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clk: sunxi-ng: v3s: Fix TCON reset de-assert bit

PATCH In review Sasha Levin 2 participants 35 messages Mar 13, 2019 – Mar 19, 2019

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Sasha Levin

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/33 clk: sunxi-ng: v3s: Fix TCON reset de-assert bit

From: Paul Kocialkowski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5c59801f7018acba11b12de59017a3fcdcf7421d ]

According to the datasheet and the reference code from Allwinner, the bit used to de-assert the TCON reset is bit 4, not bit 3.

Fix it in the V3s CCU driver.

---
 drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun8i-v3s.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun8i-v3s.c +1 -1
index 621b1cd996db..ac12f261f8ca 100644
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ static struct ccu_reset_map sun8i_v3s_ccu_resets[] = {
 	[RST_BUS_OHCI0]		=  { 0x2c0, BIT(29) },
 
 	[RST_BUS_VE]		=  { 0x2c4, BIT(0) },
-	[RST_BUS_TCON0]		=  { 0x2c4, BIT(3) },
+	[RST_BUS_TCON0]		=  { 0x2c4, BIT(4) },
 	[RST_BUS_CSI]		=  { 0x2c4, BIT(8) },
 	[RST_BUS_DE]		=  { 0x2c4, BIT(12) },
 	[RST_BUS_DBG]		=  { 0x2c4, BIT(31) },
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/33 clk: sunxi: A31: Fix wrong AHB gate number

From: Andre Przywara <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ee0b27a3a4da0b0ed2318aa092f8856896e9450b ]

According to the manual the gate clock for MMC3 is at bit 11, and NAND1 is controlled by bit 12.

Fix the gate bit definitions in the clock driver.

Fixes c6e6c96d8fa6 ("clk: sunxi-ng: Add A31/A31s clocks")
---
 drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun6i-a31.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun6i-a31.c +2 -2
index 40d5f74cb2ac..d93b4815e65c 100644
@@ -252,9 +252,9 @@ static SUNXI_CCU_GATE(ahb1_mmc1_clk,	"ahb1-mmc1",	"ahb1",
 static SUNXI_CCU_GATE(ahb1_mmc2_clk,	"ahb1-mmc2",	"ahb1",
 		      0x060, BIT(10), 0);
 static SUNXI_CCU_GATE(ahb1_mmc3_clk,	"ahb1-mmc3",	"ahb1",
-		      0x060, BIT(12), 0);
+		      0x060, BIT(11), 0);
 static SUNXI_CCU_GATE(ahb1_nand1_clk,	"ahb1-nand1",	"ahb1",
-		      0x060, BIT(13), 0);
+		      0x060, BIT(12), 0);
 static SUNXI_CCU_GATE(ahb1_nand0_clk,	"ahb1-nand0",	"ahb1",
 		      0x060, BIT(13), 0);
 static SUNXI_CCU_GATE(ahb1_sdram_clk,	"ahb1-sdram",	"ahb1",
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/33 esp: Skip TX bytes accounting when sending from a request socket

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Martin Willi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 09db51241118aeb06e1c8cd393b45879ce099b36 ]

On ESP output, sk_wmem_alloc is incremented for the added padding if a socket is associated to the skb. When replying with TCP SYNACKs over IPsec, the associated sk is a casted request socket, only. Increasing sk_wmem_alloc on a request socket results in a write at an arbitrary struct offset. In the best case, this produces the following WARNING:

WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at lib/refcount.c:102 esp_output_head+0x2e4/0x308 [esp4]
refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.
CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc3 #2
Hardware name: Marvell Armada 380/385 (Device Tree)

[...]
[<bf0ff354>] (esp_output_head [esp4]) from [<bf1006a4>] (esp_output+0xb8/0x180 [esp4]) [<bf1006a4>] (esp_output [esp4]) from [<c05dee64>] (xfrm_output_resume+0x558/0x664) [<c05dee64>] (xfrm_output_resume) from [<c05d07b0>] (xfrm4_output+0x44/0xc4) [<c05d07b0>] (xfrm4_output) from [<c05956bc>] (tcp_v4_send_synack+0xa8/0xe8) [<c05956bc>] (tcp_v4_send_synack) from [<c0586ad8>] (tcp_conn_request+0x7f4/0x948) [<c0586ad8>] (tcp_conn_request) from [<c058c404>] (tcp_rcv_state_process+0x2a0/0xe64) [<c058c404>] (tcp_rcv_state_process) from [<c05958ac>] (tcp_v4_do_rcv+0xf0/0x1f4) [<c05958ac>] (tcp_v4_do_rcv) from [<c0598a4c>] (tcp_v4_rcv+0xdb8/0xe20) [<c0598a4c>] (tcp_v4_rcv) from [<c056eb74>] (ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2c/0x2dc) [<c056eb74>] (ip_protocol_deliver_rcu) from [<c056ee6c>] (ip_local_deliver_finish+0x48/0x54) [<c056ee6c>] (ip_local_deliver_finish) from [<c056eecc>] (ip_local_deliver+0x54/0xec) [<c056eecc>] (ip_local_deliver) from [<c056efac>] (ip_rcv+0x48/0xb8) [<c056efac>] (ip_rcv) from [<c0519c2c>] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x50/0x6c) [...]

The issue triggers only when not using TCP syncookies, as for syncookies no socket is associated.

Fixes cac2661c53f3 ("esp4: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
Fixes 03e2a30f6a27 ("esp6: Avoid skb_cow_data whenever possible")
---
 net/ipv4/esp4.c | 2 +-
 net/ipv6/esp6.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/esp4.c +1 -1
index b00e4a43b4dc..d30285c5d52d 100644
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ int esp_output_head(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info *
 			skb->len += tailen;
 			skb->data_len += tailen;
 			skb->truesize += tailen;
-			if (sk)
+			if (sk && sk_fullsock(sk))
 				refcount_add(tailen, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
 
 			goto out;
net/ipv6/esp6.c +1 -1
index f112fef79216..ef7822fad0fd 100644
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ int esp6_output_head(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb, struct esp_info
 			skb->len += tailen;
 			skb->data_len += tailen;
 			skb->truesize += tailen;
-			if (sk)
+			if (sk && sk_fullsock(sk))
 				refcount_add(tailen, &sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
 
 			goto out;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 4/33 ARM: 8824/1: fix a migrating irq bug when hotplug cpu

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Dietmar Eggemann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1b5ba350784242eb1f899bcffd95d2c7cff61e84 ]

Arm TC2 fails cpu hotplug stress test.

This issue was tracked down to a missing copy of the new affinity cpumask for the vexpress-spc interrupt into struct irq_common_data.affinity when the interrupt is migrated in migrate_one_irq().

Fix it by replacing the arm specific hotplug cpu migration with the generic irq code.

This is the counterpart implementation to commit 217d453d473c ("arm64:
fix a migrating irq bug when hotplug cpu").

Tested with cpu hotplug stress test on Arm TC2 (multi_v7_defconfig plus CONFIG_ARM_BIG_LITTLE_CPUFREQ=y and CONFIG_ARM_VEXPRESS_SPC_CPUFREQ=y). The vexpress-spc interrupt (irq=22) on this board is affine to CPU0. Its affinity cpumask now changes correctly e.g. from 0 to 1-4 when CPU0 is hotplugged out.

---
 arch/arm/Kconfig           |  1 +
 arch/arm/include/asm/irq.h |  1 -
 arch/arm/kernel/irq.c      | 62 --------------------------------------
 arch/arm/kernel/smp.c      |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
arch/arm/Kconfig +1 -0
index d1346a160760..cf69aab648fb 100644
@@ -1447,6 +1447,7 @@ config NR_CPUS
 config HOTPLUG_CPU
 	bool "Support for hot-pluggable CPUs"
 	depends on SMP
+	select GENERIC_IRQ_MIGRATION
 	help
 	  Say Y here to experiment with turning CPUs off and on.  CPUs
 	  can be controlled through /sys/devices/system/cpu.
arch/arm/include/asm/irq.h +0 -1
index b6f319606e30..2de321e89b94 100644
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 struct irqaction;
 struct pt_regs;
-extern void migrate_irqs(void);
 
 extern void asm_do_IRQ(unsigned int, struct pt_regs *);
 void handle_IRQ(unsigned int, struct pt_regs *);
arch/arm/kernel/irq.c +0 -62

71 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/arm/kernel/smp.c +1 -1
index f57333f46242..65f85737c6a2 100644
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ int __cpu_disable(void)
 	/*
 	 * OK - migrate IRQs away from this CPU
 	 */
-	migrate_irqs();
+	irq_migrate_all_off_this_cpu();
 
 	/*
 	 * Flush user cache and TLB mappings, and then remove this CPU
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 5/33 af_key: unconditionally clone on broadcast

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Sean Tranchetti <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fc2d5cfdcfe2ab76b263d91429caa22451123085 ]

Attempting to avoid cloning the skb when broadcasting by inflating the refcount with sock_hold/sock_put while under RCU lock is dangerous and violates RCU principles. It leads to subtle race conditions when attempting to free the SKB, as we may reference sockets that have already been freed by the stack.

Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 6b6b6b6b6b6c4b
[006b6b6b6b6b6c4b] address between user and kernel address ranges
Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
task: fffffff78f65b380 task.stack: ffffff8049a88000
pc : sock_rfree+0x38/0x6c
lr : skb_release_head_state+0x6c/0xcc
Process repro (pid: 7117, stack limit = 0xffffff8049a88000)
Call trace:
	sock_rfree+0x38/0x6c
	skb_release_head_state+0x6c/0xcc
	skb_release_all+0x1c/0x38
	__kfree_skb+0x1c/0x30
	kfree_skb+0xd0/0xf4
	pfkey_broadcast+0x14c/0x18c
	pfkey_sendmsg+0x1d8/0x408
	sock_sendmsg+0x44/0x60
	___sys_sendmsg+0x1d0/0x2a8
	__sys_sendmsg+0x64/0xb4
	SyS_sendmsg+0x34/0x4c
	el0_svc_naked+0x34/0x38
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
---
 net/key/af_key.c | 40 +++++++++++++++-------------------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
net/key/af_key.c +15 -25
index 3b209cbfe1df..b095551a5773 100644
@@ -196,30 +196,22 @@ static int pfkey_release(struct socket *sock)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int pfkey_broadcast_one(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff **skb2,
-			       gfp_t allocation, struct sock *sk)
+static int pfkey_broadcast_one(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t allocation,
+			       struct sock *sk)
 {
 	int err = -ENOBUFS;
 
-	sock_hold(sk);
-	if (*skb2 == NULL) {
-		if (refcount_read(&skb->users) != 1) {
-			*skb2 = skb_clone(skb, allocation);
-		} else {
-			*skb2 = skb;
-			refcount_inc(&skb->users);
-		}
-	}
-	if (*skb2 != NULL) {
-		if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) <= sk->sk_rcvbuf) {
-			skb_set_owner_r(*skb2, sk);
-			skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, *skb2);
-			sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
-			*skb2 = NULL;
-			err = 0;
-		}
+	if (atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc) > sk->sk_rcvbuf)
+		return err;
+
+	skb = skb_clone(skb, allocation);
+
+	if (skb) {
+		skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk);
+		skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
+		sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
+		err = 0;
 	}
-	sock_put(sk);
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -234,7 +226,6 @@ static int pfkey_broadcast(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t allocation,
 {
 	struct netns_pfkey *net_pfkey = net_generic(net, pfkey_net_id);
 	struct sock *sk;
-	struct sk_buff *skb2 = NULL;
 	int err = -ESRCH;
 
 	/* XXX Do we need something like netlink_overrun?  I think
@@ -253,7 +244,7 @@ static int pfkey_broadcast(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t allocation,
 		 * socket.
 		 */
 		if (pfk->promisc)
-			pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, &skb2, GFP_ATOMIC, sk);
+			pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, GFP_ATOMIC, sk);
 
 		/* the exact target will be processed later */
 		if (sk == one_sk)
@@ -268,7 +259,7 @@ static int pfkey_broadcast(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t allocation,
 				continue;
 		}
 
-		err2 = pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, &skb2, GFP_ATOMIC, sk);
+		err2 = pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, GFP_ATOMIC, sk);
 
 		/* Error is cleared after successful sending to at least one
 		 * registered KM */
@@ -278,9 +269,8 @@ static int pfkey_broadcast(struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t allocation,
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	if (one_sk != NULL)
-		err = pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, &skb2, allocation, one_sk);
+		err = pfkey_broadcast_one(skb, allocation, one_sk);
 
-	kfree_skb(skb2);
 	kfree_skb(skb);
 	return err;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 6/33 assoc_array: Fix shortcut creation

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: David Howells <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bb2ba2d75a2d673e76ddaf13a9bd30d6a8b1bb08 ]

Fix the creation of shortcuts for which the length of the index key value is an exact multiple of the machine word size. The problem is that the code that blanks off the unused bits of the shortcut value malfunctions if the number of bits in the last word equals machine word size. This is due to the "<<" operator being given a shift of zero in this case, and so the mask that should be all zeros is all ones instead. This causes the subsequent masking operation to clear everything rather than clearing nothing.

Ordinarily, the presence of the hash at the beginning of the tree index key makes the issue very hard to test for, but in this case, it was encountered due to a development mistake that caused the hash output to be either 0 (keyring) or 1 (non-keyring) only. This made it susceptible to the keyctl/unlink/valid test in the keyutils package.

The fix is simply to skip the blanking if the shift would be 0. For example, an index key that is 64 bits long would produce a 0 shift and thus a 'blank' of all 1s. This would then be inverted and AND'd onto the index_key, incorrectly clearing the entire last word.

Fixes 3cb989501c26 ("Add a generic associative array implementation.")
---
 lib/assoc_array.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
lib/assoc_array.c +5 -3
index 4e53be8bc590..9463d3445ccd 100644
@@ -781,9 +781,11 @@ static bool assoc_array_insert_into_terminal_node(struct assoc_array_edit *edit,
 		new_s0->index_key[i] =
 			ops->get_key_chunk(index_key, i * ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_SIZE);
 
-	blank = ULONG_MAX << (level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK);
-	pr_devel("blank off [%zu] %d: %lx\n", keylen - 1, level, blank);
-	new_s0->index_key[keylen - 1] &= ~blank;
+	if (level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK) {
+		blank = ULONG_MAX << (level & ASSOC_ARRAY_KEY_CHUNK_MASK);
+		pr_devel("blank off [%zu] %d: %lx\n", keylen - 1, level, blank);
+		new_s0->index_key[keylen - 1] &= ~blank;
+	}
 
 	/* This now reduces to a node splitting exercise for which we'll need
 	 * to regenerate the disparity table.
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 7/33 keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: David Howells <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 822ad64d7e46a8e2c8b8a796738d7b657cbb146d ]

In the request_key() upcall mechanism there's a dependency loop by which if a key type driver overrides the ->request_key hook and the userspace side manages to lose the authorisation key, the auth key and the internal construction record (struct key_construction) can keep each other pinned.

Fix this by the following changes:

(1) Killing off the construction record and using the auth key instead.

(2) Including the operation name in the auth key payload and making the payload available outside of security/keys/.

(3) The ->request_key hook is given the authkey instead of the cons record and operation name.

Changes (2) and (3) allow the auth key to naturally be cleaned up if the keyring it is in is destroyed or cleared or the auth key is unlinked.

Fixes 7ee02a316600 ("keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key")
---
 fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c                   | 31 ++++++------
 include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h | 36 ++++++++++++++
 include/linux/key-type.h             | 22 +++------
 security/keys/internal.h             | 13 +----
 security/keys/keyctl.c               |  1 +
 security/keys/process_keys.c         |  1 +
 security/keys/request_key.c          | 72 +++++++++++-----------------
 security/keys/request_key_auth.c     | 16 ++++---
 8 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h
fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c +17 -14
index b6f9d84ba19b..ae2d6f220627 100644
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
 #include <linux/keyctl.h>
 #include <linux/key-type.h>
 #include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/request_key_auth-type.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 
 #include "internal.h"
@@ -59,7 +60,7 @@ static struct key_type key_type_id_resolver_legacy;
 struct idmap_legacy_upcalldata {
 	struct rpc_pipe_msg pipe_msg;
 	struct idmap_msg idmap_msg;
-	struct key_construction	*key_cons;
+	struct key	*authkey;
 	struct idmap *idmap;
 };
 
@@ -384,7 +385,7 @@ static const match_table_t nfs_idmap_tokens = {
 	{ Opt_find_err, NULL }
 };
 
-static int nfs_idmap_legacy_upcall(struct key_construction *, const char *, void *);
+static int nfs_idmap_legacy_upcall(struct key *, void *);
 static ssize_t idmap_pipe_downcall(struct file *, const char __user *,
 				   size_t);
 static void idmap_release_pipe(struct inode *);
@@ -545,11 +546,12 @@ nfs_idmap_prepare_pipe_upcall(struct idmap *idmap,
 static void
 nfs_idmap_complete_pipe_upcall_locked(struct idmap *idmap, int ret)
 {
-	struct key_construction *cons = idmap->idmap_upcall_data->key_cons;
+	struct key *authkey = idmap->idmap_upcall_data->authkey;
 
 	kfree(idmap->idmap_upcall_data);
 	idmap->idmap_upcall_data = NULL;
-	complete_request_key(cons, ret);
+	complete_request_key(authkey, ret);
+	key_put(authkey);
 }
 
 static void
@@ -559,15 +561,14 @@ nfs_idmap_abort_pipe_upcall(struct idmap *idmap, int ret)
 		nfs_idmap_complete_pipe_upcall_locked(idmap, ret);
 }
 
-static int nfs_idmap_legacy_upcall(struct key_construction *cons,
-				   const char *op,
-				   void *aux)
+static int nfs_idmap_legacy_upcall(struct key *authkey, void *aux)
 {
 	struct idmap_legacy_upcalldata *data;
+	struct request_key_auth *rka = get_request_key_auth(authkey);
 	struct rpc_pipe_msg *msg;
 	struct idmap_msg *im;
 	struct idmap *idmap = (struct idmap *)aux;
-	struct key *key = cons->key;
+	struct key *key = rka->target_key;
 	int ret = -ENOKEY;
 
 	if (!aux)
@@ -582,7 +583,7 @@ static int nfs_idmap_legacy_upcall(struct key_construction *cons,
 	msg = &data->pipe_msg;
 	im = &data->idmap_msg;
 	data->idmap = idmap;
-	data->key_cons = cons;
+	data->authkey = key_get(authkey);
 
 	ret = nfs_idmap_prepare_message(key->description, idmap, im, msg);
 	if (ret < 0)
@@ -600,7 +601,7 @@ static int nfs_idmap_legacy_upcall(struct key_construction *cons,
 out2:
 	kfree(data);
 out1:
-	complete_request_key(cons, ret);
+	complete_request_key(authkey, ret);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -647,9 +648,10 @@ static int nfs_idmap_read_and_verify_message(struct idmap_msg *im,
 static ssize_t
 idmap_pipe_downcall(struct file *filp, const char __user *src, size_t mlen)
 {
+	struct request_key_auth *rka;
 	struct rpc_inode *rpci = RPC_I(file_inode(filp));
 	struct idmap *idmap = (struct idmap *)rpci->private;
-	struct key_construction *cons;
+	struct key *authkey;
 	struct idmap_msg im;
 	size_t namelen_in;
 	int ret = -ENOKEY;
@@ -661,7 +663,8 @@ idmap_pipe_downcall(struct file *filp, const char __user *src, size_t mlen)
 	if (idmap->idmap_upcall_data = NULL)
 		goto out_noupcall;
 
-	cons = idmap->idmap_upcall_data->key_cons;
+	authkey = idmap->idmap_upcall_data->authkey;
+	rka = get_request_key_auth(authkey);
 
 	if (mlen != sizeof(im)) {
 		ret = -ENOSPC;
@@ -686,9 +689,9 @@ idmap_pipe_downcall(struct file *filp, const char __user *src, size_t mlen)
 
 	ret = nfs_idmap_read_and_verify_message(&im,
 			&idmap->idmap_upcall_data->idmap_msg,
-			cons->key, cons->authkey);
+			rka->target_key, authkey);
 	if (ret >= 0) {
-		key_set_timeout(cons->key, nfs_idmap_cache_timeout);
+		key_set_timeout(rka->target_key, nfs_idmap_cache_timeout);
 		ret = mlen;
 	}
 
include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h new file +36 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a726dd3f1dc6
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/* request_key authorisation token key type
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells ([email protected])
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _KEYS_REQUEST_KEY_AUTH_TYPE_H
+#define _KEYS_REQUEST_KEY_AUTH_TYPE_H
+
+#include <linux/key.h>
+
+/*
+ * Authorisation record for request_key().
+ */
+struct request_key_auth {
+	struct key		*target_key;
+	struct key		*dest_keyring;
+	const struct cred	*cred;
+	void			*callout_info;
+	size_t			callout_len;
+	pid_t			pid;
+	char			op[8];
+} __randomize_layout;
+
+static inline struct request_key_auth *get_request_key_auth(const struct key *key)
+{
+	return key->payload.data[0];
+}
+
+
+#endif /* _KEYS_REQUEST_KEY_AUTH_TYPE_H */
include/linux/key-type.h +6 -16
index 9520fc3c3b9a..dfb3ba782d2c 100644
@@ -17,15 +17,6 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 
-/*
- * key under-construction record
- * - passed to the request_key actor if supplied
- */
-struct key_construction {
-	struct key	*key;	/* key being constructed */
-	struct key	*authkey;/* authorisation for key being constructed */
-};
-
 /*
  * Pre-parsed payload, used by key add, update and instantiate.
  *
@@ -47,8 +38,7 @@ struct key_preparsed_payload {
 	time_t		expiry;		/* Expiry time of key */
 } __randomize_layout;
 
-typedef int (*request_key_actor_t)(struct key_construction *key,
-				   const char *op, void *aux);
+typedef int (*request_key_actor_t)(struct key *auth_key, void *aux);
 
 /*
  * Preparsed matching criterion.
@@ -170,20 +160,20 @@ extern int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
 				    const void *data,
 				    size_t datalen,
 				    struct key *keyring,
-				    struct key *instkey);
+				    struct key *authkey);
 extern int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
 			       unsigned timeout,
 			       unsigned error,
 			       struct key *keyring,
-			       struct key *instkey);
-extern void complete_request_key(struct key_construction *cons, int error);
+			       struct key *authkey);
+extern void complete_request_key(struct key *authkey, int error);
 
 static inline int key_negate_and_link(struct key *key,
 				      unsigned timeout,
 				      struct key *keyring,
-				      struct key *instkey)
+				      struct key *authkey)
 {
-	return key_reject_and_link(key, timeout, ENOKEY, keyring, instkey);
+	return key_reject_and_link(key, timeout, ENOKEY, keyring, authkey);
 }
 
 extern int generic_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
security/keys/internal.h +1 -12
index 503adbae7b0d..e3a573840186 100644
@@ -188,20 +188,9 @@ static inline int key_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, unsigned perm)
 	return key_task_permission(key_ref, current_cred(), perm);
 }
 
-/*
- * Authorisation record for request_key().
- */
-struct request_key_auth {
-	struct key		*target_key;
-	struct key		*dest_keyring;
-	const struct cred	*cred;
-	void			*callout_info;
-	size_t			callout_len;
-	pid_t			pid;
-} __randomize_layout;
-
 extern struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth;
 extern struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target,
+					const char *op,
 					const void *callout_info,
 					size_t callout_len,
 					struct key *dest_keyring);
security/keys/keyctl.c +1 -0
index 1ffe60bb2845..ca31af186abd 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/uio.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <keys/request_key_auth-type.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
 #define KEY_MAX_DESC_SIZE 4096
security/keys/process_keys.c +1 -0
index 740affd65ee9..5f2993ab2d50 100644
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <keys/request_key_auth-type.h>
 #include "internal.h"
 
 /* Session keyring create vs join semaphore */
security/keys/request_key.c +29 -43

144 lines not on this page · raw message

index 6797843154f0..5e515791ccd1 100644

security/keys/request_key_auth.c +9 -7
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include "internal.h"
-#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/request_key_auth-type.h>
 
 static int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
 static void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key,
 static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key,
 				      struct seq_file *m)
 {
-	struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];
+	struct request_key_auth *rka = get_request_key_auth(key);
 
 	seq_puts(m, "key:");
 	seq_puts(m, key->description);
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key,
 static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key,
 				  char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
 {
-	struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];
+	struct request_key_auth *rka = get_request_key_auth(key);
 	size_t datalen;
 	long ret;
 
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key,
  */
 static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key)
 {
-	struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];
+	struct request_key_auth *rka = get_request_key_auth(key);
 
 	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
 
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static void free_request_key_auth(struct request_key_auth *rka)
  */
 static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key)
 {
-	struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];
+	struct request_key_auth *rka = get_request_key_auth(key);
 
 	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
 
@@ -148,8 +148,9 @@ static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key)
  * Create an authorisation token for /sbin/request-key or whoever to gain
  * access to the caller's security data.
  */
-struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
-				 size_t callout_len, struct key *dest_keyring)
+struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const char *op,
+				 const void *callout_info, size_t callout_len,
+				 struct key *dest_keyring)
 {
 	struct request_key_auth *rka, *irka;
 	const struct cred *cred = current->cred;
@@ -167,6 +168,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
 	if (!rka->callout_info)
 		goto error_free_rka;
 	rka->callout_len = callout_len;
+	strlcpy(rka->op, op, sizeof(rka->op));
 
 	/* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of
 	 * another process */
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 8/33 scsi: libiscsi: Fix race between iscsi_xmit_task and iscsi_complete_task

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Anoob Soman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 79edd00dc6a96644d76b4a1cb97d94d49e026768 ]

When a target sends Check Condition, whilst initiator is busy xmiting re-queued data, could lead to race between iscsi_complete_task() and iscsi_xmit_task() and eventually crashing with the following kernel backtrace.

[3326150.987523] ALERT: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
[3326150.987549] ALERT: IP: [<ffffffffa05ce70d>] iscsi_xmit_task+0x2d/0xc0 [libiscsi]
[3326150.987571] WARN: PGD 569c8067 PUD 569c9067 PMD 0
[3326150.987582] WARN: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[3326150.987593] WARN: Modules linked in: tun nfsv3 nfs fscache dm_round_robin
[3326150.987762] WARN: CPU: 2 PID: 8399 Comm: kworker/u32:1 Tainted: G O 4.4.0+2 #1
[3326150.987774] WARN: Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R720/0W7JN5, BIOS 2.5.4 01/22/2016
[3326150.987790] WARN: Workqueue: iscsi_q_13 iscsi_xmitworker [libiscsi]
[3326150.987799] WARN: task: ffff8801d50f3800 ti: ffff8801f5458000 task.ti: ffff8801f5458000
[3326150.987810] WARN: RIP: e030:[<ffffffffa05ce70d>] [<ffffffffa05ce70d>] iscsi_xmit_task+0x2d/0xc0 [libiscsi]
[3326150.987825] WARN: RSP: e02b:ffff8801f545bdb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[3326150.987831] WARN: RAX: 00000000ffffffc3 RBX: ffff880282d2ab20 RCX: ffff88026b6ac480
[3326150.987842] WARN: RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000fffffe01 RDI: ffff880282d2ab20
[3326150.987852] WARN: RBP: ffff8801f545bdc8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000008
[3326150.987862] WARN: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 000000000000fe88 R12: 0000000000000000
[3326150.987872] WARN: R13: ffff880282d2abe8 R14: ffff880282d2abd8 R15: ffff880282d2ac08
[3326150.987890] WARN: FS: 00007f5a866b4840(0000) GS:ffff88028a640000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[3326150.987900] WARN: CS: e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[3326150.987907] WARN: CR2: 0000000000000078 CR3: 0000000070244000 CR4: 0000000000042660
[3326150.987918] WARN: Stack:
[3326150.987924] WARN: ffff880282d2ad58 ffff880282d2ab20 ffff880282d2abe8 ffff8801f545be18
[3326150.987938] WARN: ffffffffa05cea90 ffff880282d2abf8 ffff88026b59cc80 ffff88026b59cc00
[3326150.987951] WARN: ffff88022acf32c0 ffff880289491800 ffff880255a80800 0000000000000400
[3326150.987964] WARN: Call Trace:
[3326150.987975] WARN: [<ffffffffa05cea90>] iscsi_xmitworker+0x2f0/0x360 [libiscsi]
[3326150.987988] WARN: [<ffffffff8108862c>] process_one_work+0x1fc/0x3b0
[3326150.987997] WARN: [<ffffffff81088f95>] worker_thread+0x2a5/0x470
[3326150.988006] WARN: [<ffffffff8159cad8>] ? __schedule+0x648/0x870
[3326150.988015] WARN: [<ffffffff81088cf0>] ? rescuer_thread+0x300/0x300
[3326150.988023] WARN: [<ffffffff8108ddf5>] kthread+0xd5/0xe0
[3326150.988031] WARN: [<ffffffff8108dd20>] ? kthread_stop+0x110/0x110
[3326150.988040] WARN: [<ffffffff815a0bcf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[3326150.988048] WARN: [<ffffffff8108dd20>] ? kthread_stop+0x110/0x110
[3326150.988127] ALERT: RIP [<ffffffffa05ce70d>] iscsi_xmit_task+0x2d/0xc0 [libiscsi]
[3326150.988138] WARN: RSP <ffff8801f545bdb0>
[3326150.988144] WARN: CR2: 0000000000000078
[3326151.020366] WARN: ---[ end trace 1c60974d4678d81b ]---

Commit 6f8830f5bbab ("scsi: libiscsi: add lock around task lists to fix list corruption regression") introduced "taskqueuelock" to fix list corruption during the race, but this wasn't enough.

Re-setting of conn->task to NULL, could race with iscsi_xmit_task(). iscsi_complete_task()

{
    ....
    if (conn->task == task)
        conn->task = NULL;
}

conn->task in iscsi_xmit_task() could be NULL and so will be task. __iscsi_get_task(task) will crash (NullPtr de-ref), trying to access refcount.

iscsi_xmit_task()

{
    struct iscsi_task *task = conn->task;

    __iscsi_get_task(task);
}

This commit will take extra conn->session->back_lock in iscsi_xmit_task() to ensure iscsi_xmit_task() waits for iscsi_complete_task(), if iscsi_complete_task() wins the race. If iscsi_xmit_task() wins the race, iscsi_xmit_task() increments task->refcount
(__iscsi_get_task) ensuring iscsi_complete_task() will not iscsi_free_task().

---
 drivers/scsi/libiscsi.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/libiscsi.c +6 -0
index 3ff536b350a1..5ea5d42bac76 100644
@@ -1449,7 +1449,13 @@ static int iscsi_xmit_task(struct iscsi_conn *conn)
 	if (test_bit(ISCSI_SUSPEND_BIT, &conn->suspend_tx))
 		return -ENODATA;
 
+	spin_lock_bh(&conn->session->back_lock);
+	if (conn->task == NULL) {
+		spin_unlock_bh(&conn->session->back_lock);
+		return -ENODATA;
+	}
 	__iscsi_get_task(task);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&conn->session->back_lock);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&conn->session->frwd_lock);
 	rc = conn->session->tt->xmit_task(task);
 	spin_lock_bh(&conn->session->frwd_lock);
Signature · 8 lines
2.19.1

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author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 9/33 scsi: core: reset host byte in DID_NEXUS_FAILURE case

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Martin Wilck <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4a067cf823d9d8e50d41cfb618011c0d4a969c72 ]

Up to 4.12, __scsi_error_from_host_byte() would reset the host byte to DID_OK for various cases including DID_NEXUS_FAILURE. Commit 2a842acab109 ("block: introduce new block status code type") replaced this function with scsi_result_to_blk_status() and removed the host-byte resetting code for the DID_NEXUS_FAILURE case. As the line set_host_byte(cmd, DID_OK) was preserved for the other cases, I suppose this was an editing mistake.

The fact that the host byte remains set after 4.13 is causing problems with the sg_persist tool, which now returns success rather then exit status 24 when a RESERVATION CONFLICT error is encountered.

Fixes 2a842acab109 "block: introduce new block status code type"
---
 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c +1 -0
index 7f505c027ce7..37d366696d21 100644
@@ -734,6 +734,7 @@ static blk_status_t __scsi_error_from_host_byte(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd,
 		set_host_byte(cmd, DID_OK);
 		return BLK_STS_TARGET;
 	case DID_NEXUS_FAILURE:
+		set_host_byte(cmd, DID_OK);
 		return BLK_STS_NEXUS;
 	case DID_ALLOC_FAILURE:
 		set_host_byte(cmd, DID_OK);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 10/33 net: systemport: Fix reception of BPDUs

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a40061ea2e39494104602b3048751341bda374a1 ]

SYSTEMPORT has its RXCHK parser block that attempts to validate the packet structures, unfortunately setting the L2 header check bit will cause Bridge PDUs (BPDUs) to be incorrectly rejected because they look like LLC/SNAP packets with a non-IPv4 or non-IPv6 Ethernet Type.

Fixes 4e8aedfe78c7 ("net: systemport: Turn on offloads by default")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bcmsysport.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bcmsysport.c +4 -0
index ed3edb17fd09..79018fea7be2 100644
@@ -134,6 +134,10 @@ static int bcm_sysport_set_rx_csum(struct net_device *dev,
 
 	priv->rx_chk_en = !!(wanted & NETIF_F_RXCSUM);
 	reg = rxchk_readl(priv, RXCHK_CONTROL);
+	/* Clear L2 header checks, which would prevent BPDUs
+	 * from being received.
+	 */
+	reg &= ~RXCHK_L2_HDR_DIS;
 	if (priv->rx_chk_en)
 		reg |= RXCHK_EN;
 	else
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 11/33 pinctrl: meson: meson8b: fix the sdxc_a data 1..3 pins

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Martin Blumenstingl <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c17abcfa93bf0be5e48bb011607d237ac2bfc839 ]

Fix the mismatch between the "sdxc_d13_1_a" pin group definition from meson8b_cbus_groups and the entry in sdxc_a_groups ("sdxc_d0_13_1_a"). This makes it possible to use "sdxc_d13_1_a" in device-tree files to route the MMC data 1..3 pins to GPIOX_1..3.

Fixes 0fefcb6876d0d6 ("pinctrl: Add support for Meson8b")
---
 drivers/pinctrl/meson/pinctrl-meson8b.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/pinctrl/meson/pinctrl-meson8b.c +1 -1
index a6fff215e60f..aafd39eba64f 100644
@@ -668,7 +668,7 @@ static const char * const sd_a_groups[] = {
 
 static const char * const sdxc_a_groups[] = {
 	"sdxc_d0_0_a", "sdxc_d13_0_a", "sdxc_d47_a", "sdxc_clk_a",
-	"sdxc_cmd_a", "sdxc_d0_1_a", "sdxc_d0_13_1_a"
+	"sdxc_cmd_a", "sdxc_d0_1_a", "sdxc_d13_1_a"
 };
 
 static const char * const pcm_a_groups[] = {
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 12/33 qmi_wwan: apply SET_DTR quirk to Sierra WP7607

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Beniamino Galvani <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 97dc47a1308a3af46a09b1546cfb869f2e382a81 ]

The 1199:68C0 USB ID is reused by Sierra WP7607 which requires the DTR quirk to be detected. Apply QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR unconditionally as already done for other IDs shared between different devices.

---
 drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +2 -2
index 25204d2c9e89..65e47cc52d14 100644
@@ -1193,8 +1193,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id products[] = {
 	{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x114f, 0x68a2, 8)},    /* Sierra Wireless MC7750 */
 	{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1199, 0x68a2, 8)},	/* Sierra Wireless MC7710 in QMI mode */
 	{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1199, 0x68a2, 19)},	/* Sierra Wireless MC7710 in QMI mode */
-	{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1199, 0x68c0, 8)},	/* Sierra Wireless MC7304/MC7354 */
-	{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1199, 0x68c0, 10)},	/* Sierra Wireless MC7304/MC7354 */
+	{QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1199, 0x68c0, 8)},	/* Sierra Wireless MC7304/MC7354, WP76xx */
+	{QMI_QUIRK_SET_DTR(0x1199, 0x68c0, 10)},/* Sierra Wireless MC7304/MC7354 */
 	{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1199, 0x901c, 8)},    /* Sierra Wireless EM7700 */
 	{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1199, 0x901f, 8)},    /* Sierra Wireless EM7355 */
 	{QMI_FIXED_INTF(0x1199, 0x9041, 8)},	/* Sierra Wireless MC7305/MC7355 */
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 13/33 net: mv643xx_eth: disable clk on error path in mv643xx_eth_shared_probe()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Alexey Khoroshilov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e928b5d6b75e239feb9c6d5488974b6646a0ebc8 ]

If mv643xx_eth_shared_of_probe() fails, mv643xx_eth_shared_probe() leaves clk enabled.

Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mv643xx_eth.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mv643xx_eth.c +6 -1
index 81c1fac00d33..2434409f84b2 100644
@@ -2886,7 +2886,7 @@ static int mv643xx_eth_shared_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	ret = mv643xx_eth_shared_of_probe(pdev);
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto err_put_clk;
 	pd = dev_get_platdata(&pdev->dev);
 
 	msp->tx_csum_limit = (pd != NULL && pd->tx_csum_limit) ?
@@ -2894,6 +2894,11 @@ static int mv643xx_eth_shared_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	infer_hw_params(msp);
 
 	return 0;
+
+err_put_clk:
+	if (!IS_ERR(msp->clk))
+		clk_disable_unprepare(msp->clk);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static int mv643xx_eth_shared_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 14/33 mailbox: bcm-flexrm-mailbox: Fix FlexRM ring flush timeout issue

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Rayagonda Kokatanur <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d7bf31a0f85faaf63c63c39d55154825a1eaaea9 ]

RING_CONTROL reg was not written due to wrong address, hence all the subsequent ring flush was timing out.

Fixes a371c10ea4b3 ("mailbox: bcm-flexrm-mailbox: Fix FlexRM ring flush sequence")
---
 drivers/mailbox/bcm-flexrm-mailbox.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mailbox/bcm-flexrm-mailbox.c +2 -2
index f052a3eb2098..7e3ed2714630 100644
@@ -1381,9 +1381,9 @@ static void flexrm_shutdown(struct mbox_chan *chan)
 
 	/* Clear ring flush state */
 	timeout = 1000; /* timeout of 1s */
-	writel_relaxed(0x0, ring + RING_CONTROL);
+	writel_relaxed(0x0, ring->regs + RING_CONTROL);
 	do {
-		if (!(readl_relaxed(ring + RING_FLUSH_DONE) &
+		if (!(readl_relaxed(ring->regs + RING_FLUSH_DONE) &
 		      FLUSH_DONE_MASK))
 			break;
 		mdelay(1);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH 15/33 ASoC: topology: free created components in tplg load error

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Bard liao <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 304017d31df36fb61eb2ed3ebf65fb6870b3c731 ]

Topology resources are no longer needed if any element failed to load.

---
 sound/soc/soc-topology.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/soc/soc-topology.c +7 -1
index c1619860a5de..2d5cf263515b 100644
@@ -2513,6 +2513,7 @@ int snd_soc_tplg_component_load(struct snd_soc_component *comp,
 	struct snd_soc_tplg_ops *ops, const struct firmware *fw, u32 id)
 {
 	struct soc_tplg tplg;
+	int ret;
 
 	/* setup parsing context */
 	memset(&tplg, 0, sizeof(tplg));
@@ -2526,7 +2527,12 @@ int snd_soc_tplg_component_load(struct snd_soc_component *comp,
 	tplg.bytes_ext_ops = ops->bytes_ext_ops;
 	tplg.bytes_ext_ops_count = ops->bytes_ext_ops_count;
 
-	return soc_tplg_load(&tplg);
+	ret = soc_tplg_load(&tplg);
+	/* free the created components if fail to load topology */
+	if (ret)
+		snd_soc_tplg_component_remove(comp, SND_SOC_TPLG_INDEX_ALL);
+
+	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snd_soc_tplg_component_load);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH 16/33 qed: Fix iWARP syn packet mac address validation.

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Michal Kalderon <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8be3dadf04050c2907760ec1955ca1c8fbc25585 ]

The ll2 forwards all syn packets to the driver without validating the mac address. Add validation check in the driver's iWARP listener flow and drop the packet if it isn't intended for the device.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_iwarp.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qed/qed_iwarp.c +9 -0
index eb666877d1aa..bb09f5a9846f 100644
@@ -1651,6 +1651,15 @@ qed_iwarp_parse_rx_pkt(struct qed_hwfn *p_hwfn,
 
 	eth_hlen = ETH_HLEN + (vlan_valid ? sizeof(u32) : 0);
 
+	if (!ether_addr_equal(ethh->h_dest,
+			      p_hwfn->p_rdma_info->iwarp.mac_addr)) {
+		DP_VERBOSE(p_hwfn,
+			   QED_MSG_RDMA,
+			   "Got unexpected mac %pM instead of %pM\n",
+			   ethh->h_dest, p_hwfn->p_rdma_info->iwarp.mac_addr);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	ether_addr_copy(remote_mac_addr, ethh->h_source);
 	ether_addr_copy(local_mac_addr, ethh->h_dest);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH 17/33 arm64: Relax GIC version check during early boot

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Vladimir Murzin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 74698f6971f25d045301139413578865fc2bd8f9 ]

Updates to the GIC architecture allow ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.GIC to have values other than 0 or 1. At the moment, Linux is quite strict in the way it handles this field at early boot stage (cpufeature is fine) and will refuse to use the system register CPU interface if it doesn't find the value 1.

Fixes 021f653791ad17e03f98aaa7fb933816ae16f161 ("irqchip: gic-v3: Initial support for GICv3")
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/head.S +1 -2
index ec393275ba04..1371542de0d3 100644
@@ -442,8 +442,7 @@ set_hcr:
 	/* GICv3 system register access */
 	mrs	x0, id_aa64pfr0_el1
 	ubfx	x0, x0, #24, #4
-	cmp	x0, #1
-	b.ne	3f
+	cbz	x0, 3f
 
 	mrs_s	x0, SYS_ICC_SRE_EL2
 	orr	x0, x0, #ICC_SRE_EL2_SRE	// Set ICC_SRE_EL2.SRE==1
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#17 lore raw

PATCH 18/33 net: marvell: mvneta: fix DMA debug warning

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a8fef9ba58c9966ddb1fec916d8d8137c9d8bc89 ]

Booting 4.20 on SolidRun Clearfog issues this warning with DMA API debug enabled:

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 555 at kernel/dma/debug.c:1230 check_sync+0x514/0x5bc
mvneta f1070000.ethernet: DMA-API: device driver tries to sync DMA memory it has not allocated [device address=0x000000002dd7dc00] [size=240 bytes]
Modules linked in: ahci mv88e6xxx dsa_core xhci_plat_hcd xhci_hcd devlink armada_thermal marvell_cesa des_generic ehci_orion phy_armada38x_comphy mcp3021 spi_orion evbug sfp mdio_i2c ip_tables x_tables
CPU: 0 PID: 555 Comm: bridge-network- Not tainted 4.20.0+ #291
Hardware name: Marvell Armada 380/385 (Device Tree)
[<c0019638>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c0014888>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c0014888>] (show_stack) from [<c07f54e0>] (dump_stack+0x9c/0xd4)
[<c07f54e0>] (dump_stack) from [<c00312bc>] (__warn+0xf8/0x124)
[<c00312bc>] (__warn) from [<c00313b0>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x38/0x48)
[<c00313b0>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c00b0370>] (check_sync+0x514/0x5bc)
[<c00b0370>] (check_sync) from [<c00b04f8>] (debug_dma_sync_single_range_for_cpu+0x6c/0x74)
[<c00b04f8>] (debug_dma_sync_single_range_for_cpu) from [<c051bd14>] (mvneta_poll+0x298/0xf58)
[<c051bd14>] (mvneta_poll) from [<c0656194>] (net_rx_action+0x128/0x424)
[<c0656194>] (net_rx_action) from [<c000a230>] (__do_softirq+0xf0/0x540)
[<c000a230>] (__do_softirq) from [<c00386e0>] (irq_exit+0x124/0x144)
[<c00386e0>] (irq_exit) from [<c009b5e0>] (__handle_domain_irq+0x58/0xb0)
[<c009b5e0>] (__handle_domain_irq) from [<c03a63c4>] (gic_handle_irq+0x48/0x98)
[<c03a63c4>] (gic_handle_irq) from [<c0009a10>] (__irq_svc+0x70/0x98)

...

This appears to be caused by mvneta_rx_hwbm() calling dma_sync_single_range_for_cpu() with the wrong struct device pointer, as the buffer manager device pointer is used to map and unmap the buffer. Fix this.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvneta.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvneta.c +1 -1
index 074a5b79d691..f76cbefeb3c7 100644
@@ -2102,7 +2102,7 @@ static int mvneta_rx_hwbm(struct mvneta_port *pp, int rx_todo,
 			if (unlikely(!skb))
 				goto err_drop_frame_ret_pool;
 
-			dma_sync_single_range_for_cpu(dev->dev.parent,
+			dma_sync_single_range_for_cpu(&pp->bm_priv->pdev->dev,
 			                              rx_desc->buf_phys_addr,
 			                              MVNETA_MH_SIZE + NET_SKB_PAD,
 			                              rx_bytes,
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#18 lore raw

PATCH 19/33 kasan, slub: move kasan_poison_slab hook before page_address

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a71012242837fe5e67d8c999cfc357174ed5dba0 ]

With tag based KASAN page_address() looks at the page flags to see whether the resulting pointer needs to have a tag set. Since we don't want to set a tag when page_address() is called on SLAB pages, we call page_kasan_tag_reset() in kasan_poison_slab(). However in allocate_slab() page_address() is called before kasan_poison_slab(). Fix it by changing the order.

---
 mm/slub.c | 19 +++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
mm/slub.c +15 -4
index 220d42e592ef..f14ef59c9e57 100644
@@ -1087,6 +1087,16 @@ static void setup_object_debug(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
 	init_tracking(s, object);
 }
 
+static void setup_page_debug(struct kmem_cache *s, void *addr, int order)
+{
+	if (!(s->flags & SLAB_POISON))
+		return;
+
+	metadata_access_enable();
+	memset(addr, POISON_INUSE, PAGE_SIZE << order);
+	metadata_access_disable();
+}
+
 static inline int alloc_consistency_checks(struct kmem_cache *s,
 					struct page *page,
 					void *object, unsigned long addr)
@@ -1304,6 +1314,8 @@ unsigned long kmem_cache_flags(unsigned long object_size,
 #else /* !CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG */
 static inline void setup_object_debug(struct kmem_cache *s,
 			struct page *page, void *object) {}
+static inline void setup_page_debug(struct kmem_cache *s,
+			void *addr, int order) {}
 
 static inline int alloc_debug_processing(struct kmem_cache *s,
 	struct page *page, void *object, unsigned long addr) { return 0; }
@@ -1599,12 +1611,11 @@ static struct page *allocate_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, int node)
 	if (page_is_pfmemalloc(page))
 		SetPageSlabPfmemalloc(page);
 
-	start = page_address(page);
+	kasan_poison_slab(page);
 
-	if (unlikely(s->flags & SLAB_POISON))
-		memset(start, POISON_INUSE, PAGE_SIZE << order);
+	start = page_address(page);
 
-	kasan_poison_slab(page);
+	setup_page_debug(s, start, order);
 
 	shuffle = shuffle_freelist(s, page);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#19 lore raw

PATCH 20/33 tmpfs: fix link accounting when a tmpfile is linked in

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: "Darrick J. Wong" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1062af920c07f5b54cf5060fde3339da6df0cf6b ]

tmpfs has a peculiarity of accounting hard links as if they were separate inodes: so that when the number of inodes is limited, as it is by default, a user cannot soak up an unlimited amount of unreclaimable dcache memory just by repeatedly linking a file.

But when v3.11 added O_TMPFILE, and the ability to use linkat() on the fd, we missed accommodating this new case in tmpfs: "df -i" shows that an extra "inode" remains accounted after the file is unlinked and the fd closed and the actual inode evicted. If a user repeatedly links tmpfiles into a tmpfs, the limit will be hit (ENOSPC) even after they are deleted.

Just skip the extra reservation from shmem_link() in this case: there's a sense in which this first link of a tmpfile is then cheaper than a hard link of another file, but the accounting works out, and there's still good limiting, so no need to do anything more complicated.

---
 mm/shmem.c | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/shmem.c +7 -3
index 6c10f1d92251..9b78c04f532b 100644
@@ -3102,10 +3102,14 @@ static int shmem_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentr
 	 * No ordinary (disk based) filesystem counts links as inodes;
 	 * but each new link needs a new dentry, pinning lowmem, and
 	 * tmpfs dentries cannot be pruned until they are unlinked.
+	 * But if an O_TMPFILE file is linked into the tmpfs, the
+	 * first link must skip that, to get the accounting right.
 	 */
-	ret = shmem_reserve_inode(inode->i_sb);
-	if (ret)
-		goto out;
+	if (inode->i_nlink) {
+		ret = shmem_reserve_inode(inode->i_sb);
+		if (ret)
+			goto out;
+	}
 
 	dir->i_size += BOGO_DIRENT_SIZE;
 	inode->i_ctime = dir->i_ctime = dir->i_mtime = current_time(inode);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#20 lore raw

PATCH 21/33 kasan, slab: fix conflicts with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 219667c23c68eb3dbc0d5662b9246f28477fe529 ]

Similarly to commit 96fedce27e13 ("kasan: make tag based mode work with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY"), we need to reset pointer tags in __check_heap_object() in mm/slab.c before doing any pointer math.

---
 mm/slab.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
mm/slab.c +2 -0
index 09df506ae830..409631e49295 100644
@@ -4415,6 +4415,8 @@ const char *__check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n,
 	unsigned int objnr;
 	unsigned long offset;
 
+	ptr = kasan_reset_tag(ptr);
+
 	/* Find and validate object. */
 	cachep = page->slab_cache;
 	objnr = obj_to_index(cachep, page, (void *)ptr);
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#21 lore raw

PATCH 22/33 kasan, slab: make freelist stored without tags

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 51dedad06b5f6c3eea7ec1069631b1ef7796912a ]

Similarly to "kasan, slub: move kasan_poison_slab hook before page_address", move kasan_poison_slab() before alloc_slabmgmt(), which calls page_address(), to make page_address() return value to be non-tagged. This, combined with calling kasan_reset_tag() for off-slab slab management object, leads to freelist being stored non-tagged.

---
 mm/slab.c | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/slab.c +8 -1
index 409631e49295..766043dd3f8e 100644
@@ -2378,6 +2378,7 @@ static void *alloc_slabmgmt(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
 		/* Slab management obj is off-slab. */
 		freelist = kmem_cache_alloc_node(cachep->freelist_cache,
 					      local_flags, nodeid);
+		freelist = kasan_reset_tag(freelist);
 		if (!freelist)
 			return NULL;
 	} else {
@@ -2690,6 +2691,13 @@ static struct page *cache_grow_begin(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
 
 	offset *= cachep->colour_off;
 
+	/*
+	 * Call kasan_poison_slab() before calling alloc_slabmgmt(), so
+	 * page_address() in the latter returns a non-tagged pointer,
+	 * as it should be for slab pages.
+	 */
+	kasan_poison_slab(page);
+
 	/* Get slab management. */
 	freelist = alloc_slabmgmt(cachep, page, offset,
 			local_flags & ~GFP_CONSTRAINT_MASK, page_node);
@@ -2698,7 +2706,6 @@ static struct page *cache_grow_begin(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
 
 	slab_map_pages(cachep, page, freelist);
 
-	kasan_poison_slab(page);
 	cache_init_objs(cachep, page);
 
 	if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(local_flags))
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
#22 lore raw

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 22/33] kasan, slab: make freelist stored without tags

Quoted 4 lines · Sasha Levin

From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 51dedad06b5f6c3eea7ec1069631b1ef7796912a ]

Hi Sasha,

None of the 4.9, 4.14, 4.19 or 4.20 have tag-based KASAN, so backporting these 3 KASAN related patches doesn't make much sense.

Thanks!

Quoted 61 lines

Similarly to "kasan, slub: move kasan_poison_slab hook before page_address", move kasan_poison_slab() before alloc_slabmgmt(), which calls page_address(), to make page_address() return value to be non-tagged. This, combined with calling kasan_reset_tag() for off-slab slab management object, leads to freelist being stored non-tagged.

---
 mm/slab.c | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/slab.c +8 -2
index 409631e49295..766043dd3f8e 100644
@@ -2378,6 +2378,7 @@ static void *alloc_slabmgmt(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
                /* Slab management obj is off-slab. */
                freelist = kmem_cache_alloc_node(cachep->freelist_cache,
                                              local_flags, nodeid);
+               freelist = kasan_reset_tag(freelist);
                if (!freelist)
                        return NULL;
        } else {
@@ -2690,6 +2691,13 @@ static struct page *cache_grow_begin(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
 
        offset *= cachep->colour_off;
 
+       /*
+        * Call kasan_poison_slab() before calling alloc_slabmgmt(), so
+        * page_address() in the latter returns a non-tagged pointer,
+        * as it should be for slab pages.
+        */
+       kasan_poison_slab(page);
+
        /* Get slab management. */
        freelist = alloc_slabmgmt(cachep, page, offset,
                        local_flags & ~GFP_CONSTRAINT_MASK, page_node);
@@ -2698,7 +2706,6 @@ static struct page *cache_grow_begin(struct kmem_cache *cachep,
 
        slab_map_pages(cachep, page, freelist);
 
-       kasan_poison_slab(page);
        cache_init_objs(cachep, page);
 
        if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(local_flags))
--

2.19.1

author maintainer
#23 lore raw

Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 22/33] kasan, slab: make freelist stored without tags

Quoted 4 lines · Andrey Konovalov
Quoted 3 lines · Sasha Levin

From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line

[ Upstream commit 51dedad06b5f6c3eea7ec1069631b1ef7796912a ]

Hi Sasha,

None of the 4.9, 4.14, 4.19 or 4.20 have tag-based KASAN, so backporting these 3 KASAN related patches doesn't make much sense.

Thanks!

Dropped, thank you!

--
Thanks,
Sasha

author maintainer
#24 lore raw

PATCH 23/33 ixgbe: fix older devices that do not support IXGBE_MRQC_L3L4TXSWEN

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jeff Kirsher <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 156a67a9065e3339be85f811d1b13b920e50d73b ]

The enabling L3/L4 filtering for transmit switched packets for all devices caused unforeseen issue on older devices when trying to send UDP traffic in an ordered sequence. This bit was originally intended for X550 devices, which supported this feature, so limit the scope of this bit to only X550 devices.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c +5 -2
index 42183a8b649c..01c120d656c5 100644
@@ -3827,8 +3827,11 @@ static void ixgbe_setup_mrqc(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter)
 			else
 				mrqc = IXGBE_MRQC_VMDQRSS64EN;
 
-			/* Enable L3/L4 for Tx Switched packets */
-			mrqc |= IXGBE_MRQC_L3L4TXSWEN;
+			/* Enable L3/L4 for Tx Switched packets only for X550,
+			 * older devices do not support this feature
+			 */
+			if (hw->mac.type >= ixgbe_mac_X550)
+				mrqc |= IXGBE_MRQC_L3L4TXSWEN;
 		} else {
 			if (tcs > 4)
 				mrqc = IXGBE_MRQC_RTRSS8TCEN;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#25 lore raw

PATCH 24/33 ARCv2: lib: memcpy: fix doing prefetchw outside of buffer

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Eugeniy Paltsev <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f8a15f97664178f27dfbf86a38f780a532cb6df0 ]

ARCv2 optimized memcpy uses PREFETCHW instruction for prefetching the next cache line but doesn't ensure that the line is not past the end of the buffer. PRETECHW changes the line ownership and marks it dirty, which can cause data corruption if this area is used for DMA IO.

Fix the issue by avoiding the PREFETCHW. This leads to performance degradation but it is OK as we'll introduce new memcpy implementation optimized for unaligned memory access using.

We also cut off all PREFETCH instructions at they are quite useless here:
* we call PREFETCH right before LOAD instruction call.
* we copy 16 or 32 bytes of data (depending on CONFIG_ARC_HAS_LL64) in a main logical loop. so we call PREFETCH 4 times (or 2 times) for each L1 cache line (in case of 64B L1 cache Line which is default case). Obviously this is not optimal.

Signed-off-by Eugeniy Paltsev <Eugeniy.Paltsev at synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by Vineet Gupta <vgupta at synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by Sasha Levin <sashal at kernel.org>
---
 arch/arc/lib/memcpy-archs.S | 14 --------------
 1 file changed, 14 deletions(-)
arch/arc/lib/memcpy-archs.S +0 -14
index d61044dd8b58..ea14b0bf3116 100644
@@ -25,15 +25,11 @@
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARC_HAS_LL64
-# define PREFETCH_READ(RX)	prefetch    [RX, 56]
-# define PREFETCH_WRITE(RX)	prefetchw   [RX, 64]
 # define LOADX(DST,RX)		ldd.ab	DST, [RX, 8]
 # define STOREX(SRC,RX)		std.ab	SRC, [RX, 8]
 # define ZOLSHFT		5
 # define ZOLAND			0x1F
 #else
-# define PREFETCH_READ(RX)	prefetch    [RX, 28]
-# define PREFETCH_WRITE(RX)	prefetchw   [RX, 32]
 # define LOADX(DST,RX)		ld.ab	DST, [RX, 4]
 # define STOREX(SRC,RX)		st.ab	SRC, [RX, 4]
 # define ZOLSHFT		4
@@ -41,8 +37,6 @@
 #endif
 
 ENTRY_CFI(memcpy)
-	prefetch [r1]		; Prefetch the read location
-	prefetchw [r0]		; Prefetch the write location
 	mov.f	0, r2
 ;;; if size is zero
 	jz.d	[blink]
@@ -72,8 +66,6 @@ ENTRY_CFI(memcpy)
 	lpnz	@.Lcopy32_64bytes
 	;; LOOP START
 	LOADX (r6, r1)
-	PREFETCH_READ (r1)
-	PREFETCH_WRITE (r3)
 	LOADX (r8, r1)
 	LOADX (r10, r1)
 	LOADX (r4, r1)
@@ -117,9 +109,7 @@ ENTRY_CFI(memcpy)
 	lpnz	@.Lcopy8bytes_1
 	;; LOOP START
 	ld.ab	r6, [r1, 4]
-	prefetch [r1, 28]	;Prefetch the next read location
 	ld.ab	r8, [r1,4]
-	prefetchw [r3, 32]	;Prefetch the next write location
 
 	SHIFT_1	(r7, r6, 24)
 	or	r7, r7, r5
@@ -162,9 +152,7 @@ ENTRY_CFI(memcpy)
 	lpnz	@.Lcopy8bytes_2
 	;; LOOP START
 	ld.ab	r6, [r1, 4]
-	prefetch [r1, 28]	;Prefetch the next read location
 	ld.ab	r8, [r1,4]
-	prefetchw [r3, 32]	;Prefetch the next write location
 
 	SHIFT_1	(r7, r6, 16)
 	or	r7, r7, r5
@@ -204,9 +192,7 @@ ENTRY_CFI(memcpy)
 	lpnz	@.Lcopy8bytes_3
 	;; LOOP START
 	ld.ab	r6, [r1, 4]
-	prefetch [r1, 28]	;Prefetch the next read location
 	ld.ab	r8, [r1,4]
-	prefetchw [r3, 32]	;Prefetch the next write location
 
 	SHIFT_1	(r7, r6, 8)
 	or	r7, r7, r5
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#26 lore raw

PATCH 25/33 ARC: uacces: remove lp_start, lp_end from clobber list

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Vineet Gupta <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d5e3c55e01d8b1774b37b4647c30fb22f1d39077 ]

Newer ARC gcc handles lp_start, lp_end in a different way and doesn't like them in the clobber list.

Signed-off-by Vineet Gupta <vgupta at synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by Sasha Levin <sashal at kernel.org>
---
 arch/arc/include/asm/uaccess.h | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arc/include/asm/uaccess.h +4 -4
index c9173c02081c..eabc3efa6c6d 100644
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ raw_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 		*/
 		  "=&r" (tmp), "+r" (to), "+r" (from)
 		:
-		: "lp_count", "lp_start", "lp_end", "memory");
+		: "lp_count", "memory");
 
 		return n;
 	}
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ raw_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
 		 */
 		  "=&r" (tmp), "+r" (to), "+r" (from)
 		:
-		: "lp_count", "lp_start", "lp_end", "memory");
+		: "lp_count", "memory");
 
 		return n;
 	}
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ static inline unsigned long __arc_clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
 	"	.previous			\n"
 	: "+r"(d_char), "+r"(res)
 	: "i"(0)
-	: "lp_count", "lp_start", "lp_end", "memory");
+	: "lp_count", "memory");
 
 	return res;
 }
@@ -686,7 +686,7 @@ __arc_strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count)
 	"	.previous			\n"
 	: "+r"(res), "+r"(dst), "+r"(src), "=r"(val)
 	: "g"(-EFAULT), "r"(count)
-	: "lp_count", "lp_start", "lp_end", "memory");
+	: "lp_count", "memory");
 
 	return res;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#27 lore raw

PATCH 26/33 ARCv2: support manual regfile save on interrupts

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Vineet Gupta <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e494239a007e601448110ac304fe055951f9de3b ]

There's a hardware bug which affects the HSDK platform, triggered by micro-ops for auto-saving regfile on taken interrupt. The workaround is to inhibit autosave.

Signed-off-by Vineet Gupta <vgupta at synopsys.com>
Signed-off-by Sasha Levin <sashal at kernel.org>
---
 arch/arc/Kconfig                   |  8 +++++
 arch/arc/include/asm/entry-arcv2.h | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arc/kernel/entry-arcv2.S      |  4 ++-
 arch/arc/kernel/intc-arcv2.c       |  2 ++
 arch/arc/plat-hsdk/Kconfig         |  1 +
 5 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arc/Kconfig +8 -0
index 9d06c9478a0d..82050893d0b3 100644
@@ -417,6 +417,14 @@ config ARC_HAS_ACCL_REGS
 	  (also referred to as r58:r59). These can also be used by gcc as GPR so
 	  kernel needs to save/restore per process
 
+config ARC_IRQ_NO_AUTOSAVE
+	bool "Disable hardware autosave regfile on interrupts"
+	default n
+	help
+	  On HS cores, taken interrupt auto saves the regfile on stack.
+	  This is programmable and can be optionally disabled in which case
+	  software INTERRUPT_PROLOGUE/EPILGUE do the needed work
+
 endif	# ISA_ARCV2
 
 endmenu   # "ARC CPU Configuration"
arch/arc/include/asm/entry-arcv2.h +54 -0

66 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/arc/kernel/entry-arcv2.S +3 -1
index cc558a25b8fa..562089d62d9d 100644
@@ -209,7 +209,9 @@ restore_regs:
 ;####### Return from Intr #######
 
 debug_marker_l1:
-	bbit1.nt r0, STATUS_DE_BIT, .Lintr_ret_to_delay_slot
+	; bbit1.nt r0, STATUS_DE_BIT, .Lintr_ret_to_delay_slot
+	btst	r0, STATUS_DE_BIT		; Z flag set if bit clear
+	bnz	.Lintr_ret_to_delay_slot	; branch if STATUS_DE_BIT set
 
 .Lisr_ret_fast_path:
 	; Handle special case #1: (Entry via Exception, Return via IRQ)
arch/arc/kernel/intc-arcv2.c +2 -0
index 067ea362fb3e..cf18b3e5a934 100644
@@ -49,11 +49,13 @@ void arc_init_IRQ(void)
 
 	*(unsigned int *)&ictrl = 0;
 
+#ifndef CONFIG_ARC_IRQ_NO_AUTOSAVE
 	ictrl.save_nr_gpr_pairs = 6;	/* r0 to r11 (r12 saved manually) */
 	ictrl.save_blink = 1;
 	ictrl.save_lp_regs = 1;		/* LP_COUNT, LP_START, LP_END */
 	ictrl.save_u_to_u = 0;		/* user ctxt saved on kernel stack */
 	ictrl.save_idx_regs = 1;	/* JLI, LDI, EI */
+#endif
 
 	WRITE_AUX(AUX_IRQ_CTRL, ictrl);
 
arch/arc/plat-hsdk/Kconfig +1 -0
index fcc9a9e27e9c..8fb1600b29b7 100644
@@ -9,5 +9,6 @@ menuconfig ARC_SOC_HSDK
 	bool "ARC HS Development Kit SOC"
 	depends on ISA_ARCV2
 	select ARC_HAS_ACCL_REGS
+	select ARC_IRQ_NO_AUTOSAVE
 	select CLK_HSDK
 	select RESET_HSDK
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#28 lore raw

PATCH 27/33 phonet: fix building with clang

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6321aa197547da397753757bd84c6ce64b3e3d89 ]

clang warns about overflowing the data[] member in the struct pnpipehdr:

net/phonet/pep.c:295:8: warning: array index 4 is past the end of the array (which contains 1 element) [-Warray-bounds]

                        if (hdr->data[4] == PEP_IND_READY)
                            ^         ~
include/net/phonet/pep.h:66:3: note: array 'data' declared here
                u8              data[1];

Using a flexible array member at the end of the struct avoids the warning, but since we cannot have a flexible array member inside of the union, each index now has to be moved back by one, which makes it a little uglier.

---
 include/net/phonet/pep.h |  5 +++--
 net/phonet/pep.c         | 32 ++++++++++++++++----------------
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
include/net/phonet/pep.h +3 -2
index b669fe6dbc3b..98f31c7ea23d 100644
@@ -63,10 +63,11 @@ struct pnpipehdr {
 		u8		state_after_reset;	/* reset request */
 		u8		error_code;		/* any response */
 		u8		pep_type;		/* status indication */
-		u8		data[1];
+		u8		data0;			/* anything else */
 	};
+	u8			data[];
 };
-#define other_pep_type		data[1]
+#define other_pep_type		data[0]
 
 static inline struct pnpipehdr *pnp_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
net/phonet/pep.c +16 -16
index e81537991ddf..bffcef58ebf5 100644
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static int pep_indicate(struct sock *sk, u8 id, u8 code,
 	ph->utid = 0;
 	ph->message_id = id;
 	ph->pipe_handle = pn->pipe_handle;
-	ph->data[0] = code;
+	ph->error_code = code;
 	return pn_skb_send(sk, skb, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static int pipe_handler_request(struct sock *sk, u8 id, u8 code,
 	ph->utid = id; /* whatever */
 	ph->message_id = id;
 	ph->pipe_handle = pn->pipe_handle;
-	ph->data[0] = code;
+	ph->error_code = code;
 	return pn_skb_send(sk, skb, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static int pep_ctrlreq_error(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *oskb, u8 code,
 	struct pnpipehdr *ph;
 	struct sockaddr_pn dst;
 	u8 data[4] = {
-		oph->data[0], /* PEP type */
+		oph->pep_type, /* PEP type */
 		code, /* error code, at an unusual offset */
 		PAD, PAD,
 	};
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ static int pep_ctrlreq_error(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *oskb, u8 code,
 	ph->utid = oph->utid;
 	ph->message_id = PNS_PEP_CTRL_RESP;
 	ph->pipe_handle = oph->pipe_handle;
-	ph->data[0] = oph->data[1]; /* CTRL id */
+	ph->data0 = oph->data[0]; /* CTRL id */
 
 	pn_skb_get_src_sockaddr(oskb, &dst);
 	return pn_skb_send(sk, skb, &dst);
@@ -272,17 +272,17 @@ static int pipe_rcv_status(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	hdr = pnp_hdr(skb);
-	if (hdr->data[0] != PN_PEP_TYPE_COMMON) {
+	if (hdr->pep_type != PN_PEP_TYPE_COMMON) {
 		net_dbg_ratelimited("Phonet unknown PEP type: %u\n",
-				    (unsigned int)hdr->data[0]);
+				    (unsigned int)hdr->pep_type);
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
 
-	switch (hdr->data[1]) {
+	switch (hdr->data[0]) {
 	case PN_PEP_IND_FLOW_CONTROL:
 		switch (pn->tx_fc) {
 		case PN_LEGACY_FLOW_CONTROL:
-			switch (hdr->data[4]) {
+			switch (hdr->data[3]) {
 			case PEP_IND_BUSY:
 				atomic_set(&pn->tx_credits, 0);
 				break;
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ static int pipe_rcv_status(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			}
 			break;
 		case PN_ONE_CREDIT_FLOW_CONTROL:
-			if (hdr->data[4] == PEP_IND_READY)
+			if (hdr->data[3] == PEP_IND_READY)
 				atomic_set(&pn->tx_credits, wake = 1);
 			break;
 		}
@@ -301,12 +301,12 @@ static int pipe_rcv_status(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	case PN_PEP_IND_ID_MCFC_GRANT_CREDITS:
 		if (pn->tx_fc != PN_MULTI_CREDIT_FLOW_CONTROL)
 			break;
-		atomic_add(wake = hdr->data[4], &pn->tx_credits);
+		atomic_add(wake = hdr->data[3], &pn->tx_credits);
 		break;
 
 	default:
 		net_dbg_ratelimited("Phonet unknown PEP indication: %u\n",
-				    (unsigned int)hdr->data[1]);
+				    (unsigned int)hdr->data[0]);
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
 	if (wake)
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ static int pipe_rcv_created(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct pep_sock *pn = pep_sk(sk);
 	struct pnpipehdr *hdr = pnp_hdr(skb);
-	u8 n_sb = hdr->data[0];
+	u8 n_sb = hdr->data0;
 
 	pn->rx_fc = pn->tx_fc = PN_LEGACY_FLOW_CONTROL;
 	__skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*hdr));
@@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ static int pep_connresp_rcv(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return -ECONNREFUSED;
 
 	/* Parse sub-blocks */
-	n_sb = hdr->data[4];
+	n_sb = hdr->data[3];
 	while (n_sb > 0) {
 		u8 type, buf[6], len = sizeof(buf);
 		const u8 *data = pep_get_sb(skb, &type, &len, buf);
@@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ static int pipe_do_remove(struct sock *sk)
 	ph->utid = 0;
 	ph->message_id = PNS_PIPE_REMOVE_REQ;
 	ph->pipe_handle = pn->pipe_handle;
-	ph->data[0] = PAD;
+	ph->data0 = PAD;
 	return pn_skb_send(sk, skb, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -817,7 +817,7 @@ static struct sock *pep_sock_accept(struct sock *sk, int flags, int *errp,
 	peer_type = hdr->other_pep_type << 8;
 
 	/* Parse sub-blocks (options) */
-	n_sb = hdr->data[4];
+	n_sb = hdr->data[3];
 	while (n_sb > 0) {
 		u8 type, buf[1], len = sizeof(buf);
 		const u8 *data = pep_get_sb(skb, &type, &len, buf);
@@ -1109,7 +1109,7 @@ static int pipe_skb_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	ph->utid = 0;
 	if (pn->aligned) {
 		ph->message_id = PNS_PIPE_ALIGNED_DATA;
-		ph->data[0] = 0; /* padding */
+		ph->data0 = 0; /* padding */
 	} else
 		ph->message_id = PNS_PIPE_DATA;
 	ph->pipe_handle = pn->pipe_handle;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#29 lore raw

PATCH 28/33 mac80211_hwsim: propagate genlmsg_reply return code

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Li RongQing <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 17407715240456448e4989bee46ffc93991add83 ]

genlmsg_reply can fail, so propagate its return code

---
 drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c +1 -1
index 8f57ca969c9f..27224dc26413 100644
@@ -3241,7 +3241,7 @@ static int hwsim_get_radio_nl(struct sk_buff *msg, struct genl_info *info)
 			goto out_err;
 		}
 
-		genlmsg_reply(skb, info);
+		res = genlmsg_reply(skb, info);
 		break;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#30 lore raw

PATCH 29/33 net: thunderx: make CFG_DONE message to run through generic send-ack sequence

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Vadim Lomovtsev <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0dd563b9a62c4cbabf5d4fd6596440c2491e72b1 ]

At the end of NIC VF initialization VF sends CFG_DONE message to PF without using nicvf_msg_send_to_pf routine. This potentially could re-write data in mailbox. This commit is to implement common way of sending CFG_DONE message by the same way with other configuration messages by using nicvf_send_msg_to_pf() routine.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nic_main.c   |  2 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nic_main.c +1 -1
index d89ec4724efd..819f38a3225d 100644
@@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ static void nic_handle_mbx_intr(struct nicpf *nic, int vf)
 	case NIC_MBOX_MSG_CFG_DONE:
 		/* Last message of VF config msg sequence */
 		nic_enable_vf(nic, vf, true);
-		goto unlock;
+		break;
 	case NIC_MBOX_MSG_SHUTDOWN:
 		/* First msg in VF teardown sequence */
 		if (vf >= nic->num_vf_en)
drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c +12 -3
index f13256af8031..59b62b49ad48 100644
@@ -166,6 +166,17 @@ static int nicvf_check_pf_ready(struct nicvf *nic)
 	return 1;
 }
 
+static void nicvf_send_cfg_done(struct nicvf *nic)
+{
+	union nic_mbx mbx = {};
+
+	mbx.msg.msg = NIC_MBOX_MSG_CFG_DONE;
+	if (nicvf_send_msg_to_pf(nic, &mbx)) {
+		netdev_err(nic->netdev,
+			   "PF didn't respond to CFG DONE msg\n");
+	}
+}
+
 static void nicvf_read_bgx_stats(struct nicvf *nic, struct bgx_stats_msg *bgx)
 {
 	if (bgx->rx)
@@ -1329,7 +1340,6 @@ int nicvf_open(struct net_device *netdev)
 	struct nicvf *nic = netdev_priv(netdev);
 	struct queue_set *qs = nic->qs;
 	struct nicvf_cq_poll *cq_poll = NULL;
-	union nic_mbx mbx = {};
 
 	netif_carrier_off(netdev);
 
@@ -1419,8 +1429,7 @@ int nicvf_open(struct net_device *netdev)
 		nicvf_enable_intr(nic, NICVF_INTR_RBDR, qidx);
 
 	/* Send VF config done msg to PF */
-	mbx.msg.msg = NIC_MBOX_MSG_CFG_DONE;
-	nicvf_write_to_mbx(nic, &mbx);
+	nicvf_send_cfg_done(nic);
 
 	return 0;
 cleanup:
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#31 lore raw

PATCH 30/33 nfp: bpf: fix code-gen bug on BPF_ALU | BPF_XOR | BPF_K

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jiong Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 71c190249f0ced5b26377ea6bf829ab3af77a40c ]

The intended optimization should be A ^ 0 = A, not A ^ -1 = A.

Fixes cd7df56ed3e6 ("nfp: add BPF to NFP code translator")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/bpf/jit.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/bpf/jit.c +1 -1
index 239dfbe8a0a1..3105ee5bbf8e 100644
@@ -1017,7 +1017,7 @@ static int xor_reg(struct nfp_prog *nfp_prog, struct nfp_insn_meta *meta)
 
 static int xor_imm(struct nfp_prog *nfp_prog, struct nfp_insn_meta *meta)
 {
-	return wrp_alu32_imm(nfp_prog, meta, ALU_OP_XOR, !~meta->insn.imm);
+	return wrp_alu32_imm(nfp_prog, meta, ALU_OP_XOR, !meta->insn.imm);
 }
 
 static int and_reg(struct nfp_prog *nfp_prog, struct nfp_insn_meta *meta)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#32 lore raw

PATCH 31/33 nfp: bpf: fix ALU32 high bits clearance bug

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jiong Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f036ebd9bfbe1e91a3d855e85e05fc5ff156b641 ]

NFP BPF JIT compiler is doing a couple of small optimizations when jitting ALU imm instructions, some of these optimizations could save code-gen, for example:

  A & -1 =  A
  A |  0 =  A
  A ^  0 =  A

However, for ALU32, high 32-bit of the 64-bit register should still be cleared according to ISA semantics.

Fixes cd7df56ed3e6 ("nfp: add BPF to NFP code translator")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/bpf/jit.c | 17 ++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/bpf/jit.c +6 -11
index 3105ee5bbf8e..c1ffec85817a 100644
@@ -756,15 +756,10 @@ wrp_alu64_reg(struct nfp_prog *nfp_prog, struct nfp_insn_meta *meta,
 
 static int
 wrp_alu32_imm(struct nfp_prog *nfp_prog, struct nfp_insn_meta *meta,
-	      enum alu_op alu_op, bool skip)
+	      enum alu_op alu_op)
 {
 	const struct bpf_insn *insn = &meta->insn;
 
-	if (skip) {
-		meta->skip = true;
-		return 0;
-	}
-
 	wrp_alu_imm(nfp_prog, insn->dst_reg * 2, alu_op, insn->imm);
 	wrp_immed(nfp_prog, reg_both(insn->dst_reg * 2 + 1), 0);
 
@@ -1017,7 +1012,7 @@ static int xor_reg(struct nfp_prog *nfp_prog, struct nfp_insn_meta *meta)
 
 static int xor_imm(struct nfp_prog *nfp_prog, struct nfp_insn_meta *meta)
 {
-	return wrp_alu32_imm(nfp_prog, meta, ALU_OP_XOR, !meta->insn.imm);
+	return wrp_alu32_imm(nfp_prog, meta, ALU_OP_XOR);
 }
 
 static int and_reg(struct nfp_prog *nfp_prog, struct nfp_insn_meta *meta)
@@ -1027,7 +1022,7 @@ static int and_reg(struct nfp_prog *nfp_prog, struct nfp_insn_meta *meta)
 
 static int and_imm(struct nfp_prog *nfp_prog, struct nfp_insn_meta *meta)
 {
-	return wrp_alu32_imm(nfp_prog, meta, ALU_OP_AND, !~meta->insn.imm);
+	return wrp_alu32_imm(nfp_prog, meta, ALU_OP_AND);
 }
 
 static int or_reg(struct nfp_prog *nfp_prog, struct nfp_insn_meta *meta)
@@ -1037,7 +1032,7 @@ static int or_reg(struct nfp_prog *nfp_prog, struct nfp_insn_meta *meta)
 
 static int or_imm(struct nfp_prog *nfp_prog, struct nfp_insn_meta *meta)
 {
-	return wrp_alu32_imm(nfp_prog, meta, ALU_OP_OR, !meta->insn.imm);
+	return wrp_alu32_imm(nfp_prog, meta, ALU_OP_OR);
 }
 
 static int add_reg(struct nfp_prog *nfp_prog, struct nfp_insn_meta *meta)
@@ -1047,7 +1042,7 @@ static int add_reg(struct nfp_prog *nfp_prog, struct nfp_insn_meta *meta)
 
 static int add_imm(struct nfp_prog *nfp_prog, struct nfp_insn_meta *meta)
 {
-	return wrp_alu32_imm(nfp_prog, meta, ALU_OP_ADD, !meta->insn.imm);
+	return wrp_alu32_imm(nfp_prog, meta, ALU_OP_ADD);
 }
 
 static int sub_reg(struct nfp_prog *nfp_prog, struct nfp_insn_meta *meta)
@@ -1057,7 +1052,7 @@ static int sub_reg(struct nfp_prog *nfp_prog, struct nfp_insn_meta *meta)
 
 static int sub_imm(struct nfp_prog *nfp_prog, struct nfp_insn_meta *meta)
 {
-	return wrp_alu32_imm(nfp_prog, meta, ALU_OP_SUB, !meta->insn.imm);
+	return wrp_alu32_imm(nfp_prog, meta, ALU_OP_SUB);
 }
 
 static int shl_imm(struct nfp_prog *nfp_prog, struct nfp_insn_meta *meta)
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#33 lore raw

PATCH 32/33 mdio_bus: Fix use-after-free on device_register fails

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: YueHaibing <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6ff7b060535e87c2ae14dd8548512abfdda528fb ]

KASAN has found use-after-free in fixed_mdio_bus_init, commit 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call put_device on device_register() failure") call put_device() while device_register() fails,give up the last reference to the device and allow mdiobus_release to be executed ,kfreeing the bus. However in most drives, mdiobus_free be called to free the bus while mdiobus_register fails. use-after-free occurs when access bus again, this patch revert it to let mdiobus_free free the bus.

KASAN report details as below:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881dc824d78 by task syz-executor.0/3524

CPU: 1 PID: 3524 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc7+ #45
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0xfa/0x1ce lib/dump_stack.c:113
 print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
 kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
 mdiobus_free+0x85/0x90 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:482
 fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x283/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
 ? 0xffffffffc0e40000
 ? 0xffffffffc0e40000
 ? 0xffffffffc0e40000
 do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
 do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
 load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
 __do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
 do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f6215c19c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f6215c19c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f6215c1a6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefb R14: 00000000006f7030 R15: 0000000000000004

Allocated by task 3524:
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:496
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline]
 kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:740 [inline]
 mdiobus_alloc_size+0x54/0x1b0 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:143
 fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x163/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
 do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
 do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
 load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
 __do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
 do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Freed by task 3524:
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:85 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:458
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1409 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1436 [inline]
 slab_free mm/slub.c:2986 [inline]
 kfree+0xe1/0x270 mm/slub.c:3938
 device_release+0x78/0x200 drivers/base/core.c:919
 kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:662 [inline]
 kobject_release lib/kobject.c:691 [inline]
 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:67 [inline]
 kobject_put+0x146/0x240 lib/kobject.c:708
 put_device+0x1c/0x30 drivers/base/core.c:2060
 __mdiobus_register+0x483/0x560 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:382
 fixed_mdio_bus_init+0x26b/0x1000 [fixed_phy]
 do_one_initcall+0xfa/0x5ca init/main.c:887
 do_init_module+0x204/0x5f6 kernel/module.c:3460
 load_module+0x66b2/0x8570 kernel/module.c:3808
 __do_sys_finit_module+0x238/0x2a0 kernel/module.c:3902
 do_syscall_64+0x147/0x600 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881dc824c80
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 248 bytes inside of
 2048-byte region [ffff8881dc824c80, ffff8881dc825480)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007720800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6c02800 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x2fffc0000010200(slab|head)
raw: 02fffc0000010200 0000000000000000 0000000500000001 ffff8881f6c02800
raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800f000f 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff8881dc824c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ffff8881dc824c80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8881dc824d00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
                                                                ^
 ffff8881dc824d80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
 ffff8881dc824e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes 0c692d07842a ("drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c: call put_device on device_register() failure")
---
 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c +0 -1
index 1ece41277993..c545fb1f82bd 100644
@@ -347,7 +347,6 @@ int __mdiobus_register(struct mii_bus *bus, struct module *owner)
 	err = device_register(&bus->dev);
 	if (err) {
 		pr_err("mii_bus %s failed to register\n", bus->id);
-		put_device(&bus->dev);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
author maintainer
#34 lore raw

PATCH 33/33 net: set static variable an initial value in atl2_probe()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Mao Wenan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4593403fa516a5a4cffe6883c5062d60932cbfbe ]

cards_found is a static variable, but when it enters atl2_probe(), cards_found is set to zero, the value is not consistent with last probe, so next behavior is not our expect.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/atheros/atlx/atl2.c | 4 +---
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/atheros/atlx/atl2.c +1 -3
index 77a1c03255de..225b4d452e0e 100644
@@ -1334,13 +1334,11 @@ static int atl2_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
 {
 	struct net_device *netdev;
 	struct atl2_adapter *adapter;
-	static int cards_found;
+	static int cards_found = 0;
 	unsigned long mmio_start;
 	int mmio_len;
 	int err;
 
-	cards_found = 0;
-
 	err = pci_enable_device(pdev);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1