sched/core: check format and overflows in cgroup2 cpu.max
PATCH 1/1 sched/core: check format and overflows in cgroup2 cpu.max
Cgroup2 interface for cpu bandwidth limit has some flaws:
- on stack buffer overflow
- no checks for valid format or trailing garbage
- no checks for integer overflows
This patch fixes all these flaws.
--- kernel/sched/core.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
kernel/sched/core.c +22 -7
@@ -6947,19 +6947,34 @@ static int __maybe_unused cpu_period_quota_parse(char *buf, u64 *periodp, u64 *quotap) {char tok[21 ];/* U64_MAX */ +int ret, len; -if (!sscanf (buf,"%s %llu" , tok, periodp)) +if (sscanf (buf,"%20s %n" , tok, &len) !=1 )return -EINVAL ; - *periodp *=NSEC_PER_USEC ; - -if (sscanf (tok,"%llu" , quotap)) - *quotap *=NSEC_PER_USEC ; -else if (!strcmp (tok,"max" )) + ret =kstrtou64 (tok,10 , quotap); +if (ret) { +if (strcmp (tok,"max" )) +return ret; *quotap =RUNTIME_INF ; -else + }else if (*quotap <=U64_MAX /NSEC_PER_USEC ) { + *quotap *=NSEC_PER_USEC ; + }else return -EINVAL ; + buf += len; +if (*buf) { +if (sscanf (buf,"%20s %n" , tok, &len) !=1 || buf[len]) +return -EINVAL ; + ret =kstrtou64 (tok,10 , periodp); +if (ret) +return ret; +if (*periodp >U64_MAX /NSEC_PER_USEC ) +return -EINVAL ; + } + + *periodp *=NSEC_PER_USEC ; +return 0 ; }
Tejun Heo
maintainerHello,
Quoted 7 lines · Konstantin Khlebnikov
Cgroup2 interface for cpu bandwidth limit has some flaws:
- on stack buffer overflow
- no checks for valid format or trailing garbage
- no checks for integer overflowsThis patch fixes all these flaws.
Ditto as the blkio patch. Unless there is a correctness problem, my preference is towards keeping the parsing functions simple and I don't think the kernel needs to play the role of strict input verifier here as long as the only foot getting shot is the user's own.
Thanks.
Signature · 1 line
tejun
Quoted 9 lines · Tejun Heo
Hello,
Quoted 6 lines · Konstantin Khlebnikov
Cgroup2 interface for cpu bandwidth limit has some flaws:
- on stack buffer overflow
- no checks for valid format or trailing garbage
- no checks for integer overflows
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
This patch fixes all these flaws.
Ditto as the blkio patch. Unless there is a correctness problem, my preference is towards keeping the parsing functions simple and I don't think the kernel needs to play the role of strict input verifier here as long as the only foot getting shot is the user's own.
IMHO non-strict interface more likely hides bugs and could cause problems for future changes.
Here is only only one fatal bug - buffer overflow in sscanf because %s has no limit.
Strict validation could be done as more strict sscanf variant or some kind of extension for format string.
Quoted 3 lines
Thanks.
Tejun Heo
maintainerHello, Konstantin.
Quoted 10 lines · Konstantin Khlebnikov
Quoted 4 lines
Ditto as the blkio patch. Unless there is a correctness problem, my preference is towards keeping the parsing functions simple and I don't think the kernel needs to play the role of strict input verifier here as long as the only foot getting shot is the user's own.
IMHO non-strict interface more likely hides bugs and could cause problems for future changes.
Here is only only one fatal bug - buffer overflow in sscanf because %s has no limit.
Ah, indeed. Can you please post a patch to fix that problem first?
Quoted 2 lines
Strict validation could be done as more strict sscanf variant or some kind of extension for format string.
I don't necessarily disagree with you; however, what often ends up with these manually crafted parsing approach are 1. code which is unnecessarily difficult to follow 2. different subset of validations and parsing bugs (of course) everywhere.
Given the above, I tend to lean towards dump sscanf() parsing. If we wanna improve the situation, I think the right thing to do is either improving sscanf or introducing new helpers to parse these things rather than hand-crafting each site. It is really error-prone.
Thanks.
Signature · 1 line
tejun
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerQuoted 24 lines · Tejun Heo
Hello, Konstantin.
Quoted 10 lines · Konstantin Khlebnikov
Quoted 4 lines
Ditto as the blkio patch. Unless there is a correctness problem, my preference is towards keeping the parsing functions simple and I don't think the kernel needs to play the role of strict input verifier here as long as the only foot getting shot is the user's own.
IMHO non-strict interface more likely hides bugs and could cause problems for future changes.
Here is only only one fatal bug - buffer overflow in sscanf because %s has no limit.
Ah, indeed. Can you please post a patch to fix that problem first?
Quoted 2 lines
Strict validation could be done as more strict sscanf variant or some kind of extension for format string.
I don't necessarily disagree with you; however, what often ends up with these manually crafted parsing approach are 1. code which is unnecessarily difficult to follow 2. different subset of validations and parsing bugs (of course) everywhere.
Quoted 4 lines
Given the above, I tend to lean towards dump
sscanf()parsing. If we wanna improve the situation, I think the right thing to do is either improving sscanf or introducing new helpers to parse these things rather than hand-crafting each site. It is really error-prone.
Always use a field width specifier with %s. Which is exactly what the proposed patch did IIRC.
Maybe that's something checkpatch could warn about.
Quoted 9 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 8 lines · Tejun Heo
Hello, Konstantin.
Quoted 5 lines · Konstantin Khlebnikov
Quoted 4 lines
Ditto as the blkio patch. Unless there is a correctness problem, my preference is towards keeping the parsing functions simple and I don't think the kernel needs to play the role of strict input verifier here as long as the only foot getting shot is the user's own.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
IMHO non-strict interface more likely hides bugs and could cause problems for future changes.
Here is only only one fatal bug - buffer overflow in sscanf because %s has no limit.
Ah, indeed. Can you please post a patch to fix that problem first?
Done.
Please see [PATCH] sched/core: fix buffer overflow in cgroup2 property cpu.max
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Strict validation could be done as more strict sscanf variant or some kind of extension for format string.
I don't necessarily disagree with you; however, what often ends up with these manually crafted parsing approach are 1. code which is unnecessarily difficult to follow 2. different subset of validations and parsing bugs (of course) everywhere.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Given the above, I tend to lean towards dump
sscanf()parsing. If we wanna improve the situation, I think the right thing to do is either improving sscanf or introducing new helpers to parse these things rather than hand-crafting each site. It is really error-prone.
I'm playing with sscanf right now.
Both problems (integer overflows and matching end of string) are relatively easy to fix without breaking sane compatibility.
Quoted 6 lines
Always use a field width specifier with %s. Which is exactly what the proposed patch did IIRC.
Maybe that's something checkpatch could warn about.
This could be done mandatory.
In-kernel sscanf always requires width for "%[...]".