4.19.32-stable review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.32 release. There are 45 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Thu Mar 28 04:26:41 UTC 2019. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.32-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 4.19.32-rc1

Baolin Wang <[email protected]>
power: supply: charger-manager: Fix incorrect return value

Hui Wang <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda - Enforces runtime_resume after S3 and S4 for each codec

Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda - Record the current power state before suspend/resume calls

Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
mm, mempolicy: fix uninit memory access

Waiman Long <[email protected]>
locking/lockdep: Add debug_locks check in __lock_downgrade()

Jann Horn <[email protected]>
x86/unwind: Add hardcoded ORC entry for NULL

Jann Horn <[email protected]>
x86/unwind: Handle NULL pointer calls better in frame unwinder

Dongli Zhang <[email protected]>
loop: access lo_backing_file only when the loop device is Lo_bound

Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
netfilter: ebtables: remove BUGPRINT messages

Chao Yu <[email protected]>
f2fs: fix to avoid deadlock of atomic file operations

Myungho Jung <[email protected]>
RDMA/cma: Rollback source IP address if failing to acquire device

Chris Wilson <[email protected]>
drm: Reorder set_property_atomic to avoid returning with an active ww_ctx

Kefeng Wang <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: hci_ldisc: Postpone HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit set in hci_uart_set_proto()

Jeremy Cline <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: hci_ldisc: Initialize hci_dev before open()

Myungho Jung <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: Fix decrementing reference count twice in releasing socket

Myungho Jung <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: hci_uart: Check if socket buffer is ERR_PTR in h4_recv_buf()

Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
media: v4l2-ctrls.c/uvc: zero v4l2_event

zhangyi (F) <[email protected]>
ext4: brelse all indirect buffer in ext4_ind_remove_space()

Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>
ext4: fix data corruption caused by unaligned direct AIO

Jiufei Xue <[email protected]>
ext4: fix NULL pointer dereference while journal is aborted

Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: ac97: Fix of-node refcount unbalance

Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda/ca0132 - make pci_iounmap() call conditional

Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>
ALSA: x86: Fix runtime PM for hdmi-lpe-audio

Steve French <[email protected]>
SMB3: Fix SMB3.1.1 guest mounts to Samba

Rasmus Villemoes <[email protected]>
irqchip/gic-v3-its: Fix comparison logic in lpi_range_cmp

Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
objtool: Move objtool_file struct off the stack

Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
perf probe: Fix getting the kernel map

Ronnie Sahlberg <[email protected]>
cifs: allow guest mounts to work for smb3.11

Chen Jie <[email protected]>
futex: Ensure that futex address is aligned in handle_futex_death()

Tyrel Datwyler <[email protected]>
scsi: ibmvscsi: Fix empty event pool access during host removal

Tyrel Datwyler <[email protected]>
scsi: ibmvscsi: Protect ibmvscsi_head from concurrent modificaiton

Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
powerpc/vdso64: Fix CLOCK_MONOTONIC inconsistencies across Y2038

Archer Yan <[email protected]>
MIPS: Fix kernel crash for R6 in jump label branch function

Yasha Cherikovsky <[email protected]>
MIPS: Ensure ELF appended dtb is relocated

Yifeng Li <[email protected]>
mips: loongson64: lemote-2f: Add IRQF_NO_SUSPEND to "cascade" irqaction.

Jan Kara <[email protected]>
udf: Fix crash on IO error during truncate

Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>
libceph: wait for latest osdmap in ceph_monc_blacklist_add()

Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>

    iommu/amd: fix sg->dma_address for sg->offset bigger than PAGE_SIZE

Deepak Rawat <[email protected]>
drm/vmwgfx: Return 0 when gmrid::get_node runs out of ID's

Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]>

    drm/vmwgfx: Don't double-free the mode stored in par->set_mode

Wolfram Sang <[email protected]>
mmc: renesas_sdhi: limit block count to 16 bit for old revisions

Alexander Shiyan <[email protected]>
mmc: mxcmmc: "Revert mmc: mxcmmc: handle highmem pages"

Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
mmc: pxamci: fix enum type confusion

Takashi Sakamoto <[email protected]>
ALSA: firewire-motu: use 'version' field of unit directory to identify model

Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda - add Lenovo IdeaCentre B550 to the power_save_blacklist

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                      |   4 +-
 arch/mips/include/asm/jump_label.h            |   8 +-
 arch/mips/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S                |  12 ++-
 arch/mips/loongson64/lemote-2f/irq.c          |   2 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/vdso_datapage.h      |   8 +-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/vdso64/gettimeofday.S     |   4 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h                 |   6 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c                |  25 ++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c                  |  17 ++++
 drivers/block/loop.c                          |   2 +-
 drivers/bluetooth/h4_recv.h                   |   4 +
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_h4.c                    |   4 +
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c                 |  24 +++--
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_object.c             |   5 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fb.c            |  12 +--
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_gmrid_manager.c |   2 +-
 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c                 |  13 ++-
 drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c                     |   7 +-
 drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c              |   2 +-
 drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c              |   2 +-
 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls.c          |   2 +-
 drivers/mmc/host/mxcmmc.c                     |  16 +---
 drivers/mmc/host/pxamci.c                     |   2 +-
 drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c          |   8 +-
 drivers/power/supply/charger-manager.c        |   3 +-
 drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c              |  23 ++++-
 fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c                             |  11 ++-
 fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.h                           |   2 +-
 fs/ext4/file.c                                |   2 +-
 fs/ext4/indirect.c                            |  12 ++-
 fs/f2fs/segment.c                             |  43 ++++++---
 fs/udf/truncate.c                             |   3 +
 include/linux/ceph/libceph.h                  |   2 +
 kernel/futex.c                                |   4 +
 kernel/locking/lockdep.c                      |   3 +
 mm/mempolicy.c                                |   2 +-
 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c                      |   3 +-
 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c               | 131 ++++++++------------------
 net/ceph/ceph_common.c                        |  18 +++-
 net/ceph/mon_client.c                         |   9 ++
 sound/ac97/bus.c                              |   2 +-
 sound/firewire/motu/motu.c                    |  20 ++--
 sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c                     |  57 ++++++++++-
 sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c                     |   6 +-
 sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c                  |   2 +-
 sound/x86/intel_hdmi_audio.c                  |   1 -
 tools/objtool/check.c                         |   3 +-
 tools/perf/util/probe-event.c                 |   6 +-
 48 files changed, 355 insertions(+), 204 deletions(-)

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jaroslav Kysela <[email protected]>

commit 721f1e6c1fd137e7e2053d8e103b666faaa2d50c upstream.

Another machine which does not like the power saving (noise):
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1689623

Also, reorder the Lenovo C50 entry to keep the table sorted.

---
 sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -2274,10 +2274,12 @@ static struct snd_pci_quirk power_save_b
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x8086, 0x2057, "Intel NUC5i7RYB", 0),
 	/* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1520902 */
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x8086, 0x2068, "Intel NUC7i3BNB", 0),
-	/* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1572975 */
-	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x36a7, "Lenovo C50 All in one", 0),
 	/* https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=198611 */
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x2227, "Lenovo X1 Carbon 3rd Gen", 0),
+	/* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1689623 */
+	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x367b, "Lenovo IdeaCentre B550", 0),
+	/* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1572975 */
+	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x36a7, "Lenovo C50 All in one", 0),
 	{}
 };
 #endif /* CONFIG_PM */

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Sakamoto <[email protected]>

commit 2d012c65a9ca26a0ef87ea0a42f1653dd37155f5 upstream.

Current ALSA firewire-motu driver uses the value of 'model' field of unit directory in configuration ROM for modalias for MOTU FireWire models. However, as long as I checked, Pre8 and 828mk3(Hybrid) have the same value for the field (=0x100800).

unit            | version   | model
--------------- | --------- | ----------
828mkII         | 0x000003  | 0x101800
Traveler        | 0x000009  | 0x107800
Pre8            | 0x00000f  | 0x100800 <-
828mk3(FW)      | 0x000015  | 0x106800
AudioExpress    | 0x000033  | 0x104800
828mk3(Hybrid)  | 0x000035  | 0x100800 <-

When updating firmware for MOTU 8pre FireWire from v1.0.0 to v1.0.3, I got change of the value from 0x100800 to 0x103800. On the other hand, the value of 'version' field is fixed to 0x00000f. As a quick glance, the higher 12 bits of the value of 'version' field represent firmware version, while the lower 12 bits is unknown.

By induction, the value of 'version' field represents actual model.

This commit changes modalias to match the value of 'version' field, instead of 'model' field. For degug, long name of added sound card includes hexadecimal value of 'model' field.

---
 sound/firewire/motu/motu.c |   20 ++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static void name_card(struct snd_motu *m
 	fw_csr_iterator_init(&it, motu->unit->directory);
 	while (fw_csr_iterator_next(&it, &key, &val)) {
 		switch (key) {
-		case CSR_VERSION:
+		case CSR_MODEL:
 			version = val;
 			break;
 		}

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ static void name_card(struct snd_motu *m
 	strcpy(motu->card->shortname, motu->spec->name);
 	strcpy(motu->card->mixername, motu->spec->name);
 	snprintf(motu->card->longname, sizeof(motu->card->longname),
-		 "MOTU %s (version:%d), GUID %08x%08x at %s, S%d",
+		 "MOTU %s (version:%06x), GUID %08x%08x at %s, S%d",
 		 motu->spec->name, version,
 		 fw_dev->config_rom[3], fw_dev->config_rom[4],
 		 dev_name(&motu->unit->device), 100 << fw_dev->max_speed);

@@ -258,20 +258,20 @@ static const struct snd_motu_spec motu_a
 #define SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(model, data)			\
 {							\
 	.match_flags	= IEEE1394_MATCH_VENDOR_ID |	\
-			  IEEE1394_MATCH_MODEL_ID |	\
-			  IEEE1394_MATCH_SPECIFIER_ID,	\
+			  IEEE1394_MATCH_SPECIFIER_ID |	\
+			  IEEE1394_MATCH_VERSION,	\
 	.vendor_id	= OUI_MOTU,			\
-	.model_id	= model,			\
 	.specifier_id	= OUI_MOTU,			\
+	.version	= model,			\
 	.driver_data	= (kernel_ulong_t)data,		\
 }
 
 static const struct ieee1394_device_id motu_id_table[] = {
-	SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(0x101800, &motu_828mk2),
-	SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(0x107800, &snd_motu_spec_traveler),
-	SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(0x106800, &motu_828mk3),	/* FireWire only. */
-	SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(0x100800, &motu_828mk3),	/* Hybrid. */
-	SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(0x104800, &motu_audio_express),
+	SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(0x000003, &motu_828mk2),
+	SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(0x000009, &snd_motu_spec_traveler),
+	SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(0x000015, &motu_828mk3),	/* FireWire only. */
+	SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(0x000035, &motu_828mk3),	/* Hybrid. */
+	SND_MOTU_DEV_ENTRY(0x000033, &motu_audio_express),
 	{ }
 };
 MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(ieee1394, motu_id_table);

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

commit e60a582bcde01158a64ff948fb799f21f5d31a11 upstream.

clang points out several instances of mismatched types in this drivers, all coming from a single declaration:

drivers/mmc/host/pxamci.c:193:15: error: implicit conversion from enumeration type 'enum dma_transfer_direction' to

      different enumeration type 'enum dma_data_direction' [-Werror,-Wenum-conversion]
                direction = DMA_DEV_TO_MEM;
                          ~ ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~

drivers/mmc/host/pxamci.c:212:62: error: implicit conversion from enumeration type 'enum dma_data_direction' to
different enumeration type 'enum dma_transfer_direction' [-Werror,-Wenum-conversion]
tx = dmaengine_prep_slave_sg(chan, data->sg, host->dma_len, direction,

The behavior is correct, so this must be a simply typo from dma_data_direction and dma_transfer_direction being similarly named types with a similar purpose.

---
 drivers/mmc/host/pxamci.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static void pxamci_dma_irq(void *param);
 static void pxamci_setup_data(struct pxamci_host *host, struct mmc_data *data)
 {
 	struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx;
-	enum dma_data_direction direction;
+	enum dma_transfer_direction direction;
 	struct dma_slave_config	config;
 	struct dma_chan *chan;
 	unsigned int nob = data->blocks;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexander Shiyan <[email protected]>

commit 2b77158ffa92b820a0c5da9a3c6ead7aa069c71c upstream.

This reverts commit b189e7589f6d3411e85c6b7ae6eef158f08f388f.

Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address c8358000
pgd = efa405c3
[c8358000] *pgd=00000000
Internal error: Oops: 805 [#1] PREEMPT ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 711 Comm: kworker/0:2 Not tainted 4.20.0+ #30
Hardware name: Freescale i.MX27 (Device Tree Support)
Workqueue: events mxcmci_datawork
PC is at mxcmci_datawork+0xbc/0x2ac
LR is at mxcmci_datawork+0xac/0x2ac
pc : [<c04e33c8>]    lr : [<c04e33b8>]    psr: 60000013

sp : c6c93f08 ip : 24004180 fp : 00000008
r10: c8358000 r9 : c78b3e24 r8 : c6c92000
r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7bb8680 r5 : c7bb86d4 r4 : c78b3de0 r3 : 00002502 r2 : c090b2e0 r1 : 00000880 r0 : 00000000
Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 0005317f Table: a68a8000 DAC: 00000055 Process kworker/0:2 (pid: 711, stack limit = 0x389543bc)

Stack: (0xc6c93f08 to 0xc6c94000)

3f00: c7bb86d4 00000000 00000000 c6cbfde0 c7bb86d4 c7ee4200
3f20: 00000000 c0907ea8 00000000 c7bb86d8 c0907ea8 c012077c c6cbfde0 c7bb86d4 3f40: c6cbfde0 c6c92000 c6cbfdf4 c09280ba c0907ea8 c090b2e0 c0907ebc c0120c18 3f60: c6cbfde0 00000000 00000000 c6cbb580 c7ba7c40 c7837edc c6cbb598 00000000 3f80: c6cbfde0 c01208f8 00000000 c01254fc c7ba7c40 c0125400 00000000 00000000 3fa0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 c01010d0 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 3fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 3fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 00000000 00000000 [<c04e33c8>] (mxcmci_datawork) from [<c012077c>] (process_one_work+0x1f0/0x338) [<c012077c>] (process_one_work) from [<c0120c18>] (worker_thread+0x320/0x474) [<c0120c18>] (worker_thread) from [<c01254fc>] (kthread+0xfc/0x118) [<c01254fc>] (kthread) from [<c01010d0>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24)

Exception stack(0xc6c93fb0 to 0xc6c93ff8)
3fa0:                                     00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
3fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
3fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000
Code: e3500000 1a000059 e5153050 e5933038 (e48a3004)
---[ end trace 54ca629b75f0e737 ]---

note: kworker/0:2[711] exited with preempt_count 1

---
 drivers/mmc/host/mxcmmc.c |   16 ++++------------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

@@ -292,11 +292,8 @@ static void mxcmci_swap_buffers(struct m
 	struct scatterlist *sg;
 	int i;
 
-	for_each_sg(data->sg, sg, data->sg_len, i) {
-		void *buf = kmap_atomic(sg_page(sg) + sg->offset);
-		buffer_swap32(buf, sg->length);
-		kunmap_atomic(buf);
-	}
+	for_each_sg(data->sg, sg, data->sg_len, i)
+		buffer_swap32(sg_virt(sg), sg->length);
 }
 #else
 static inline void mxcmci_swap_buffers(struct mmc_data *data) {}

@@ -613,7 +610,6 @@ static int mxcmci_transfer_data(struct m
 {
 	struct mmc_data *data = host->req->data;
 	struct scatterlist *sg;
-	void *buf;
 	int stat, i;
 
 	host->data = data;

@@ -621,18 +617,14 @@ static int mxcmci_transfer_data(struct m
 
 	if (data->flags & MMC_DATA_READ) {
 		for_each_sg(data->sg, sg, data->sg_len, i) {
-			buf = kmap_atomic(sg_page(sg) + sg->offset);
-			stat = mxcmci_pull(host, buf, sg->length);
-			kunmap(buf);
+			stat = mxcmci_pull(host, sg_virt(sg), sg->length);
 			if (stat)
 				return stat;
 			host->datasize += sg->length;
 		}
 	} else {
 		for_each_sg(data->sg, sg, data->sg_len, i) {
-			buf = kmap_atomic(sg_page(sg) + sg->offset);
-			stat = mxcmci_push(host, buf, sg->length);
-			kunmap(buf);
+			stat = mxcmci_push(host, sg_virt(sg), sg->length);
 			if (stat)
 				return stat;
 			host->datasize += sg->length;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wolfram Sang <[email protected]>

commit c9a9497ccef205ed4ed2e247011382627876d831 upstream.

R-Car Gen2 has two different SDHI incarnations in the same chip. The older one does not support the recently introduced 32 bit register access to the block count register. Make sure we use this feature only after the first known version.

Thanks to the Renesas Testing team for this bug report!

---
 drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -557,6 +557,7 @@ int renesas_sdhi_probe(struct platform_d
 	struct renesas_sdhi *priv;
 	struct resource *res;
 	int irq, ret, i;
+	u16 ver;
 
 	of_data = of_device_get_match_data(&pdev->dev);
 

@@ -671,12 +672,17 @@ int renesas_sdhi_probe(struct platform_d
 	if (ret)
 		goto efree;
 
+	ver = sd_ctrl_read16(host, CTL_VERSION);
+	/* GEN2_SDR104 is first known SDHI to use 32bit block count */
+	if (ver < SDHI_VER_GEN2_SDR104 && mmc_data->max_blk_count > U16_MAX)
+		mmc_data->max_blk_count = U16_MAX;
+
 	ret = tmio_mmc_host_probe(host);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto edisclk;
 
 	/* One Gen2 SDHI incarnation does NOT have a CBSY bit */
-	if (sd_ctrl_read16(host, CTL_VERSION) == SDHI_VER_GEN2_SDR50)
+	if (ver == SDHI_VER_GEN2_SDR50)
 		mmc_data->flags &= ~TMIO_MMC_HAVE_CBSY;
 
 	/* Enable tuning iff we have an SCC and a supported mode */

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Zimmermann <[email protected]>

commit c2d311553855395764e2e5bf401d987ba65c2056 upstream.

When calling vmw_fb_set_par(), the mode stored in par->set_mode gets free'd twice. The first free is in vmw_fb_kms_detach(), the second is near the end of vmw_fb_set_par() under the name of 'old_mode'. The mode-setting code only works correctly if the mode doesn't actually change. Removing 'old_mode' in favor of using par->set_mode directly fixes the problem.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fb.c |   12 +++---------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

@@ -564,11 +564,9 @@ static int vmw_fb_set_par(struct fb_info
 		0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
 		DRM_MODE_FLAG_NHSYNC | DRM_MODE_FLAG_PVSYNC)
 	};
-	struct drm_display_mode *old_mode;
 	struct drm_display_mode *mode;
 	int ret;
 
-	old_mode = par->set_mode;
 	mode = drm_mode_duplicate(vmw_priv->dev, &new_mode);
 	if (!mode) {
 		DRM_ERROR("Could not create new fb mode.\n");

@@ -579,11 +577,7 @@ static int vmw_fb_set_par(struct fb_info
 	mode->vdisplay = var->yres;
 	vmw_guess_mode_timing(mode);
 
-	if (old_mode && drm_mode_equal(old_mode, mode)) {
-		drm_mode_destroy(vmw_priv->dev, mode);
-		mode = old_mode;
-		old_mode = NULL;
-	} else if (!vmw_kms_validate_mode_vram(vmw_priv,
+	if (!vmw_kms_validate_mode_vram(vmw_priv,
 					mode->hdisplay *
 					DIV_ROUND_UP(var->bits_per_pixel, 8),
 					mode->vdisplay)) {

@@ -620,8 +614,8 @@ static int vmw_fb_set_par(struct fb_info
 	schedule_delayed_work(&par->local_work, 0);
 
 out_unlock:
-	if (old_mode)
-		drm_mode_destroy(vmw_priv->dev, old_mode);
+	if (par->set_mode)
+		drm_mode_destroy(vmw_priv->dev, par->set_mode);
 	par->set_mode = mode;
 
 	mutex_unlock(&par->bo_mutex);

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Deepak Rawat <[email protected]>

commit 4b9ce3a651a37c60527101db4451a315a8b9588f upstream.

If it's not a system error and get_node implementation accommodate the buffer object then it should return 0 with memm::mm_node set to NULL.

v2: Test for id != -ENOMEM instead of id == -ENOSPC.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_gmrid_manager.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static int vmw_gmrid_man_get_node(struct
 
 	id = ida_alloc_max(&gman->gmr_ida, gman->max_gmr_ids - 1, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (id < 0)
-		return id;
+		return (id != -ENOMEM ? 0 : id);
 
 	spin_lock(&gman->lock);
 

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>

commit 4e50ce03976fbc8ae995a000c4b10c737467beaa upstream.

Take into account that sg->offset can be bigger than PAGE_SIZE when setting segment sg->dma_address. Otherwise sg->dma_address will point at diffrent page, what makes DMA not possible with erros like this:

xhci_hcd 0000:38:00.3: AMD-Vi: Event logged [IO_PAGE_FAULT domain=0x0000 address=0x00000000fdaa70c0 flags=0x0020] xhci_hcd 0000:38:00.3: AMD-Vi: Event logged [IO_PAGE_FAULT domain=0x0000 address=0x00000000fdaa7040 flags=0x0020] xhci_hcd 0000:38:00.3: AMD-Vi: Event logged [IO_PAGE_FAULT domain=0x0000 address=0x00000000fdaa7080 flags=0x0020] xhci_hcd 0000:38:00.3: AMD-Vi: Event logged [IO_PAGE_FAULT domain=0x0000 address=0x00000000fdaa7100 flags=0x0020] xhci_hcd 0000:38:00.3: AMD-Vi: Event logged [IO_PAGE_FAULT domain=0x0000 address=0x00000000fdaa7000 flags=0x0020]

Additinally with wrong sg->dma_address unmap_sg will free wrong pages, what what can cause crashes like this:

Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: BUG: Bad page state in process cinnamon  pfn:39e8b1
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: flags: 0x2ffff0000000000()
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: raw: 02ffff0000000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff00000301 0000000000000000
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: page dumped because: nonzero _refcount
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: Modules linked in: ccm fuse arc4 nct6775 hwmon_vid amdgpu nls_iso8859_1 nls_cp437 edac_mce_amd vfat fat kvm_amd ccp rng_core kvm mt76x0u mt76x0_common mt76x02_usb irqbypass mt76_usb mt76x02_lib mt76 crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul chash mac80211 amd_iommu_v2 ghash_clmulni_intel gpu_sched i2c_algo_bit ttm wmi_bmof snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic drm_kms_helper snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_intel drm snd_hda_codec aesni_intel snd_hda_core snd_hwdep aes_x86_64 crypto_simd snd_pcm cfg80211 cryptd mousedev snd_timer glue_helper pcspkr r8169 input_leds realtek agpgart libphy rfkill snd syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops soundcore sp5100_tco k10temp i2c_piix4 wmi evdev gpio_amdpt pinctrl_amd mac_hid pcc_cpufreq acpi_cpufreq sg ip_tables x_tables ext4(E) crc32c_generic(E) crc16(E) mbcache(E) jbd2(E) fscrypto(E) sd_mod(E) hid_generic(E) usbhid(E) hid(E) dm_mod(E) serio_raw(E) atkbd(E) libps2(E) crc32c_intel(E) ahci(E) libahci(E) libata(E) xhci_pci(E) xhci_hcd(E)
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  scsi_mod(E) i8042(E) serio(E) bcache(E) crc64(E)
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: CPU: 2 PID: 896 Comm: cinnamon Tainted: G    B   W   E     4.20.12-arch1-1-custom #1
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./B450M Pro4, BIOS P1.20 06/26/2018
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel: Call Trace:
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  dump_stack+0x5c/0x80
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  bad_page.cold.29+0x7f/0xb2
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  __free_pages_ok+0x2c0/0x2d0
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  skb_release_data+0x96/0x180
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  __kfree_skb+0xe/0x20
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  tcp_recvmsg+0x894/0xc60
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  ? reuse_swap_page+0x120/0x340
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  ? ptep_set_access_flags+0x23/0x30
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  inet_recvmsg+0x5b/0x100
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  __sys_recvfrom+0xc3/0x180
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  ? handle_mm_fault+0x10a/0x250
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  ? syscall_trace_enter+0x1d3/0x2d0
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x22a/0x290
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x24/0x30
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x170
Feb 28 19:27:45 kernel:  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

---
 drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -2543,7 +2543,12 @@ static int map_sg(struct device *dev, st
 
 	/* Everything is mapped - write the right values into s->dma_address */
 	for_each_sg(sglist, s, nelems, i) {
-		s->dma_address += address + s->offset;
+		/*
+		 * Add in the remaining piece of the scatter-gather offset that
+		 * was masked out when we were determining the physical address
+		 * via (sg_phys(s) & PAGE_MASK) earlier.
+		 */
+		s->dma_address += address + (s->offset & ~PAGE_MASK);
 		s->dma_length   = s->length;
 	}
 

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>

commit bb229bbb3bf63d23128e851a1f3b85c083178fa1 upstream.

Because map updates are distributed lazily, an OSD may not know about the new blacklist for quite some time after "osd blacklist add" command is completed. This makes it possible for a blacklisted but still alive client to overwrite a post-blacklist update, resulting in data corruption.

Waiting for latest osdmap in ceph_monc_blacklist_add() and thus using the post-blacklist epoch for all post-blacklist requests ensures that all such requests "wait" for the blacklist to come into force on their respective OSDs.

---
 include/linux/ceph/libceph.h |    2 ++
 net/ceph/ceph_common.c       |   18 +++++++++++++++++-
 net/ceph/mon_client.c        |    9 +++++++++
 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -292,6 +292,8 @@ extern void ceph_destroy_client(struct c
 extern int __ceph_open_session(struct ceph_client *client,
 			       unsigned long started);
 extern int ceph_open_session(struct ceph_client *client);
+int ceph_wait_for_latest_osdmap(struct ceph_client *client,
+				unsigned long timeout);
 
 /* pagevec.c */
 extern void ceph_release_page_vector(struct page **pages, int num_pages);

@@ -729,7 +729,6 @@ int __ceph_open_session(struct ceph_clie
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ceph_open_session);
 
-
 int ceph_open_session(struct ceph_client *client)
 {
 	int ret;

@@ -745,6 +744,23 @@ int ceph_open_session(struct ceph_client
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_open_session);
 
+int ceph_wait_for_latest_osdmap(struct ceph_client *client,
+				unsigned long timeout)
+{
+	u64 newest_epoch;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = ceph_monc_get_version(&client->monc, "osdmap", &newest_epoch);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (client->osdc.osdmap->epoch >= newest_epoch)
+		return 0;
+
+	ceph_osdc_maybe_request_map(&client->osdc);
+	return ceph_monc_wait_osdmap(&client->monc, newest_epoch, timeout);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_wait_for_latest_osdmap);
 
 static int __init init_ceph_lib(void)
 {

@@ -922,6 +922,15 @@ int ceph_monc_blacklist_add(struct ceph_
 	mutex_unlock(&monc->mutex);
 
 	ret = wait_generic_request(req);
+	if (!ret)
+		/*
+		 * Make sure we have the osdmap that includes the blacklist
+		 * entry.  This is needed to ensure that the OSDs pick up the
+		 * new blacklist before processing any future requests from
+		 * this client.
+		 */
+		ret = ceph_wait_for_latest_osdmap(monc->client, 0);
+
 out:
 	put_generic_request(req);
 	return ret;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

commit d3ca4651d05c0ff7259d087d8c949bcf3e14fb46 upstream.

When truncate(2) hits IO error when reading indirect extent block the code just bugs with:

kernel BUG at linux-4.15.0/fs/udf/truncate.c:249!
...

Fix the problem by bailing out cleanly in case of IO error.

---
 fs/udf/truncate.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -260,6 +260,9 @@ void udf_truncate_extents(struct inode *
 			epos.block = eloc;
 			epos.bh = udf_tread(sb,
 					udf_get_lb_pblock(sb, &eloc, 0));
+			/* Error reading indirect block? */
+			if (!epos.bh)
+				return;
 			if (elen)
 				indirect_ext_len =
 					(elen + sb->s_blocksize - 1) >>

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yifeng Li <[email protected]>

commit 5f5f67da9781770df0403269bc57d7aae608fecd upstream.

Timekeeping IRQs from CS5536 MFGPT are routed to i8259, which then triggers the "cascade" IRQ on MIPS CPU. Without IRQF_NO_SUSPEND in cascade_irqaction, MFGPT interrupts will be masked in suspend mode, and the machine would be unable to resume once suspended.

Previously, MIPS IRQs were not disabled properly, so the original code appeared to work. Commit a3e6c1eff5 ("MIPS: IRQ: Fix disable_irq on CPU IRQs") uncovers the bug. To fix it, add IRQF_NO_SUSPEND to cascade_irqaction.

This commit is functionally identical to 0add9c2f1cff ("MIPS:
Loongson-3: Add IRQF_NO_SUSPEND to Cascade irqaction"), but it forgot to apply the same fix to Loongson2.

---
 arch/mips/loongson64/lemote-2f/irq.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static struct irqaction ip6_irqaction =
 static struct irqaction cascade_irqaction = {
 	.handler = no_action,
 	.name = "cascade",
-	.flags = IRQF_NO_THREAD,
+	.flags = IRQF_NO_THREAD | IRQF_NO_SUSPEND,
 };
 
 void __init mach_init_irq(void)

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yasha Cherikovsky <[email protected]>

commit 3f0a53bc6482fb09770982a8447981260ea258dc upstream.

This fixes booting with the combination of CONFIG_RELOCATABLE=y and CONFIG_MIPS_ELF_APPENDED_DTB=y.

Sections that appear after the relocation table are not relocated on system boot (except .bss, which has special handling).

With CONFIG_MIPS_ELF_APPENDED_DTB, the dtb is part of the vmlinux ELF, so it must be relocated together with everything else.

---
 arch/mips/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S |   12 +++++++-----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -140,6 +140,13 @@ SECTIONS
 	PERCPU_SECTION(1 << CONFIG_MIPS_L1_CACHE_SHIFT)
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS_ELF_APPENDED_DTB
+	.appended_dtb : AT(ADDR(.appended_dtb) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+		*(.appended_dtb)
+		KEEP(*(.appended_dtb))
+	}
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE
 	. = ALIGN(4);
 

@@ -164,11 +171,6 @@ SECTIONS
 	__appended_dtb = .;
 	/* leave space for appended DTB */
 	. += 0x100000;
-#elif defined(CONFIG_MIPS_ELF_APPENDED_DTB)
-	.appended_dtb : AT(ADDR(.appended_dtb) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
-		*(.appended_dtb)
-		KEEP(*(.appended_dtb))
-	}
 #endif
 	/*
 	 * Align to 64K in attempt to eliminate holes before the

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Archer Yan <[email protected]>

commit 47c25036b60f27b86ab44b66a8861bcf81cde39b upstream.

Insert Branch instruction instead of NOP to make sure assembler don't patch code in forbidden slot. In jump label function, it might be possible to patch Control Transfer Instructions(CTIs) into forbidden slot, which will generate Reserved Instruction exception in MIPS release 6.

[[email protected]:
- Add MIPS prefix to subject.
- Mark for stable from v4.0, which introduced r6 support, onwards.]

---
 arch/mips/include/asm/jump_label.h |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -21,15 +21,15 @@
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_MICROMIPS
-#define NOP_INSN "nop32"
+#define B_INSN "b32"
 #else
-#define NOP_INSN "nop"
+#define B_INSN "b"
 #endif
 
 static __always_inline bool arch_static_branch(struct static_key *key, bool branch)
 {
-	asm_volatile_goto("1:\t" NOP_INSN "\n\t"
-		"nop\n\t"
+	asm_volatile_goto("1:\t" B_INSN " 2f\n\t"
+		"2:\tnop\n\t"
 		".pushsection __jump_table,  \"aw\"\n\t"
 		WORD_INSN " 1b, %l[l_yes], %0\n\t"
 		".popsection\n\t"

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>

commit b5b4453e7912f056da1ca7572574cada32ecb60c upstream.

Jakub Drnec reported:
Setting the realtime clock can sometimes make the monotonic clock go back by over a hundred years. Decreasing the realtime clock across the y2k38 threshold is one reliable way to reproduce. Allegedly this can also happen just by running ntpd, I have not managed to reproduce that other than booting with rtc at >2038 and then running ntp. When this happens, anything with timers (e.g. openjdk) breaks rather badly.

And included a test case (slightly edited for brevity):
#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 199309L
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>

  long get_time(void) {
    struct timespec tp;
    clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &tp);
    return tp.tv_sec + tp.tv_nsec / 1000000000;
  }

  int main(void) {
    long last = get_time();
    while(1) {
      long now = get_time();
      if (now < last) {
        printf("clock went backwards by %ld seconds!\n", last - now);
      }
      last = now;
      sleep(1);
    }
    return 0;
  }

Which when run concurrently with:

 # date -s 2040-1-1
 # date -s 2037-1-1

Will detect the clock going backward.

The root cause is that wtom_clock_sec in struct vdso_data is only a 32-bit signed value, even though we set its value to be equal to tk->wall_to_monotonic.tv_sec which is 64-bits.

Because the monotonic clock starts at zero when the system boots the wall_to_montonic.tv_sec offset is negative for current and future dates. Currently on a freshly booted system the offset will be in the vicinity of negative 1.5 billion seconds.

However if the wall clock is set past the Y2038 boundary, the offset from wall to monotonic becomes less than negative 2^31, and no longer fits in 32-bits. When that value is assigned to wtom_clock_sec it is truncated and becomes positive, causing the VDSO assembly code to calculate CLOCK_MONOTONIC incorrectly.

That causes CLOCK_MONOTONIC to jump ahead by ~4 billion seconds which it is not meant to do. Worse, if the time is then set back before the Y2038 boundary CLOCK_MONOTONIC will jump backward.

We can fix it simply by storing the full 64-bit offset in the vdso_data, and using that in the VDSO assembly code. We also shuffle some of the fields in vdso_data to avoid creating a hole.

The original commit that added the CLOCK_MONOTONIC support to the VDSO did actually use a 64-bit value for wtom_clock_sec, see commit a7f290dad32e ("[PATCH] powerpc: Merge vdso's and add vdso support to 32 bits kernel") (Nov 2005). However just 3 days later it was converted to 32-bits in commit 0c37ec2aa88b ("[PATCH] powerpc: vdso fixes (take #2)"), and the bug has existed since then AFAICS.

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/vdso_datapage.h  |    8 ++++----
 arch/powerpc/kernel/vdso64/gettimeofday.S |    4 ++--
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -82,10 +82,10 @@ struct vdso_data {
 	__u32 icache_block_size;		/* L1 i-cache block size     */
 	__u32 dcache_log_block_size;		/* L1 d-cache log block size */
 	__u32 icache_log_block_size;		/* L1 i-cache log block size */
-	__s32 wtom_clock_sec;			/* Wall to monotonic clock */
-	__s32 wtom_clock_nsec;
-	struct timespec stamp_xtime;	/* xtime as at tb_orig_stamp */
-	__u32 stamp_sec_fraction;	/* fractional seconds of stamp_xtime */
+	__u32 stamp_sec_fraction;		/* fractional seconds of stamp_xtime */
+	__s32 wtom_clock_nsec;			/* Wall to monotonic clock nsec */
+	__s64 wtom_clock_sec;			/* Wall to monotonic clock sec */
+	struct timespec stamp_xtime;		/* xtime as at tb_orig_stamp */
    	__u32 syscall_map_64[SYSCALL_MAP_SIZE]; /* map of syscalls  */
    	__u32 syscall_map_32[SYSCALL_MAP_SIZE]; /* map of syscalls */
 };

@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ V_FUNCTION_BEGIN(__kernel_clock_gettime)
 	 * At this point, r4,r5 contain our sec/nsec values.
 	 */
 
-	lwa	r6,WTOM_CLOCK_SEC(r3)
+	ld	r6,WTOM_CLOCK_SEC(r3)
 	lwa	r9,WTOM_CLOCK_NSEC(r3)
 
 	/* We now have our result in r6,r9. We create a fake dependency

@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ V_FUNCTION_BEGIN(__kernel_clock_gettime)
 	bne     cr6,75f
 
 	/* CLOCK_MONOTONIC_COARSE */
-	lwa     r6,WTOM_CLOCK_SEC(r3)
+	ld	r6,WTOM_CLOCK_SEC(r3)
 	lwa     r9,WTOM_CLOCK_NSEC(r3)
 
 	/* check if counter has updated */

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tyrel Datwyler <[email protected]>

commit 7205981e045e752ccf96cf6ddd703a98c59d4339 upstream.

For each ibmvscsi host created during a probe or destroyed during a remove we either add or remove that host to/from the global ibmvscsi_head list. This runs the risk of concurrent modification.

This patch adds a simple spinlock around the list modification calls to prevent concurrent updates as is done similarly in the ibmvfc driver and ipr driver.

---
 drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ static int client_reserve = 1;
 static char partition_name[96] = "UNKNOWN";
 static unsigned int partition_number = -1;
 static LIST_HEAD(ibmvscsi_head);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
 
 static struct scsi_transport_template *ibmvscsi_transport_template;
 

@@ -2271,7 +2272,9 @@ static int ibmvscsi_probe(struct vio_dev
 	}
 
 	dev_set_drvdata(&vdev->dev, hostdata);
+	spin_lock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
 	list_add_tail(&hostdata->host_list, &ibmvscsi_head);
+	spin_unlock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
 	return 0;
 
       add_srp_port_failed:

@@ -2293,7 +2296,9 @@ static int ibmvscsi_probe(struct vio_dev
 static int ibmvscsi_remove(struct vio_dev *vdev)
 {
 	struct ibmvscsi_host_data *hostdata = dev_get_drvdata(&vdev->dev);
+	spin_lock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
 	list_del(&hostdata->host_list);
+	spin_unlock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
 	unmap_persist_bufs(hostdata);
 	release_event_pool(&hostdata->pool, hostdata);
 	ibmvscsi_release_crq_queue(&hostdata->queue, hostdata,

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tyrel Datwyler <[email protected]>

commit 7f5203c13ba8a7b7f9f6ecfe5a4d5567188d7835 upstream.

The event pool used for queueing commands is destroyed fairly early in the ibmvscsi_remove() code path. Since, this happens prior to the call so scsi_remove_host() it is possible for further calls to queuecommand to be processed which manifest as a panic due to a NULL pointer dereference as seen here:

PANIC: "Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000000"

Context process backtrace:

DSISR: 0000000042000000 ????Syscall Result: 0000000000000000
4 [c000000002cb3820] memcpy_power7 at c000000000064204
[Link Register] [c000000002cb3820] ibmvscsi_send_srp_event at d000000003ed14a4 5 [c000000002cb3920] ibmvscsi_send_srp_event at d000000003ed14a4 [ibmvscsi] ?(unreliable) 6 [c000000002cb39c0] ibmvscsi_queuecommand at d000000003ed2388 [ibmvscsi]
7 [c000000002cb3a70] scsi_dispatch_cmd at d00000000395c2d8 [scsi_mod]
8 [c000000002cb3af0] scsi_request_fn at d00000000395ef88 [scsi_mod]
9 [c000000002cb3be0] __blk_run_queue at c000000000429860
10 [c000000002cb3c10] blk_delay_work at c00000000042a0ec
11 [c000000002cb3c40] process_one_work at c0000000000dac30
12 [c000000002cb3cd0] worker_thread at c0000000000db110
13 [c000000002cb3d80] kthread at c0000000000e3378
14 [c000000002cb3e30] ret_from_kernel_thread at c00000000000982c

The kernel buffer log is overfilled with this log:

[11261.952732] ibmvscsi: found no event struct in pool!

This patch reorders the operations during host teardown. Start by calling the SRP transport and Scsi_Host remove functions to flush any outstanding work and set the host offline. LLDD teardown follows including destruction of the event pool, freeing the Command Response Queue (CRQ), and unmapping any persistent buffers. The event pool destruction is protected by the scsi_host lock, and the pool is purged prior of any requests for which we never received a response. Finally, move the removal of the scsi host from our global list to the end so that the host is easily locatable for debugging purposes during teardown.

---
 drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvscsi.c |   22 ++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -2296,17 +2296,27 @@ static int ibmvscsi_probe(struct vio_dev
 static int ibmvscsi_remove(struct vio_dev *vdev)
 {
 	struct ibmvscsi_host_data *hostdata = dev_get_drvdata(&vdev->dev);
-	spin_lock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
-	list_del(&hostdata->host_list);
-	spin_unlock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
-	unmap_persist_bufs(hostdata);
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	srp_remove_host(hostdata->host);
+	scsi_remove_host(hostdata->host);
+
+	purge_requests(hostdata, DID_ERROR);
+
+	spin_lock_irqsave(hostdata->host->host_lock, flags);
 	release_event_pool(&hostdata->pool, hostdata);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(hostdata->host->host_lock, flags);
+
 	ibmvscsi_release_crq_queue(&hostdata->queue, hostdata,
 					max_events);
 
 	kthread_stop(hostdata->work_thread);
-	srp_remove_host(hostdata->host);
-	scsi_remove_host(hostdata->host);
+	unmap_persist_bufs(hostdata);
+
+	spin_lock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
+	list_del(&hostdata->host_list);
+	spin_unlock(&ibmvscsi_driver_lock);
+
 	scsi_host_put(hostdata->host);
 
 	return 0;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chen Jie <[email protected]>

commit 5a07168d8d89b00fe1760120714378175b3ef992 upstream.

The futex code requires that the user space addresses of futexes are 32bit aligned. sys_futex() checks this in futex_get_keys() but the robust list code has no alignment check in place.

As a consequence the kernel crashes on architectures with strict alignment requirements in handle_futex_death() when trying to cmpxchg() on an unaligned futex address which was retrieved from the robust list.

[ tglx: Rewrote changelog, proper sizeof() based alignement check and add
comment ]

---
 kernel/futex.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

@@ -3432,6 +3432,10 @@ int handle_futex_death(u32 __user *uaddr
 {
 	u32 uval, uninitialized_var(nval), mval;
 
+	/* Futex address must be 32bit aligned */
+	if ((((unsigned long)uaddr) % sizeof(*uaddr)) != 0)
+		return -1;
+
 retry:
 	if (get_user(uval, uaddr))
 		return -1;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ronnie Sahlberg <[email protected]>

commit e71ab2aa06f731a944993120b0eef1556c63b81c upstream.

Fix Guest/Anonymous sessions so that they work with SMB 3.11.

The commit noted below tightened the conditions and forced signing for the SMB2-TreeConnect commands as per MS-SMB2.
However, this should only apply to normal user sessions and not for Guest/Anonumous sessions.

---
 fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c |    8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1500,9 +1500,13 @@ SMB2_tcon(const unsigned int xid, struct
 	iov[1].iov_base = unc_path;
 	iov[1].iov_len = unc_path_len;
 
-	/* 3.11 tcon req must be signed if not encrypted. See MS-SMB2 3.2.4.1.1 */
+	/*
+	 * 3.11 tcon req must be signed if not encrypted. See MS-SMB2 3.2.4.1.1
+	 * unless it is guest or anonymous user. See MS-SMB2 3.2.5.3.1
+	 */
 	if ((ses->server->dialect == SMB311_PROT_ID) &&
-	    !smb3_encryption_required(tcon))
+	    !smb3_encryption_required(tcon) &&
+	    !(ses->session_flags & (SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST|SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_NULL)))
 		req->sync_hdr.Flags |= SMB2_FLAGS_SIGNED;
 
 	memset(&rqst, 0, sizeof(struct smb_rqst));

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>

commit eaeffeb9838a7c0dec981d258666bfcc0fa6a947 upstream.

Since commit 4d99e4136580 ("perf machine: Workaround missing maps for x86 PTI entry trampolines"), perf tools has been creating more than one kernel map, however 'perf probe' assumed there could be only one.

Fix by using machine__kernel_map() to get the main kernel map.

---
 tools/perf/util/probe-event.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -157,8 +157,10 @@ static struct map *kernel_get_module_map
 	if (module && strchr(module, '/'))
 		return dso__new_map(module);
 
-	if (!module)
-		module = "kernel";
+	if (!module) {
+		pos = machine__kernel_map(host_machine);
+		return map__get(pos);
+	}
 
 	for (pos = maps__first(maps); pos; pos = map__next(pos)) {
 		/* short_name is "[module]" */

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>

commit 0c671812f152b628bd87c0af49da032cc2a2c319 upstream.

Objtool uses over 512k of stack, thanks to the hash table embedded in the objtool_file struct. This causes an unnecessarily large stack allocation and breaks users with low stack limits.

Move the struct off the stack.

---
 tools/objtool/check.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -2157,9 +2157,10 @@ static void cleanup(struct objtool_file
 	elf_close(file->elf);
 }
 
+static struct objtool_file file;
+
 int check(const char *_objname, bool orc)
 {
-	struct objtool_file file;
 	int ret, warnings = 0;
 
 	objname = _objname;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Rasmus Villemoes <[email protected]>

commit 89dc891792c2e046b030f87600109c22209da32e upstream.

The lpi_range_list is supposed to be sorted in ascending order of ->base_id (at least if the range merging is to work), but the current comparison function returns a positive value if rb->base_id > ra->base_id, which means that list_sort() will put A after B in that case - and vice versa, of course.

---
 drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1477,7 +1477,7 @@ static int lpi_range_cmp(void *priv, str
 	ra = container_of(a, struct lpi_range, entry);
 	rb = container_of(b, struct lpi_range, entry);
 
-	return rb->base_id - ra->base_id;
+	return ra->base_id - rb->base_id;
 }
 
 static void merge_lpi_ranges(void)

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steve French <[email protected]>

commit 8c11a607d1d9cd6e7f01fd6b03923597fb0ef95a upstream.

Workaround problem with Samba responses to SMB3.1.1 null user (guest) mounts. The server doesn't set the expected flag in the session setup response so we have to do a similar check to what is done in smb3_validate_negotiate where we also check if the user is a null user (but not sec=krb5 since username might not be passed in on mount for Kerberos case).

Note that the commit below tightened the conditions and forced signing for the SMB2-TreeConnect commands as per MS-SMB2.
However, this should only apply to normal user sessions and not for cases where there is no user (even if server forgets to set the flag in the response) since we don't have anything useful to sign with. This is especially important now that the more secure SMB3.1.1 protocol is in the default dialect list.

An earlier patch ("cifs: allow guest mounts to work for smb3.11") fixed the guest mounts to Windows.

---
 fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1503,10 +1503,13 @@ SMB2_tcon(const unsigned int xid, struct
 	/*
 	 * 3.11 tcon req must be signed if not encrypted. See MS-SMB2 3.2.4.1.1
 	 * unless it is guest or anonymous user. See MS-SMB2 3.2.5.3.1
+	 * (Samba servers don't always set the flag so also check if null user)
 	 */
 	if ((ses->server->dialect == SMB311_PROT_ID) &&
 	    !smb3_encryption_required(tcon) &&
-	    !(ses->session_flags & (SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST|SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_NULL)))
+	    !(ses->session_flags &
+		    (SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_GUEST|SMB2_SESSION_FLAG_IS_NULL)) &&
+	    ((ses->user_name != NULL) || (ses->sectype == Kerberos)))
 		req->sync_hdr.Flags |= SMB2_FLAGS_SIGNED;
 
 	memset(&rqst, 0, sizeof(struct smb_rqst));

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ville Syrjälä <[email protected]>

commit 8dfb839cfe737a17def8e5f88ee13c295230364a upstream.

Commit 46e831abe864 ("drm/i915/lpe: Mark LPE audio runtime pm as "no callbacks"") broke runtime PM with lpe audio. We can no longer runtime suspend the GPU since the sysfs power/control for the lpe-audio device no longer exists and the device is considered always active. We can fix this by not marking the device as active.

---
 sound/x86/intel_hdmi_audio.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

@@ -1900,7 +1900,6 @@ static int hdmi_lpe_audio_probe(struct p
 
 	pm_runtime_use_autosuspend(&pdev->dev);
 	pm_runtime_mark_last_busy(&pdev->dev);
-	pm_runtime_set_active(&pdev->dev);
 
 	dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "%s: handle pending notification\n", __func__);
 	for_each_port(card_ctx, port) {

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>

commit 1e73359a24fad529b0794515b46cbfff99e5fbe6 upstream.

When building without CONFIG_PCI, we can (depending on the architecture) get a link failure:

ERROR: "pci_iounmap" [sound/pci/hda/snd-hda-codec-ca0132.ko] undefined!

Adding a compile-time check for PCI gets it to work correctly on 32-bit ARM.

---
 sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -7394,7 +7394,7 @@ static void ca0132_free(struct hda_codec
 	ca0132_exit_chip(codec);
 
 	snd_hda_power_down(codec);
-	if (spec->mem_base)
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PCI) && spec->mem_base)
 		pci_iounmap(codec->bus->pci, spec->mem_base);
 	kfree(spec->spec_init_verbs);
 	kfree(codec->spec);

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

commit 31d2350d602511efc9ef626b848fe521233b0387 upstream.

ac97_of_get_child_device() take the refcount of the node explicitly via of_node_get(), but this leads to an unbalance. The for_each_child_of_node() loop itself takes the refcount for each iteration node, hence you don't need to take the extra refcount again.

---
 sound/ac97/bus.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ ac97_of_get_child_device(struct ac97_con
 		if ((idx != of_property_read_u32(node, "reg", &reg)) ||
 		    !of_device_is_compatible(node, compat))
 			continue;
-		return of_node_get(node);
+		return node;
 	}
 
 	return NULL;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiufei Xue <[email protected]>

commit fa30dde38aa8628c73a6dded7cb0bba38c27b576 upstream.

We see the following NULL pointer dereference while running xfstests generic/475:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008
PGD 8000000c84bad067 P4D 8000000c84bad067 PUD c84e62067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 7 PID: 9886 Comm: fsstress Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.0.0-rc8 #10
RIP: 0010:ext4_do_update_inode+0x4ec/0x760
...
Call Trace:
? jbd2_journal_get_write_access+0x42/0x50
? __ext4_journal_get_write_access+0x2c/0x70
? ext4_truncate+0x186/0x3f0
ext4_mark_iloc_dirty+0x61/0x80
ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x62/0x1b0
ext4_truncate+0x186/0x3f0
? unmap_mapping_pages+0x56/0x100
ext4_setattr+0x817/0x8b0
notify_change+0x1df/0x430
do_truncate+0x5e/0x90
? generic_permission+0x12b/0x1a0

This is triggered because the NULL pointer handle->h_transaction was dereferenced in function ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans().
I found that the h_transaction was set to NULL in jbd2__journal_restart but failed to attached to a new transaction while the journal is aborted.

Fix this by checking the handle before updating the inode.

---
 fs/ext4/ext4_jbd2.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static inline void ext4_update_inode_fsy
 {
 	struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
 
-	if (ext4_handle_valid(handle)) {
+	if (ext4_handle_valid(handle) && !is_handle_aborted(handle)) {
 		ei->i_sync_tid = handle->h_transaction->t_tid;
 		if (datasync)
 			ei->i_datasync_tid = handle->h_transaction->t_tid;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lukas Czerner <[email protected]>

commit 372a03e01853f860560eade508794dd274e9b390 upstream.

Ext4 needs to serialize unaligned direct AIO because the zeroing of partial blocks of two competing unaligned AIOs can result in data corruption.

However it decides not to serialize if the potentially unaligned aio is past i_size with the rationale that no pending writes are possible past i_size. Unfortunately if the i_size is not block aligned and the second unaligned write lands past i_size, but still into the same block, it has the potential of corrupting the previous unaligned write to the same block.

This is (very simplified) reproducer from Frank

    // 41472 = (10 * 4096) + 512
    // 37376 = 41472 - 4096

    ftruncate(fd, 41472);
    io_prep_pwrite(iocbs[0], fd, buf[0], 4096, 37376);
    io_prep_pwrite(iocbs[1], fd, buf[1], 4096, 41472);

    io_submit(io_ctx, 1, &iocbs[1]);
    io_submit(io_ctx, 1, &iocbs[2]);

    io_getevents(io_ctx, 2, 2, events, NULL);

Without this patch the 512B range from 40960 up to the start of the second unaligned write (41472) is going to be zeroed overwriting the data written by the first write. This is a data corruption.

00000000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 *
00009200 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 *
0000a000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 *
0000a200 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31

With this patch the data corruption is avoided because we will recognize the unaligned_aio and wait for the unwritten extent conversion.

00000000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 *
00009200 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 *
0000a200 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 *
0000b200

---
 fs/ext4/file.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ ext4_unaligned_aio(struct inode *inode,
 	struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
 	int blockmask = sb->s_blocksize - 1;
 
-	if (pos >= i_size_read(inode))
+	if (pos >= ALIGN(i_size_read(inode), sb->s_blocksize))
 		return 0;
 
 	if ((pos | iov_iter_alignment(from)) & blockmask)

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: zhangyi (F) <[email protected]>

commit 674a2b27234d1b7afcb0a9162e81b2e53aeef217 upstream.

All indirect buffers get by ext4_find_shared() should be released no mater the branch should be freed or not. But now, we forget to release the lower depth indirect buffers when removing space from the same higher depth indirect block. It will lead to buffer leak and futher more, it may lead to quota information corruption when using old quota, consider the following case.

- Create and mount an empty ext4 filesystem without extent and quota features,
- quotacheck and enable the user & group quota,
- Create some files and write some data to them, and then punch hole to some files of them, it may trigger the buffer leak problem mentioned above.
- Disable quota and run quotacheck again, it will create two new aquota files and write the checked quota information to them, which probably may reuse the freed indirect block(the buffer and page cache was not freed) as data block.
- Enable quota again, it will invoke vfs_load_quota_inode()->invalidate_bdev() to try to clean unused buffers and pagecache. Unfortunately, because of the buffer of quota data block is still referenced, quota code cannot read the up to date quota info from the device and lead to quota information corruption.

This problem can be reproduced by xfstests generic/231 on ext3 file system or ext4 file system without extent and quota features.

This patch fix this problem by releasing the missing indirect buffers, in ext4_ind_remove_space().

---
 fs/ext4/indirect.c |   12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -1387,10 +1387,14 @@ end_range:
 					   partial->p + 1,
 					   partial2->p,
 					   (chain+n-1) - partial);
-			BUFFER_TRACE(partial->bh, "call brelse");
-			brelse(partial->bh);
-			BUFFER_TRACE(partial2->bh, "call brelse");
-			brelse(partial2->bh);
+			while (partial > chain) {
+				BUFFER_TRACE(partial->bh, "call brelse");
+				brelse(partial->bh);
+			}
+			while (partial2 > chain2) {
+				BUFFER_TRACE(partial2->bh, "call brelse");
+				brelse(partial2->bh);
+			}
 			return 0;
 		}
 

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>

commit f45f3f753b0a3d739acda8e311b4f744d82dc52a upstream.

Control events can leak kernel memory since they do not fully zero the event. The same code is present in both v4l2-ctrls.c and uvc_ctrl.c, so fix both.

It appears that all other event code is properly zeroing the structure, it's these two places.

---
 drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_ctrl.c     |    2 +-
 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ctrls.c |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1212,7 +1212,7 @@ static void uvc_ctrl_fill_event(struct u
 
 	__uvc_query_v4l2_ctrl(chain, ctrl, mapping, &v4l2_ctrl);
 
-	memset(ev->reserved, 0, sizeof(ev->reserved));
+	memset(ev, 0, sizeof(*ev));
 	ev->type = V4L2_EVENT_CTRL;
 	ev->id = v4l2_ctrl.id;
 	ev->u.ctrl.value = value;

@@ -1379,7 +1379,7 @@ static u32 user_flags(const struct v4l2_
 
 static void fill_event(struct v4l2_event *ev, struct v4l2_ctrl *ctrl, u32 changes)
 {
-	memset(ev->reserved, 0, sizeof(ev->reserved));
+	memset(ev, 0, sizeof(*ev));
 	ev->type = V4L2_EVENT_CTRL;
 	ev->id = ctrl->id;
 	ev->u.ctrl.changes = changes;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Myungho Jung <[email protected]>

commit 1dc2d785156cbdc80806c32e8d2c7c735d0b4721 upstream.

h4_recv_buf() callers store the return value to socket buffer and recursively pass the buffer to h4_recv_buf() without protection. So, ERR_PTR returned from h4_recv_buf() can be dereferenced, if called again before setting the socket buffer to NULL from previous error. Check if skb is ERR_PTR in h4_recv_buf().

---
 drivers/bluetooth/h4_recv.h |    4 ++++
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_h4.c  |    4 ++++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)

@@ -60,6 +60,10 @@ static inline struct sk_buff *h4_recv_bu
 					  const struct h4_recv_pkt *pkts,
 					  int pkts_count)
 {
+	/* Check for error from previous call */
+	if (IS_ERR(skb))
+		skb = NULL;
+
 	while (count) {
 		int i, len;
 

@@ -174,6 +174,10 @@ struct sk_buff *h4_recv_buf(struct hci_d
 	struct hci_uart *hu = hci_get_drvdata(hdev);
 	u8 alignment = hu->alignment ? hu->alignment : 1;
 
+	/* Check for error from previous call */
+	if (IS_ERR(skb))
+		skb = NULL;
+
 	while (count) {
 		int i, len;
 

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Myungho Jung <[email protected]>

commit e20a2e9c42c9e4002d9e338d74e7819e88d77162 upstream.

When releasing socket, it is possible to enter hci_sock_release() and hci_sock_dev_event(HCI_DEV_UNREG) at the same time in different thread. The reference count of hdev should be decremented only once from one of them but if storing hdev to local variable in hci_sock_release() before detached from socket and setting to NULL in hci_sock_dev_event(), hci_dev_put(hdev) is unexpectedly called twice. This is resolved by referencing hdev from socket after bt_sock_unlink() in hci_sock_release().

---
 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -831,8 +831,6 @@ static int hci_sock_release(struct socke
 	if (!sk)
 		return 0;
 
-	hdev = hci_pi(sk)->hdev;
-
 	switch (hci_pi(sk)->channel) {
 	case HCI_CHANNEL_MONITOR:
 		atomic_dec(&monitor_promisc);

@@ -854,6 +852,7 @@ static int hci_sock_release(struct socke
 
 	bt_sock_unlink(&hci_sk_list, sk);
 
+	hdev = hci_pi(sk)->hdev;
 	if (hdev) {
 		if (hci_pi(sk)->channel == HCI_CHANNEL_USER) {
 			/* When releasing a user channel exclusive access,

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeremy Cline <[email protected]>

commit 32a7b4cbe93b0a0ef7e63d31ca69ce54736c4412 upstream.

The hci_dev struct hdev is referenced in work queues and timers started by open() in some protocols. This creates a race between the initialization function and the work or timer which can result hdev being dereferenced while it is still null.

The syzbot report contains a reliable reproducer which causes a null pointer dereference of hdev in hci_uart_write_work() by making the memory allocation for hdev fail.

To fix this, ensure hdev is valid from before calling a protocol's open() until after calling a protocol's close().

---
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c |   21 ++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

@@ -207,11 +207,11 @@ void hci_uart_init_work(struct work_stru
 	err = hci_register_dev(hu->hdev);
 	if (err < 0) {
 		BT_ERR("Can't register HCI device");
+		clear_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
+		hu->proto->close(hu);
 		hdev = hu->hdev;
 		hu->hdev = NULL;
 		hci_free_dev(hdev);
-		clear_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
-		hu->proto->close(hu);
 		return;
 	}
 

@@ -616,6 +616,7 @@ static void hci_uart_tty_receive(struct
 static int hci_uart_register_dev(struct hci_uart *hu)
 {
 	struct hci_dev *hdev;
+	int err;
 
 	BT_DBG("");
 

@@ -659,11 +660,22 @@ static int hci_uart_register_dev(struct
 	else
 		hdev->dev_type = HCI_PRIMARY;
 
+	/* Only call open() for the protocol after hdev is fully initialized as
+	 * open() (or a timer/workqueue it starts) may attempt to reference it.
+	 */
+	err = hu->proto->open(hu);
+	if (err) {
+		hu->hdev = NULL;
+		hci_free_dev(hdev);
+		return err;
+	}
+
 	if (test_bit(HCI_UART_INIT_PENDING, &hu->hdev_flags))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (hci_register_dev(hdev) < 0) {
 		BT_ERR("Can't register HCI device");
+		hu->proto->close(hu);
 		hu->hdev = NULL;
 		hci_free_dev(hdev);
 		return -ENODEV;

@@ -683,17 +695,12 @@ static int hci_uart_set_proto(struct hci
 	if (!p)
 		return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
 
-	err = p->open(hu);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
 	hu->proto = p;
 	set_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
 
 	err = hci_uart_register_dev(hu);
 	if (err) {
 		clear_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
-		p->close(hu);
 		return err;
 	}
 

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kefeng Wang <[email protected]>

commit 56897b217a1d0a91c9920cb418d6b3fe922f590a upstream.

task A:                                task B:
hci_uart_set_proto                     flush_to_ldisc
 - p->open(hu) -> h5_open  //alloc h5  - receive_buf

- set_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY - tty_port_default_receive_buf
- hci_uart_register_dev - tty_ldisc_receive_buf
- hci_uart_tty_receive
- test_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY
- h5_recv
- clear_bit HCI_UART_PROTO_READY while() {
- p->open(hu) -> h5_close //free h5
- h5_rx_3wire_hdr
- h5_reset() //use-after-free
}

It could use ioctl to set hci uart proto, but there is a use-after-free issue when hci_uart_register_dev() fail in hci_uart_set_proto(), see stack above, fix this by setting HCI_UART_PROTO_READY bit only when hci_uart_register_dev() return success.

---
 drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -696,14 +696,13 @@ static int hci_uart_set_proto(struct hci
 		return -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
 
 	hu->proto = p;
-	set_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
 
 	err = hci_uart_register_dev(hu);
 	if (err) {
-		clear_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
 		return err;
 	}
 
+	set_bit(HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, &hu->flags);
 	return 0;
 }
 

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chris Wilson <[email protected]>

commit 227ad6d957898a88b1746e30234ece64d305f066 upstream.

Delay the drm_modeset_acquire_init() until after we check for an allocation failure so that we can return immediately upon error without having to unwind.

WARNING: lock held when returning to user space!
4.20.0+ #174 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------
syz-executor556/8153 is leaving the kernel with locks still held! 1 lock held by syz-executor556/8153:
#0: 000000005100c85c (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}, at:
set_property_atomic+0xb3/0x330 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_object.c:462

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_mode_object.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -458,12 +458,13 @@ static int set_property_atomic(struct dr
 	struct drm_modeset_acquire_ctx ctx;
 	int ret;
 
-	drm_modeset_acquire_init(&ctx, 0);
-
 	state = drm_atomic_state_alloc(dev);
 	if (!state)
 		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	drm_modeset_acquire_init(&ctx, 0);
 	state->acquire_ctx = &ctx;
+
 retry:
 	if (prop == state->dev->mode_config.dpms_property) {
 		if (obj->type != DRM_MODE_OBJECT_CONNECTOR) {

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Myungho Jung <[email protected]>

commit 5fc01fb846bce8fa6d5f95e2625b8ce0f8e86810 upstream.

If cma_acquire_dev_by_src_ip() returns error in addr_handler(), the device state changes back to RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND but the resolved source IP address is still left. After that, if rdma_destroy_id() is called after rdma_listen(), the device is freed without removed from listen_any_list in cma_cancel_operation(). Revert to the previous IP address if acquiring device fails.

---
 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c |   13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -2854,13 +2854,22 @@ static void addr_handler(int status, str
 {
 	struct rdma_id_private *id_priv = context;
 	struct rdma_cm_event event = {};
+	struct sockaddr *addr;
+	struct sockaddr_storage old_addr;
 
 	mutex_lock(&id_priv->handler_mutex);
 	if (!cma_comp_exch(id_priv, RDMA_CM_ADDR_QUERY,
 			   RDMA_CM_ADDR_RESOLVED))
 		goto out;
 
-	memcpy(cma_src_addr(id_priv), src_addr, rdma_addr_size(src_addr));
+	/*
+	 * Store the previous src address, so that if we fail to acquire
+	 * matching rdma device, old address can be restored back, which helps
+	 * to cancel the cma listen operation correctly.
+	 */
+	addr = cma_src_addr(id_priv);
+	memcpy(&old_addr, addr, rdma_addr_size(addr));
+	memcpy(addr, src_addr, rdma_addr_size(src_addr));
 	if (!status && !id_priv->cma_dev) {
 		status = cma_acquire_dev(id_priv, NULL);
 		if (status)

@@ -2871,6 +2880,8 @@ static void addr_handler(int status, str
 	}
 
 	if (status) {
+		memcpy(addr, &old_addr,
+		       rdma_addr_size((struct sockaddr *)&old_addr));
 		if (!cma_comp_exch(id_priv, RDMA_CM_ADDR_RESOLVED,
 				   RDMA_CM_ADDR_BOUND))
 			goto out;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>

commit 48432984d718c95cf13e26d487c2d1b697c3c01f upstream.

Thread A Thread B
- __fput
- f2fs_release_file
- drop_inmem_pages
- mutex_lock(&fi->inmem_lock)
- __revoke_inmem_pages
- lock_page(page)
- open
- f2fs_setattr
- truncate_setsize
- truncate_inode_pages_range
- lock_page(page)
- truncate_cleanup_page
- f2fs_invalidate_page
- drop_inmem_page
- mutex_lock(&fi->inmem_lock);

We may encounter above ABBA deadlock as reported by Kyungtae Kim:

I'm reporting a bug in linux-4.17.19: "INFO: task hung in drop_inmem_page" (no reproducer)

I think this might be somehow related to the following:
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/syzkaller-bugs/INFO$3A$20task$20hung$20in$20%7Csort:date/syzkaller-bugs/c6soBTrdaIo/AjAzPeIzCgAJ

=========================================

INFO: task syz-executor7:10822 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
      Not tainted 4.17.19 #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
syz-executor7   D27024 10822   6346 0x00000004
Call Trace:
 context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2867 [inline]
 __schedule+0x721/0x1e60 kernel/sched/core.c:3515
 schedule+0x88/0x1c0 kernel/sched/core.c:3559
 schedule_preempt_disabled+0x18/0x30 kernel/sched/core.c:3617
 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:833 [inline]
 __mutex_lock+0x5bd/0x1410 kernel/locking/mutex.c:893
 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:908
 drop_inmem_page+0xcb/0x810 fs/f2fs/segment.c:327
 f2fs_invalidate_page+0x337/0x5e0 fs/f2fs/data.c:2401
 do_invalidatepage mm/truncate.c:165 [inline]
 truncate_cleanup_page+0x261/0x330 mm/truncate.c:187
 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x552/0x1610 mm/truncate.c:367
 truncate_inode_pages mm/truncate.c:478 [inline]
 truncate_pagecache+0x6d/0x90 mm/truncate.c:801
 truncate_setsize+0x81/0xa0 mm/truncate.c:826
 f2fs_setattr+0x44f/0x1270 fs/f2fs/file.c:781
 notify_change+0xa62/0xe80 fs/attr.c:313
 do_truncate+0x12e/0x1e0 fs/open.c:63
 do_last fs/namei.c:2955 [inline]
 path_openat+0x2042/0x29f0 fs/namei.c:3505
 do_filp_open+0x1bd/0x2c0 fs/namei.c:3540
 do_sys_open+0x35e/0x4e0 fs/open.c:1101
 __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1119 [inline]
 __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1114 [inline]
 __x64_sys_open+0x89/0xc0 fs/open.c:1114
 do_syscall_64+0xc4/0x4e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4497b9
RSP: 002b:00007f734e459c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f734e45a6cc RCX: 00000000004497b9
RDX: 0000000000000104 RSI: 00000000000a8280 RDI: 0000000020000080
RBP: 000000000071bea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 0000000000007230 R14: 00000000006f02d0 R15: 00007f734e45a700
INFO: task syz-executor7:10858 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
      Not tainted 4.17.19 #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
syz-executor7   D28880 10858   6346 0x00000004
Call Trace:
 context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2867 [inline]
 __schedule+0x721/0x1e60 kernel/sched/core.c:3515
 schedule+0x88/0x1c0 kernel/sched/core.c:3559
 __rwsem_down_write_failed_common kernel/locking/rwsem-xadd.c:565 [inline]
 rwsem_down_write_failed+0x5e6/0xc90 kernel/locking/rwsem-xadd.c:594
 call_rwsem_down_write_failed+0x17/0x30 arch/x86/lib/rwsem.S:117
 __down_write arch/x86/include/asm/rwsem.h:142 [inline]
 down_write+0x58/0xa0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:72
 inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:713 [inline]
 do_truncate+0x120/0x1e0 fs/open.c:61
 do_last fs/namei.c:2955 [inline]
 path_openat+0x2042/0x29f0 fs/namei.c:3505
 do_filp_open+0x1bd/0x2c0 fs/namei.c:3540
 do_sys_open+0x35e/0x4e0 fs/open.c:1101
 __do_sys_open fs/open.c:1119 [inline]
 __se_sys_open fs/open.c:1114 [inline]
 __x64_sys_open+0x89/0xc0 fs/open.c:1114
 do_syscall_64+0xc4/0x4e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4497b9
RSP: 002b:00007f734e3b4c68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f734e3b56cc RCX: 00000000004497b9
RDX: 0000000000000104 RSI: 00000000000a8280 RDI: 0000000020000080
RBP: 000000000071c238 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 0000000000007230 R14: 00000000006f02d0 R15: 00007f734e3b5700
INFO: task syz-executor5:10829 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
      Not tainted 4.17.19 #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
syz-executor5   D28760 10829   6308 0x80000002
Call Trace:
 context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:2867 [inline]
 __schedule+0x721/0x1e60 kernel/sched/core.c:3515
 schedule+0x88/0x1c0 kernel/sched/core.c:3559
 io_schedule+0x21/0x80 kernel/sched/core.c:5179
 wait_on_page_bit_common mm/filemap.c:1100 [inline]
 __lock_page+0x2b5/0x390 mm/filemap.c:1273
 lock_page include/linux/pagemap.h:483 [inline]
 __revoke_inmem_pages+0xb35/0x11c0 fs/f2fs/segment.c:231
 drop_inmem_pages+0xa3/0x3e0 fs/f2fs/segment.c:306
 f2fs_release_file+0x2c7/0x330 fs/f2fs/file.c:1556
 __fput+0x2c7/0x780 fs/file_table.c:209
 ____fput+0x1a/0x20 fs/file_table.c:243
 task_work_run+0x151/0x1d0 kernel/task_work.c:113
 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:22 [inline]
 do_exit+0x8ba/0x30a0 kernel/exit.c:865
 do_group_exit+0x13b/0x3a0 kernel/exit.c:968
 get_signal+0x6bb/0x1650 kernel/signal.c:2482
 do_signal+0x84/0x1b70 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:810
 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x155/0x190 arch/x86/entry/common.c:162
 prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:196 [inline]
 syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:265 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x445/0x4e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4497b9
RSP: 002b:00007f1c68e74ce8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca
RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 000000000071bf80 RCX: 00000000004497b9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000000071bf80
RBP: 000000000071bf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000071bf58
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f1c68e759c0 R15: 00007f1c68e75700

This patch tries to use trylock_page to mitigate such deadlock condition for fix.

---
 fs/f2fs/segment.c |   43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

@@ -216,7 +216,8 @@ void f2fs_register_inmem_page(struct ino
 }
 
 static int __revoke_inmem_pages(struct inode *inode,
-				struct list_head *head, bool drop, bool recover)
+				struct list_head *head, bool drop, bool recover,
+				bool trylock)
 {
 	struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
 	struct inmem_pages *cur, *tmp;

@@ -228,7 +229,16 @@ static int __revoke_inmem_pages(struct i
 		if (drop)
 			trace_f2fs_commit_inmem_page(page, INMEM_DROP);
 
-		lock_page(page);
+		if (trylock) {
+			/*
+			 * to avoid deadlock in between page lock and
+			 * inmem_lock.
+			 */
+			if (!trylock_page(page))
+				continue;
+		} else {
+			lock_page(page);
+		}
 
 		f2fs_wait_on_page_writeback(page, DATA, true);
 

@@ -317,13 +327,19 @@ void f2fs_drop_inmem_pages(struct inode
 	struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
 	struct f2fs_inode_info *fi = F2FS_I(inode);
 
-	mutex_lock(&fi->inmem_lock);
-	__revoke_inmem_pages(inode, &fi->inmem_pages, true, false);
-	spin_lock(&sbi->inode_lock[ATOMIC_FILE]);
-	if (!list_empty(&fi->inmem_ilist))
-		list_del_init(&fi->inmem_ilist);
-	spin_unlock(&sbi->inode_lock[ATOMIC_FILE]);
-	mutex_unlock(&fi->inmem_lock);
+	while (!list_empty(&fi->inmem_pages)) {
+		mutex_lock(&fi->inmem_lock);
+		__revoke_inmem_pages(inode, &fi->inmem_pages,
+						true, false, true);
+
+		if (list_empty(&fi->inmem_pages)) {
+			spin_lock(&sbi->inode_lock[ATOMIC_FILE]);
+			if (!list_empty(&fi->inmem_ilist))
+				list_del_init(&fi->inmem_ilist);
+			spin_unlock(&sbi->inode_lock[ATOMIC_FILE]);
+		}
+		mutex_unlock(&fi->inmem_lock);
+	}
 
 	clear_inode_flag(inode, FI_ATOMIC_FILE);
 	fi->i_gc_failures[GC_FAILURE_ATOMIC] = 0;

@@ -427,12 +443,15 @@ retry:
 		 * recovery or rewrite & commit last transaction. For other
 		 * error number, revoking was done by filesystem itself.
 		 */
-		err = __revoke_inmem_pages(inode, &revoke_list, false, true);
+		err = __revoke_inmem_pages(inode, &revoke_list,
+						false, true, false);
 
 		/* drop all uncommitted pages */
-		__revoke_inmem_pages(inode, &fi->inmem_pages, true, false);
+		__revoke_inmem_pages(inode, &fi->inmem_pages,
+						true, false, false);
 	} else {
-		__revoke_inmem_pages(inode, &revoke_list, false, false);
+		__revoke_inmem_pages(inode, &revoke_list,
+						false, false, false);
 	}
 
 	return err;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

commit d824548dae220820bdf69b2d1561b7c4b072783f upstream.

They are however frequently triggered by syzkaller, so remove them.

ebtables userspace should never trigger any of these, so there is little value in making them pr_debug (or ratelimited).

---
 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c |  131 +++++++++++-----------------------------
 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)

@@ -31,10 +31,6 @@
 /* needed for logical [in,out]-dev filtering */
 #include "../br_private.h"
 
-#define BUGPRINT(format, args...) printk("kernel msg: ebtables bug: please "\
-					 "report to author: "format, ## args)
-/* #define BUGPRINT(format, args...) */
-
 /* Each cpu has its own set of counters, so there is no need for write_lock in
  * the softirq
  * For reading or updating the counters, the user context needs to

@@ -466,8 +462,6 @@ static int ebt_verify_pointers(const str
 				/* we make userspace set this right,
 				 * so there is no misunderstanding
 				 */
-				BUGPRINT("EBT_ENTRY_OR_ENTRIES shouldn't be set "
-					 "in distinguisher\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 			if (i != NF_BR_NUMHOOKS)

@@ -485,18 +479,14 @@ static int ebt_verify_pointers(const str
 			offset += e->next_offset;
 		}
 	}
-	if (offset != limit) {
-		BUGPRINT("entries_size too small\n");
+	if (offset != limit)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	/* check if all valid hooks have a chain */
 	for (i = 0; i < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
 		if (!newinfo->hook_entry[i] &&
-		   (valid_hooks & (1 << i))) {
-			BUGPRINT("Valid hook without chain\n");
+		   (valid_hooks & (1 << i)))
 			return -EINVAL;
-		}
 	}
 	return 0;
 }

@@ -523,26 +513,20 @@ ebt_check_entry_size_and_hooks(const str
 		/* this checks if the previous chain has as many entries
 		 * as it said it has
 		 */
-		if (*n != *cnt) {
-			BUGPRINT("nentries does not equal the nr of entries "
-				 "in the chain\n");
+		if (*n != *cnt)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		}
+
 		if (((struct ebt_entries *)e)->policy != EBT_DROP &&
 		   ((struct ebt_entries *)e)->policy != EBT_ACCEPT) {
 			/* only RETURN from udc */
 			if (i != NF_BR_NUMHOOKS ||
-			   ((struct ebt_entries *)e)->policy != EBT_RETURN) {
-				BUGPRINT("bad policy\n");
+			   ((struct ebt_entries *)e)->policy != EBT_RETURN)
 				return -EINVAL;
-			}
 		}
 		if (i == NF_BR_NUMHOOKS) /* it's a user defined chain */
 			(*udc_cnt)++;
-		if (((struct ebt_entries *)e)->counter_offset != *totalcnt) {
-			BUGPRINT("counter_offset != totalcnt");
+		if (((struct ebt_entries *)e)->counter_offset != *totalcnt)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		}
 		*n = ((struct ebt_entries *)e)->nentries;
 		*cnt = 0;
 		return 0;

@@ -550,15 +534,13 @@ ebt_check_entry_size_and_hooks(const str
 	/* a plain old entry, heh */
 	if (sizeof(struct ebt_entry) > e->watchers_offset ||
 	   e->watchers_offset > e->target_offset ||
-	   e->target_offset >= e->next_offset) {
-		BUGPRINT("entry offsets not in right order\n");
+	   e->target_offset >= e->next_offset)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+
 	/* this is not checked anywhere else */
-	if (e->next_offset - e->target_offset < sizeof(struct ebt_entry_target)) {
-		BUGPRINT("target size too small\n");
+	if (e->next_offset - e->target_offset < sizeof(struct ebt_entry_target))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+
 	(*cnt)++;
 	(*totalcnt)++;
 	return 0;

@@ -678,18 +660,15 @@ ebt_check_entry(struct ebt_entry *e, str
 	if (e->bitmask == 0)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (e->bitmask & ~EBT_F_MASK) {
-		BUGPRINT("Unknown flag for bitmask\n");
+	if (e->bitmask & ~EBT_F_MASK)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (e->invflags & ~EBT_INV_MASK) {
-		BUGPRINT("Unknown flag for inv bitmask\n");
+
+	if (e->invflags & ~EBT_INV_MASK)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if ((e->bitmask & EBT_NOPROTO) && (e->bitmask & EBT_802_3)) {
-		BUGPRINT("NOPROTO & 802_3 not allowed\n");
+
+	if ((e->bitmask & EBT_NOPROTO) && (e->bitmask & EBT_802_3))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+
 	/* what hook do we belong to? */
 	for (i = 0; i < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
 		if (!newinfo->hook_entry[i])

@@ -748,13 +727,11 @@ ebt_check_entry(struct ebt_entry *e, str
 	t->u.target = target;
 	if (t->u.target == &ebt_standard_target) {
 		if (gap < sizeof(struct ebt_standard_target)) {
-			BUGPRINT("Standard target size too big\n");
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 			goto cleanup_watchers;
 		}
 		if (((struct ebt_standard_target *)t)->verdict <
 		   -NUM_STANDARD_TARGETS) {
-			BUGPRINT("Invalid standard target\n");
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 			goto cleanup_watchers;
 		}

@@ -813,10 +790,9 @@ static int check_chainloops(const struct
 		if (strcmp(t->u.name, EBT_STANDARD_TARGET))
 			goto letscontinue;
 		if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct ebt_standard_target) >
-		   e->next_offset) {
-			BUGPRINT("Standard target size too big\n");
+		   e->next_offset)
 			return -1;
-		}
+
 		verdict = ((struct ebt_standard_target *)t)->verdict;
 		if (verdict >= 0) { /* jump to another chain */
 			struct ebt_entries *hlp2 =

@@ -825,14 +801,12 @@ static int check_chainloops(const struct
 				if (hlp2 == cl_s[i].cs.chaininfo)
 					break;
 			/* bad destination or loop */
-			if (i == udc_cnt) {
-				BUGPRINT("bad destination\n");
+			if (i == udc_cnt)
 				return -1;
-			}
-			if (cl_s[i].cs.n) {
-				BUGPRINT("loop\n");
+
+			if (cl_s[i].cs.n)
 				return -1;
-			}
+
 			if (cl_s[i].hookmask & (1 << hooknr))
 				goto letscontinue;
 			/* this can't be 0, so the loop test is correct */

@@ -865,24 +839,21 @@ static int translate_table(struct net *n
 	i = 0;
 	while (i < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS && !newinfo->hook_entry[i])
 		i++;
-	if (i == NF_BR_NUMHOOKS) {
-		BUGPRINT("No valid hooks specified\n");
+	if (i == NF_BR_NUMHOOKS)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (newinfo->hook_entry[i] != (struct ebt_entries *)newinfo->entries) {
-		BUGPRINT("Chains don't start at beginning\n");
+
+	if (newinfo->hook_entry[i] != (struct ebt_entries *)newinfo->entries)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+
 	/* make sure chains are ordered after each other in same order
 	 * as their corresponding hooks
 	 */
 	for (j = i + 1; j < NF_BR_NUMHOOKS; j++) {
 		if (!newinfo->hook_entry[j])
 			continue;
-		if (newinfo->hook_entry[j] <= newinfo->hook_entry[i]) {
-			BUGPRINT("Hook order must be followed\n");
+		if (newinfo->hook_entry[j] <= newinfo->hook_entry[i])
 			return -EINVAL;
-		}
+
 		i = j;
 	}
 

@@ -900,15 +871,11 @@ static int translate_table(struct net *n
 	if (ret != 0)
 		return ret;
 
-	if (i != j) {
-		BUGPRINT("nentries does not equal the nr of entries in the "
-			 "(last) chain\n");
+	if (i != j)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (k != newinfo->nentries) {
-		BUGPRINT("Total nentries is wrong\n");
+
+	if (k != newinfo->nentries)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	/* get the location of the udc, put them in an array
 	 * while we're at it, allocate the chainstack

@@ -942,7 +909,6 @@ static int translate_table(struct net *n
 		   ebt_get_udc_positions, newinfo, &i, cl_s);
 		/* sanity check */
 		if (i != udc_cnt) {
-			BUGPRINT("i != udc_cnt\n");
 			vfree(cl_s);
 			return -EFAULT;
 		}

@@ -1042,7 +1008,6 @@ static int do_replace_finish(struct net
 		goto free_unlock;
 
 	if (repl->num_counters && repl->num_counters != t->private->nentries) {
-		BUGPRINT("Wrong nr. of counters requested\n");
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto free_unlock;
 	}

@@ -1118,15 +1083,12 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, c
 	if (copy_from_user(&tmp, user, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	if (len != sizeof(tmp) + tmp.entries_size) {
-		BUGPRINT("Wrong len argument\n");
+	if (len != sizeof(tmp) + tmp.entries_size)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
-	if (tmp.entries_size == 0) {
-		BUGPRINT("Entries_size never zero\n");
+	if (tmp.entries_size == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+
 	/* overflow check */
 	if (tmp.nentries >= ((INT_MAX - sizeof(struct ebt_table_info)) /
 			NR_CPUS - SMP_CACHE_BYTES) / sizeof(struct ebt_counter))

@@ -1153,7 +1115,6 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, c
 	}
 	if (copy_from_user(
 	   newinfo->entries, tmp.entries, tmp.entries_size) != 0) {
-		BUGPRINT("Couldn't copy entries from userspace\n");
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 		goto free_entries;
 	}

@@ -1194,10 +1155,8 @@ int ebt_register_table(struct net *net,
 
 	if (input_table == NULL || (repl = input_table->table) == NULL ||
 	    repl->entries == NULL || repl->entries_size == 0 ||
-	    repl->counters != NULL || input_table->private != NULL) {
-		BUGPRINT("Bad table data for ebt_register_table!!!\n");
+	    repl->counters != NULL || input_table->private != NULL)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	/* Don't add one table to multiple lists. */
 	table = kmemdup(input_table, sizeof(struct ebt_table), GFP_KERNEL);

@@ -1235,13 +1194,10 @@ int ebt_register_table(struct net *net,
 				((char *)repl->hook_entry[i] - repl->entries);
 	}
 	ret = translate_table(net, repl->name, newinfo);
-	if (ret != 0) {
-		BUGPRINT("Translate_table failed\n");
+	if (ret != 0)
 		goto free_chainstack;
-	}
 
 	if (table->check && table->check(newinfo, table->valid_hooks)) {
-		BUGPRINT("The table doesn't like its own initial data, lol\n");
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto free_chainstack;
 	}

@@ -1252,7 +1208,6 @@ int ebt_register_table(struct net *net,
 	list_for_each_entry(t, &net->xt.tables[NFPROTO_BRIDGE], list) {
 		if (strcmp(t->name, table->name) == 0) {
 			ret = -EEXIST;
-			BUGPRINT("Table name already exists\n");
 			goto free_unlock;
 		}
 	}

@@ -1320,7 +1275,6 @@ static int do_update_counters(struct net
 		goto free_tmp;
 
 	if (num_counters != t->private->nentries) {
-		BUGPRINT("Wrong nr of counters\n");
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto unlock_mutex;
 	}

@@ -1447,10 +1401,8 @@ static int copy_counters_to_user(struct
 	if (num_counters == 0)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (num_counters != nentries) {
-		BUGPRINT("Num_counters wrong\n");
+	if (num_counters != nentries)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	counterstmp = vmalloc(array_size(nentries, sizeof(*counterstmp)));
 	if (!counterstmp)

@@ -1496,15 +1448,11 @@ static int copy_everything_to_user(struc
 	   (tmp.num_counters ? nentries * sizeof(struct ebt_counter) : 0))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (tmp.nentries != nentries) {
-		BUGPRINT("Nentries wrong\n");
+	if (tmp.nentries != nentries)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
-	if (tmp.entries_size != entries_size) {
-		BUGPRINT("Wrong size\n");
+	if (tmp.entries_size != entries_size)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	ret = copy_counters_to_user(t, oldcounters, tmp.counters,
 					tmp.num_counters, nentries);

@@ -1576,7 +1524,6 @@ static int do_ebt_get_ctl(struct sock *s
 		}
 		mutex_unlock(&ebt_mutex);
 		if (copy_to_user(user, &tmp, *len) != 0) {
-			BUGPRINT("c2u Didn't work\n");
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 			break;
 		}

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dongli Zhang <[email protected]>

commit f7c8a4120eedf24c36090b7542b179ff7a649219 upstream.

Commit 758a58d0bc67 ("loop: set GENHD_FL_NO_PART_SCAN after blkdev_reread_part()") separates "lo->lo_backing_file = NULL" and "lo->lo_state = Lo_unbound" into different critical regions protected by loop_ctl_mutex.

However, there is below race that the NULL lo->lo_backing_file would be accessed when the backend of a loop is another loop device, e.g., loop0's backend is a file, while loop1's backend is loop0.

loop0's backend is file loop1's backend is loop0

__loop_clr_fd()
mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
lo->lo_backing_file = NULL; --> set to NULL

  mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
                                   loop_set_fd()
                                     mutex_lock_killable(&loop_ctl_mutex);
                                     loop_validate_file()
                                       f = l->lo_backing_file; --> NULL
                                         access if loop0 is not Lo_unbound

mutex_lock(&loop_ctl_mutex);
lo->lo_state = Lo_unbound;
mutex_unlock(&loop_ctl_mutex);

lo->lo_backing_file should be accessed only when the loop device is Lo_bound.

In fact, the problem has been introduced already in commit 7ccd0791d985 ("loop: Push loop_ctl_mutex down into loop_clr_fd()") after which loop_validate_file() could see devices in Lo_rundown state with which it did not count. It was harmless at that point but still.

---
 drivers/block/loop.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ static int loop_validate_file(struct fil
 			return -EBADF;
 
 		l = f->f_mapping->host->i_bdev->bd_disk->private_data;
-		if (l->lo_state == Lo_unbound) {
+		if (l->lo_state != Lo_bound) {
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
 		f = l->lo_backing_file;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>

commit f4f34e1b82eb4219d8eaa1c7e2e17ca219a6a2b5 upstream.

When the frame unwinder is invoked for an oops caused by a call to NULL, it currently skips the parent function because BP still points to the parent's stack frame; the (nonexistent) current function only has the first half of a stack frame, and BP doesn't point to it yet.

Add a special case for IP==0 that calculates a fake BP from SP, then uses the real BP for the next frame.

Note that this handles first_frame specially: Return information about the parent function as long as the saved IP is >=first_frame, even if the fake BP points below it.

With an artificially-added NULL call in prctl_set_seccomp(), before this patch, the trace is:

Call Trace:
 ? prctl_set_seccomp+0x3a/0x50
 __x64_sys_prctl+0x457/0x6f0
 ? __ia32_sys_prctl+0x750/0x750
 do_syscall_64+0x72/0x160
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

After this patch, the trace is:

Call Trace:
 prctl_set_seccomp+0x3a/0x50
 __x64_sys_prctl+0x457/0x6f0
 ? __ia32_sys_prctl+0x750/0x750
 do_syscall_64+0x72/0x160
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h  |    6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c |   25 ++++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ struct unwind_state {
 #elif defined(CONFIG_UNWINDER_FRAME_POINTER)
 	bool got_irq;
 	unsigned long *bp, *orig_sp, ip;
+	/*
+	 * If non-NULL: The current frame is incomplete and doesn't contain a
+	 * valid BP. When looking for the next frame, use this instead of the
+	 * non-existent saved BP.
+	 */
+	unsigned long *next_bp;
 	struct pt_regs *regs;
 #else
 	unsigned long *sp;

@@ -320,10 +320,14 @@ bool unwind_next_frame(struct unwind_sta
 	}
 
 	/* Get the next frame pointer: */
-	if (state->regs)
+	if (state->next_bp) {
+		next_bp = state->next_bp;
+		state->next_bp = NULL;
+	} else if (state->regs) {
 		next_bp = (unsigned long *)state->regs->bp;
-	else
+	} else {
 		next_bp = (unsigned long *)READ_ONCE_TASK_STACK(state->task, *state->bp);
+	}
 
 	/* Move to the next frame if it's safe: */
 	if (!update_stack_state(state, next_bp))

@@ -398,6 +402,21 @@ void __unwind_start(struct unwind_state
 
 	bp = get_frame_pointer(task, regs);
 
+	/*
+	 * If we crash with IP==0, the last successfully executed instruction
+	 * was probably an indirect function call with a NULL function pointer.
+	 * That means that SP points into the middle of an incomplete frame:
+	 * *SP is a return pointer, and *(SP-sizeof(unsigned long)) is where we
+	 * would have written a frame pointer if we hadn't crashed.
+	 * Pretend that the frame is complete and that BP points to it, but save
+	 * the real BP so that we can use it when looking for the next frame.
+	 */
+	if (regs && regs->ip == 0 &&
+	    (unsigned long *)kernel_stack_pointer(regs) >= first_frame) {
+		state->next_bp = bp;
+		bp = ((unsigned long *)kernel_stack_pointer(regs)) - 1;
+	}
+
 	/* Initialize stack info and make sure the frame data is accessible: */
 	get_stack_info(bp, state->task, &state->stack_info,
 		       &state->stack_mask);

@@ -410,7 +429,7 @@ void __unwind_start(struct unwind_state
 	 */
 	while (!unwind_done(state) &&
 	       (!on_stack(&state->stack_info, first_frame, sizeof(long)) ||
-			state->bp < first_frame))
+			(state->next_bp == NULL && state->bp < first_frame)))
 		unwind_next_frame(state);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__unwind_start);

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jann Horn <[email protected]>

commit ac5ceccce5501e43d217c596e4ee859f2a3fef79 upstream.

When the ORC unwinder is invoked for an oops caused by IP==0, it currently has no idea what to do because there is no debug information for the stack frame of NULL.

But if RIP is NULL, it is very likely that the last successfully executed instruction was an indirect CALL/JMP, and it is possible to unwind out in the same way as for the first instruction of a normal function. Hardcode a corresponding ORC entry.

With an artificially-added NULL call in prctl_set_seccomp(), before this patch, the trace is:

Call Trace:
 ? __x64_sys_prctl+0x402/0x680
 ? __ia32_sys_prctl+0x6e0/0x6e0
 ? __do_page_fault+0x457/0x620
 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x160
 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

After this patch, the trace looks like this:

Call Trace:
 __x64_sys_prctl+0x402/0x680
 ? __ia32_sys_prctl+0x6e0/0x6e0
 ? __do_page_fault+0x457/0x620
 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x160
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

prctl_set_seccomp() still doesn't show up in the trace because for some reason, tail call optimization is only disabled in builds that use the frame pointer unwinder.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)

@@ -113,6 +113,20 @@ static struct orc_entry *orc_ftrace_find
 }
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * If we crash with IP==0, the last successfully executed instruction
+ * was probably an indirect function call with a NULL function pointer,
+ * and we don't have unwind information for NULL.
+ * This hardcoded ORC entry for IP==0 allows us to unwind from a NULL function
+ * pointer into its parent and then continue normally from there.
+ */
+static struct orc_entry null_orc_entry = {
+	.sp_offset = sizeof(long),
+	.sp_reg = ORC_REG_SP,
+	.bp_reg = ORC_REG_UNDEFINED,
+	.type = ORC_TYPE_CALL
+};
+
 static struct orc_entry *orc_find(unsigned long ip)
 {
 	static struct orc_entry *orc;

@@ -120,6 +134,9 @@ static struct orc_entry *orc_find(unsign
 	if (!orc_init)
 		return NULL;
 
+	if (ip == 0)
+		return &null_orc_entry;
+
 	/* For non-init vmlinux addresses, use the fast lookup table: */
 	if (ip >= LOOKUP_START_IP && ip < LOOKUP_STOP_IP) {
 		unsigned int idx, start, stop;

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Waiman Long <[email protected]>

commit 71492580571467fb7177aade19c18ce7486267f5 upstream.

Tetsuo Handa had reported he saw an incorrect "downgrading a read lock" warning right after a previous lockdep warning. It is likely that the previous warning turned off lock debugging causing the lockdep to have inconsistency states leading to the lock downgrade warning.

Fix that by add a check for debug_locks at the beginning of __lock_downgrade().

---
 kernel/locking/lockdep.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

@@ -3567,6 +3567,9 @@ __lock_set_class(struct lockdep_map *loc
 	unsigned int depth;
 	int i;
 
+	if (unlikely(!debug_locks))
+		return 0;
+
 	depth = curr->lockdep_depth;
 	/*
 	 * This function is about (re)setting the class of a held lock,

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>

commit 2e25644e8da4ed3a27e7b8315aaae74660be72dc upstream.

Syzbot with KMSAN reports (excerpt):

==================================================================

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_policy mm/mempolicy.c:353 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in mpol_rebind_mm+0x249/0x370 mm/mempolicy.c:384
CPU: 1 PID: 17420 Comm: syz-executor4 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #15
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
  dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
  kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613
  __msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:295
  mpol_rebind_policy mm/mempolicy.c:353 [inline]
  mpol_rebind_mm+0x249/0x370 mm/mempolicy.c:384
  update_tasks_nodemask+0x608/0xca0 kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1120
  update_nodemasks_hier kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1185 [inline]
  update_nodemask kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1253 [inline]
  cpuset_write_resmask+0x2a98/0x34b0 kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1728

...

Uninit was created at:

  kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline]
  kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:158
  kmsan_kmalloc+0xa6/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:176
  kmem_cache_alloc+0x572/0xb90 mm/slub.c:2777
  mpol_new mm/mempolicy.c:276 [inline]
  do_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1180 [inline]
  kernel_mbind+0x8a7/0x31a0 mm/mempolicy.c:1347
  __do_sys_mbind mm/mempolicy.c:1354 [inline]

As it's difficult to report where exactly the uninit value resides in the mempolicy object, we have to guess a bit. mm/mempolicy.c:353 contains this part of mpol_rebind_policy():

        if (!mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol) &&
            nodes_equal(pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed, *newmask))

"mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol)" is testing pol->flags, which I couldn't ever see being uninitialized after leaving mpol_new(). So I'll guess it's actually about accessing pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed on line 354, but still part of statement starting on line 353.

For w.cpuset_mems_allowed to be not initialized, and the nodes_equal() reachable for a mempolicy where mpol_set_nodemask() is called in do_mbind(), it seems the only possibility is a MPOL_PREFERRED policy with empty set of nodes, i.e. MPOL_LOCAL equivalent, with MPOL_F_LOCAL flag. Let's exclude such policies from the nodes_equal() check. Note the uninit access should be benign anyway, as rebinding this kind of policy is always a no-op. Therefore no actual need for stable inclusion.

---
 mm/mempolicy.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ static void mpol_rebind_policy(struct me
 {
 	if (!pol)
 		return;
-	if (!mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol) &&
+	if (!mpol_store_user_nodemask(pol) && !(pol->flags & MPOL_F_LOCAL) &&
 	    nodes_equal(pol->w.cpuset_mems_allowed, *newmask))
 		return;
 

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

commit 98081ca62cbac31fb0f7efaf90b2e7384ce22257 upstream.

Currently we deal with single codec and suspend codec callbacks for all S3, S4 and runtime PM handling. But it turned out that we want distinguish the call patterns sometimes, e.g. for applying some init sequence only at probing and restoring from hibernate.

This patch slightly modifies the common PM callbacks for HD-audio codec and stores the currently processed PM event in power_state of the codec's device.power field, which is currently unused. The codec callback can take a look at this event value and judges which purpose it's being called.

---
 sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c |   43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -2909,6 +2909,7 @@ static void hda_call_codec_resume(struct
 		hda_jackpoll_work(&codec->jackpoll_work.work);
 	else
 		snd_hda_jack_report_sync(codec);
+	codec->core.dev.power.power_state = PMSG_ON;
 	snd_hdac_leave_pm(&codec->core);
 }
 

@@ -2942,10 +2943,48 @@ static int hda_codec_runtime_resume(stru
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_PM */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP
+static int hda_codec_pm_suspend(struct device *dev)
+{
+	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_SUSPEND;
+	return pm_runtime_force_suspend(dev);
+}
+
+static int hda_codec_pm_resume(struct device *dev)
+{
+	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_RESUME;
+	return pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+}
+
+static int hda_codec_pm_freeze(struct device *dev)
+{
+	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_FREEZE;
+	return pm_runtime_force_suspend(dev);
+}
+
+static int hda_codec_pm_thaw(struct device *dev)
+{
+	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_THAW;
+	return pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+}
+
+static int hda_codec_pm_restore(struct device *dev)
+{
+	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_RESTORE;
+	return pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_PM_SLEEP */
+
 /* referred in hda_bind.c */
 const struct dev_pm_ops hda_codec_driver_pm = {
-	SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(pm_runtime_force_suspend,
-				pm_runtime_force_resume)
+#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP
+	.suspend = hda_codec_pm_suspend,
+	.resume = hda_codec_pm_resume,
+	.freeze = hda_codec_pm_freeze,
+	.thaw = hda_codec_pm_thaw,
+	.poweroff = hda_codec_pm_suspend,
+	.restore = hda_codec_pm_restore,
+#endif /* CONFIG_PM_SLEEP */
 	SET_RUNTIME_PM_OPS(hda_codec_runtime_suspend, hda_codec_runtime_resume,
 			   NULL)
 };

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hui Wang <[email protected]>

commit b5a236c175b0d984552a5f7c9d35141024c2b261 upstream.

Recently we found the audio jack detection stop working after suspend on many machines with Realtek codec. Sometimes the audio selection dialogue didn't show up after users plugged headhphone/headset into the headset jack, sometimes after uses plugged headphone/headset, then click the sound icon on the upper-right corner of gnome-desktop, it also showed the speaker rather than the headphone.

The root cause is that before suspend, the codec already call the runtime_suspend since this codec is not used by any apps, then in resume, it will not call runtime_resume for this codec. But for some realtek codec (so far, alc236, alc255 and alc891) with the specific BIOS, if it doesn't run runtime_resume after suspend, all codec functions including jack detection stop working anymore.

This problem existed for a long time, but it was not exposed, that is because when problem happens, if users play sound or open sound-setting to check audio device, this will trigger calling to runtime_resume (via snd_hda_power_up), then the codec starts working again before users notice this problem.

Since we don't know how many codec and BIOS combinations have this problem, to fix it, let the driver call runtime_resume for all codecs in pm_resume, maybe for some codecs, this is not needed, but it is harmless. After a codec is runtime resumed, if it is not used by any apps, it will be runtime suspended soon and furthermore we don't run suspend frequently, this change will not add much power consumption.

---
 sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c |   20 +++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

@@ -2944,6 +2944,20 @@ static int hda_codec_runtime_resume(stru
 #endif /* CONFIG_PM */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP
+static int hda_codec_force_resume(struct device *dev)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/* The get/put pair below enforces the runtime resume even if the
+	 * device hasn't been used at suspend time.  This trick is needed to
+	 * update the jack state change during the sleep.
+	 */
+	pm_runtime_get_noresume(dev);
+	ret = pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+	pm_runtime_put(dev);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int hda_codec_pm_suspend(struct device *dev)
 {
 	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_SUSPEND;

@@ -2953,7 +2967,7 @@ static int hda_codec_pm_suspend(struct d
 static int hda_codec_pm_resume(struct device *dev)
 {
 	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_RESUME;
-	return pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+	return hda_codec_force_resume(dev);
 }
 
 static int hda_codec_pm_freeze(struct device *dev)

@@ -2965,13 +2979,13 @@ static int hda_codec_pm_freeze(struct de
 static int hda_codec_pm_thaw(struct device *dev)
 {
 	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_THAW;
-	return pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+	return hda_codec_force_resume(dev);
 }
 
 static int hda_codec_pm_restore(struct device *dev)
 {
 	dev->power.power_state = PMSG_RESTORE;
-	return pm_runtime_force_resume(dev);
+	return hda_codec_force_resume(dev);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_PM_SLEEP */
 

4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Baolin Wang <[email protected]>

commit f25a646fbe2051527ad9721853e892d13a99199e upstream.

Fix incorrect return value.

---
 drivers/power/supply/charger-manager.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1212,7 +1212,6 @@ static int charger_extcon_init(struct ch
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		pr_info("Cannot register extcon_dev for %s(cable: %s)\n",
 			cable->extcon_name, cable->name);
-		ret = -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	return ret;

@@ -1633,7 +1632,7 @@ static int charger_manager_probe(struct
 
 	if (IS_ERR(desc)) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "No platform data (desc) found\n");
-		return -ENODEV;
+		return PTR_ERR(desc);
 	}
 
 	cm = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(*cm), GFP_KERNEL);

All tests are passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v4.19:

    11 builds:	11 pass, 0 fail
    22 boots:	22 pass, 0 fail
    28 tests:	28 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 4.19.32-rc1-g91ed293
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,

                tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra20-ventana,
                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04

Cheers
Jon

nvpublic

Build results:

	total: 156 pass: 156 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 345 pass: 345 fail: 0

Guenter

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 4.19.32-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.19.y
git commit: 91ed293142f4947a4c5c2af1fc80aa91b3782642
git describe: v4.19.31-46-g91ed293142f4
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.19-oe/build/v4.19.31-46-g91ed293142f4

No regressions (compared to build v4.19.31)

No fixes (compared to build v4.19.31)

Ran 23114 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64

Test Suites
-----------
* boot
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-timers-tests
* perf
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none

Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org