x86/asm: Pin sensitive CR4 bits
PATCH 1/1 x86/asm: Pin sensitive CR4 bits
Several recent exploits have used direct calls to the native_write_cr4() function to disable SMEP and SMAP before then continuing their exploits using userspace memory access. This pins bits of cr4 so that they cannot be changed through a common function. This is not intended to be general ROP protection (which would require CFI to defend against properly), but rather a way to avoid trivial direct function calling (or CFI bypassing via a matching function prototype) as seen in:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/05/exploiting-linux-kernel-via-packet.html
(https://github.com/xairy/kernel-exploits/tree/master/CVE-2017-7308)
The goals of this change:
- pin specific bits (SMEP, SMAP, and UMIP) when writing cr4.
- avoid setting the bits too early (they must become pinned only after first being used).
- pinning mask needs to be read-only during normal runtime.
- pinning needs to be rechecked after set to avoid jumps into the middle of the function.
Using __ro_after_init on the mask is done so it can't be first disabled with a malicious write. And since it becomes read-only, we must avoid writing to it later (hence the check for bits already having been set instead of unconditionally writing to the mask).
The use of volatile is done to force the compiler to perform a full reload of the mask after setting cr4 (to protect against just jumping into the function past where the masking happens; we must check that the mask was applied after we do the set). Due to how this function can be built by the compiler (especially due to the removal of frame pointers), jumping into the middle of the function frequently doesn't require stack manipulation to construct a stack frame (there may only a retq without pops, which is sufficient for use with exploits like timer overwrites mentioned above).
For example, without the recheck, the function may appear as:
native_write_cr4:
mov [pin], %rbx
or %rbx, %rdi
1: mov %rdi, %cr4
retq
The masking "or" could be trivially bypassed by just calling to label "1" instead of "native_write_cr4". (CFI will force calls to only be able to call into native_write_cr4, but CFI and CET are uncommon currently.)
--- arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h | 12 ++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 12 +++++++++++- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h +12 -0
@@ -72,9 +72,21 @@ static inline unsigned long native_read_cr4(void)return val; } +extern volatile unsigned long cr4_pin; +static inline void native_write_cr4 (unsigned long val) { +again: + val |= cr4_pin; asmvolatile ("mov %0,%%cr4" : :"r" (val),"m" (__force_order)); +/* +* If the MOV above was used directly as a ROP gadget we can +* notice the lack of pinned bits in "val" and start the function +* from the beginning to gain the cr4_pin bits for sure. +*/ +if (WARN_ONCE (cr4_pin && (val & cr4_pin) ==0 , +"cr4 pin bypass attempt?!\n" )) + goto again; }#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +11 -1
@@ -312,10 +312,16 @@ static __init int setup_disable_smep(char *arg) }__setup ("nosmep" , setup_disable_smep); +volatile unsigned long cr4_pin__ro_after_init ; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (cr4_pin); + static __always_inline void setup_smep(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { -if (cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_SMEP )) +if (cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_SMEP )) { +if (!(cr4_pin &X86_CR4_SMEP )) + cr4_pin |=X86_CR4_SMEP ;cr4_set_bits (X86_CR4_SMEP ); + } }static __init int setup_disable_smap (char *arg)
@@ -334,6 +340,8 @@ static __always_inline void setup_smap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)if (cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_SMAP )) {#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SMAP +if (!(cr4_pin &X86_CR4_SMAP )) + cr4_pin |=X86_CR4_SMAP ;cr4_set_bits (X86_CR4_SMAP );#else cr4_clear_bits (X86_CR4_SMAP );
@@ -351,6 +359,8 @@ static __always_inline void setup_umip(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)if (!cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_UMIP )) goto out; +if (!(cr4_pin &X86_CR4_UMIP )) + cr4_pin |=X86_CR4_UMIP ;cr4_set_bits (X86_CR4_UMIP );pr_info_once ("x86/cpu: User Mode Instruction Prevention (UMIP) activated\n" );
Signature · 5 lines
2.17.1 -- Kees Cook
Quoted 47 lines · Kees Cook
Several recent exploits have used direct calls to the
native_write_cr4()function to disable SMEP and SMAP before then continuing their exploits using userspace memory access. This pins bits of cr4 so that they cannot be changed through a common function. This is not intended to be general ROP protection (which would require CFI to defend against properly), but rather a way to avoid trivial direct function calling (or CFI bypassing via a matching function prototype) as seen in:https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2017/05/exploiting-linux-kernel-via-packet.html
(https://github.com/xairy/kernel-exploits/tree/master/CVE-2017-7308)The goals of this change:
- pin specific bits (SMEP, SMAP, and UMIP) when writing cr4.
- avoid setting the bits too early (they must become pinned only after first being used).
- pinning mask needs to be read-only during normal runtime.
- pinning needs to be rechecked after set to avoid jumps into the middle of the function.Using
__ro_after_initon the mask is done so it can't be first disabled with a malicious write. And since it becomes read-only, we must avoid writing to it later (hence the check for bits already having been set instead of unconditionally writing to the mask).The use of volatile is done to force the compiler to perform a full reload of the mask after setting cr4 (to protect against just jumping into the function past where the masking happens; we must check that the mask was applied after we do the set). Due to how this function can be built by the compiler (especially due to the removal of frame pointers), jumping into the middle of the function frequently doesn't require stack manipulation to construct a stack frame (there may only a retq without pops, which is sufficient for use with exploits like timer overwrites mentioned above).
For example, without the recheck, the function may appear as:
native_write_cr4: mov [pin], %rbx or %rbx, %rdi 1: mov %rdi, %cr4 retqThe masking "or" could be trivially bypassed by just calling to label "1" instead of "
native_write_cr4". (CFI will force calls to only be able to call intonative_write_cr4, but CFI and CET are uncommon currently.)Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>---
[...]
arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h static inline unsigned long native_read_cr4(void) · line 87
Quoted 11 lines
static inline void
native_write_cr4(unsigned long val){arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h +8
-0+again: + val |= cr4_pin; asmvolatile ("mov %0,%%cr4" : :"r" (val),"m" (__force_order)); +/* +* If the MOV above was used directly as a ROP gadget we can +* notice the lack of pinned bits in "val" and start the function +* from the beginning to gain the cr4_pin bits for sure. +*/ + if (WARN_ONCE(cr4_pin && (val & cr4_pin) == 0,
Don't you mean cr4_pin && (val & cr4_pin) != cr4_pin)?
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h +2
-0+ "cr4 pin bypass attempt?!\n")) + goto again; }
Quoted 5 lines · Jann Horn
Quoted 1 line · Kees Cook
+ if (WARN_ONCE(cr4_pin && (val &
cr4_pin) == 0,Don't you mean
cr4_pin && (val & cr4_pin) != cr4_pin)?
Whoops! Yes, thanks. :)
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c static __init int setup_disable_smep(char *arg) · line 316
Quoted 10 lines · Kees Cook
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +2
-0@@ -312,10 +312,16 @@ static __init int setup_disable_smep(char *arg) }__setup ("nosmep" , setup_disable_smep); +volatile unsigned long cr4_pin__ro_after_init ; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (cr4_pin);
Where is this export needed?
Thanks,
Dominik
Quoted 10 lines · Dominik Brodowski
Quoted 8 lines · Kees Cook
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +0
-0@@ -312,10 +312,16 @@ static __init int setup_disable_smep(char *arg) }__setup ("nosmep" , setup_disable_smep);
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c static __init int setup_disable_smep(char *arg) · line 316
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +2
-0+volatile unsigned long cr4_pin__ro_after_init ; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (cr4_pin);Where is this export needed?
I use it in lkdtm (which I was going to land through the drivers tree, but I haven't sent to Greg):
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux.git/commit/?h=kspp/x86/cr4
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook