kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
Subsystems (7)
PATCH 1/1 kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down
Systems in lockdown mode should block the kexec of untrusted kernels. For x86 and ARM we can ensure that a kernel is trustworthy by validating a PE signature, but this isn't possible on other architectures. On those platforms we can use IMA digital signatures instead. Add a function to determine whether IMA has or will verify signatures for a given event type, and if so permit kexec_file() even if the kernel is otherwise locked down. This is restricted to cases where CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is set in order to prevent an attacker from loading additional keys at runtime.
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Mimi, this relies on the lockdown patchset but I /think/ is independent of the arch policy code - as a result I think it's possible to include this in lockdown PR if that works for you, otherwise it can go through your tree once the lockdown code is merged?
include/linux/ima.h | 9 ++++++ kernel/kexec_file.c | 7 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/ima.h +9 -0
@@ -132,4 +132,13 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,return 0 ; }#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE ) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING ) +extern bool ima_appraise_signature (enum kernel_read_file_id func); +#else +static inline bool ima_appraise_kexec_signature (enum kernel_read_file_id func) +{ +return false; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */ #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
kernel/kexec_file.c +6 -1
@@ -240,7 +240,12 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, ret =0 ; -if (kernel_is_locked_down (reason)) { +/* If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec +* image, permit it even if the kernel is otherwise locked +* down. +*/ +if (!ima_appraise_signature (READING_KEXEC_IMAGE ) && +kernel_is_locked_down (reason)) { ret = -EPERM ; goto out; }
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2 -0
@@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr {u64 count; }; +extern const int read_idmap[]; +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC void ima_load_kexec_buffer (void );#else
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1 -1
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)return 0 ; } -static const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID ] = { +const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID ] = { [READING_FIRMWARE ] =FIRMWARE_CHECK , [READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER ] =FIRMWARE_CHECK , [READING_MODULE ] =MODULE_CHECK ,
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +50 -0
53 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.225.g810b269d1ac-goog
Quoted 10 lines · Matthew Garrett
Systems in lockdown mode should block the kexec of untrusted kernels. For x86 and ARM we can ensure that a kernel is trustworthy by validating a PE signature, but this isn't possible on other architectures. On those platforms we can use IMA digital signatures instead. Add a function to determine whether IMA has or will verify signatures for a given event type, and if so permit
kexec_file()even if the kernel is otherwise locked down. This is restricted to cases whereCONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRINGis set in order to prevent an attacker from loading additional keys at runtime.Signed-off-by Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines
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Mimi, this relies on the lockdown patchset but I /think/ is independent of the arch policy code - as a result I think it's possible to include this in lockdown PR if that works for you, otherwise it can go through your tree once the lockdown code is merged?
Yes, please include this patch with the rest of the lockdown patchset.
thanks,
Mimi
Quoted 128 lines
include/linux/ima.h | 9 ++++++ kernel/kexec_file.c | 7 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)include/linux/ima.h +9
-0@@ -132,4 +132,13 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,return 0 ; }#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE ) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING ) +extern bool ima_appraise_signature (enum kernel_read_file_id func); +#else +static inline bool ima_appraise_kexec_signature (enum kernel_read_file_id func) +{ +return false; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */ #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */ kernel/kexec_file.c +6
-1@@ -240,7 +240,12 @@ kimage_file_prepare_segments(struct kimage *image, int kernel_fd, int initrd_fd, ret =0 ; -if (kernel_is_locked_down (reason)) { +/* If IMA is guaranteed to appraise a signature on the kexec +* image, permit it even if the kernel is otherwise locked +* down. +*/ +if (!ima_appraise_signature (READING_KEXEC_IMAGE ) && +kernel_is_locked_down (reason)) { ret = -EPERM ; goto out; }security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2
-0@@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ struct ima_kexec_hdr {u64 count; }; +extern const int read_idmap[]; +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC void ima_load_kexec_buffer (void );#else security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-1@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)return 0 ; } -static const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID ] = { +const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID ] = { [READING_FIRMWARE ] =FIRMWARE_CHECK , [READING_FIRMWARE_PREALLOC_BUFFER ] =FIRMWARE_CHECK , [READING_MODULE ] =MODULE_CHECK ,security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +50
-0@@ -1337,3 +1337,53 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) return 0; }#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */ + +#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE ) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING ) +/* +* ima_appraise_signature: whether IMA will appraise a given function using +* an IMA digital signature. This is restricted to cases where the kernel +* has a set of built-in trusted keys in order to avoid an attacker simply +* loading additional keys. +*/ +bool ima_appraise_signature (enum kernel_read_file_id id) +{ +struct ima_rule_entry *entry; +bool found = false; +enum ima_hooks func; + +if (id >=READING_MAX_ID ) +return false; + + func = read_idmap[id] ?:FILE_CHECK ; + +rcu_read_lock (); +list_for_each_entry_rcu (entry, ima_rules, list) { +if (entry->action !=APPRAISE ) +continue ; + +/* +* A generic entry will match, but otherwise require that it +* match the func we're looking for +*/ +if (entry->func && entry->func != func) +continue ; + +/* +* We require this to be a digital signature, not a raw IMA +* hash. +*/ +if (entry->flags &IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED ) + found = true; + +/* +* We've found a rule that matches, so break now even if it +* didn't require a digital signature - a later rule that does +* won't override it, so would be a false positive. +*/ +break ; + } + +rcu_read_unlock (); +return found; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */