Label /sys/kernel/ns_last_pid as sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t
PATCH 1/1 Label /sys/kernel/ns_last_pid as sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t
CRIU can influence the PID of the threads it wants to create. CRIU uses /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pidto tell the kernel which PID it wants for the next clone().
So it has to write to that file. This feels like a problematic as it opens up the container writing to all sysctl_kernel_t.
Using new label container_t will just write to sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t instad writing to more generic sysctl_kernel_t files.
--- policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te | 7 ++++ 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+)
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if +60 -0
@@ -2150,6 +2150,66 @@ interface(`kernel_mounton_kernel_sysctl_files',` allow $1 sysctl_kernel_t:file { getattr mounton }; ') +######################################## +## <summary> +## Read kernel ns lastpid sysctls. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +## <rolecap/> +# +interface(`kernel_read_kernel_ns_lastpid_sysctls',` + gen_require(` + type proc_t, sysctl_t, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t; + ') + + read_files_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t) + + list_dirs_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t) +') + +######################################## +## <summary> +## Do not audit attempts to write kernel ns lastpid sysctls. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain to not audit. +## </summary> +## </param> +# +interface(`kernel_dontaudit_write_kernel_ns_lastpid_sysctl',` + gen_require(` + type sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t:file write; +') + +######################################## +## <summary> +## Read and write kernel ns lastpid sysctls. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +## <rolecap/> +# +interface(`kernel_rw_kernel_ns_lastpid_sysctl',` + gen_require(` + type proc_t, sysctl_t, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t; + ') + + rw_files_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t) + + list_dirs_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t) +') + ######################################## ## <summary> ## Search filesystem sysctl directories.
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te +7 -0
@@ -132,6 +132,11 @@ genfscon proc /sys/fs gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t,s0) type sysctl_kernel_t, sysctl_type; genfscon proc /sys/kernel gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t,s0) +# /sys/kernel/ns_last_pid file +type sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t, sysctl_type; +fs_associate(sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t) +genfscon proc /sys/kernel/ns_last_pid gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t,s0) + # /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe file type sysctl_modprobe_t, sysctl_type; genfscon proc /sys/kernel/modprobe gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_modprobe_t,s0)
@@ -232,6 +237,8 @@ allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:file read_file_perms; allow kernel_t sysctl_t:dir list_dir_perms; +allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t:file read_file_perms; + # Other possible mount points for the root fs are in files allow kernel_t unlabeled_t:dir mounton; # Kernel-generated traffic e.g., TCP resets on
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Quoted 90 lines · Lukas Vrabec
CRIU can influence the PID of the threads it wants to create. CRIU uses
/proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pidtotell the kernel which PID it wants for the nextclone().
So it has to write to that file. This feels like a problematic as it opens up the container writing to allsysctl_kernel_t.Using new label
container_twill just write tosysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_tinstad writing to more genericsysctl_kernel_tfiles.--- policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te | 7 ++++ 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+)policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if +60
-0@@ -2150,6 +2150,66 @@ interface(`kernel_mounton_kernel_sysctl_files',` allow $1 sysctl_kernel_t:file { getattr mounton }; ') +######################################## +## <summary> +## Read kernel ns lastpid sysctls. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +## <rolecap/> +# +interface(`kernel_read_kernel_ns_lastpid_sysctls',` + gen_require(` + type proc_t, sysctl_t, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t; + ') + + read_files_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t) + + list_dirs_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t) +') + +######################################## +## <summary> +## Do not audit attempts to write kernel ns lastpid sysctls. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain to not audit. +## </summary> +## </param> +# +interface(`kernel_dontaudit_write_kernel_ns_lastpid_sysctl',` + gen_require(` + type sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t:file write; +') + +######################################## +## <summary> +## Read and write kernel ns lastpid sysctls. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +## <rolecap/> +# +interface(`kernel_rw_kernel_ns_lastpid_sysctl',` + gen_require(` + type proc_t, sysctl_t, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t; + ') + + rw_files_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t) + + list_dirs_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t) +') + ######################################## ## <summary> ## Search filesystem sysctl directories.policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te +0
-0
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te genfscon proc /sys/fs gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t,s0) · line 137
Quoted 6 lines
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te +3
-0@@ -132,6 +132,11 @@ genfscon proc /sys/fs gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t,s0) type sysctl_kernel_t, sysctl_type; genfscon proc /sys/kernel gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t,s0) +# /sys/kernel/ns_last_pid file +type sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t, sysctl_type; +fs_associate(sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t)
Is this associate really necessary? It's not used for any other sysctls.
Quoted 15 lines
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te +4
-0+genfscon proc /sys/kernel/ns_last_pid gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t,s0) + # /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe file type sysctl_modprobe_t, sysctl_type; genfscon proc /sys/kernel/modprobe gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_modprobe_t,s0)@@ -232,6 +237,8 @@ allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:file read_file_perms; allow kernel_t sysctl_t:dir list_dir_perms; +allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t:file read_file_perms; + # Other possible mount points for the root fs are in files allow kernel_t unlabeled_t:dir mounton; # Kernel-generated traffic e.g., TCP resets on
Signature · 1 line
Chris PeBenito
Quoted 97 lines · Chris PeBenito
Quoted 96 lines · Lukas Vrabec
CRIU can influence the PID of the threads it wants to create. CRIU uses
/proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pidtotell the kernel which PID it wants for the nextclone().
So it has to write to that file. This feels like a problematic as it opens up the container writing to allsysctl_kernel_t.Using new label
container_twill just write tosysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_tinstad writing to more genericsysctl_kernel_tfiles.
---
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te | 7 ++++2 files changed, 67 insertions(+)policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if +0
-0@@ -2150,6 +2150,66 @@ interface(`kernel_mounton_kernel_sysctl_files',` allow $1 sysctl_kernel_t:file { getattr mounton }; ')+########################################
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if +16
-0+## <summary> +## Read kernel ns lastpid sysctls. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +## <rolecap/> +# +interface(`kernel_read_kernel_ns_lastpid_sysctls',` + gen_require(` + type proc_t, sysctl_t, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t; + ') + + read_files_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t
sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t},sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t) +
+list_dirs_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t)
+')policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if +36
-0+ +######################################## +## <summary> +## Do not audit attempts to write kernel ns lastpid sysctls. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain to not audit. +## </summary> +## </param> +# +interface(`kernel_dontaudit_write_kernel_ns_lastpid_sysctl',` + gen_require(` + type sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t:file write; +') + +######################################## +## <summary> +## Read and write kernel ns lastpid sysctls. +## </summary> +## <param name="domain"> +## <summary> +## Domain allowed access. +## </summary> +## </param> +## <rolecap/> +# +interface(`kernel_rw_kernel_ns_lastpid_sysctl',` + gen_require(` + type proc_t, sysctl_t, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t; + ') + + rw_files_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t
sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t},sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t) +
+list_dirs_pattern($1, { proc_t sysctl_t }, sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t)
+')
+
########################################
## <summary>
## Search filesystem sysctl directories.policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te +0
-0@@ -132,6 +132,11 @@ genfscon proc /sys/fs gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t,s0)
Quoted 9 lines
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te genfscon proc /sys/fs gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t,s0) · line 137
Quoted 6 lines
policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te +0
-0type sysctl_kernel_t, sysctl_type;genfscon proc
/sys/kernelgen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t,s0)
+#/sys/kernel/ns_last_pidfilepolicy/modules/kernel/kernel.te +2
-0+type sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t, sysctl_type; +fs_associate(sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t)Is this associate really necessary? It's not used for any other sysctls.
You're right, it's not really needed.
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 16 lines
+genfscon proc
/sys/kernel/ns_last_pidgen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t,s0)+# /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe file type sysctl_modprobe_t, sysctl_type; genfscon proc /sys/kernel/modprobe gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_modprobe_t,s0)policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te +1
-0@@ -232,6 +237,8 @@ allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:file read_file_perms; allow kernel_t sysctl_t:dir list_dir_perms; +allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_ns_last_pid_t:file read_file_perms; + # Other possible mount points for the root fs are in files allow kernel_t unlabeled_t:dir mounton; # Kernel-generated traffic e.g., TCP resets on
Signature · 3 lines
Lukas Vrabec Senior Software Engineer, Security Technologies Red Hat, Inc.