to turn this into a contest to see which maintainer has the biggest clout.
Re: [PATCH v6 5/5] kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes
Quoted 105 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 104 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Quoted 103 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 88 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Quoted 5 lines · Tejun Heo
Quoted 4 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
Quoted 3 lines · Tejun Heo
Quoted 2 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
(quoted diff) +2
-0+static int kernfs_node_init_security(struct kernfs_node *parent, + struct kernfs_node *kn)Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Can we skip the whole thing if security is not enabled?
Do you mean just skipping the whole part when
CONFIG_SECURITY=n? That is easy to do and I can add it in the next respin (although the compiler should be able to optimize most of it out in that case).So the goal is allowing folks who don't use this to not pay. It'd be better the evaulation can be as late as possible but obviously there's a point where that'd be too complicated. Maybe "ever enabled in this boot" is a good and simple enough at the same time?
I don't think there is a way currently to check whether some LSM has been enabled at boot or not. I suppose we could add such function for this kind of heuristics, but I'm not sure how it would interplay with the plans to allow multiple LSM to be enabled simultaneously... Perhaps it would be better/easier to just add a
security_kernfs_needs_init()function, which would simply check if the list of registeredkernfs_init_securityhooks is empty.I propose something like the patch below (the whitespace is mangled - intended just for visual review). I plan to fold it into the next respin if there are no objections to this approach.
fs/kernfs/dir.c +3
-0@@ -625,6 +625,9 @@ static int kernfs_node_init_security(structkernfs_node *parent, struct qstr q;int ret; +if (!security_kernfs_needs_init () || !parent) +return 0 ; +if (!parent->iattr) {kernfs_iattr_init (&iattr_parent, parent);simple_xattrs_init(&xattr_parent);fs/kernfs/dir.c +3
-5@@ -720,11 +723,9 @@ static struct kernfs_node *__kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_root *root, goto err_out3; } - if (parent) { - ret = kernfs_node_init_security(parent, kn); - if (ret) - goto err_out3; - } + ret = kernfs_node_init_security(parent, kn); +if (ret) + goto err_out3;return kn;include/linux/security.h +1
-0@@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffervoid security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid);int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new);int security_inode_copy_up_xattr (const char *name); +int security_kernfs_needs_init (void ); int security_kernfs_init_security(const struct qstr *qstr, const struct iattr *dir_iattr,struct
simple_xattrs*dir_secattr,include/linux/security.h +5
-0@@ -789,6 +790,11 @@ static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) return 0; } +static inline int security_kernfs_needs_init (void ) +{ +return 0 ; +} + static inline int security_kernfs_init_security( const struct qstr *qstr, const struct iattr *dir_iattr,struct
simple_xattrs*dir_secattr, const struct iattr *iattr,security/security.c +0
-0security/security.c int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) · line 899
Quoted 8 lines
security/security.c +5
-0@@ -892,6 +892,11 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_copy_up_xattr); +int security_kernfs_needs_init (void ) +{ +return !hlist_empty (&security_hook_heads.kernfs_init_security); +} +Yuck. That's an awful lot of infrastructure just to track that state. May I suggest that instead you have the
security_kernfs_init_security()hook return-EOPNOTSUPPin the no-LSM case (2nd argument tocall_in_hook). You could then have a state flag in kernfs that you can set to indicate you don't need to callsecurity_kernfs_init_security()again.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
Well, maintaining a global variable sounds even more yucky to me...
The state you're maintaining is kernfs state, not LSM infrastructure state. The state should be maintained in kernfs, not in the LSM infrastructure.
But I'm not maintaining any state. I'm merely trying to answer the query "Is there anything that will handle this hook? Do I need to prepare stuff for it?", which is obviously a query about the LSM state. Granted, ideally we wouldn't need to do any preparatory work at all, but that would require exposing more of the kernfs internals (which brings its own issues, but maybe I'll need to look into that approach more...).
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 3 lines
And I don't understand why you'd consider a simple one-line function to be "an awful lot of infrastructure" :)
That is because you haven't been working with the LSM infrastructure very long. If you'll recall, I have already objected to kernfs specific LSM hooks. Now, when you find that your approach for using a hook has issues, you want to add another function that does nothing but tell you that there's nothing to do. You can get that by calling the
security_kernfs_init_security()hook. The LSM infrastructure is set up to be as painless as possible when you don't want to use it.Quoted 3 lines
But at the end of the day it
is up to the maintainers - Greg/Tejun and James/Serge (who I forgot to Cc on these patches, sorry)
Quoted 6 lines
Yes, James and Serge are the maintainers for the security sub-system, but I have done the transition from hook vector to hook lists and am currently doing the transition from module to infrastructure blob management. I know it better, and have more invested in it, than anyone else just now.
Fair enough.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
- what works better for them.
Kernfs is an important component of the kernel. So is the security infrastructure. I would hope you don't want to turn this into a contest to see which maintainer has the biggest clout.
Oh, no, you misunderstood my intention. I just got a feeling that this thread was turning into a discussion about perceived code ugliness (and about which subsystem that ugliness ends up in), which is naturally a very subjective topic, so I wanted to know what is the opinion of the people that have the final decision about whether the code should get in or not. Anyway, I'll try to find a more elegant variant of the solution once again, hopefully I manage to get to something less controversial.
--
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com> Associate Software Engineer, Security Technologies Red Hat, Inc.
Re: [PATCH v6 5/5] kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes
Quoted 5 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 5:43 PM Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:
.....Quoted 3 lines
The state you're maintaining is kernfs state, not LSM infrastructure state. The state should be maintained in kernfs, not in the LSM infrastructure.
Quoted 7 lines
But I'm not maintaining any state. I'm merely trying to answer the query "Is there anything that will handle this hook? Do I need to prepare stuff for it?", which is obviously a query about the LSM state. Granted, ideally we wouldn't need to do any preparatory work at all, but that would require exposing more of the kernfs internals (which brings its own issues, but maybe I'll need to look into that approach more...).
It sounds like you're bumping up against the limitations of the finely honed optimized implementation of kernfs. :( If it where still the pre-android era, when using an LSM was rare, the check for an LSM might have made sense. Today, with the vast majority of systems using LSMs*, optimizing for the no LSM case is nonsensical.
---
* Android, Tizen, Fedora/RHEL, Ubuntu
Quoted 5 lines
...
Kernfs is an important component of the kernel. So is the security infrastructure. I would hope you don't want to turn this into a contest to see which maintainer has the biggest clout.
Quoted 8 lines
Oh, no, you misunderstood my intention. I just got a feeling that this thread was turning into a discussion about perceived code ugliness (and about which subsystem that ugliness ends up in), which is naturally a very subjective topic, so I wanted to know what is the opinion of the people that have the final decision about whether the code should get in or not. Anyway, I'll try to find a more elegant variant of the solution once again, hopefully I manage to get to something less controversial.
Thank you. I believe (which, of course, doesn't make it true) that when a component goes outside the general system architecture the way that kernfs does *even for performance reasons* that it is responsible for the edge cases it encounters. I know that I've had to do a good bit of that in Smack.
Re: [PATCH v6 5/5] kernfs: initialize security of newly created nodes
Quoted 14 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 5 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
On Tue, Feb 19, 2019 at 5:43 PM Casey Schaufler <[email protected]> wrote:
.....Quoted 3 lines
The state you're maintaining is kernfs state, not LSM infrastructure state. The state should be maintained in kernfs, not in the LSM infrastructure.
Quoted 7 lines
But I'm not maintaining any state. I'm merely trying to answer the query "Is there anything that will handle this hook? Do I need to prepare stuff for it?", which is obviously a query about the LSM state. Granted, ideally we wouldn't need to do any preparatory work at all, but that would require exposing more of the kernfs internals (which brings its own issues, but maybe I'll need to look into that approach more...).
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It sounds like you're bumping up against the limitations of the finely honed optimized implementation of kernfs. :( If it where still the pre-android era, when using an LSM was rare, the check for an LSM might have made sense. Today, with the vast majority of systems using LSMs*, optimizing for the no LSM case is nonsensical.
I imagine it might make sense on some very minimal embedded systems (microcontrollers?), where you almost certainly need kernfs (via sysfs or debugfs), but you don't necessarily need advanced security controls (you might just have a single monolithic userspace process running there and very limited memory/CPU resources). I'm hardly an expert on embedded platforms, but it sounds like a reasonable use case. (Although in such cases I'd expect CONFIG_SECURITY to be simply set to 'n', so no need for runtime checks anyway...).
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* Android, Tizen, Fedora/RHEL, UbuntuQuoted 5 lines
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Kernfs is an important component of the kernel. So is the security infrastructure. I would hope you don't want to turn this into a contest to see which maintainer has the biggest clout.Quoted 8 lines
Oh, no, you misunderstood my intention. I just got a feeling that this thread was turning into a discussion about perceived code ugliness (and about which subsystem that ugliness ends up in), which is naturally a very subjective topic, so I wanted to know what is the opinion of the people that have the final decision about whether the code should get in or not. Anyway, I'll try to find a more elegant variant of the solution once again, hopefully I manage to get to something less controversial.
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Thank you. I believe (which, of course, doesn't make it true) that when a component goes outside the general system architecture the way that kernfs does *even for performance reasons* that it is responsible for the edge cases it encounters. I know that I've had to do a good bit of that in Smack.
OK, so I tried taking the other approach (pass kernfs nodes and expose necessary kernfs internals) and I'm quite happy with the result. It turns out the only thing I actually need to expose (at least for SELinux) is getting and setting the security xattrs, which is just two simple functions. The rest of the attributes (uid, gid, and access times) don't seem important and they can always be exposed by adding more helper functions as needed. With this design the last patch now becomes embarrassingly simple - there is just a single call that will either call an LSM hook or do nothing at all.
I still need to do some testing on the new patches before posting. In the meantime they are available here for the curious:
https://gitlab.com/omos/linux-public/compare/selinux-next...selinux-fix-cgroupfs-v12
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Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com> Associate Software Engineer, Security Technologies Red Hat, Inc.