4.14.109-stable review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.109 release. There are 41 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu Mar 28 04:26:32 UTC 2019. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.109-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 4.14.109-rc1

Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
ath10k: avoid possible string overflow

Baolin Wang <[email protected]>
power: supply: charger-manager: Fix incorrect return value

Enric Balletbo i Serra <[email protected]>
pwm-backlight: Enable/disable the PWM before/after LCD enable toggle.

Jules Maselbas <[email protected]>
sched/cpufreq/schedutil: Fix error path mutex unlock

Baolin Wang <[email protected]>
rtc: Fix overflow when converting time64_t to rtc_time

Kishon Vijay Abraham I <[email protected]>
PCI: endpoint: Use EPC's device in dma_alloc_coherent()/dma_free_coherent()

Niklas Cassel <[email protected]>
PCI: designware-ep: Read-only registers need DBI_RO_WR_EN to be writable

Niklas Cassel <[email protected]>
PCI: designware-ep: dw_pcie_ep_set_msi() should only set MMC bits

kehuanlin <[email protected]>
scsi: ufs: fix wrong command type of UTRD for UFSHCI v2.1

Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
USB: core: only clean up what we allocated

Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
lib/int_sqrt: optimize small argument

Hui Wang <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda - Enforces runtime_resume after S3 and S4 for each codec

Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda - Record the current power state before suspend/resume calls

Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
mm, mempolicy: fix uninit memory access

Waiman Long <[email protected]>
locking/lockdep: Add debug_locks check in __lock_downgrade()

Jann Horn <[email protected]>
x86/unwind: Add hardcoded ORC entry for NULL

Jann Horn <[email protected]>
x86/unwind: Handle NULL pointer calls better in frame unwinder

Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
netfilter: ebtables: remove BUGPRINT messages

Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
drm: Reorder set_property_atomic to avoid returning with an active ww_ctx

Kefeng Wang <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: hci_ldisc: Postpone HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit set in hci_uart_set_proto()

Jeremy Cline <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: hci_ldisc: Initialize hci_dev before open()

Myungho Jung <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: Fix decrementing reference count twice in releasing socket

Myungho Jung <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: hci_uart: Check if socket buffer is ERR_PTR in h4_recv_buf()

Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
media: v4l2-ctrls.c/uvc: zero v4l2_event

zhangyi (F) <[email protected]>
ext4: brelse all indirect buffer in ext4_ind_remove_space()

Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>
ext4: fix data corruption caused by unaligned direct AIO

Jiufei Xue <[email protected]>
ext4: fix NULL pointer dereference while journal is aborted

Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
ALSA: x86: Fix runtime PM for hdmi-lpe-audio

Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
objtool: Move objtool_file struct off the stack

Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
perf probe: Fix getting the kernel map

Chen Jie <[email protected]>
futex: Ensure that futex address is aligned in handle_futex_death()

Tyrel Datwyler <[email protected]>
scsi: ibmvscsi: Fix empty event pool access during host removal

Tyrel Datwyler <[email protected]>
scsi: ibmvscsi: Protect ibmvscsi_head from concurrent modificaiton

Archer Yan <[email protected]>
MIPS: Fix kernel crash for R6 in jump label branch function

Yasha Cherikovsky <[email protected]>
MIPS: Ensure ELF appended dtb is relocated

Yifeng Li <[email protected]>
mips: loongson64: lemote-2f: Add IRQF_NO_SUSPEND to "cascade" irqaction.

Jan Kara <[email protected]>
udf: Fix crash on IO error during truncate

Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
libceph: wait for latest osdmap in ceph_monc_blacklist_add()

Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>

    iommu/amd: fix sg->dma_address for sg->offset bigger than PAGE_SIZE

Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]>

    drm/vmwgfx: Don't double-free the mode stored in par->set_mode

Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
mmc: pxamci: fix enum type confusion

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                               |   4 +-
 arch/mips/include/asm/jump_label.h     |   8 +-
 arch/mips/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S         |  12 +--
 arch/mips/loongson64/lemote-2f/irq.c   |   2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h          |   6 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c         |  25 ++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c           |  17 +++++
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_h4.c             |   4 +
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c          |  24 +++---
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_object.c      |   5 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fb.c     |  12 +--
 drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c              |   7 +-
 drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c       |   2 +-
 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls.c   |   2 +-
 drivers/mmc/host/pxamci.c              |   2 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/wmi.c  |   2 +-
 drivers/pci/dwc/pcie-designware-ep.c   |  12 ++-
 drivers/pci/dwc/pcie-designware.h      |   1 +
 drivers/pci/endpoint/pci-epc-core.c    |  10 ---
 drivers/pci/endpoint/pci-epf-core.c    |   4 +-
 drivers/power/supply/charger-manager.c |   3 +-
 drivers/rtc/rtc-lib.c                  |   6 +-
 drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c       |  23 +++++-
 drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c              |  14 ++--
 drivers/usb/core/config.c              |   9 ++-
 drivers/video/backlight/pwm_bl.c       |   9 ++-
 fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.h                    |   2 +-
 fs/ext4/file.c                         |   2 +-
 fs/ext4/indirect.c                     |  12 ++-
 fs/udf/truncate.c                      |   3 +
 include/linux/ceph/libceph.h           |   2 +
 kernel/futex.c                         |   4 +
 kernel/locking/lockdep.c               |   3 +
 kernel/sched/cpufreq_schedutil.c       |   3 +-
 lib/int_sqrt.c                         |   3 +
 mm/mempolicy.c                         |   2 +-
 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c               |   3 +-
 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c        | 131 ++++++++++-----------------------
 net/ceph/ceph_common.c                 |  18 ++++-
 net/ceph/mon_client.c                  |   9 +++
 sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c              |  57 +++++++++++++-
 sound/x86/intel_hdmi_audio.c           |   1 -
 tools/objtool/check.c                  |   3 +-
 tools/perf/util/probe-event.c          |   6 +-
 44 files changed, 303 insertions(+), 186 deletions(-)

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

commit e60a582bcde01158a64ff948fb799f21f5d31a11 upstream.

clang points out several instances of mismatched types in this drivers, all coming from a single declaration:

drivers/mmc/host/pxamci.c:193:15: error: implicit conversion from enumeration type 'enum dma_transfer_direction' to

      different enumeration type 'enum dma_data_direction' [-Werror,-Wenum-conversion]
                direction = DMA_DEV_TO_MEM;
                          ~ ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~

drivers/mmc/host/pxamci.c:212:62: error: implicit conversion from enumeration type 'enum dma_data_direction' to
different enumeration type 'enum dma_transfer_direction' [-Werror,-Wenum-conversion]
tx = dmaengine_prep_slave_sg(chan, data->sg, host->dma_len, direction,

The behavior is correct, so this must be a simply typo from dma_data_direction and dma_transfer_direction being similarly named types with a similar purpose.

---
 drivers/mmc/host/pxamci.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ static void pxamci_dma_irq(void *param);
 static void pxamci_setup_data(struct pxamci_host *host, struct mmc_data *data)
 {
 	struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx;
-	enum dma_data_direction direction;
+	enum dma_transfer_direction direction;
 	struct dma_slave_config	config;
 	struct dma_chan *chan;
 	unsigned int nob = data->blocks;

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]>

commit c2d311553855395764e2e5bf401d987ba65c2056 upstream.

When calling vmw_fb_set_par(), the mode stored in par->set_mode gets free'd twice. The first free is in vmw_fb_kms_detach(), the second is near the end of vmw_fb_set_par() under the name of 'old_mode'. The mode-setting code only works correctly if the mode doesn't actually change. Removing 'old_mode' in favor of using par->set_mode directly fixes the problem.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fb.c |   12 +++---------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

@@ -588,11 +588,9 @@ static int vmw_fb_set_par(struct fb_info
 		0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
 		DRM_MODE_FLAG_NHSYNC | DRM_MODE_FLAG_PVSYNC)
 	};
-	struct drm_display_mode *old_mode;
 	struct drm_display_mode *mode;
 	int ret;
 
-	old_mode = par->set_mode;
 	mode = drm_mode_duplicate(vmw_priv->dev, &new_mode);
 	if (!mode) {
 		DRM_ERROR("Could not create new fb mode.\n");

@@ -603,11 +601,7 @@ static int vmw_fb_set_par(struct fb_info
 	mode->vdisplay = var->yres;
 	vmw_guess_mode_timing(mode);
 
-	if (old_mode && drm_mode_equal(old_mode, mode)) {
-		drm_mode_destroy(vmw_priv->dev, mode);
-		mode = old_mode;
-		old_mode = NULL;
-	} else if (!vmw_kms_validate_mode_vram(vmw_priv,
+	if (!vmw_kms_validate_mode_vram(vmw_priv,
 					mode->hdisplay *
 					DIV_ROUND_UP(var->bits_per_pixel, 8),
 					mode->vdisplay)) {

@@ -677,8 +671,8 @@ static int vmw_fb_set_par(struct fb_info
 	schedule_delayed_work(&par->local_work, 0);
 
 out_unlock:
-	if (old_mode)
-		drm_mode_destroy(vmw_priv->dev, old_mode);
+	if (par->set_mode)
+		drm_mode_destroy(vmw_priv->dev, par->set_mode);
 	par->set_mode = mode;
 
 	drm_modeset_unlock_all(vmw_priv->dev);

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>

commit 4e50ce03976fbc8ae995a000c4b10c737467beaa upstream.

Take into account that sg->offset can be bigger than PAGE_SIZE when setting segment sg->dma_address. Otherwise sg->dma_address will point at diffrent page, what makes DMA not possible with erros like this:

xhci_hcd 0000:38:00.3: AMD-Vi: Event logged [IO_PAGE_FAULT domain=0x0000 address=0x00000000fdaa70c0 flags=0x0020] xhci_hcd 0000:38:00.3: AMD-Vi: Event logged [IO_PAGE_FAULT domain=0x0000 address=0x00000000fdaa7040 flags=0x0020] xhci_hcd 0000:38:00.3: AMD-Vi: Event logged [IO_PAGE_FAULT domain=0x0000 address=0x00000000fdaa7080 flags=0x0020] xhci_hcd 0000:38:00.3: AMD-Vi: Event logged [IO_PAGE_FAULT domain=0x0000 address=0x00000000fdaa7100 flags=0x0020] xhci_hcd 0000:38:00.3: AMD-Vi: Event logged [IO_PAGE_FAULT domain=0x0000 address=0x00000000fdaa7000 flags=0x0020]

Additinally with wrong sg->dma_address unmap_sg will free wrong pages, what what can cause crashes like this:

Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: BUG: Bad page state in process cinnamon  pfn:39e8b1
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: raw: 02ffff0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff00000301 0000000000000000
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: page dumped because: nonzero _refcount
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: Modules linked in: ccm fuse arc4 nct6775 hwmon_vid amdgpu nls_iso8859_1 nls_cp437 edac_mce_amd vfat fat kvm_amd ccp rng_core kvm mt76x0u mt76x0_common mt76x02_usb irqbypass mt76_usb mt76x02_lib mt76 crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul chash mac80211 amd_iommu_v2 ghash_clmulni_intel gpu_sched i2c_algo_bit ttm wmi_bmof snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic drm_kms_helper snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel drm snd_hda_codec aesni_intel snd_hda_core snd_hwdep aes_x86_64 crypto_simd snd_pcm cfg80211 cryptd mousedev snd_timer glue_helper pcspkr r8169 input_leds realtek agpgart libphy rfkill snd syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops soundcore sp5100_tco k10temp i2c_piix4 wmi evdev gpio_amdpt pinctrl_amd mac_hid pcc_cpufreq acpi_cpufreq sg ip_tables x_tables ext4(E) crc32c_generic(E) crc16(E) mbcache(E) jbd2(E) fscrypto(E) sd_mod(E) hid_generic(E) usbhid(E) hid(E) dm_mod(E) serio_raw(E) atkbd(E) libps2(E) crc32c_intel(E) ahci(E) libahci(E) libata(E) xhci_pci(E) xhci_hcd(E)
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  scsi_mod(E) i8042(E) serio(E) bcache(E) crc64(E)
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: CPU: 2 PID: 896 Comm: cinnamon Tainted: G    B   W   E     4.20.12-arch1-1-custom #1
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./B450M Pro4, BIOS P1.20 06/26/2018
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: Call Trace:
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  dump_stack+0x5c/0x80
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  bad_page.cold.29+0x7f/0xb2
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  __free_pages_ok+0x2c0/0x2d0
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  skb_release_data+0x96/0x180
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  __kfree_skb+0xe/0x20
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  tcp_recvmsg+0x894/0xc60
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  ? reuse_swap_page+0x120/0x340
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  ? ptep_set_access_flags+0x23/0x30
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  inet_recvmsg+0x5b/0x100
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  __sys_recvfrom+0xc3/0x180
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  ? handle_mm_fault+0x10a/0x250
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  ? syscall_trace_enter+0x1d3/0x2d0
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x22a/0x290
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x24/0x30
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x170
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

---
 drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -2548,7 +2548,12 @@ static int map_sg(struct device *dev, st
 
 	/* Everything is mapped - write the right values into s->dma_address */
 	for_each_sg(sglist, s, nelems, i) {
-		s->dma_address += address + s->offset;
+		/*
+		 * Add in the remaining piece of the scatter-gather offset that
+		 * was masked out when we were determining the physical address
+		 * via (sg_phys(s) & PAGE_MASK) earlier.
+		 */
+		s->dma_address += address + (s->offset & ~PAGE_MASK);
 		s->dma_length   = s->length;
 	}
 

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>

commit bb229bbb3bf63d23128e851a1f3b85c083178fa1 upstream.

Because map updates are distributed lazily, an OSD may not know about the new blacklist for quite some time after "osd blacklist add" command is completed. This makes it possible for a blacklisted but still alive client to overwrite a post-blacklist update, resulting in data corruption.

Waiting for latest osdmap in ceph_monc_blacklist_add() and thus using the post-blacklist epoch for all post-blacklist requests ensures that all such requests "wait" for the blacklist to come into force on their respective OSDs.

---
 include/linux/ceph/libceph.h |    2 ++
 net/ceph/ceph_common.c       |   18 +++++++++++++++++-
 net/ceph/mon_client.c        |    9 +++++++++
 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -291,6 +291,8 @@ extern void ceph_destroy_client(struct c
 extern int __ceph_open_session(struct ceph_client *client,
 			       unsigned long started);
 extern int ceph_open_session(struct ceph_client *client);
+int ceph_wait_for_latest_osdmap(struct ceph_client *client,
+				unsigned long timeout);
 
 /* pagevec.c */
 extern void ceph_release_page_vector(struct page **pages, int num_pages);

@@ -720,7 +720,6 @@ int __ceph_open_session(struct ceph_clie
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ceph_open_session);
 
-
 int ceph_open_session(struct ceph_client *client)
 {
 	int ret;

@@ -736,6 +735,23 @@ int ceph_open_session(struct ceph_client
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_open_session);
 
+int ceph_wait_for_latest_osdmap(struct ceph_client *client,
+				unsigned long timeout)
+{
+	u64 newest_epoch;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = ceph_monc_get_version(&client->monc, "osdmap", &newest_epoch);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (client->osdc.osdmap->epoch >= newest_epoch)
+		return 0;
+
+	ceph_osdc_maybe_request_map(&client->osdc);
+	return ceph_monc_wait_osdmap(&client->monc, newest_epoch, timeout);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_wait_for_latest_osdmap);
 
 static int __init init_ceph_lib(void)
 {

@@ -922,6 +922,15 @@ int ceph_monc_blacklist_add(struct ceph_
 	mutex_unlock(&monc->mutex);
 
 	ret = wait_generic_request(req);
+	if (!ret)
+		/*
+		 * Make sure we have the osdmap that includes the blacklist
+		 * entry.  This is needed to ensure that the OSDs pick up the
+		 * new blacklist before processing any future requests from
+		 * this client.
+		 */
+		ret = ceph_wait_for_latest_osdmap(monc->client, 0);
+
 out:
 	put_generic_request(req);
 	return ret;

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

commit d3ca4651d05c0ff7259d087d8c949bcf3e14fb46 upstream.

When truncate(2) hits IO error when reading indirect extent block the code just bugs with:

kernel BUG at linux-4.15.0/fs/udf/truncate.c:249!
...

Fix the problem by bailing out cleanly in case of IO error.

---
 fs/udf/truncate.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -260,6 +260,9 @@ void udf_truncate_extents(struct inode *
 			epos.block = eloc;
 			epos.bh = udf_tread(sb,
 					udf_get_lb_pblock(sb, &eloc, 0));
+			/* Error reading indirect block? */
+			if (!epos.bh)
+				return;
 			if (elen)
 				indirect_ext_len =
 					(elen + sb->s_blocksize - 1) >>

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yifeng Li <[email protected]>

commit 5f5f67da9781770df0403269bc57d7aae608fecd upstream.

Timekeeping IRQs from CS5536 MFGPT are routed to i8259, which then triggers the "cascade" IRQ on MIPS CPU. Without IRQF_NO_SUSPEND in cascade_irqaction, MFGPT interrupts will be masked in suspend mode, and the machine would be unable to resume once suspended.

Previously, MIPS IRQs were not disabled properly, so the original code appeared to work. Commit a3e6c1eff5 ("MIPS: IRQ: Fix disable_irq on CPU IRQs") uncovers the bug. To fix it, add IRQF_NO_SUSPEND to cascade_irqaction.

This commit is functionally identical to 0add9c2f1cff ("MIPS:
Loongson-3: Add IRQF_NO_SUSPEND to Cascade irqaction"), but it forgot to apply the same fix to Loongson2.

---
 arch/mips/loongson64/lemote-2f/irq.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static struct irqaction ip6_irqaction =
 static struct irqaction cascade_irqaction = {
 	.handler = no_action,
 	.name = "cascade",
-	.flags = IRQF_NO_THREAD,
+	.flags = IRQF_NO_THREAD | IRQF_NO_SUSPEND,
 };
 
 void __init mach_init_irq(void)

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yasha Cherikovsky <[email protected]>

commit 3f0a53bc6482fb09770982a8447981260ea258dc upstream.

This fixes booting with the combination of CONFIG_RELOCATABLE=y and CONFIG_MIPS_ELF_APPENDED_DTB=y.

Sections that appear after the relocation table are not relocated on system boot (except .bss, which has special handling).

With CONFIG_MIPS_ELF_APPENDED_DTB, the dtb is part of the vmlinux ELF, so it must be relocated together with everything else.

---
 arch/mips/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S |   12 +++++++-----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -140,6 +140,13 @@ SECTIONS
 	PERCPU_SECTION(1 << CONFIG_MIPS_L1_CACHE_SHIFT)
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS_ELF_APPENDED_DTB
+	.appended_dtb : AT(ADDR(.appended_dtb) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+		*(.appended_dtb)
+		KEEP(*(.appended_dtb))
+	}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE
 	. = ALIGN(4);
 

@@ -164,11 +171,6 @@ SECTIONS
 	__appended_dtb = .;
 	/* leave space for appended DTB */
 	. += 0x100000;
-#elif defined(CONFIG_MIPS_ELF_APPENDED_DTB)
-	.appended_dtb : AT(ADDR(.appended_dtb) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
-		*(.appended_dtb)
-		KEEP(*(.appended_dtb))
-	}
 #endif
 	/*
 	 * Align to 64K in attempt to eliminate holes before the

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Archer Yan <[email protected]>

commit 47c25036b60f27b86ab44b66a8861bcf81cde39b upstream.

Insert Branch instruction instead of NOP to make sure assembler don't patch code in forbidden slot. In jump label function, it might be possible to patch Control Transfer Instructions(CTIs) into forbidden slot, which will generate Reserved Instruction exception in MIPS release 6.

[[email protected]:
- Add MIPS prefix to subject.
- Mark for stable from v4.0, which introduced r6 support, onwards.]

---
 arch/mips/include/asm/jump_label.h |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -21,15 +21,15 @@
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_MICROMIPS
-#define NOP_INSN "nop32"
+#define B_INSN "b32"
 #else
-#define NOP_INSN "nop"
+#define B_INSN "b"
 #endif
 
 static __always_inline bool arch_static_branch(struct static_key *key, bool branch)
 {
-	asm_volatile_goto("1:\t" NOP_INSN "\n\t"
-		"nop\n\t"
+	asm_volatile_goto("1:\t" B_INSN " 2f\n\t"
+		"2:\tnop\n\t"
 		".pushsection __jump_table,  \"aw\"\n\t"
 		WORD_INSN " 1b, %l[l_yes], %0\n\t"
 		".popsection\n\t"

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tyrel Datwyler <[email protected]>

commit 7205981e045e752ccf96cf6ddd703a98c59d4339 upstream.

For each ibmvscsi host created during a probe or destroyed during a remove we either add or remove that host to/from the global ibmvscsi_head list. This runs the risk of concurrent modification.

This patch adds a simple spinlock around the list modification calls to prevent concurrent updates as is done similarly in the ibmvfc driver and ipr driver.

---
 drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ static int client_reserve = 1;
 static char partition_name[96] = "UNKNOWN";
 static unsigned int partition_number = -1;
 static LIST_HEAD(ibmvscsi_head);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
 
 static struct scsi_transport_template *ibmvscsi_transport_template;
 

@@ -2274,7 +2275,9 @@ static int ibmvscsi_probe(struct vio_dev
 	}
 
 	dev_set_drvdata(&vdev->dev, hostdata);
+	spin_lock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
 	list_add_tail(&hostdata->host_list, &ibmvscsi_head);
+	spin_unlock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
 	return 0;
 
       add_srp_port_failed:

@@ -2296,7 +2299,9 @@ static int ibmvscsi_probe(struct vio_dev
 static int ibmvscsi_remove(struct vio_dev *vdev)
 {
 	struct ibmvscsi_host_data *hostdata = dev_get_drvdata(&vdev->dev);
+	spin_lock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
 	list_del(&hostdata->host_list);
+	spin_unlock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
 	unmap_persist_bufs(hostdata);
 	release_event_pool(&hostdata->pool, hostdata);
 	ibmvscsi_release_crq_queue(&hostdata->queue, hostdata,

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tyrel Datwyler <[email protected]>

commit 7f5203c13ba8a7b7f9f6ecfe5a4d5567188d7835 upstream.

The event pool used for queueing commands is destroyed fairly early in the ibmvscsi_remove() code path. Since, this happens prior to the call so scsi_remove_host() it is possible for further calls to queuecommand to be processed which manifest as a panic due to a NULL pointer dereference as seen here:

PANIC: "Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000000"

Context process backtrace:

DSISR: 0000000042000000 ????Syscall Result: 0000000000000000
4 [c000000002cb3820] memcpy_power7 at c000000000064204
[Link Register] [c000000002cb3820] ibmvscsi_send_srp_event at d000000003ed14a4 5 [c000000002cb3920] ibmvscsi_send_srp_event at d000000003ed14a4 [ibmvscsi] ?(unreliable) 6 [c000000002cb39c0] ibmvscsi_queuecommand at d000000003ed2388 [ibmvscsi]
7 [c000000002cb3a70] scsi_dispatch_cmd at d00000000395c2d8 [scsi_mod]
8 [c000000002cb3af0] scsi_request_fn at d00000000395ef88 [scsi_mod]
9 [c000000002cb3be0] __blk_run_queue at c000000000429860
10 [c000000002cb3c10] blk_delay_work at c00000000042a0ec
11 [c000000002cb3c40] process_one_work at c0000000000dac30
12 [c000000002cb3cd0] worker_thread at c0000000000db110
13 [c000000002cb3d80] kthread at c0000000000e3378
14 [c000000002cb3e30] ret_from_kernel_thread at c00000000000982c

The kernel buffer log is overfilled with this log:

[11261.952732] ibmvscsi: found no event struct in pool!

This patch reorders the operations during host teardown. Start by calling the SRP transport and Scsi_Host remove functions to flush any outstanding work and set the host offline. LLDD teardown follows including destruction of the event pool, freeing the Command Response Queue (CRQ), and unmapping any persistent buffers. The event pool destruction is protected by the scsi_host lock, and the pool is purged prior of any requests for which we never received a response. Finally, move the removal of the scsi host from our global list to the end so that the host is easily locatable for debugging purposes during teardown.

---
 drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c |   22 ++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -2299,17 +2299,27 @@ static int ibmvscsi_probe(struct vio_dev
 static int ibmvscsi_remove(struct vio_dev *vdev)
 {
 	struct ibmvscsi_host_data *hostdata = dev_get_drvdata(&vdev->dev);
-	spin_lock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
-	list_del(&hostdata->host_list);
-	spin_unlock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
-	unmap_persist_bufs(hostdata);
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	srp_remove_host(hostdata->host);
+	scsi_remove_host(hostdata->host);
+
+	purge_requests(hostdata, DID_ERROR);
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(hostdata->host->host_lock, flags);
 	release_event_pool(&hostdata->pool, hostdata);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(hostdata->host->host_lock, flags);
+
 	ibmvscsi_release_crq_queue(&hostdata->queue, hostdata,
 					max_events);
 
 	kthread_stop(hostdata->work_thread);
-	srp_remove_host(hostdata->host);
-	scsi_remove_host(hostdata->host);
+	unmap_persist_bufs(hostdata);
+
+	spin_lock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
+	list_del(&hostdata->host_list);
+	spin_unlock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
+
 	scsi_host_put(hostdata->host);
 
 	return 0;

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chen Jie <[email protected]>

commit 5a07168d8d89b00fe1760120714378175b3ef992 upstream.

The futex code requires that the user space addresses of futexes are 32bit aligned. sys_futex() checks this in futex_get_keys() but the robust list code has no alignment check in place.

As a consequence the kernel crashes on architectures with strict alignment requirements in handle_futex_death() when trying to cmpxchg() on an unaligned futex address which was retrieved from the robust list.

[ tglx: Rewrote changelog, proper sizeof() based alignement check and add
comment ]

---
 kernel/futex.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

@@ -3450,6 +3450,10 @@ int handle_futex_death(u32 __user *uaddr
 {
 	u32 uval, uninitialized_var(nval), mval;
 
+	/* Futex address must be 32bit aligned */
+	if ((((unsigned long)uaddr) % sizeof(*uaddr)) != 0)
+		return -1;
+
 retry:
 	if (get_user(uval, uaddr))
 		return -1;

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>

commit eaeffeb9838a7c0dec981d258666bfcc0fa6a947 upstream.

Since commit 4d99e4136580 ("perf machine: Workaround missing maps for x86 PTI entry trampolines"), perf tools has been creating more than one kernel map, however 'perf probe' assumed there could be only one.

Fix by using machine__kernel_map() to get the main kernel map.

---
 tools/perf/util/probe-event.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -169,8 +169,10 @@ static struct map *kernel_get_module_map
 	if (module && strchr(module, '/'))
 		return dso__new_map(module);
 
-	if (!module)
-		module = "kernel";
+	if (!module) {
+		pos = machine__kernel_map(host_machine);
+		return map__get(pos);
+	}
 
 	for (pos = maps__first(maps); pos; pos = map__next(pos)) {
 		/* short_name is "[module]" */

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

commit 0c671812f152b628bd87c0af49da032cc2a2c319 upstream.

Objtool uses over 512k of stack, thanks to the hash table embedded in the objtool_file struct. This causes an unnecessarily large stack allocation and breaks users with low stack limits.

Move the struct off the stack.

---
 tools/objtool/check.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -2132,9 +2132,10 @@ static void cleanup(struct objtool_file
 	elf_close(file->elf);
 }
 
+static struct objtool_file file;
+
 int check(const char *_objname, bool orc)
 {
-	struct objtool_file file;
 	int ret, warnings = 0;
 
 	objname = _objname;

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>

commit 8dfb839cfe737a17def8e5f88ee13c295230364a upstream.

Commit 46e831abe864 ("drm/i915/lpe: Mark LPE audio runtime pm as "no callbacks"") broke runtime PM with lpe audio. We can no longer runtime suspend the GPU since the sysfs power/control for the lpe-audio device no longer exists and the device is considered always active. We can fix this by not marking the device as active.

---
 sound/x86/intel_hdmi_audio.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1887,7 +1887,6 @@ static int hdmi_lpe_audio_probe(struct p
 
 	pm_runtime_use_autosuspend(&pdev->dev);
 	pm_runtime_mark_last_busy(&pdev->dev);
-	pm_runtime_set_active(&pdev->dev);
 
 	dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "%s: handle pending notification\n", __func__);
 	for_each_port(card_ctx, port) {

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiufei Xue <[email protected]>

commit fa30dde38aa8628c73a6dded7cb0bba38c27b576 upstream.

We see the following NULL pointer dereference while running xfstests generic/475:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008
PGD 8000000c84bad067 P4D 8000000c84bad067 PUD c84e62067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 7 PID: 9886 Comm: fsstress Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8 #10
RIP: 0010:ext4_do_update_inode+0x4ec/0x760
...
Call Trace:
? jbd2_journal_get_write_access+0x42/0x50
? __ext4_journal_get_write_access+0x2c/0x70
? ext4_truncate+0x186/0x3f0
ext4_mark_iloc_dirty+0x61/0x80
ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x62/0x1b0
ext4_truncate+0x186/0x3f0
? unmap_mapping_pages+0x56/0x100
ext4_setattr+0x817/0x8b0
notify_change+0x1df/0x430
do_truncate+0x5e/0x90
? generic_permission+0x12b/0x1a0

This is triggered because the NULL pointer handle->h_transaction was dereferenced in function ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans().
I found that the h_transaction was set to NULL in jbd2__journal_restart but failed to attached to a new transaction while the journal is aborted.

Fix this by checking the handle before updating the inode.

---
 fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ static inline void ext4_update_inode_fsy
 {
 	struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
 
-	if (ext4_handle_valid(handle)) {
+	if (ext4_handle_valid(handle) && !is_handle_aborted(handle)) {
 		ei->i_sync_tid = handle->h_transaction->t_tid;
 		if (datasync)
 			ei->i_datasync_tid = handle->h_transaction->t_tid;

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>

commit 372a03e01853f860560eade508794dd274e9b390 upstream.

Ext4 needs to serialize unaligned direct AIO because the zeroing of partial blocks of two competing unaligned AIOs can result in data corruption.

However it decides not to serialize if the potentially unaligned aio is past i_size with the rationale that no pending writes are possible past i_size. Unfortunately if the i_size is not block aligned and the second unaligned write lands past i_size, but still into the same block, it has the potential of corrupting the previous unaligned write to the same block.

This is (very simplified) reproducer from Frank

    // 41472 = (10 * 4096) + 512
    // 37376 = 41472 - 4096

    ftruncate(fd, 41472);
    io_prep_pwrite(iocbs[0], fd, buf[0], 4096, 37376);
    io_prep_pwrite(iocbs[1], fd, buf[1], 4096, 41472);

    io_submit(io_ctx, 1, &iocbs[1]);
    io_submit(io_ctx, 1, &iocbs[2]);

    io_getevents(io_ctx, 2, 2, events, NULL);

Without this patch the 512B range from 40960 up to the start of the second unaligned write (41472) is going to be zeroed overwriting the data written by the first write. This is a data corruption.

00000000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 *
00009200 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 *
0000a000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 *
0000a200 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31

With this patch the data corruption is avoided because we will recognize the unaligned_aio and wait for the unwritten extent conversion.

00000000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 *
00009200 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 *
0000a200 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 *
0000b200

---
 fs/ext4/file.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ ext4_unaligned_aio(struct inode *inode,
 	struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
 	int blockmask = sb->s_blocksize - 1;
 
-	if (pos >= i_size_read(inode))
+	if (pos >= ALIGN(i_size_read(inode), sb->s_blocksize))
 		return 0;
 
 	if ((pos | iov_iter_alignment(from)) & blockmask)

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: zhangyi (F) <[email protected]>

commit 674a2b27234d1b7afcb0a9162e81b2e53aeef217 upstream.

All indirect buffers get by ext4_find_shared() should be released no mater the branch should be freed or not. But now, we forget to release the lower depth indirect buffers when removing space from the same higher depth indirect block. It will lead to buffer leak and futher more, it may lead to quota information corruption when using old quota, consider the following case.

- Create and mount an empty ext4 filesystem without extent and quota features,
- quotacheck and enable the user & group quota,
- Create some files and write some data to them, and then punch hole to some files of them, it may trigger the buffer leak problem mentioned above.
- Disable quota and run quotacheck again, it will create two new aquota files and write the checked quota information to them, which probably may reuse the freed indirect block(the buffer and page cache was not freed) as data block.
- Enable quota again, it will invoke vfs_load_quota_inode()->invalidate_bdev() to try to clean unused buffers and pagecache. Unfortunately, because of the buffer of quota data block is still referenced, quota code cannot read the up to date quota info from the device and lead to quota information corruption.

This problem can be reproduced by xfstests generic/231 on ext3 file system or ext4 file system without extent and quota features.

This patch fix this problem by releasing the missing indirect buffers, in ext4_ind_remove_space().

---
 fs/ext4/indirect.c |   12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -1387,10 +1387,14 @@ end_range:
 					   partial->p + 1,
 					   partial2->p,
 					   (chain+n-1) - partial);
-			BUFFER_TRACE(partial->bh, "call brelse");
-			brelse(partial->bh);
-			BUFFER_TRACE(partial2->bh, "call brelse");
-			brelse(partial2->bh);
+			while (partial > chain) {
+				BUFFER_TRACE(partial->bh, "call brelse");
+				brelse(partial->bh);
+			}
+			while (partial2 > chain2) {
+				BUFFER_TRACE(partial2->bh, "call brelse");
+				brelse(partial2->bh);
+			}
 			return 0;
 		}
 

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>

commit f45f3f753b0a3d739acda8e311b4f744d82dc52a upstream.

Control events can leak kernel memory since they do not fully zero the event. The same code is present in both v4l2-ctrls.c and uvc_ctrl.c, so fix both.

It appears that all other event code is properly zeroing the structure, it's these two places.

---
 drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c     |    2 +-
 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls.c |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1203,7 +1203,7 @@ static void uvc_ctrl_fill_event(struct u
 
 	__uvc_query_v4l2_ctrl(chain, ctrl, mapping, &v4l2_ctrl);
 
-	memset(ev->reserved, 0, sizeof(ev->reserved));
+	memset(ev, 0, sizeof(*ev));
 	ev->type = V4L2_EVENT_CTRL;
 	ev->id = v4l2_ctrl.id;
 	ev->u.ctrl.value = value;

@@ -1239,7 +1239,7 @@ static u32 user_flags(const struct v4l2_
 
 static void fill_event(struct v4l2_event *ev, struct v4l2_ctrl *ctrl, u32 changes)
 {
-	memset(ev->reserved, 0, sizeof(ev->reserved));
+	memset(ev, 0, sizeof(*ev));
 	ev->type = V4L2_EVENT_CTRL;
 	ev->id = ctrl->id;
 	ev->u.ctrl.changes = changes;

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Myungho Jung <[email protected]>

commit 1dc2d785156cbdc80806c32e8d2c7c735d0b4721 upstream.

h4_recv_buf() callers store the return value to socket buffer and recursively pass the buffer to h4_recv_buf() without protection. So, ERR_PTR returned from h4_recv_buf() can be dereferenced, if called again before setting the socket buffer to NULL from previous error. Check if skb is ERR_PTR in h4_recv_buf().

---
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_h4.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

@@ -174,6 +174,10 @@ struct sk_buff *h4_recv_buf(struct hci_d
 	struct hci_uart *hu = hci_get_drvdata(hdev);
 	u8 alignment = hu->alignment ? hu->alignment : 1;
 
+	/* Check for error from previous call */
+	if (IS_ERR(skb))
+		skb = NULL;
+
 	while (count) {
 		int i, len;
 

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Myungho Jung <[email protected]>

commit e20a2e9c42c9e4002d9e338d74e7819e88d77162 upstream.

When releasing socket, it is possible to enter hci_sock_release() and hci_sock_dev_event(HCI_DEV_UNREG) at the same time in different thread. The reference count of hdev should be decremented only once from one of them but if storing hdev to local variable in hci_sock_release() before detached from socket and setting to NULL in hci_sock_dev_event(), hci_dev_put(hdev) is unexpectedly called twice. This is resolved by referencing hdev from socket after bt_sock_unlink() in hci_sock_release().

---
 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -826,8 +826,6 @@ static int hci_sock_release(struct socke
 	if (!sk)
 		return 0;
 
-	hdev = hci_pi(sk)->hdev;
-
 	switch (hci_pi(sk)->channel) {
 	case HCI_CHANNEL_MONITOR:
 		atomic_dec(&monitor_promisc);

@@ -849,6 +847,7 @@ static int hci_sock_release(struct socke
 
 	bt_sock_unlink(&hci_sk_list, sk);
 
+	hdev = hci_pi(sk)->hdev;
 	if (hdev) {
 		if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_USER) {
 			/* When releasing a user channel exclusive access,

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeremy Cline <[email protected]>

commit 32a7b4cbe93b0a0ef7e63d31ca69ce54736c4412 upstream.

The hci_dev struct hdev is referenced in work queues and timers started by open() in some protocols. This creates a race between the initialization function and the work or timer which can result hdev being dereferenced while it is still null.

The syzbot report contains a reliable reproducer which causes a null pointer dereference of hdev in hci_uart_write_work() by making the memory allocation for hdev fail.

To fix this, ensure hdev is valid from before calling a protocol's open() until after calling a protocol's close().

---
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c |   21 ++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

@@ -207,11 +207,11 @@ static void hci_uart_init_work(struct wo
 	err = hci_register_dev(hu->hdev);
 	if (err < 0) {
 		BT_ERR("Can't register HCI device");
+		clear_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
+		hu->proto->close(hu);
 		hdev = hu->hdev;
 		hu->hdev = NULL;
 		hci_free_dev(hdev);
-		clear_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
-		hu->proto->close(hu);
 		return;
 	}
 

@@ -612,6 +612,7 @@ static void hci_uart_tty_receive(struct
 static int hci_uart_register_dev(struct hci_uart *hu)
 {
 	struct hci_dev *hdev;
+	int err;
 
 	BT_DBG("");
 

@@ -655,11 +656,22 @@ static int hci_uart_register_dev(struct
 	else
 		hdev->dev_type = HCI_PRIMARY;
 
+	/* Only call open() for the protocol after hdev is fully initialized as
+	 * open() (or a timer/workqueue it starts) may attempt to reference it.
+	 */
+	err = hu->proto->open(hu);
+	if (err) {
+		hu->hdev = NULL;
+		hci_free_dev(hdev);
+		return err;
+	}
+
 	if (test_bit(HCI_UART_INIT_PENDING, &hu->hdev_flags))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (hci_register_dev(hdev) < 0) {
 		BT_ERR("Can't register HCI device");
+		hu->proto->close(hu);
 		hu->hdev = NULL;
 		hci_free_dev(hdev);
 		return -ENODEV;

@@ -679,17 +691,12 @@ static int hci_uart_set_proto(struct hci
 	if (!p)
 		return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
 
-	err = p->open(hu);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
 	hu->proto = p;
 	set_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
 
 	err = hci_uart_register_dev(hu);
 	if (err) {
 		clear_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
-		p->close(hu);
 		return err;
 	}
 

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kefeng Wang <[email protected]>

commit 56897b217a1d0a91c9920cb418d6b3fe922f590a upstream.

task A:                                task B:
hci_uart_set_proto                     flush_to_ldisc
 - p->open(hu) -> h5_open  //alloc h5  - receive_buf

- set_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY - tty_port_default_receive_buf
- hci_uart_register_dev - tty_ldisc_receive_buf
- hci_uart_tty_receive
- test_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY
- h5_recv
- clear_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY while() {
- p->open(hu) -> h5_close //free h5
- h5_rx_3wire_hdr
- h5_reset() //use-after-free
}

It could use ioctl to set hci uart proto, but there is a use-after-free issue when hci_uart_register_dev() fail in hci_uart_set_proto(), see stack above, fix this by setting HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit only when hci_uart_register_dev() return success.

---
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -692,14 +692,13 @@ static int hci_uart_set_proto(struct hci
 		return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
 
 	hu->proto = p;
-	set_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
 
 	err = hci_uart_register_dev(hu);
 	if (err) {
-		clear_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
 		return err;
 	}
 
+	set_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
 	return 0;
 }
 

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>

commit 227ad6d957898a88b1746e30234ece64d305f066 upstream.

Delay the drm_modeset_acquire_init() until after we check for an allocation failure so that we can return immediately upon error without having to unwind.

WARNING: lock held when returning to user space!
4.20.0+ #174 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------
syz-executor556/8153 is leaving the kernel with locks still held! 1 lock held by syz-executor556/8153:
#0: 000000005100c85c (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}, at:
set_property_atomic+0xb3/0x330 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_object.c:462

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_object.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -432,12 +432,13 @@ static int set_property_atomic(struct dr
 	struct drm_modeset_acquire_ctx ctx;
 	int ret;
 
-	drm_modeset_acquire_init(&ctx, 0);
-
 	state = drm_atomic_state_alloc(dev);
 	if (!state)
 		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	drm_modeset_acquire_init(&ctx, 0);
 	state->acquire_ctx = &ctx;
+
 retry:
 	if (prop == state->dev->mode_config.dpms_property) {
 		if (obj->type != DRM_MODE_OBJECT_CONNECTOR) {

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

commit d824548dae220820bdf69b2d1561b7c4b072783f upstream.

They are however frequently triggered by syzkaller, so remove them.

ebtables userspace should never trigger any of these, so there is little value in making them pr_debug (or ratelimited).

---
 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c |  131 +++++++++++-----------------------------
 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)

@@ -31,10 +31,6 @@
 /* needed for logical [in,out]-dev filtering */
 #include "../br_private.h"
 
-#define BUGPRINT(format, args...) printk("kernel msg: ebtables bug: please "\
-					 "report to author: "format, ## args)
-/* #define BUGPRINT(format, args...) */
-
 /* Each cpu has its own set of counters, so there is no need for write_lock in
  * the softirq
  * For reading or updating the counters, the user context needs to

@@ -453,8 +449,6 @@ static int ebt_verify_pointers(const str
 				/* we make userspace set this right,
 				 * so there is no misunderstanding
 				 */
-				BUGPRINT("EBT_ENTRY_OR_ENTRIES shouldn't be set "
-					 "in distinguisher\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 			if (i != NF_BR_NUMHOOKS)

@@ -472,18 +466,14 @@ static int ebt_verify_pointers(const str
 			offset += e->next_offset;
 		}
 	}
-	if (offset != limit) {
-		BUGPRINT("entries_size too small\n");
+	if (offset != limit)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	/* check if all valid hooks have a chain */
 	for (i = 0; i < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
 		if (!newinfo->hook_entry[i] &&
-		   (valid_hooks & (1 << i))) {
-			BUGPRINT("Valid hook without chain\n");
+		   (valid_hooks & (1 << i)))
 			return -EINVAL;
-		}
 	}
 	return 0;
 }

@@ -510,26 +500,20 @@ ebt_check_entry_size_and_hooks(const str
 		/* this checks if the previous chain has as many entries
 		 * as it said it has
 		 */
-		if (*n != *cnt) {
-			BUGPRINT("nentries does not equal the nr of entries "
-				 "in the chain\n");
+		if (*n != *cnt)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		}
+
 		if (((struct ebt_entries *)e)->policy != EBT_DROP &&
 		   ((struct ebt_entries *)e)->policy != EBT_ACCEPT) {
 			/* only RETURN from udc */
 			if (i != NF_BR_NUMHOOKS ||
-			   ((struct ebt_entries *)e)->policy != EBT_RETURN) {
-				BUGPRINT("bad policy\n");
+			   ((struct ebt_entries *)e)->policy != EBT_RETURN)
 				return -EINVAL;
-			}
 		}
 		if (i == NF_BR_NUMHOOKS) /* it's a user defined chain */
 			(*udc_cnt)++;
-		if (((struct ebt_entries *)e)->counter_offset != *totalcnt) {
-			BUGPRINT("counter_offset != totalcnt");
+		if (((struct ebt_entries *)e)->counter_offset != *totalcnt)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		}
 		*n = ((struct ebt_entries *)e)->nentries;
 		*cnt = 0;
 		return 0;

@@ -537,15 +521,13 @@ ebt_check_entry_size_and_hooks(const str
 	/* a plain old entry, heh */
 	if (sizeof(struct ebt_entry) > e->watchers_offset ||
 	   e->watchers_offset > e->target_offset ||
-	   e->target_offset >= e->next_offset) {
-		BUGPRINT("entry offsets not in right order\n");
+	   e->target_offset >= e->next_offset)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+
 	/* this is not checked anywhere else */
-	if (e->next_offset - e->target_offset < sizeof(struct ebt_entry_target)) {
-		BUGPRINT("target size too small\n");
+	if (e->next_offset - e->target_offset < sizeof(struct ebt_entry_target))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+
 	(*cnt)++;
 	(*totalcnt)++;
 	return 0;

@@ -665,18 +647,15 @@ ebt_check_entry(struct ebt_entry *e, str
 	if (e->bitmask == 0)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (e->bitmask & ~EBT_F_MASK) {
-		BUGPRINT("Unknown flag for bitmask\n");
+	if (e->bitmask & ~EBT_F_MASK)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (e->invflags & ~EBT_INV_MASK) {
-		BUGPRINT("Unknown flag for inv bitmask\n");
+
+	if (e->invflags & ~EBT_INV_MASK)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if ((e->bitmask & EBT_NOPROTO) && (e->bitmask & EBT_802_3)) {
-		BUGPRINT("NOPROTO & 802_3 not allowed\n");
+
+	if ((e->bitmask & EBT_NOPROTO) && (e->bitmask & EBT_802_3))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+
 	/* what hook do we belong to? */
 	for (i = 0; i < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
 		if (!newinfo->hook_entry[i])

@@ -735,13 +714,11 @@ ebt_check_entry(struct ebt_entry *e, str
 	t->u.target = target;
 	if (t->u.target == &ebt_standard_target) {
 		if (gap < sizeof(struct ebt_standard_target)) {
-			BUGPRINT("Standard target size too big\n");
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 			goto cleanup_watchers;
 		}
 		if (((struct ebt_standard_target *)t)->verdict <
 		   -NUM_STANDARD_TARGETS) {
-			BUGPRINT("Invalid standard target\n");
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 			goto cleanup_watchers;
 		}

@@ -801,10 +778,9 @@ static int check_chainloops(const struct
 		if (strcmp(t->u.name, EBT_STANDARD_TARGET))
 			goto letscontinue;
 		if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct ebt_standard_target) >
-		   e->next_offset) {
-			BUGPRINT("Standard target size too big\n");
+		   e->next_offset)
 			return -1;
-		}
+
 		verdict = ((struct ebt_standard_target *)t)->verdict;
 		if (verdict >= 0) { /* jump to another chain */
 			struct ebt_entries *hlp2 =

@@ -813,14 +789,12 @@ static int check_chainloops(const struct
 				if (hlp2 == cl_s[i].cs.chaininfo)
 					break;
 			/* bad destination or loop */
-			if (i == udc_cnt) {
-				BUGPRINT("bad destination\n");
+			if (i == udc_cnt)
 				return -1;
-			}
-			if (cl_s[i].cs.n) {
-				BUGPRINT("loop\n");
+
+			if (cl_s[i].cs.n)
 				return -1;
-			}
+
 			if (cl_s[i].hookmask & (1 << hooknr))
 				goto letscontinue;
 			/* this can't be 0, so the loop test is correct */

@@ -853,24 +827,21 @@ static int translate_table(struct net *n
 	i = 0;
 	while (i < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS && !newinfo->hook_entry[i])
 		i++;
-	if (i == NF_BR_NUMHOOKS) {
-		BUGPRINT("No valid hooks specified\n");
+	if (i == NF_BR_NUMHOOKS)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (newinfo->hook_entry[i] != (struct ebt_entries *)newinfo->entries) {
-		BUGPRINT("Chains don't start at beginning\n");
+
+	if (newinfo->hook_entry[i] != (struct ebt_entries *)newinfo->entries)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+
 	/* make sure chains are ordered after each other in same order
 	 * as their corresponding hooks
 	 */
 	for (j = i + 1; j < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS; j++) {
 		if (!newinfo->hook_entry[j])
 			continue;
-		if (newinfo->hook_entry[j] <= newinfo->hook_entry[i]) {
-			BUGPRINT("Hook order must be followed\n");
+		if (newinfo->hook_entry[j] <= newinfo->hook_entry[i])
 			return -EINVAL;
-		}
+
 		i = j;
 	}
 

@@ -888,15 +859,11 @@ static int translate_table(struct net *n
 	if (ret != 0)
 		return ret;
 
-	if (i != j) {
-		BUGPRINT("nentries does not equal the nr of entries in the "
-			 "(last) chain\n");
+	if (i != j)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (k != newinfo->nentries) {
-		BUGPRINT("Total nentries is wrong\n");
+
+	if (k != newinfo->nentries)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	/* get the location of the udc, put them in an array
 	 * while we're at it, allocate the chainstack

@@ -929,7 +896,6 @@ static int translate_table(struct net *n
 		   ebt_get_udc_positions, newinfo, &i, cl_s);
 		/* sanity check */
 		if (i != udc_cnt) {
-			BUGPRINT("i != udc_cnt\n");
 			vfree(cl_s);
 			return -EFAULT;
 		}

@@ -1030,7 +996,6 @@ static int do_replace_finish(struct net
 		goto free_unlock;
 
 	if (repl->num_counters && repl->num_counters != t->private->nentries) {
-		BUGPRINT("Wrong nr. of counters requested\n");
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto free_unlock;
 	}

@@ -1115,15 +1080,12 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, c
 	if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	if (len != sizeof(tmp) + tmp.entries_size) {
-		BUGPRINT("Wrong len argument\n");
+	if (len != sizeof(tmp) + tmp.entries_size)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
-	if (tmp.entries_size == 0) {
-		BUGPRINT("Entries_size never zero\n");
+	if (tmp.entries_size == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+
 	/* overflow check */
 	if (tmp.nentries >= ((INT_MAX - sizeof(struct ebt_table_info)) /
 			NR_CPUS - SMP_CACHE_BYTES) / sizeof(struct ebt_counter))

@@ -1150,7 +1112,6 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, c
 	}
 	if (copy_from_user(
 	   newinfo->entries, tmp.entries, tmp.entries_size) != 0) {
-		BUGPRINT("Couldn't copy entries from userspace\n");
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 		goto free_entries;
 	}

@@ -1197,10 +1158,8 @@ int ebt_register_table(struct net *net,
 
 	if (input_table == NULL || (repl = input_table->table) == NULL ||
 	    repl->entries == NULL || repl->entries_size == 0 ||
-	    repl->counters != NULL || input_table->private != NULL) {
-		BUGPRINT("Bad table data for ebt_register_table!!!\n");
+	    repl->counters != NULL || input_table->private != NULL)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	/* Don't add one table to multiple lists. */
 	table = kmemdup(input_table, sizeof(struct ebt_table), GFP_KERNEL);

@@ -1238,13 +1197,10 @@ int ebt_register_table(struct net *net,
 				((char *)repl->hook_entry[i] - repl->entries);
 	}
 	ret = translate_table(net, repl->name, newinfo);
-	if (ret != 0) {
-		BUGPRINT("Translate_table failed\n");
+	if (ret != 0)
 		goto free_chainstack;
-	}
 
 	if (table->check && table->check(newinfo, table->valid_hooks)) {
-		BUGPRINT("The table doesn't like its own initial data, lol\n");
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto free_chainstack;
 	}

@@ -1255,7 +1211,6 @@ int ebt_register_table(struct net *net,
 	list_for_each_entry(t, &net->xt.tables[NFPROTO_BRIDGE], list) {
 		if (strcmp(t->name, table->name) == 0) {
 			ret = -EEXIST;
-			BUGPRINT("Table name already exists\n");
 			goto free_unlock;
 		}
 	}

@@ -1327,7 +1282,6 @@ static int do_update_counters(struct net
 		goto free_tmp;
 
 	if (num_counters != t->private->nentries) {
-		BUGPRINT("Wrong nr of counters\n");
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto unlock_mutex;
 	}

@@ -1452,10 +1406,8 @@ static int copy_counters_to_user(struct
 	if (num_counters == 0)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (num_counters != nentries) {
-		BUGPRINT("Num_counters wrong\n");
+	if (num_counters != nentries)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	counterstmp = vmalloc(nentries * sizeof(*counterstmp));
 	if (!counterstmp)

@@ -1501,15 +1453,11 @@ static int copy_everything_to_user(struc
 	   (tmp.num_counters ? nentries * sizeof(struct ebt_counter) : 0))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (tmp.nentries != nentries) {
-		BUGPRINT("Nentries wrong\n");
+	if (tmp.nentries != nentries)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
-	if (tmp.entries_size != entries_size) {
-		BUGPRINT("Wrong size\n");
+	if (tmp.entries_size != entries_size)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	ret = copy_counters_to_user(t, oldcounters, tmp.counters,
 					tmp.num_counters, nentries);

@@ -1581,7 +1529,6 @@ static int do_ebt_get_ctl(struct sock *s
 		}
 		mutex_unlock(&ebt_mutex);
 		if (copy_to_user(user, &tmp, *len) != 0) {
-			BUGPRINT("c2u Didn't work\n");
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 			break;
 		}

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>

commit f4f34e1b82eb4219d8eaa1c7e2e17ca219a6a2b5 upstream.

When the frame unwinder is invoked for an oops caused by a call to NULL, it currently skips the parent function because BP still points to the parent's stack frame; the (nonexistent) current function only has the first half of a stack frame, and BP doesn't point to it yet.

Add a special case for IP==0 that calculates a fake BP from SP, then uses the real BP for the next frame.

Note that this handles first_frame specially: Return information about the parent function as long as the saved IP is >=first_frame, even if the fake BP points below it.

With an artificially-added NULL call in prctl_set_seccomp(), before this patch, the trace is:

Call Trace:
 ? prctl_set_seccomp+0x3a/0x50
 __x64_sys_prctl+0x457/0x6f0
 ? __ia32_sys_prctl+0x750/0x750
 do_syscall_64+0x72/0x160
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

After this patch, the trace is:

Call Trace:
 prctl_set_seccomp+0x3a/0x50
 __x64_sys_prctl+0x457/0x6f0
 ? __ia32_sys_prctl+0x750/0x750
 do_syscall_64+0x72/0x160
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h  |    6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c |   25 ++++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ struct unwind_state {
 #elif defined(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER)
 	bool got_irq;
 	unsigned long *bp, *orig_sp, ip;
+	/*
+	 * If non-NULL: The current frame is incomplete and doesn't contain a
+	 * valid BP. When looking for the next frame, use this instead of the
+	 * non-existent saved BP.
+	 */
+	unsigned long *next_bp;
 	struct pt_regs *regs;
 #else
 	unsigned long *sp;

@@ -320,10 +320,14 @@ bool unwind_next_frame(struct unwind_sta
 	}
 
 	/* Get the next frame pointer: */
-	if (state->regs)
+	if (state->next_bp) {
+		next_bp = state->next_bp;
+		state->next_bp = NULL;
+	} else if (state->regs) {
 		next_bp = (unsigned long *)state->regs->bp;
-	else
+	} else {
 		next_bp = (unsigned long *)READ_ONCE_TASK_STACK(state->task, *state->bp);
+	}
 
 	/* Move to the next frame if it's safe: */
 	if (!update_stack_state(state, next_bp))

@@ -398,6 +402,21 @@ void __unwind_start(struct unwind_state
 
 	bp = get_frame_pointer(task, regs);
 
+	/*
+	 * If we crash with IP==0, the last successfully executed instruction
+	 * was probably an indirect function call with a NULL function pointer.
+	 * That means that SP points into the middle of an incomplete frame:
+	 * *SP is a return pointer, and *(SP-sizeof(unsigned long)) is where we
+	 * would have written a frame pointer if we hadn't crashed.
+	 * Pretend that the frame is complete and that BP points to it, but save
+	 * the real BP so that we can use it when looking for the next frame.
+	 */
+	if (regs && regs->ip == 0 &&
+	    (unsigned long *)kernel_stack_pointer(regs) >= first_frame) {
+		state->next_bp = bp;
+		bp = ((unsigned long *)kernel_stack_pointer(regs)) - 1;
+	}
+
 	/* Initialize stack info and make sure the frame data is accessible: */
 	get_stack_info(bp, state->task, &state->stack_info,
 		       &state->stack_mask);

@@ -410,7 +429,7 @@ void __unwind_start(struct unwind_state
 	 */
 	while (!unwind_done(state) &&
 	       (!on_stack(&state->stack_info, first_frame, sizeof(long)) ||
-			state->bp < first_frame))
+			(state->next_bp == NULL && state->bp < first_frame)))
 		unwind_next_frame(state);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__unwind_start);

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>

commit ac5ceccce5501e43d217c596e4ee859f2a3fef79 upstream.

When the ORC unwinder is invoked for an oops caused by IP==0, it currently has no idea what to do because there is no debug information for the stack frame of NULL.

But if RIP is NULL, it is very likely that the last successfully executed instruction was an indirect CALL/JMP, and it is possible to unwind out in the same way as for the first instruction of a normal function. Hardcode a corresponding ORC entry.

With an artificially-added NULL call in prctl_set_seccomp(), before this patch, the trace is:

Call Trace:
 ? __x64_sys_prctl+0x402/0x680
 ? __ia32_sys_prctl+0x6e0/0x6e0
 ? __do_page_fault+0x457/0x620
 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x160
 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

After this patch, the trace looks like this:

Call Trace:
 __x64_sys_prctl+0x402/0x680
 ? __ia32_sys_prctl+0x6e0/0x6e0
 ? __do_page_fault+0x457/0x620
 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x160
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

prctl_set_seccomp() still doesn't show up in the trace because for some reason, tail call optimization is only disabled in builds that use the frame pointer unwinder.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)

@@ -74,11 +74,28 @@ static struct orc_entry *orc_module_find
 }
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * If we crash with IP==0, the last successfully executed instruction
+ * was probably an indirect function call with a NULL function pointer,
+ * and we don't have unwind information for NULL.
+ * This hardcoded ORC entry for IP==0 allows us to unwind from a NULL function
+ * pointer into its parent and then continue normally from there.
+ */
+static struct orc_entry null_orc_entry = {
+	.sp_offset = sizeof(long),
+	.sp_reg = ORC_REG_SP,
+	.bp_reg = ORC_REG_UNDEFINED,
+	.type = ORC_TYPE_CALL
+};
+
 static struct orc_entry *orc_find(unsigned long ip)
 {
 	if (!orc_init)
 		return NULL;
 
+	if (ip == 0)
+		return &null_orc_entry;
+
 	/* For non-init vmlinux addresses, use the fast lookup table: */
 	if (ip >= LOOKUP_START_IP && ip < LOOKUP_STOP_IP) {
 		unsigned int idx, start, stop;

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Waiman Long <[email protected]>

commit 71492580571467fb7177aade19c18ce7486267f5 upstream.

Tetsuo Handa had reported he saw an incorrect "downgrading a read lock" warning right after a previous lockdep warning. It is likely that the previous warning turned off lock debugging causing the lockdep to have inconsistency states leading to the lock downgrade warning.

Fix that by add a check for debug_locks at the beginning of __lock_downgrade().

---
 kernel/locking/lockdep.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -3650,6 +3650,9 @@ __lock_set_class(struct lockdep_map *loc
 	unsigned int depth;
 	int i;
 
+	if (unlikely(!debug_locks))
+		return 0;
+
 	depth = curr->lockdep_depth;
 	/*
 	 * This function is about (re)setting the class of a held lock,

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>

commit 2e25644e8da4ed3a27e7b8315aaae74660be72dc upstream.

Syzbot with KMSAN reports (excerpt):

==================================================================

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_policy mm/mempolicy.c:353 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_mm+0x249/0x370 mm/mempolicy.c:384
CPU: 1 PID: 17420 Comm: syz-executor4 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #15
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
  dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
  kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613
  __msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:295
  mpol_rebind_policy mm/mempolicy.c:353 [inline]
  mpol_rebind_mm+0x249/0x370 mm/mempolicy.c:384
  update_tasks_nodemask+0x608/0xca0 kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1120
  update_nodemasks_hier kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1185 [inline]
  update_nodemask kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1253 [inline]
  cpuset_write_resmask+0x2a98/0x34b0 kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1728

...

Uninit was created at:

  kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline]
  kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:158
  kmsan_kmalloc+0xa6/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:176
  kmem_cache_alloc+0x572/0xb90 mm/slub.c:2777
  mpol_new mm/mempolicy.c:276 [inline]
  do_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1180 [inline]
  kernel_mbind+0x8a7/0x31a0 mm/mempolicy.c:1347
  __do_sys_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1354 [inline]

As it's difficult to report where exactly the uninit value resides in the mempolicy object, we have to guess a bit. mm/mempolicy.c:353 contains this part of mpol_rebind_policy():

        if (!mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol) &&
            nodes_equal(pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed, *newmask))

"mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol)" is testing pol->flags, which I couldn't ever see being uninitialized after leaving mpol_new(). So I'll guess it's actually about accessing pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed on line 354, but still part of statement starting on line 353.

For w.cpuset_mems_allowed to be not initialized, and the nodes_equal() reachable for a mempolicy where mpol_set_nodemask() is called in do_mbind(), it seems the only possibility is a MPOL_PREFERRED policy with empty set of nodes, i.e. MPOL_LOCAL equivalent, with MPOL_F_LOCAL flag. Let's exclude such policies from the nodes_equal() check. Note the uninit access should be benign anyway, as rebinding this kind of policy is always a no-op. Therefore no actual need for stable inclusion.

---
 mm/mempolicy.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ static void mpol_rebind_policy(struct me
 {
 	if (!pol)
 		return;
-	if (!mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol) &&
+	if (!mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol) && !(pol->flags & MPOL_F_LOCAL) &&
 	    nodes_equal(pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed, *newmask))
 		return;
 

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

commit 98081ca62cbac31fb0f7efaf90b2e7384ce22257 upstream.

Currently we deal with single codec and suspend codec callbacks for all S3, S4 and runtime PM handling. But it turned out that we want distinguish the call patterns sometimes, e.g. for applying some init sequence only at probing and restoring from hibernate.

This patch slightly modifies the common PM callbacks for HD-audio codec and stores the currently processed PM event in power_state of the codec's device.power field, which is currently unused. The codec callback can take a look at this event value and judges which purpose it's being called.

---
 sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c |   43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -2900,6 +2900,7 @@ static void hda_call_codec_resume(struct
 		hda_jackpoll_work(&codec->jackpoll_work.work);
 	else
 		snd_hda_jack_report_sync(codec);
+	codec->core.dev.power.power_state = PMSG_ON;
 	atomic_dec(&codec->core.in_pm);
 }
 

@@ -2932,10 +2933,48 @@ static int hda_codec_runtime_resume(stru
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_PM */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP
+static int hda_codec_pm_suspend(struct device *dev)
+{
+	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_SUSPEND;
+	return pm_runtime_force_suspend(dev);
+}
+
+static int hda_codec_pm_resume(struct device *dev)
+{
+	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_RESUME;
+	return pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+}
+
+static int hda_codec_pm_freeze(struct device *dev)
+{
+	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_FREEZE;
+	return pm_runtime_force_suspend(dev);
+}
+
+static int hda_codec_pm_thaw(struct device *dev)
+{
+	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_THAW;
+	return pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+}
+
+static int hda_codec_pm_restore(struct device *dev)
+{
+	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_RESTORE;
+	return pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PM_SLEEP */
+
 /* referred in hda_bind.c */
 const struct dev_pm_ops hda_codec_driver_pm = {
-	SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(pm_runtime_force_suspend,
-				pm_runtime_force_resume)
+#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP
+	.suspend = hda_codec_pm_suspend,
+	.resume = hda_codec_pm_resume,
+	.freeze = hda_codec_pm_freeze,
+	.thaw = hda_codec_pm_thaw,
+	.poweroff = hda_codec_pm_suspend,
+	.restore = hda_codec_pm_restore,
+#endif /* CONFIG_PM_SLEEP */
 	SET_RUNTIME_PM_OPS(hda_codec_runtime_suspend, hda_codec_runtime_resume,
 			   NULL)
 };

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hui Wang <[email protected]>

commit b5a236c175b0d984552a5f7c9d35141024c2b261 upstream.

Recently we found the audio jack detection stop working after suspend on many machines with Realtek codec. Sometimes the audio selection dialogue didn't show up after users plugged headhphone/headset into the headset jack, sometimes after uses plugged headphone/headset, then click the sound icon on the upper-right corner of gnome-desktop, it also showed the speaker rather than the headphone.

The root cause is that before suspend, the codec already call the runtime_suspend since this codec is not used by any apps, then in resume, it will not call runtime_resume for this codec. But for some realtek codec (so far, alc236, alc255 and alc891) with the specific BIOS, if it doesn't run runtime_resume after suspend, all codec functions including jack detection stop working anymore.

This problem existed for a long time, but it was not exposed, that is because when problem happens, if users play sound or open sound-setting to check audio device, this will trigger calling to runtime_resume (via snd_hda_power_up), then the codec starts working again before users notice this problem.

Since we don't know how many codec and BIOS combinations have this problem, to fix it, let the driver call runtime_resume for all codecs in pm_resume, maybe for some codecs, this is not needed, but it is harmless. After a codec is runtime resumed, if it is not used by any apps, it will be runtime suspended soon and furthermore we don't run suspend frequently, this change will not add much power consumption.

---
 sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c |   20 +++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -2934,6 +2934,20 @@ static int hda_codec_runtime_resume(stru
 #endif /* CONFIG_PM */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP
+static int hda_codec_force_resume(struct device *dev)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* The get/put pair below enforces the runtime resume even if the
+	 * device hasn't been used at suspend time.  This trick is needed to
+	 * update the jack state change during the sleep.
+	 */
+	pm_runtime_get_noresume(dev);
+	ret = pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+	pm_runtime_put(dev);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int hda_codec_pm_suspend(struct device *dev)
 {
 	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_SUSPEND;

@@ -2943,7 +2957,7 @@ static int hda_codec_pm_suspend(struct d
 static int hda_codec_pm_resume(struct device *dev)
 {
 	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_RESUME;
-	return pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+	return hda_codec_force_resume(dev);
 }
 
 static int hda_codec_pm_freeze(struct device *dev)

@@ -2955,13 +2969,13 @@ static int hda_codec_pm_freeze(struct de
 static int hda_codec_pm_thaw(struct device *dev)
 {
 	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_THAW;
-	return pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+	return hda_codec_force_resume(dev);
 }
 
 static int hda_codec_pm_restore(struct device *dev)
 {
 	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_RESTORE;
-	return pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+	return hda_codec_force_resume(dev);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_PM_SLEEP */
 

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>

commit 3f3295709edea6268ff1609855f498035286af73 upstream.

The current int_sqrt() computation is sub-optimal for the case of small @x. Which is the interesting case when we're going to do cumulative distribution functions on idle times, which we assume to be a random variable, where the target residency of the deepest idle state gives an upper bound on the variable (5e6ns on recent Intel chips).

In the case of small @x, the compute loop:

	while (m != 0) {
		b = y + m;
		y >>= 1;

		if (x >= b) {
			x -= b;
			y += m;
		}
		m >>= 2;
	}

can be reduced to:

	while (m > x)
		m >>= 2;

Because y==0, b==m and until x>=m y will remain 0.

And while this is computationally equivalent, it runs much faster because there's less code, in particular less branches.

cycles: branches: branch-misses:

OLD:

hot: 45.109444 +- 0.044117 44.333392 +- 0.002254 0.018723 +- 0.000593
cold: 187.737379 +- 0.156678 44.333407 +- 0.002254 6.272844 +- 0.004305

PRE:

hot: 67.937492 +- 0.064124 66.999535 +- 0.000488 0.066720 +- 0.001113
cold: 232.004379 +- 0.332811 66.999527 +- 0.000488 6.914634 +- 0.006568

POST:

hot: 43.633557 +- 0.034373 45.333132 +- 0.002277 0.023529 +- 0.000681
cold: 207.438411 +- 0.125840 45.333132 +- 0.002277 6.976486 +- 0.004219

Averages computed over all values <128k using a LFSR to generate order. Cold numbers have a LFSR based branch trace buffer 'confuser' ran between each int_sqrt() invocation.

---
 lib/int_sqrt.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ unsigned long int_sqrt(unsigned long x)
 		return x;
 
 	m = 1UL << (BITS_PER_LONG - 2);
+	while (m > x)
+		m >>= 2;
+
 	while (m != 0) {
 		b = y + m;
 		y >>= 1;

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>

commit 32fd87b3bbf5f7a045546401dfe2894dbbf4d8c3 upstream.

When cleaning up the configurations, make sure we only free the number of configurations and interfaces that we could have allocated.

---
 drivers/usb/core/config.c |    9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -768,18 +768,21 @@ void usb_destroy_configuration(struct us
 		return;
 
 	if (dev->rawdescriptors) {
-		for (i = 0; i < dev->descriptor.bNumConfigurations; i++)
+		for (i = 0; i < dev->descriptor.bNumConfigurations &&
+				i < USB_MAXCONFIG; i++)
 			kfree(dev->rawdescriptors[i]);
 
 		kfree(dev->rawdescriptors);
 		dev->rawdescriptors = NULL;
 	}
 
-	for (c = 0; c < dev->descriptor.bNumConfigurations; c++) {
+	for (c = 0; c < dev->descriptor.bNumConfigurations &&
+			c < USB_MAXCONFIG; c++) {
 		struct usb_host_config *cf = &dev->config[c];
 
 		kfree(cf->string);
-		for (i = 0; i < cf->desc.bNumInterfaces; i++) {
+		for (i = 0; i < cf->desc.bNumInterfaces &&
+				i < USB_MAXINTERFACES; i++) {
 			if (cf->intf_cache[i])
 				kref_put(&cf->intf_cache[i]->ref,
 					  usb_release_interface_cache);

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: kehuanlin <[email protected]>

commit 83dc7e3dea76b77b6bcc289eb86c5b5c145e8dff upstream.

Since the command type of UTRD in UFS 2.1 specification is the same with UFS 2.0. And it assumes the future UFS specification will follow the same definition.

---
 drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c |   14 ++++++++------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -2195,10 +2195,11 @@ static int ufshcd_comp_devman_upiu(struc
 	u32 upiu_flags;
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	if (hba->ufs_version == UFSHCI_VERSION_20)
-		lrbp->command_type = UTP_CMD_TYPE_UFS_STORAGE;
-	else
+	if ((hba->ufs_version == UFSHCI_VERSION_10) ||
+	    (hba->ufs_version == UFSHCI_VERSION_11))
 		lrbp->command_type = UTP_CMD_TYPE_DEV_MANAGE;
+	else
+		lrbp->command_type = UTP_CMD_TYPE_UFS_STORAGE;
 
 	ufshcd_prepare_req_desc_hdr(lrbp, &upiu_flags, DMA_NONE);
 	if (hba->dev_cmd.type == DEV_CMD_TYPE_QUERY)

@@ -2222,10 +2223,11 @@ static int ufshcd_comp_scsi_upiu(struct
 	u32 upiu_flags;
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	if (hba->ufs_version == UFSHCI_VERSION_20)
-		lrbp->command_type = UTP_CMD_TYPE_UFS_STORAGE;
-	else
+	if ((hba->ufs_version == UFSHCI_VERSION_10) ||
+	    (hba->ufs_version == UFSHCI_VERSION_11))
 		lrbp->command_type = UTP_CMD_TYPE_SCSI;
+	else
+		lrbp->command_type = UTP_CMD_TYPE_UFS_STORAGE;
 
 	if (likely(lrbp->cmd)) {
 		ufshcd_prepare_req_desc_hdr(lrbp, &upiu_flags,

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Niklas Cassel <[email protected]>

commit 099a95f3591ade29da52131895a3ba9f92a0e82c upstream.

Previously, dw_pcie_ep_set_msi() wrote all bits in the Message Control register, thus overwriting the PCI_MSI_FLAGS_64BIT bit.
By clearing the PCI_MSI_FLAGS_64BIT bit, we break MSI
on systems where the RC has set a 64 bit MSI address.
Fix dw_pcie_ep_set_msi() so that it only sets MMC bits.

---
 drivers/pci/dwc/pcie-designware-ep.c |    4 +++-
 drivers/pci/dwc/pcie-designware.h    |    1 +
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -214,7 +214,9 @@ static int dw_pcie_ep_set_msi(struct pci
 	struct dw_pcie_ep *ep = epc_get_drvdata(epc);
 	struct dw_pcie *pci = to_dw_pcie_from_ep(ep);
 
-	val = (encode_int << MSI_CAP_MMC_SHIFT);
+	val = dw_pcie_readw_dbi(pci, MSI_MESSAGE_CONTROL);
+	val &= ~MSI_CAP_MMC_MASK;
+	val |= (encode_int << MSI_CAP_MMC_SHIFT) & MSI_CAP_MMC_MASK;
 	dw_pcie_writew_dbi(pci, MSI_MESSAGE_CONTROL, val);
 
 	return 0;

@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@
 
 #define MSI_MESSAGE_CONTROL		0x52
 #define MSI_CAP_MMC_SHIFT		1
+#define MSI_CAP_MMC_MASK		(7 << MSI_CAP_MMC_SHIFT)
 #define MSI_CAP_MME_SHIFT		4
 #define MSI_CAP_MSI_EN_MASK		0x1
 #define MSI_CAP_MME_MASK		(7 << MSI_CAP_MME_SHIFT)

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Niklas Cassel <[email protected]>

commit 1cab826b30c6275d479a6ab1dea1067e15dbec62 upstream.

Certain registers that pcie-designware-ep tries to write to are read-only registers. However, these registers can become read/write if we first enable the DBI_RO_WR_EN bit. Set/unset the DBI_RO_WR_EN bit before/after writing these registers.

---
 drivers/pci/dwc/pcie-designware-ep.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

@@ -35,8 +35,10 @@ static void dw_pcie_ep_reset_bar(struct
 	u32 reg;
 
 	reg = PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_0 + (4 * bar);
+	dw_pcie_dbi_ro_wr_en(pci);
 	dw_pcie_writel_dbi2(pci, reg, 0x0);
 	dw_pcie_writel_dbi(pci, reg, 0x0);
+	dw_pcie_dbi_ro_wr_dis(pci);
 }
 
 static int dw_pcie_ep_write_header(struct pci_epc *epc,

@@ -45,6 +47,7 @@ static int dw_pcie_ep_write_header(struc
 	struct dw_pcie_ep *ep = epc_get_drvdata(epc);
 	struct dw_pcie *pci = to_dw_pcie_from_ep(ep);
 
+	dw_pcie_dbi_ro_wr_en(pci);
 	dw_pcie_writew_dbi(pci, PCI_VENDOR_ID, hdr->vendorid);
 	dw_pcie_writew_dbi(pci, PCI_DEVICE_ID, hdr->deviceid);
 	dw_pcie_writeb_dbi(pci, PCI_REVISION_ID, hdr->revid);

@@ -58,6 +61,7 @@ static int dw_pcie_ep_write_header(struc
 	dw_pcie_writew_dbi(pci, PCI_SUBSYSTEM_ID, hdr->subsys_id);
 	dw_pcie_writeb_dbi(pci, PCI_INTERRUPT_PIN,
 			   hdr->interrupt_pin);
+	dw_pcie_dbi_ro_wr_dis(pci);
 
 	return 0;
 }

@@ -142,8 +146,10 @@ static int dw_pcie_ep_set_bar(struct pci
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
+	dw_pcie_dbi_ro_wr_en(pci);
 	dw_pcie_writel_dbi2(pci, reg, size - 1);
 	dw_pcie_writel_dbi(pci, reg, flags);
+	dw_pcie_dbi_ro_wr_dis(pci);
 
 	return 0;
 }

@@ -217,7 +223,9 @@ static int dw_pcie_ep_set_msi(struct pci
 	val = dw_pcie_readw_dbi(pci, MSI_MESSAGE_CONTROL);
 	val &= ~MSI_CAP_MMC_MASK;
 	val |= (encode_int << MSI_CAP_MMC_SHIFT) & MSI_CAP_MMC_MASK;
+	dw_pcie_dbi_ro_wr_en(pci);
 	dw_pcie_writew_dbi(pci, MSI_MESSAGE_CONTROL, val);
+	dw_pcie_dbi_ro_wr_dis(pci);
 
 	return 0;
 }

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <[email protected]>

commit b330104fa76df3eae6e199a23791fed5d35f06b4 upstream.

After commit 723288836628 ("of: restrict DMA configuration"), of_dma_configure() doesn't configure the coherent_dma_mask/dma_mask of endpoint function device (since it doesn't have a DT node associated with and hence no dma-ranges property), resulting in dma_alloc_coherent() (used in pci_epf_alloc_space()) to fail.

Fix it by making dma_alloc_coherent() use EPC's device for allocating memory address.

---
 drivers/pci/endpoint/pci-epc-core.c |   10 ----------
 drivers/pci/endpoint/pci-epf-core.c |    4 ++--
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/device.h>
-#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/of_device.h>

@@ -371,7 +370,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pci_epc_write_header);
 int pci_epc_add_epf(struct pci_epc *epc, struct pci_epf *epf)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
-	struct device *dev = epc->dev.parent;
 
 	if (epf->epc)
 		return -EBUSY;

@@ -383,12 +381,6 @@ int pci_epc_add_epf(struct pci_epc *epc,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	epf->epc = epc;
-	if (dev->of_node) {
-		of_dma_configure(&epf->dev, dev->of_node);
-	} else {
-		dma_set_coherent_mask(&epf->dev, epc->dev.coherent_dma_mask);
-		epf->dev.dma_mask = epc->dev.dma_mask;
-	}
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&epc->lock, flags);
 	list_add_tail(&epf->list, &epc->pci_epf);

@@ -503,9 +495,7 @@ __pci_epc_create(struct device *dev, con
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&epc->pci_epf);
 
 	device_initialize(&epc->dev);
-	dma_set_coherent_mask(&epc->dev, dev->coherent_dma_mask);
 	epc->dev.class = pci_epc_class;
-	epc->dev.dma_mask = dev->dma_mask;
 	epc->dev.parent = dev;
 	epc->ops = ops;
 

@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pci_epf_bind);
  */
 void pci_epf_free_space(struct pci_epf *epf, void *addr, enum pci_barno bar)
 {
-	struct device *dev = &epf->dev;
+	struct device *dev = epf->epc->dev.parent;
 
 	if (!addr)
 		return;

@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pci_epf_free_space);
 void *pci_epf_alloc_space(struct pci_epf *epf, size_t size, enum pci_barno bar)
 {
 	void *space;
-	struct device *dev = &epf->dev;
+	struct device *dev = epf->epc->dev.parent;
 	dma_addr_t phys_addr;
 
 	if (size < 128)

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Baolin Wang <[email protected]>

commit 36d46cdb43efea74043e29e2a62b13e9aca31452 upstream.

If we convert one large time values to rtc_time, in the original formula 'days * 86400' can be overflowed in 'unsigned int' type to make the formula get one incorrect remain seconds value. Thus we can use div_s64_rem() function to avoid this situation.

---
 drivers/rtc/rtc-lib.c |    6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -52,13 +52,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rtc_year_days);
  */
 void rtc_time64_to_tm(time64_t time, struct rtc_time *tm)
 {
-	unsigned int month, year;
-	unsigned long secs;
+	unsigned int month, year, secs;
 	int days;
 
 	/* time must be positive */
-	days = div_s64(time, 86400);
-	secs = time - (unsigned int) days * 86400;
+	days = div_s64_rem(time, 86400, &secs);
 
 	/* day of the week, 1970-01-01 was a Thursday */
 	tm->tm_wday = (days + 4) % 7;

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jules Maselbas <[email protected]>

commit 1b5d43cfb69759d8ef8d30469cea31d0c037aed5 upstream.

This patch prevents the 'global_tunables_lock' mutex from being unlocked before being locked. This mutex is not locked if the sugov_kthread_create() function fails.

---
 kernel/sched/cpufreq_schedutil.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -605,10 +605,9 @@ fail:
 
 stop_kthread:
 	sugov_kthread_stop(sg_policy);
-
-free_sg_policy:
 	mutex_unlock(&global_tunables_lock);
 
+free_sg_policy:
 	sugov_policy_free(sg_policy);
 
 disable_fast_switch:

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Enric Balletbo i Serra <[email protected]>

commit 5fb5caee92ba35a4a3baa61d45a78eb057e2c031 upstream.

Before this patch the enable signal was set before the PWM signal and vice-versa on power off. This sequence is wrong, at least, it is on the different panels datasheets that I checked, so I inverted the sequence to follow the specs.

For reference the following panels have the mentioned sequence:
- N133HSE-EA1 (Innolux)
- N116BGE (Innolux)
- N156BGE-L21 (Innolux)
- B101EAN0 (Auo)
- B101AW03 (Auo)
- LTN101NT05 (Samsung)
- CLAA101WA01A (Chunghwa)

---
 drivers/video/backlight/pwm_bl.c |    9 +++++----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -54,10 +54,11 @@ static void pwm_backlight_power_on(struc
 	if (err < 0)
 		dev_err(pb->dev, "failed to enable power supply\n");
 
+	pwm_enable(pb->pwm);
+
 	if (pb->enable_gpio)
 		gpiod_set_value_cansleep(pb->enable_gpio, 1);
 
-	pwm_enable(pb->pwm);
 	pb->enabled = true;
 }
 

@@ -66,12 +67,12 @@ static void pwm_backlight_power_off(stru
 	if (!pb->enabled)
 		return;
 
-	pwm_config(pb->pwm, 0, pb->period);
-	pwm_disable(pb->pwm);
-
 	if (pb->enable_gpio)
 		gpiod_set_value_cansleep(pb->enable_gpio, 0);
 
+	pwm_config(pb->pwm, 0, pb->period);
+	pwm_disable(pb->pwm);
+
 	regulator_disable(pb->power_supply);
 	pb->enabled = false;
 }

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Baolin Wang <[email protected]>

commit f25a646fbe2051527ad9721853e892d13a99199e upstream.

Fix incorrect return value.

---
 drivers/power/supply/charger-manager.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1212,7 +1212,6 @@ static int charger_extcon_init(struct ch
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		pr_info("Cannot register extcon_dev for %s(cable: %s)\n",
 			cable->extcon_name, cable->name);
-		ret = -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	return ret;

@@ -1629,7 +1628,7 @@ static int charger_manager_probe(struct
 
 	if (IS_ERR(desc)) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "No platform data (desc) found\n");
-		return -ENODEV;
+		return PTR_ERR(desc);
 	}
 
 	cm = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*cm), GFP_KERNEL);

4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

commit 6707ba0105a2d350710bc0a537a98f49eb4b895d upstream.

The way that 'strncat' is used here raised a warning in gcc-8:

drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/wmi.c: In function 'ath10k_wmi_tpc_stats_final_disp_tables':
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/wmi.c:4649:4: error: 'strncat' output truncated before terminating nul copying as many bytes from a string as its length [-Werror=stringop-truncation]

Effectively, this is simply a strcat() but the use of strncat() suggests some form of overflow check. Regardless of whether this might actually overflow, using strlcat() instead of strncat() avoids the warning and makes the code more robust.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/wmi.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -4309,7 +4309,7 @@ static void ath10k_tpc_config_disp_table
 							    rate_code[i],
 							    type);
 			snprintf(buff, sizeof(buff), "%8d ", tpc[j]);
-			strncat(tpc_value, buff, strlen(buff));
+			strlcat(tpc_value, buff, sizeof(tpc_value));
 		}
 		tpc_stats->tpc_table[type].pream_idx[i] = pream_idx;
 		tpc_stats->tpc_table[type].rate_code[i] = rate_code[i];

All tests are passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v4.14:

    8 builds:	8 pass, 0 fail
    16 boots:	16 pass, 0 fail
    20 tests:	20 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 4.14.109-rc1-g4bb6d9c
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana,

                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04

Cheers
Jon

nvpublic

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 4.14.109-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.14.y
git commit: 4bb6d9c67e49d5301e6341b32ab5d72354e821d6
git describe: v4.14.108-42-g4bb6d9c67e49
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.14-oe/build/v4.14.108-42-g4bb6d9c67e49

No regressions (compared to build v4.14.108)

No fixes (compared to build v4.14.108)

Ran 22897 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64

Test Suites
-----------
* boot
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* perf
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none

Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

Build results:

	total: 172 pass: 172 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 329 pass: 329 fail: 0

Guenter

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah