Proposed cmdline improvements
Subsystems (7)
cover Proposed cmdline improvements
For MDS and SMT, I'd propose that we do something similar to what we did for L1TF: a) add an mds=full,nosmt option; and b) add a printk warning if SMT is enabled. That's the first three patches.
The last patch proposes a meta-option which is intended to make it easier for users to choose sane mitigation defaults for all the speculative vulnerabilities at once.
Josh Poimboeuf (4):
x86/speculation/mds: Add mds=full,nosmt cmdline option x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after mitigation
decisions
x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning message x86/speculation: Add 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst | 3 + .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 49 ++++++++++++- arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c | 6 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 2 +- arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c | 4 +- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/mm/pti.c | 3 +- include/linux/cpu.h | 8 +++ kernel/cpu.c | 15 ++++ 10 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
RFC PATCH 1/4 1
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH RFC 1/4] x86/speculation/mds: Add mds=full,nosmt cmdline
option
Add the mds=full,nosmt cmdline option. This is like mds=full, but with SMT disabled if the CPU is vulnerable.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst | 3 +++ Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 ++++++++++ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst +3 -0
@@ -260,6 +260,9 @@ time with the option "mds=". The valid arguments for this option are: It does not automatically disable SMT. + full,nosmt The same as mds=full, with SMT disabled on vulnerable + CPUs. This is the complete mitigation. + off Disables MDS mitigations completely. ============ =============================================================
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +4 -2
@@ -2372,8 +2372,10 @@ This parameter controls the MDS mitigation. The options are: - full - Enable MDS mitigation on vulnerable CPUs - off - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation + full - Enable MDS mitigation on vulnerable CPUs + full,nosmt - Enable MDS mitigation and disable + SMT on vulnerable CPUs + off - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation Not specifying this option is equivalent to mds=full.
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +10 -0
@@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)/* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */ static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation__ro_after_init =MDS_MITIGATION_FULL ; +static bool mds_nosmt__ro_after_init = false;static const char *const mds_strings[] = { [MDS_MITIGATION_OFF ] ="Vulnerable" ,
@@ -238,8 +239,13 @@ static void mds_select_mitigation(void)if (mds_mitigation ==MDS_MITIGATION_FULL ) {if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR )) mds_mitigation =MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV ; +static_branch_enable (&mds_user_clear); + +if (mds_nosmt && !boot_cpu_has (X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY )) +cpu_smt_disable (false); } +pr_info ("%s\n" , mds_strings[mds_mitigation]); }
@@ -255,6 +261,10 @@ static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str) mds_mitigation =MDS_MITIGATION_OFF ; else if (!strcmp(str, "full")) mds_mitigation =MDS_MITIGATION_FULL ; + else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) { + mds_mitigation =MDS_MITIGATION_FULL ; + mds_nosmt = true; + }return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
[MODERATED] Encrypted Message
From: Jon Masters <[email protected]>
To: speck for Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 1/4] 1
Quoted 13 lines · speck for Josh Poimboeuf
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +1
-0@@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)/* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */ static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation__ro_after_init =MDS_MITIGATION_FULL ; +static bool mds_nosmt__ro_after_init = false;static const char *const mds_strings[] = { [MDS_MITIGATION_OFF ] ="Vulnerable" ,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c static void mds_select_mitigation(void) · line 246
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +4
-0@@ -238,8 +239,13 @@ static void mds_select_mitigation(void)if (mds_mitigation ==MDS_MITIGATION_FULL ) {if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR )) mds_mitigation =MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV ; +static_branch_enable (&mds_user_clear); + +if (mds_nosmt && !boot_cpu_has (X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY )) +cpu_smt_disable (false);
Is there some logic missing here to disable SMT?
Jon.
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Computer Architect | Sent with my Fedora powered laptop
[MODERATED] Re: Encrypted Message
Quoted 12 lines · speck for Jon Masters
Quoted 10 lines · speck for Josh Poimboeuf
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +1
-0@@ -221,6 +221,7 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)/* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */ static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation__ro_after_init =MDS_MITIGATION_FULL ; +static bool mds_nosmt__ro_after_init = false;
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c static void mds_select_mitigation(void) · line 246
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +4
-0static const char *const mds_strings[] = { [MDS_MITIGATION_OFF ] ="Vulnerable" ,@@ -238,8 +239,13 @@ static void mds_select_mitigation(void)if (mds_mitigation ==MDS_MITIGATION_FULL ) {if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR )) mds_mitigation =MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV ; +static_branch_enable (&mds_user_clear); + +if (mds_nosmt && !boot_cpu_has (X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY )) +cpu_smt_disable (false);Is there some logic missing here to disable SMT?
That would be the cpu_smt_disable() call :-)
Signature · 1 line
Josh
[MODERATED] Re: [PATCH RFC 1/4] 1
In reply to Josh PoimboeufQuoted 19 lines · speck for Josh Poimboeuf
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH RFC 1/4] x86/speculation/mds: Add mds=full,nosmt cmdline
optionAdd the mds=full,nosmt cmdline option. This is like mds=full, but with SMT disabled if the CPU is vulnerable.
Signed-off-by Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst | 3 +++ Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 ++++++++++ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst +0
-0
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst time with the option "mds=". The valid arguments for this option are: · line 264
Quoted 5 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst +2
-0@@ -260,6 +260,9 @@ time with the option "mds=". The valid arguments for this option are: It does not automatically disable SMT. + full,nosmt The same as mds=full, with SMT disabled on vulnerable + CPUs. This is the complete mitigation.
While I understand the intention, the number of different combinations we are "offering" to userspace here is huge, and everyone is going to be confused as to what to do. If we really think/say that SMT is a major issue for this, why don't we just have "full" disable SMT?
thanks,
greg k-h
[MODERATED] Encrypted Message
From: Jon Masters <[email protected]>
To: speck for Greg KH <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 1/4] 1
Quoted 23 lines · speck for Greg KH
Quoted 22 lines · speck for Josh Poimboeuf
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH RFC 1/4] x86/speculation/mds: Add mds=full,nosmt cmdline
optionAdd the mds=full,nosmt cmdline option. This is like mds=full, but with SMT disabled if the CPU is vulnerable.
Signed-off-by Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst | 3 +++ Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 ++++++++++ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst +0
-0@@ -260,6 +260,9 @@ time with the option "mds=". The valid arguments for this option are: It does not automatically disable SMT.
Quoted 7 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst time with the option "mds=". The valid arguments for this option are: · line 264
Quoted 2 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst +2
-0+ full,nosmt The same as mds=full, with SMT disabled on vulnerable + CPUs. This is the complete mitigation.While I understand the intention, the number of different combinations we are "offering" to userspace here is huge, and everyone is going to be confused as to what to do. If we really think/say that SMT is a major issue for this, why don't we just have "full" disable SMT?
Frankly, it ought to for safety (can't be made safe). The reason cited for not doing so (Thomas and Linus can speak up on this part) was upgrades vs new installs. The concern was not to break existing folks by losing half their logical CPU count when upgrading a kernel.
Jon.
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Computer Architect | Sent with my Fedora powered laptop
RFC PATCH 2/4 2
In reply to Josh PoimboeufFrom: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH RFC 2/4] x86/speculation: Move arch_smt_update() call to after
mitigation decisions
arch_smt_update() now has a dependency on both Spectre v2 and MDS mitigations. Move its initial call to after all the mitigation decisions have been made.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +2 -3
@@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)mds_select_mitigation (); +arch_smt_update (); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 /* * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
@@ -638,9 +640,6 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)/* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation (cmd); - -/* Enable STIBP if appropriate */ -arch_smt_update (); }static void update_stibp_msr (void * __unused)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
[MODERATED] Re: [PATCH RFC 2/4] 2
Quoted 7 lines · speck for Josh Poimboeuf
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH RFC 2/4] x86/speculation: Movearch_smt_update()call to after
mitigation decisions
arch_smt_update()now has a dependency on both Spectre v2 and MDS mitigations. Move its initial call to after all the mitigation decisions have been made.
So Patch 1 doesn't work without this? If so, shouldn't this go first?
thanks,
greg k-h
[MODERATED] Re: [PATCH RFC 2/4] 2
Quoted 10 lines · speck for Greg KH
Quoted 7 lines · speck for Josh Poimboeuf
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH RFC 2/4] x86/speculation: Movearch_smt_update()call to after
mitigation decisions
arch_smt_update()now has a dependency on both Spectre v2 and MDS mitigations. Move its initial call to after all the mitigation decisions have been made.So Patch 1 doesn't work without this? If so, shouldn't this go first?
No, I think patch 1 works fine without it. It's really a prereq for patch 3 (and also a cleanup to prevent future bugs).
Signature · 1 line
Josh
RFC PATCH 3/4 3
In reply to Josh PoimboeufFrom: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH RFC 3/4] x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning message
MDS is vulnerable with SMT. Make that clear with a one-time printk whenever SMT first gets enabled.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +4 -0
@@ -691,6 +691,8 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)static_branch_disable (&mds_idle_clear); } +#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n" +void arch_smt_update (void ) {/* Enhanced IBRS implies STIBP. No update required. */
@@ -715,6 +717,8 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)switch (mds_mitigation) {case MDS_MITIGATION_FULL :case MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV : +if (sched_smt_active () && !boot_cpu_has (X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY )) +pr_warn_once (MDS_MSG_SMT );update_mds_branch_idle ();break ;case MDS_MITIGATION_OFF :
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
[MODERATED] Encrypted Message
From: Jon Masters <[email protected]>
To: speck for Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 3/4] 3
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c void arch_smt_update(void) · line 721
Quoted 2 lines · speck for Josh Poimboeuf
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +2
-0+if (sched_smt_active () && !boot_cpu_has (X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY )) +pr_warn_once (MDS_MSG_SMT );
It's never fully safe to use SMT. I get that if we only had MSBDS then it's unlikely we'll hit the e.g. power state change cases needed to exploit it but I think it would be prudent to display something anyway?
Jon.
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Computer Architect | Sent with my Fedora powered laptop
[MODERATED] Re: Encrypted Message
Quoted 8 lines · speck for Jon Masters
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c void arch_smt_update(void) · line 721
Quoted 2 lines · speck for Josh Poimboeuf
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +2
-0+if (sched_smt_active () && !boot_cpu_has (X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY )) +pr_warn_once (MDS_MSG_SMT );It's never fully safe to use SMT. I get that if we only had MSBDS then it's unlikely we'll hit the e.g. power state change cases needed to exploit it but I think it would be prudent to display something anyway?
My understanding is that the idle state changes are mitigated elsewhere in the MDS patches, so it should be safe in theory.
Signature · 1 line
Josh
[MODERATED] Encrypted Message
From: Jon Masters <[email protected]>
To: speck for Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Encrypted Message
Quoted 11 lines · speck for Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 8 lines · speck for Jon Masters
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c void arch_smt_update(void) · line 721
Quoted 2 lines · speck for Josh Poimboeuf
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +2
-0+if (sched_smt_active () && !boot_cpu_has (X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY )) +pr_warn_once (MDS_MSG_SMT );It's never fully safe to use SMT. I get that if we only had MSBDS then it's unlikely we'll hit the e.g. power state change cases needed to exploit it but I think it would be prudent to display something anyway?
Quoted 2 lines
My understanding is that the idle state changes are mitigated elsewhere in the MDS patches, so it should be safe in theory.
Looked at it again. Agree. Sorry about that.
Jon.
Signature · 1 line
Computer Architect | Sent with my Fedora powered laptop
[MODERATED] Re: [PATCH RFC 3/4] 3
In reply to Josh PoimboeufQuoted 16 lines · speck for Josh Poimboeuf
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH RFC 3/4] x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning messageMDS is vulnerable with SMT. Make that clear with a one-time printk whenever SMT first gets enabled.
Signed-off-by Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c static void update_mds_branch_idle(void) · line 694
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +1
-0@@ -691,6 +691,8 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)static_branch_disable (&mds_idle_clear); } +#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
Why a #define? Just stick that string into the printk message.
thanks,
greg k-h
[MODERATED] Re: [PATCH RFC 3/4] 3
Quoted 20 lines · speck for Greg KH
Quoted 19 lines · speck for Josh Poimboeuf
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH RFC 3/4] x86/speculation/mds: Add SMT warning messageMDS is vulnerable with SMT. Make that clear with a one-time printk whenever SMT first gets enabled.
Signed-off-by Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +0
-0@@ -691,6 +691,8 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)static_branch_disable (&mds_idle_clear); }
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c static void update_mds_branch_idle(void) · line 694
Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +1
-0+#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"Why a #define? Just stick that string into the printk message.
The message is so long that it will really break up the flow and readability of the code IMO. We did the same thing in the vmx code for the same reasons -- see L1TF_MSG_SMT and L1TF_MSG_L1D.
Signature · 1 line
Josh
RFC PATCH 4/4 4
In reply to Josh PoimboeufFrom: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH RFC 4/4] x86/speculation: Add 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline
options
Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation bugs has become overwhelming for many users. It's getting more and more complicated to decide what mitigations are needed for a given architecture.
Most users fall into a few basic categories:
- want all mitigations off;
- want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if it's vulnerable; or
- want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if vulnerable.
Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an aggregation of existing options:
- cpu_spec_mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.
- cpu_spec_mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.
- cpu_spec_mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling SMT if needed by a mitigation.
See the documentation for more details.
--- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 43 ++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c | 6 +-- arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 2 +- arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c | 4 +- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/mm/pti.c | 3 +- include/linux/cpu.h | 8 +++ kernel/cpu.c | 15 ++++++ 9 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +43 -0
@@ -2537,6 +2537,49 @@ in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git + cpu_spec_mitigations= + [KNL] Control mitigations for CPU speculation + vulnerabilities on affected CPUs. This is a set of + curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an + aggregation of existing options. + + off + Disable all speculative CPU mitigations. + Equivalent to: nopti + nospectre_v1 + nospectre_v2 + spectre_v2_user=off + nobp=0 + spec_store_bypass_disable=off + l1tf=off + mds=off + + auto (default) + Mitigate all speculative CPU vulnerabilities, + but leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable. + This is useful for users who don't want to be + surprised by SMT getting disabled across kernel + upgrades, or who have other ways of avoiding + SMT-based attacks. + Equivalent to: pti=auto + spectre_v2=auto + spectre_v2_user=auto + spec_store_bypass_disable=auto + l1tf=flush + mds=full + + auto,nosmt + Mitigate all speculative CPU vulnerabilities, + disabling SMT if needed. This is for users who + always want to be fully mitigated, even if it + means losing SMT. + Equivalent to: pti=auto + spectre_v2=auto + spectre_v2_user=auto + spec_store_bypass_disable=auto + l1tf=flush,nosmt + mds=full,nosmt + mminit_loglevel= [KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this parameter allows control of the logging verbosity for
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +3 -3
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void) enable =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ) &&security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR ); -if (!no_nospec) +if (!no_nospec && cpu_spec_mitigations !=CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF )enable_barrier_nospec (enable); }
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int __init handle_nospectre_v2(char *p)early_param ("nospectre_v2" , handle_nospectre_v2);void setup_spectre_v2 (void ) { -if (no_spectrev2) +if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_spec_mitigations ==CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF )do_btb_flush_fixups ();else btb_flush_enabled = true;
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ void setup_stf_barrier(void) stf_enabled_flush_types = type; -if (!no_stf_barrier) +if (!no_stf_barrier && cpu_spec_mitigations !=CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF )stf_barrier_enable (enable); }
arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +1 -1
@@ -958,7 +958,7 @@ void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable) enabled_flush_types = types; -if (!no_rfi_flush) +if (!no_rfi_flush || cpu_spec_mitigations !=CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF )rfi_flush_enable (enable); }
arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c +3 -1
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/device.h> +#include <linux/cpu.h> #include <asm/nospec-branch.h> static int __init nobp_setup_early (char *str)
@@ -58,7 +59,8 @@ early_param("nospectre_v2", nospectre_v2_setup_early);void __init nospec_auto_detect (void ) { -if (test_facility (156 )) { +if (test_facility (156 ) || + cpu_spec_mitigations ==CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF ) {/* * The machine supports etokens. * Disable expolines and disable nobp.
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +2 -0
@@ -983,6 +983,7 @@ void microcode_check(void);enum l1tf_mitigations {L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF , +L1TF_MITIGATION_DEFAULT ,L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN ,L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH ,L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT ,
@@ -994,6 +995,7 @@ extern enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation;enum mds_mitigations {MDS_MITIGATION_OFF , +MDS_MITIGATION_DEFAULT ,MDS_MITIGATION_FULL ,MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV , };
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +45 -6
106 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/mm/pti.c +2 -1
@@ -115,7 +115,8 @@ void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(void) } } -if (cmdline_find_option_bool (boot_command_line,"nopti" )) { +if (cmdline_find_option_bool (boot_command_line,"nopti" ) || + cpu_spec_mitigations ==CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF ) { pti_mode =PTI_FORCE_OFF ;pti_print_if_insecure ("disabled on command line." );return ;
include/linux/cpu.h +8 -0
@@ -189,4 +189,12 @@ static inline void cpu_smt_disable(bool force) { }static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology (void ) { }#endif +enum cpu_spec_mitigations { +CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF , +CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_AUTO , +CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT , +}; + +extern enum cpu_spec_mitigations cpu_spec_mitigations; +#endif /* _LINUX_CPU_H_ */
kernel/cpu.c +15 -0
@@ -2279,3 +2279,18 @@ void __init boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void)#endif this_cpu_write (cpuhp_state.state,CPUHP_ONLINE ); } + +enum cpu_spec_mitigations cpu_spec_mitigations__ro_after_init =CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_AUTO ; + +static int __init cpu_spec_mitigations_setup (char *arg) +{ +if (!strcmp (arg,"off" )) + cpu_spec_mitigations =CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"auto" )) + cpu_spec_mitigations =CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_AUTO ; +else if (!strcmp (arg,"auto,nosmt" )) + cpu_spec_mitigations =CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT ; + +return 0 ; +} +early_param ("cpu_spec_mitigations" , cpu_spec_mitigations_setup);
Signature · 1 line
2.17.2
[MODERATED] Encrypted Message
From: Jon Masters <[email protected]>
To: speck for Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 4/4] 4
Quoted 23 lines · speck for Josh Poimboeuf
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH RFC 4/4] x86/speculation: Add 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline
optionsKeeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation bugs has become overwhelming for many users. It's getting more and more complicated to decide what mitigations are needed for a given architecture.
Most users fall into a few basic categories:
- want all mitigations off;
- want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if it's vulnerable; or
- want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if vulnerable.
Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an aggregation of existing options:
- cpu_spec_mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.
Quoted 7 lines
- cpu_spec_mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.
- cpu_spec_mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling SMT if needed by a mitigation.
See the documentation for more details.
Looks good. There's an effort to upstream mitigation controls for the arm64 but that's not in place yet. They'll want to wire that up later. I actually had missed the s390x etokens work so that was fun to see here.
Jon.
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Computer Architect | Sent with my Fedora powered laptop