inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 1/1 inet: switch IP ID generator to siphash
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent net_hash_mix() fix (netns: provide pure entropy for net_hash_mix()) having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.
It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reported-by Amit Klein <[email protected]>
Reported-by Benny Pinkas <[email protected]>
--- include/linux/siphash.h | 5 +++++ include/net/netns/ipv4.h | 2 ++ net/ipv4/route.c | 12 +++++++----- net/ipv6/output_core.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++-------------- 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
include/linux/siphash.h +5 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,11 @@ typedef struct {u64 key[2 ]; } siphash_key_t; +static inline bool siphash_key_is_zero (const siphash_key_t *key) +{ +return !(key->key[0 ] | key->key[1 ]); +} +u64 __siphash_aligned (const void *data,size_t len,const siphash_key_t *key);#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS u64 __siphash_unaligned (const void *data,size_t len,const siphash_key_t *key);
include/net/netns/ipv4.h +2 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <linux/uidgid.h> #include <net/inet_frag.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> +#include <linux/siphash.h> struct tcpm_hash_bucket ;struct ctl_table_header ;
@@ -217,5 +218,6 @@ struct netns_ipv4 {unsigned int ipmr_seq;/* protected by rtnl_mutex */ atomic_t rt_genid; + siphash_key_t ip_id_key; };#endif
net/ipv4/route.c +7 -5
@@ -500,15 +500,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ip_idents_reserve);void __ip_select_ident (struct net *net,struct iphdr *iph,int segs) { -static u32 ip_idents_hashrnd__read_mostly ;u32 hash, id; -net_get_random_once (&ip_idents_hashrnd,sizeof (ip_idents_hashrnd)); +/* Note the following code is not safe, but this is okay. */ +if (unlikely (siphash_key_is_zero (&net->ipv4.ip_id_key))) +get_random_bytes (&net->ipv4.ip_id_key, +sizeof (net->ipv4.ip_id_key)); - hash =jhash_3words ((__force u32 )iph->daddr, + hash =siphash_3u32 ((__force u32 )iph->daddr, (__force u32 )iph->saddr, - iph->protocol ^net_hash_mix (net), - ip_idents_hashrnd); + iph->protocol, + &net->ipv4.ip_id_key); id =ip_idents_reserve (hash, segs); iph->id =htons (id); }
net/ipv6/output_core.c +16 -14
@@ -10,15 +10,25 @@#include <net/secure_seq.h> #include <linux/netfilter.h> -static u32 __ipv6_select_ident (struct net *net,u32 hashrnd, +static u32 __ipv6_select_ident (struct net *net,const struct in6_addr *dst,const struct in6_addr *src) { +const struct { +struct in6_addr dst; +struct in6_addr src; + }__aligned(SIPHASH_ALIGNMENT) combined = { + .dst = *dst, + .src = *src, + };u32 hash, id; - hash =__ipv6_addr_jhash (dst, hashrnd); - hash =__ipv6_addr_jhash (src, hash); - hash ^=net_hash_mix (net); +/* Note the following code is not safe, but this is okay. */ +if (unlikely (siphash_key_is_zero (&net->ipv4.ip_id_key))) +get_random_bytes (&net->ipv4.ip_id_key, +sizeof (net->ipv4.ip_id_key)); + + hash =siphash (&combined,sizeof (combined), &net->ipv4.ip_id_key);/* Treat id of 0 as unset and if we get 0 back from ip_idents_reserve, * set the hight order instead thus minimizing possible future
@@ -41,7 +51,6 @@ static u32 __ipv6_select_ident(struct net *net, u32 hashrnd,*/ __be32 ipv6_proxy_select_ident (struct net *net,struct sk_buff *skb) { -static u32 ip6_proxy_idents_hashrnd__read_mostly ;struct in6_addr buf[2 ];struct in6_addr *addrs;u32 id;
@@ -53,11 +62,7 @@ __be32 ipv6_proxy_select_ident(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb)if (!addrs)return 0 ; -net_get_random_once (&ip6_proxy_idents_hashrnd, -sizeof (ip6_proxy_idents_hashrnd)); - - id =__ipv6_select_ident (net, ip6_proxy_idents_hashrnd, - &addrs[1 ], &addrs[0 ]); + id =__ipv6_select_ident (net, &addrs[1 ], &addrs[0 ]);return htonl (id); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (ipv6_proxy_select_ident);
@@ -66,12 +71,9 @@ __be32 ipv6_select_ident(struct net *net,const struct in6_addr *daddr, const struct in6_addr *saddr) { - static u32 ip6_idents_hashrnd __read_mostly; u32 id; -net_get_random_once (&ip6_idents_hashrnd,sizeof (ip6_idents_hashrnd)); - - id =__ipv6_select_ident (net, ip6_idents_hashrnd, daddr, saddr); + id =__ipv6_select_ident (net, daddr, saddr);return htonl (id); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (ipv6_select_ident);
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2019 12:40:33 -0700
Quoted 11 lines
According to Amit Klein and Benny Pinkas, IP ID generation is too weak and might be used by attackers.
Even with recent
net_hash_mix()fix (netns: provide pure entropy fornet_hash_mix()) having 64bit key and Jenkins hash is risky.It is time to switch to siphash and its 128bit keys.
Signed-off-by Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>Reported-by Amit Klein <[email protected]>Reported-by Benny Pinkas <[email protected]>
Applied to net-next.