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fs/common.mk: disable real chown calls in fakeroot

PATCH New Peter Korsgaard 1 participant 2 messages Apr 3, 2019 – Apr 6, 2019 VFS

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PATCH 1/1 fs/common.mk: disable real chown calls in fakeroot

fakeroot by default forwards {f,l,}chown calls to libc and ignores permission issues, which may cause issues when building in restricted environments like user namespaces as set up with bubblewrap where a chown call with a uid/gid not mapped in the user namespace instead returns EINVAL. This error is not masked by fakeroot and returned to the caller, causing failures.

There is no real reason to really perform the *chown calls in the context of Buildroot (as the calls will likely just fail and files are not accessed outside the fakeroot environment any way).

This forwarding can be disabled by setting the FAKEROOTDONTTRYCHOWN environment variable, so set it when fakeroot is executed.

---
 fs/common.mk | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/common.mk +1 -1
index daa43efd75..4ad51fdd0a 100644
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ $$(BINARIES_DIR)/$$(ROOTFS_$(2)_FINAL_IMAGE_NAME): $$(ROOTFS_$(2)_DEPENDENCIES)
 	$$(call PRINTF,$$(ROOTFS_REPRODUCIBLE)) >> $$(FAKEROOT_SCRIPT)
 	$$(call PRINTF,$$(ROOTFS_$(2)_CMD)) >> $$(FAKEROOT_SCRIPT)
 	chmod a+x $$(FAKEROOT_SCRIPT)
-	PATH=$$(BR_PATH) $$(HOST_DIR)/bin/fakeroot -- $$(FAKEROOT_SCRIPT)
+	PATH=$$(BR_PATH) FAKEROOTDONTTRYCHOWN=1 $$(HOST_DIR)/bin/fakeroot -- $$(FAKEROOT_SCRIPT)
 	$(Q)rm -rf $$(TARGET_DIR)
 ifneq ($$(ROOTFS_$(2)_COMPRESS_CMD),)
 	PATH=$$(BR_PATH) $$(ROOTFS_$(2)_COMPRESS_CMD) $$@ > $$@$$(ROOTFS_$(2)_COMPRESS_EXT)
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 fs/common.mk: disable real chown calls in fakeroot

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"Peter" == Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]> writes:

fakeroot by default forwards {f,l,}chown calls to libc and ignores permission issues, which may cause issues when building in restricted environments like user namespaces as set up with bubblewrap where a chown call with a uid/gid not mapped in the user namespace instead returns EINVAL. This error is not masked by fakeroot and returned to the caller, causing failures.

There is no real reason to really perform the *chown calls in the context of Buildroot (as the calls will likely just fail and files are not accessed outside the fakeroot environment any way).

Quoted 5 lines

This forwarding can be disabled by setting the FAKEROOTDONTTRYCHOWN environment variable, so set it when fakeroot is executed.

Committed, thanks.

Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard