keys: safe concurrent user->{session,uid}_keyring access
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 keys: safe concurrent user->{session,uid}_keyring access
The current code can perform concurrent updates and reads on user->session_keyring and user->uid_keyring. Add a comment to struct user_struct to document the nontrivial locking semantics, and use READ_ONCE() for unlocked readers and smp_store_release() for writers to prevent memory ordering issues.
--- include/linux/sched/user.h | 7 +++++++ security/keys/process_keys.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++-------------- security/keys/request_key.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
include/linux/sched/user.h +7 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,13 @@ struct user_struct {atomic_long_t pipe_bufs;/* how many pages are allocated in pipe buffers */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +/* +* These pointers can only change from NULL to a non-NULL value once. +* Writes are protected by key_user_keyring_mutex. +* Unlocked readers should use READ_ONCE() unless they know that +* install_user_keyrings() has been called successfully (which sets +* these members to non-NULL values, preventing further modifications). +*/ struct key *uid_keyring;/* UID specific keyring */ struct key *session_keyring;/* UID's default session keyring */ #endif
security/keys/process_keys.c +17 -14
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void)kenter ("%p{%u}" , user, uid); -if (user->uid_keyring && user->session_keyring) { +if (READ_ONCE (user->uid_keyring) &&READ_ONCE (user->session_keyring)) {kleave (" = 0 [exist]" );return 0 ; }
@@ -111,8 +111,10 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void) }/* install the keyrings */ - user->uid_keyring = uid_keyring; - user->session_keyring = session_keyring; +/* paired with READ_ONCE() */ +smp_store_release (&user->uid_keyring, uid_keyring); +/* paired with READ_ONCE() */ +smp_store_release (&user->session_keyring, session_keyring); }mutex_unlock (&key_user_keyring_mutex);
@@ -340,6 +342,7 @@ void key_fsgid_changed(struct task_struct *tsk)key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings (struct keyring_search_context *ctx) {key_ref_t key_ref, ret, err; +const struct cred *cred = ctx->cred;/* we want to return -EAGAIN or -ENOKEY if any of the keyrings were * searchable, but we failed to find a key or we found a negative key;
@@ -353,9 +356,9 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx) err =ERR_PTR (-EAGAIN );/* search the thread keyring first */ -if (ctx->cred->thread_keyring) { +if (cred->thread_keyring) { key_ref =keyring_search_aux ( -make_key_ref (ctx->cred->thread_keyring,1 ), ctx); +make_key_ref (cred->thread_keyring,1 ), ctx);if (!IS_ERR (key_ref)) goto found;
@@ -371,9 +374,9 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx) }/* search the process keyring second */ -if (ctx->cred->process_keyring) { +if (cred->process_keyring) { key_ref =keyring_search_aux ( -make_key_ref (ctx->cred->process_keyring,1 ), ctx); +make_key_ref (cred->process_keyring,1 ), ctx);if (!IS_ERR (key_ref)) goto found;
@@ -392,9 +395,9 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx) }/* search the session keyring */ -if (ctx->cred->session_keyring) { +if (cred->session_keyring) { key_ref =keyring_search_aux ( -make_key_ref (ctx->cred->session_keyring,1 ), ctx); +make_key_ref (cred->session_keyring,1 ), ctx);if (!IS_ERR (key_ref)) goto found;
@@ -413,9 +416,9 @@ key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx) } }/* or search the user-session keyring */ -else if (ctx->cred->user->session_keyring) { +else if (READ_ONCE (cred->user->session_keyring)) { key_ref =keyring_search_aux ( -make_key_ref (ctx->cred->user->session_keyring,1 ), +make_key_ref (READ_ONCE (cred->user->session_keyring),1 ), ctx);if (!IS_ERR (key_ref)) goto found;
@@ -602,7 +605,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags, goto error; goto reget_creds; }else if (ctx.cred->session_keyring = - ctx.cred->user->session_keyring && +READ_ONCE (ctx.cred->user->session_keyring) && lflags &KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE ) { ret =join_session_keyring (NULL );if (ret <0 )
@@ -616,7 +619,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,break ;case KEY_SPEC_USER_KEYRING : -if (!ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring) { +if (!READ_ONCE (ctx.cred->user->uid_keyring)) { ret =install_user_keyrings ();if (ret <0 ) goto error;
@@ -628,7 +631,7 @@ key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long lflags,break ;case KEY_SPEC_USER_SESSION_KEYRING : -if (!ctx.cred->user->session_keyring) { +if (!READ_ONCE (ctx.cred->user->session_keyring)) { ret =install_user_keyrings ();if (ret <0 ) goto error;
security/keys/request_key.c +2 -1
@@ -293,11 +293,12 @@ static int construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)/* fall through */ case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING : dest_keyring -key_get (cred->user->session_keyring); +key_get (READ_ONCE (cred->user->session_keyring));break ;case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING : - dest_keyring =key_get (cred->user->uid_keyring); + dest_keyring +key_get (READ_ONCE (cred->user->uid_keyring));break ;case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING :
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog
James Morris
maintainerQuoted 8 lines · Jann Horn
The current code can perform concurrent updates and reads on
user->session_keyringanduser->uid_keyring. Add a comment to structuser_structto document the nontrivial locking semantics, and useREAD_ONCE()for unlocked readers andsmp_store_release()for writers to prevent memory ordering issues.Fixes 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")Signed-off-by Jann Horn <[email protected]>
Applied togit://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git next-general
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>