WARNING: bad usercopy in fanotify_read
Subsystems (3)
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
Jan Kara
maintainerThanks for forwarding Andrew!
Quoted 24 lines · Andrew Morton
fyi
Begin forwarded message:
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 13:42:06 -0700
From: syzbot <[email protected]>
To: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Subject: WARNING: bad usercopy infanotify_readHello,
syzbot found the following crash on:
HEAD commit: 12ad143e Merge branch 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.. git tree: upstream console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=12776f57200000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=e9d91b7192a5e96e dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2c49971e251e36216d1f compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental) userspace arch: amd64 syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=1287516f200000 C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=17ee410b200000
Quoted 8 lines
IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by [email protected]------------[ cut here ]------------ Bad or missing usercopy whitelist? Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLAB object 'fanotify_event' (offset 40, size 8)! WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7649 at mm/usercopy.c:78 usercopy_warn+0xeb/0x110
mm/usercopy.c:78
Yeah, right. We need to create fanotify_event cache so that copying of fanotify_event.fid.fh to userspace is allowed. Sadly the area is unioned with a possible slab pointer so that won't be protected from leaking but life is not perfect. Amir, something like attached patch?
Honza
Quoted 67 lines
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 1 PID: 7649 Comm: syz-executor381 Not tainted 5.0.0+ #17 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 panic+0x2cb/0x65c kernel/panic.c:214 __warn.cold+0x20/0x45 kernel/panic.c:571 report_bug+0x263/0x2b0 lib/bug.c:186 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:179 [inline] fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:174 [inline] do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:272 do_invalid_op+0x37/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:291 invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:973 RIP: 0010:usercopy_warn+0xeb/0x110 mm/usercopy.c:78 Code: c8 e8 d9 88 c0 ff 4c 8b 45 c0 4d 89 e9 4c 89 e1 48 8b 55 c8 41 57 4889 de 48 c7 c7 e0 dc 74 87 ff 75 d0 41 56 e8 03 4b 93 ff <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 18 e9 46 ff ff ff 49 c7 c5 e0 da 74 87 4d 89 ee 4d
RSP: 0018:ffff8880a417fb18 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX:ffffffff8774dca0RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI:ffffffff815ad7b6RDI:ffffed101482ff55
RBP:ffff8880a417fb70R08:ffff888088d78580R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:ffffffff8859408d
R13:ffffffff8775d500R14:ffffffff8774db20R15: 0000000000000008__check_heap_object+0x88/0xb3 mm/slab.c:4453 check_heap_object mm/usercopy.c:238 [inline] __check_object_size mm/usercopy.c:284 [inline] __check_object_size+0x342/0x42f mm/usercopy.c:254 check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:119 [inline] check_copy_size include/linux/thread_info.h:150 [inline] copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:151 [inline] copy_fid_to_user fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c:236 [inline] copy_event_to_user fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c:294 [inline] fanotify_read+0xde0/0x1430 fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c:362 __vfs_read+0x8d/0x110 fs/read_write.c:416 vfs_read+0x194/0x3e0 fs/read_write.c:452 ksys_read+0xea/0x1f0 fs/read_write.c:578 __do_sys_read fs/read_write.c:588 [inline] __se_sys_read fs/read_write.c:586 [inline] __x64_sys_read+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:586 do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x4456b9 Code: e8 6c b6 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f748 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 2b 12 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fb296f31db8 EFLAGS: 00000246ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX:00000000006dac28RCX:00000000004456b9
RDX:000000000000006bRSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP:00000000006dac20R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:00000000006dac2c
R13:00007ffd8eb3d16fR14:00007fb296f329c0R15:20c49ba5e353f7cfKernel Offset: disabled
Rebooting in 86400 seconds..---
This bug is generated by a bot. It may contain errors. See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot. syzbot engineers can be reached at [email protected].syzbot will keep track of this bug report. See:
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syzbot can test patches for this bug, for details see:
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Signature · 2 lines
Jan Kara <[email protected]> SUSE Labs, CR
From beb8c3a76f2740757fb1765f793bb394ad71c183 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2019 12:42:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] fanotify: Allow copying of file handle to userspace
When file handle is embedded inside fanotify_event and usercopy checks are enabled, we get a warning like:
Bad or missing usercopy whitelist? Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLAB object 'fanotify_event' (offset 40, size 8)!
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7649 at mm/usercopy.c:78 usercopy_warn+0xeb/0x110
mm/usercopy.c:78
Annotate handling in fanotify_event properly to mark copying it to userspace is fine.
--- fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c +2 -1
@@ -1092,7 +1092,8 @@ static int __init fanotify_user_setup(void) fanotify_mark_cache =KMEM_CACHE (fsnotify_mark,SLAB_PANIC |SLAB_ACCOUNT ); - fanotify_event_cachep =KMEM_CACHE (fanotify_event,SLAB_PANIC ); + fanotify_event_cachep =KMEM_CACHE_USERCOPY (fanotify_event,SLAB_PANIC , + fid.fh);if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_FANOTIFY_ACCESS_PERMISSIONS )) { fanotify_perm_event_cachep =KMEM_CACHE (fanotify_perm_event,SLAB_PANIC );
Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
Amir Goldstein
reviewerQuoted 37 lines · Jan Kara
Thanks for forwarding Andrew!
Quoted 24 lines · Andrew Morton
fyi
Begin forwarded message:
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 13:42:06 -0700
From: syzbot <[email protected]>
To: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Subject: WARNING: bad usercopy infanotify_readHello,
syzbot found the following crash on:
HEAD commit: 12ad143e Merge branch 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.. git tree: upstream console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=12776f57200000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=e9d91b7192a5e96e dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2c49971e251e36216d1f compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental) userspace arch: amd64 syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=1287516f200000 C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=17ee410b200000Quoted 8 lines
IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by [email protected]------------[ cut here ]------------ Bad or missing usercopy whitelist? Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLAB object 'fanotify_event' (offset 40, size 8)! WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7649 at mm/usercopy.c:78 usercopy_warn+0xeb/0x110
mm/usercopy.c:78
Quoted 4 lines
Yeah, right. We need to create
fanotify_eventcache so that copying of fanotify_event.fid.fh to userspace is allowed. Sadly the area is unioned with a possible slab pointer so that won't be protected from leaking but life is not perfect. Amir, something like attached patch?
I agree. We could do something like this, to first copy the inline fh from slab to short stack buf:
static inline void *fanotify_fid_fh_user(struct fanotify_fid *fid,
unsigned int fh_len, char *fh_buf)
{
if (fh_len > FANOTIFY_INLINE_FH_LEN)
return fid->ext_fh;
memcpy(fh_buf, fid->fh, fh_len);
return fh_buf;
}But I don't think we should bother.
Thanks,
Amir.
Jan Kara
maintainerQuoted 48 lines · Amir Goldstein
Quoted 37 lines · Jan Kara
Thanks for forwarding Andrew!
Quoted 24 lines · Andrew Morton
fyi
Begin forwarded message:
Date: Mon, 11 Mar 2019 13:42:06 -0700
From: syzbot <[email protected]>
To: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]
Subject: WARNING: bad usercopy infanotify_readHello,
syzbot found the following crash on:
HEAD commit: 12ad143e Merge branch 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.. git tree: upstream console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=12776f57200000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=e9d91b7192a5e96e dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2c49971e251e36216d1f compiler: gcc (GCC) 9.0.0 20181231 (experimental) userspace arch: amd64 syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=1287516f200000 C reproducer: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=17ee410b200000Quoted 8 lines
IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by [email protected]------------[ cut here ]------------ Bad or missing usercopy whitelist? Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLAB object 'fanotify_event' (offset 40, size 8)! WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7649 at mm/usercopy.c:78 usercopy_warn+0xeb/0x110
mm/usercopy.c:78Quoted 4 lines
Yeah, right. We need to create
fanotify_eventcache so that copying of fanotify_event.fid.fh to userspace is allowed. Sadly the area is unioned with a possible slab pointer so that won't be protected from leaking but life is not perfect. Amir, something like attached patch?I agree. We could do something like this, to first copy the inline fh from slab to short stack buf:
static inline void *fanotify_fid_fh_user(struct
fanotify_fid*fid,
unsigned intfh_len, char*fh_buf)
Quoted 8 lines
{ if (fh_len > FANOTIFY_INLINE_FH_LEN) return fid->ext_fh; memcpy(fh_buf, fid->fh, fh_len); return fh_buf; }But I don't think we should bother.
OK, pushed my fix to my tree.
Honza
Signature · 2 lines
Jan Kara <[email protected]> SUSE Labs, CR