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xen/pciback: Don't disable PCI_COMMAND on PCI device reset.

PATCH Applied Prarit Bhargava 3 participants 4 messages Feb 13, 2019 – Feb 17, 2019 Xen hypervisor interface

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PATCH 1/1 xen/pciback: Don't disable PCI_COMMAND on PCI device reset.

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>

This was submitted in 2015 here

https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=142807132515973&w=2

and has been included in Fedora builds ever since. No issues have been reported with the patch.

P.

----8<----

There is no need for this at all. Worst it means that if the guest tries to write to BARs it could lead (on certain platforms) to PCI SERR errors.

Please note that with af6fc858a35b90e89ea7a7ee58e66628c55c776b "xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register"
a guest is still allowed to enable those control bits (safely), but is not allowed to disable them and that therefore a well behaved frontend which enables things before using them will still function correctly.

This is done via an write to the configuration register 0x4 which triggers on the backend side:
command_write
\- pci_enable_device
\- pci_enable_device_flags
\- do_pci_enable_device
\- pcibios_enable_device
\-pci_enable_resourcess
[which enables the PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY|PCI_COMMAND_IO]

However guests (and drivers) which don't do this could cause problems, including the security issues which XSA-120 sought to address.

---
 drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c +0 -2
index ea4a08b83fa0..787966f44589 100644
@@ -127,8 +127,6 @@ void xen_pcibk_reset_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
 		if (pci_is_enabled(dev))
 			pci_disable_device(dev);
 
-		pci_write_config_word(dev, PCI_COMMAND, 0);
-
 		dev->is_busmaster = 0;
 	} else {
 		pci_read_config_word(dev, PCI_COMMAND, &cmd);
Signature · 7 lines
2.18.1


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#1 lore raw
Quoted 2 lines · Prarit Bhargava

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>

+LKML

Quoted 60 lines

This was submitted in 2015 here

https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=142807132515973&w=2

and has been included in Fedora builds ever since. No issues have been reported with the patch.

P.

----8<----

There is no need for this at all. Worst it means that if the guest tries to write to BARs it could lead (on certain platforms) to PCI SERR errors.

Please note that with af6fc858a35b90e89ea7a7ee58e66628c55c776b "xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register"
a guest is still allowed to enable those control bits (safely), but is not allowed to disable them and that therefore a well behaved frontend which enables things before using them will still function correctly.

This is done via an write to the configuration register 0x4 which triggers on the backend side:
command_write
\- pci_enable_device
\- pci_enable_device_flags
\- do_pci_enable_device
\- pcibios_enable_device
\-pci_enable_resourcess
[which enables the PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY|PCI_COMMAND_IO]

However guests (and drivers) which don't do this could cause problems, including the security issues which XSA-120 sought to address.

---
 drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c +0 -2
index ea4a08b83fa0..787966f44589 100644
@@ -127,8 +127,6 @@ void xen_pcibk_reset_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
 		if (pci_is_enabled(dev))
 			pci_disable_device(dev);
 
-		pci_write_config_word(dev, PCI_COMMAND, 0);
-
 		dev->is_busmaster = 0;
 	} else {
 		pci_read_config_word(dev, PCI_COMMAND, &cmd);
Signature · 1 line
2.18.1

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[email protected]
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel

#2 lore raw
In reply to Prarit Bhargava
Quoted 2 lines · Prarit Bhargava

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>

+LKML

Quoted 60 lines

This was submitted in 2015 here

https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=142807132515973&w=2

and has been included in Fedora builds ever since. No issues have been reported with the patch.

P.

----8<----

There is no need for this at all. Worst it means that if the guest tries to write to BARs it could lead (on certain platforms) to PCI SERR errors.

Please note that with af6fc858a35b90e89ea7a7ee58e66628c55c776b "xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register"
a guest is still allowed to enable those control bits (safely), but is not allowed to disable them and that therefore a well behaved frontend which enables things before using them will still function correctly.

This is done via an write to the configuration register 0x4 which triggers on the backend side:
command_write
\- pci_enable_device
\- pci_enable_device_flags
\- do_pci_enable_device
\- pcibios_enable_device
\-pci_enable_resourcess
[which enables the PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY|PCI_COMMAND_IO]

However guests (and drivers) which don't do this could cause problems, including the security issues which XSA-120 sought to address.

---
 drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c +0 -2
index ea4a08b83fa0..787966f44589 100644
@@ -127,8 +127,6 @@ void xen_pcibk_reset_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
 		if (pci_is_enabled(dev))
 			pci_disable_device(dev);
 
-		pci_write_config_word(dev, PCI_COMMAND, 0);
-
 		dev->is_busmaster = 0;
 	} else {
 		pci_read_config_word(dev, PCI_COMMAND, &cmd);
Signature · 1 line
2.18.1
maintainer Applied
#3 lore raw
In reply to Prarit Bhargava
Quoted 34 lines · Prarit Bhargava

From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <[email protected]>

This was submitted in 2015 here

https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=142807132515973&w=2

and has been included in Fedora builds ever since. No issues have been reported with the patch.

P.

----8<----

There is no need for this at all. Worst it means that if the guest tries to write to BARs it could lead (on certain platforms) to PCI SERR errors.

Please note that with af6fc858a35b90e89ea7a7ee58e66628c55c776b "xen-pciback: limit guest control of command register"
a guest is still allowed to enable those control bits (safely), but is not allowed to disable them and that therefore a well behaved frontend which enables things before using them will still function correctly.

This is done via an write to the configuration register 0x4 which triggers on the backend side:
command_write
\- pci_enable_device
\- pci_enable_device_flags
\- do_pci_enable_device
\- pcibios_enable_device
\-pci_enable_resourcess
[which enables the PCI_COMMAND_MEMORY|PCI_COMMAND_IO]

Quoted 8 lines

However guests (and drivers) which don't do this could cause problems, including the security issues which XSA-120 sought to address.

Applied to xen/tip.git for-linus-5.1

Juergen

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