x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flag into __put_user() value evaluation
Subsystems (2)
PATCH v2 1/1 x86/uaccess: Don't leak the AC flag into __put_user() value evaluation
From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
commit 2a418cf3f5f1caf911af288e978d61c9844b0695 upstream.
When calling __put_user(foo(), ptr), the __put_user() macro would call foo() in between __uaccess_begin() and __uaccess_end(). If that code were buggy, then those bugs would be run without SMAP protection.
Fortunately, there seem to be few instances of the problem in the kernel. Nevertheless, __put_user() should be fixed to avoid doing this. Therefore, evaluate __put_user()'s argument before setting AC.
This issue was noticed when an objtool hack by Peter Zijlstra complained about genregs_get() and I compared the assembly output to the C source.
[ bp: Massage commit message and fixed up whitespace. ]
--- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +4 -2
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ do { \__put_user_asm (x, ptr, retval,"l" ,"k" ,"ir" , errret); \break ; \case 8 : \ -__put_user_asm_u64 ((__typeof__ (*ptr))(x), ptr, retval, \ +__put_user_asm_u64 (x, ptr, retval, \ errret); \break ; \default : \
@@ -427,8 +427,10 @@ do { \#define __put_user_nocheck (x, ptr, size) \ ({ \ int __pu_err; \ + __typeof__(*(ptr)) __pu_val; \ + __pu_val = x; \ __uaccess_begin(); \ - __put_user_size((x), (ptr), (size), __pu_err, -EFAULT); \ + __put_user_size(__pu_val, (ptr), (size), __pu_err, -EFAULT); \ __uaccess_end(); \ __builtin_expect(__pu_err, 0); \ })
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 37 lines · Maxim Zhukov
From: Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
commit
2a418cf3f5f1caf911af288e978d61c9844b0695upstream.When calling
__put_user(foo(), ptr), the__put_user()macro would callfoo()in between__uaccess_begin()and__uaccess_end(). If that code were buggy, then those bugs would be run without SMAP protection.Fortunately, there seem to be few instances of the problem in the kernel. Nevertheless,
__put_user()should be fixed to avoid doing this. Therefore, evaluate __put_user()'s argument before setting AC.This issue was noticed when an objtool hack by Peter Zijlstra complained about
genregs_get()and I compared the assembly output to the C source.[ bp: Massage commit message and fixed up whitespace. ]
Fixes 11f1a4b9755f ("x86: reorganize SMAP handling in user space accesses")Signed-off-by Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>Acked-by Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>Cc Brian Gerst <[email protected]>Cc Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>Cc Denys Vlasenko <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Maxim Zhukov <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +0
-0
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h do { \ · line 296
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +1
-1@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ do { \__put_user_asm (x, ptr, retval,"l" ,"k" ,"ir" , errret); \break ; \case 8 : \ -__put_user_asm_u64 ((__typeof__ (*ptr))(x), ptr, retval, \ +__put_user_asm_u64 (x, ptr, retval, \ errret); \
That can all be on one line now :(
Let me go see if I can do the backport, it doesn't look that complex...
greg k-h