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Label /sys/kernel/ns_last_pid as sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t

PATCH In review Lukas Vrabec 2 participants 3 messages Apr 8, 2019 – Apr 10, 2019

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 Label /sys/kernel/ns_last_pid as sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t

CRIU can influence the PID of the threads it wants to create. CRIU uses /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pidto tell the kernel which PID it wants for the next clone().
So it has to write to that file. This feels like a problematic as it opens up the container writing to all sysctl_kernel_t.

Using new label container_t will just write to sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t instad writing to more generic sysctl_kernel_t files.

---
 policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te |  7 ++++
 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+)
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if +60 -0
index 1ad282aa..3f0a2dbe 100644
@@ -2150,6 +2150,66 @@ interface(`kernel_mounton_kernel_sysctl_files',`
 	allow $1 sysctl_kernel_t:file { getattr mounton };
 ')
 
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	Read kernel ns lastpid sysctls.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+## <rolecap/>
+#
+interface(`kernel_read_kernel_ns_lastpid_sysctls',`
+	gen_require(`
+		type proc_t, sysctl_t, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t;
+	')
+
+	read_files_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t)
+
+	list_dirs_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	Do not audit attempts to write kernel ns lastpid sysctls.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain to not audit.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`kernel_dontaudit_write_kernel_ns_lastpid_sysctl',`
+	gen_require(`
+		type sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t;
+	')
+
+	dontaudit $1 sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t:file write;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	Read and write kernel ns lastpid sysctls.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+## <rolecap/>
+#
+interface(`kernel_rw_kernel_ns_lastpid_sysctl',`
+	gen_require(`
+		type proc_t, sysctl_t, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t;
+	')
+
+	rw_files_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t)
+
+	list_dirs_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t)
+')
+
 ########################################
 ## <summary>
 ##	Search filesystem sysctl directories.
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te +7 -0
index 8e958074..f5ec1c22 100644
@@ -132,6 +132,11 @@ genfscon proc /sys/fs gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t,s0)
 type sysctl_kernel_t, sysctl_type;
 genfscon proc /sys/kernel gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t,s0)
 
+# /sys/kernel/ns_last_pid file
+type sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t, sysctl_type;
+fs_associate(sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t)
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/ns_last_pid gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t,s0)
+
 # /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe file
 type sysctl_modprobe_t, sysctl_type;
 genfscon proc /sys/kernel/modprobe gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_modprobe_t,s0)
@@ -232,6 +237,8 @@ allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir list_dir_perms;
 allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:file read_file_perms;
 allow kernel_t sysctl_t:dir list_dir_perms;
 
+allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t:file read_file_perms;
+
 # Other possible mount points for the root fs are in files
 allow kernel_t unlabeled_t:dir mounton;
 # Kernel-generated traffic e.g., TCP resets on
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 90 lines · Lukas Vrabec

CRIU can influence the PID of the threads it wants to create. CRIU uses /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pidto tell the kernel which PID it wants for the next clone().
So it has to write to that file. This feels like a problematic as it opens up the container writing to all sysctl_kernel_t.

Using new label container_t will just write to sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t instad writing to more generic sysctl_kernel_t files.

---
  policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te |  7 ++++
  2 files changed, 67 insertions(+)
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if +60 -0
index 1ad282aa..3f0a2dbe 100644
@@ -2150,6 +2150,66 @@ interface(`kernel_mounton_kernel_sysctl_files',`
  	allow $1 sysctl_kernel_t:file { getattr mounton };
  ')
 
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	Read kernel ns lastpid sysctls.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+## <rolecap/>
+#
+interface(`kernel_read_kernel_ns_lastpid_sysctls',`
+	gen_require(`
+		type proc_t, sysctl_t, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t;
+	')
+
+	read_files_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t)
+
+	list_dirs_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t)
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	Do not audit attempts to write kernel ns lastpid sysctls.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain to not audit.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`kernel_dontaudit_write_kernel_ns_lastpid_sysctl',`
+	gen_require(`
+		type sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t;
+	')
+
+	dontaudit $1 sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t:file write;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##	Read and write kernel ns lastpid sysctls.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##	<summary>
+##	Domain allowed access.
+##	</summary>
+## </param>
+## <rolecap/>
+#
+interface(`kernel_rw_kernel_ns_lastpid_sysctl',`
+	gen_require(`
+		type proc_t, sysctl_t, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t;
+	')
+
+	rw_files_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t)
+
+	list_dirs_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t)
+')
+
  ########################################
  ## <summary>
  ##	Search filesystem sysctl directories.
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te +0 -0
index 8e958074..f5ec1c22 100644

policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te genfscon proc /sys/fs gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t,s0) · line 137

Quoted 6 lines
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te +3 -0
@@ -132,6 +132,11 @@ genfscon proc /sys/fs gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t,s0)
  type sysctl_kernel_t, sysctl_type;
  genfscon proc /sys/kernel gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t,s0)
 
+# /sys/kernel/ns_last_pid file
+type sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t, sysctl_type;
+fs_associate(sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t)

Is this associate really necessary? It's not used for any other sysctls.

Quoted 15 lines
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te +4 -0
+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/ns_last_pid gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t,s0)
+
  # /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe file
  type sysctl_modprobe_t, sysctl_type;
  genfscon proc /sys/kernel/modprobe gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_modprobe_t,s0)
@@ -232,6 +237,8 @@ allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir list_dir_perms;
  allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:file read_file_perms;
  allow kernel_t sysctl_t:dir list_dir_perms;
 
+allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t:file read_file_perms;
+
  # Other possible mount points for the root fs are in files
  allow kernel_t unlabeled_t:dir mounton;
  # Kernel-generated traffic e.g., TCP resets on
Signature · 1 line
Chris PeBenito
#2 lore raw
Quoted 97 lines · Chris PeBenito
Quoted 96 lines · Lukas Vrabec

CRIU can influence the PID of the threads it wants to create. CRIU uses /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pidto tell the kernel which PID it wants for the next clone().
So it has to write to that file. This feels like a problematic as it opens up the container writing to all sysctl_kernel_t.

Using new label container_t will just write to sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t instad writing to more generic sysctl_kernel_t files.
---
  policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te |  7 ++++

  2 files changed, 67 insertions(+)
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if +0 -0
index 1ad282aa..3f0a2dbe 100644
@@ -2150,6 +2150,66 @@ interface(`kernel_mounton_kernel_sysctl_files',`
       allow $1 sysctl_kernel_t:file { getattr mounton };
   ')

  +########################################

policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if +16 -0
+## <summary>
+##    Read kernel ns lastpid sysctls.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##    <summary>
+##    Domain allowed access.
+##    </summary>
+## </param>
+## <rolecap/>
+#
+interface(`kernel_read_kernel_ns_lastpid_sysctls',`
+    gen_require(`
+        type proc_t, sysctl_t, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t;
+    ')
+
+    read_files_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t

sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t) +
+    list_dirs_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t)
+')

policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if +36 -0
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##    Do not audit attempts to write kernel ns lastpid sysctls.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##    <summary>
+##    Domain to not audit.
+##    </summary>
+## </param>
+#
+interface(`kernel_dontaudit_write_kernel_ns_lastpid_sysctl',`
+    gen_require(`
+        type sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t;
+    ')
+
+    dontaudit $1 sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t:file write;
+')
+
+########################################
+## <summary>
+##    Read and write kernel ns lastpid sysctls.
+## </summary>
+## <param name="domain">
+##    <summary>
+##    Domain allowed access.
+##    </summary>
+## </param>
+## <rolecap/>
+#
+interface(`kernel_rw_kernel_ns_lastpid_sysctl',`
+    gen_require(`
+        type proc_t, sysctl_t, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t;
+    ')
+
+    rw_files_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t

sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t) +
+    list_dirs_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t)
+')
+
  ########################################
  ## <summary>
  ##    Search filesystem sysctl directories.

policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te +0 -0
index 8e958074..f5ec1c22 100644
@@ -132,6 +132,11 @@ genfscon proc /sys/fs
 gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t,s0)
Quoted 9 lines

policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te genfscon proc /sys/fs gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t,s0) · line 137

Quoted 6 lines
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te +0 -0
   type sysctl_kernel_t, sysctl_type;

  genfscon proc /sys/kernel
gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t,s0)
  +# /sys/kernel/ns_last_pid file

policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te +2 -0
+type sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t, sysctl_type;
+fs_associate(sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t)

Is this associate really necessary?  It's not used for any other sysctls.

You're right, it's not really needed.

Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 16 lines

+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/ns_last_pid gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t,s0) +

  # /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe file
  type sysctl_modprobe_t, sysctl_type;
  genfscon proc /sys/kernel/modprobe
gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_modprobe_t,s0)
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te +1 -0
@@ -232,6 +237,8 @@ allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir list_dir_perms;
   allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:file read_file_perms;
   allow kernel_t sysctl_t:dir list_dir_perms;
   +allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t:file read_file_perms;
+
   # Other possible mount points for the root fs are in files
   allow kernel_t unlabeled_t:dir mounton;
   # Kernel-generated traffic e.g., TCP resets on
Signature · 3 lines
Lukas Vrabec
Senior Software Engineer, Security Technologies
Red Hat, Inc.